Gargan v Kippin Investments Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gargan v Kippin Investments Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1718

Constitution s 80

Australia Act 1986 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 7, 27, 86, 116, 153B, 178, 179
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 13
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B
Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16, O 20 r 5
Common Law Procedure Act 1899 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 14
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)
Habeus Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car 1, c 10
Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw 1
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) 999 UNTS 171

Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 referred to

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Gargan (2004) 140 FCR 1 applied

Daemar v Industrial Commission (NSW) (1988) 12 NSWLR 45 cited

Gargan v Scott (unreported, NSWSC, 27 October 2003) referred to

Gye v McIntyre (1991) 171 CLR 609 considered

Heinrich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2001] FCA 661 considered

Heinrich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2003] FCAFC 315 applied

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 referred to

Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 172 referred to
Re Gargan; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (unreported, FCA, Kiefel J, 23 August 1996) referred to
Samootin v Wagner [2008] FCA 1066 referred to

PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN v KIPPIN INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD. and OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

NSD 932 of 2008

PERRAM J

29 OCTOBER 2008

SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 932 of 2008

BETWEEN:

PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
Applicant

AND:

KIPPIN INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD.
First Respondent

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 OCTOBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Judgment be entered in favour of the first and second respondents pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis.

3.Leave is granted to the parties to approach his Honour’s Associate for a date for directions in relation to the cross-claim.

4.The parties have liberty to apply on three days’ notice.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 932 of 2008

BETWEEN:

PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
Applicant

AND:

KIPPIN INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD.
First Respondent

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

29 OCTOBER 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. There are before the Court two notices of motion and an interim application. The first notice of motion is brought by the second respondent and was filed on…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Gargan v Kippin Investments Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1718
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Gargan v Kippin Investments Pty Ltd involved an application for summary judgment brought by the respondents against the applicant, Mr Gargan. The application was pursuant to section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which allows the court to grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. The court had to determine whether the applications met the criteria for summary judgment under section 31A and whether there was merit in Mr Gargan's argument that section 31A was constitutionally invalid.

The court found that the applications were devoid of merit, and therefore, the respondents had no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. The court also rejected Mr Gargan's argument that section 31A was constitutionally invalid. The court held that the argument was completely devoid of merit and did not amount to a constitutional matter within the meaning of section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The court concluded that there must be judgment for the respondents under section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

The court ordered that judgment be entered in favour of the respondents and that Mr Gargan pay the respondents' costs on an indemnity basis. The court also granted leave to the parties to approach its Associate for a date for directions in relation to the cross-claim. The parties were given liberty to apply on three days’ notice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be entered in favour of the first and second respondents pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis.

3. Leave is granted to the parties to approach his Honour’s Associate for a date for directions in relation to the cross-claim.

4. The parties have liberty to apply on three days’ notice.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is then necessary to say a little bit about the nature of the applications which are currently before the court. The first is an application pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Section 31A of that Act provides: Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section. It has been said that s 31A lowers the bar in terms of summary judgment applications. The operation of s 31A was considered by Rares J in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720. I do not think it necessary to enter into the interesting questions of what the particular standard imposed by the new version of s 31A might be. This is because whatever the bar is, the current applications pass well beneath it. That is, I find that they are, despite their creativity, devoid of merit. It follows, in my opinion, that there should be orders under s 31A. That makes it unnecessary for me to consider the operation of Order 20 rule 5 or to consider the operation of Order 11 rule 16 in so far as the statement of claim is concerned. Mr Gargan argued that s 31A was constitutionally invalid. Normally s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) would impose upon this Court an obligation not to proceed to deal with Mr Gargan’s constitutional argument without adjourning the proceeding in order to allow the various Attorneys-General for the States and of the Commonwealth a chance to intervene. However, s 78B operates on constitutional matters. I do not think that a constitutional argument which is completely devoid of merit amounts to a constitutional matter within the meaning of those provisions. To make good that point, it is necessary to take account of what the argument is. The argument is that s 31A operates to “dictate” to the Federal Court what the outcome of the case is. There may well have been an issue if s 31A had commanded the Court to dismiss a proceeding which had any of the qualities described in s 31A(1)(a) or (b). However, the plain text of s 31A is that the Court “may” give judgment. There is simply no room to argue whatever that s 31A operates as a dictation. Accordingly I reject that argument. The necessary consequence is that there must, on both notices of motion, be judgment for the first and second respondents under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.