Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Gargan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Gargan [2004] FCA 707

BANKRUPTCY – sequestration order – whether sufficient cause to show that sequestration order should not be made – whether person challenging petition has a genuine and serious claim and has been unable to litigate that claim – whether fraud or miscarriage of justice established in earlier proceedings – genuine and serious claim not demonstrated – fraud and miscarriage of justice not proved – sufficient cause not shown – sequestration order made

PROCEDURE – qui tam actions – validity of action in current Australian law – statutory prerequisites for existence of action – statutory prerequisites not demonstrated – existence of action at best speculative

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g), 41, 52(1), 52(2)(a), 52(2)(b)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4B, 4G, 4J, 43
Criminal Code 1995 s 134.2
Director of Public Prosecution Act 1983 (Cth) s 9
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 69, 79
Fines Act 1996 (NSW) s 122

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E

Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) s 8(1)
22 and 23 Car II c 22 (Fines and Forfeitures to the Crown) (1670-1671)
4 Henry VII c 20 (Penal Actions) (1488-1489)
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 386 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Bradlaugh v Clarke (1883) 8 App Cas 354 cited
Ex parte Pearce (1844) 1 Legge 189 cited
Fleming q. t. v Bailey (1804) 5 East 313 considered
Gargan v Scott (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Adams J, 27 October 2003) referred to
Gargan v Woodgate [2004] NSWSC 177 referred to
Hawkesbury City Council v Foster (1997) 97 LGERA 12 referred to
Jamison and Brookmans v R (1993) 177 CLR 574 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 cited
Morriset Mega-Market Pty Ltd v Gargan [2003] NSWCA 1199 cited
Orpen v Haymarket Capital Ltd (1931) 145 LT 614 considered
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 77 ALJR 699 cited
Tranton v Aster (1917) 33 TLR 383 considered

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA v PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN (IN THE MATTER OF PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN)
N 7369 OF 2003

HELY J
4 JUNE 2004
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7369 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
ACN 123 123 124
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
(IN THE MATTER OF PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN)
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JUNE 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        A sequestration order be made against the estate of Peter Alexander Gargan.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7369 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
ACN 123 123 124
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER ALEXANDER GARGAN
(IN THE MATTER…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Gargan was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The central dispute involved claims by the respondent, Peter Alexander Gargan, against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) for penalties allegedly incurred due to the bank's procurement of sequestration orders against two individuals, Mr Heinrich and Ms Teese, without considering mutual dealings between them as required by section 86 of the relevant Act. Gargan sought penalties from the CBA under section 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) through a statutory demand. The primary legal issues the court needed to address were whether Gargan had a legitimate basis to claim penalties from the CBA, and if his actions constituted an abuse of process.

The court examined whether section 86 of the Act had any application before bankruptcy, concluding that it did not. It further found that if Heinrich or Teese had valid counter-claims against the CBA, they could have been presented in the relevant bankruptcy proceedings or by applying to set aside the bankruptcy notice. Since none of these actions occurred, the court dismissed Gargan’s claims. It held that Gargan did not establish that Heinrich and Teese had valid counter-claims exceeding the CBA's claims, nor did he prove fraud by the CBA. Consequently, Gargan had not demonstrated a genuine and serious claim to receive any penalties from the CBA, leading the court to conclude that his proceedings were an abuse of process.

The court ultimately ruled that Gargan had no existing obligation to pay any sums to the CBA as penalties for the bankruptcy of Heinrich or Teese. Furthermore, it dismissed Gargan’s claims in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, stating they constituted an abuse of process. The court emphasised that Gargan’s entitlement to any share of potential penalties was speculative and hinged on the ordinary criminal process. The court also noted substantial doubts about Gargan’s ability to benefit from such a process. Consequently, Gargan's claims were dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. A sequestration order be made against the estate of Peter Alexander Gargan.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A sequestration order be made against the estate of Peter Alexander Gargan.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J
Finally, the respondent has not established a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that the CBA is guilty of the particularised crimes. The respondent’s claim has its genesis in an assertion that the CBA procured sequestration orders against the estates of Mr Heinrich and Ms Teese without an account first being taken of mutual dealings between them as required by s 86 of the Act. However, s 86 of the Act has no relevant application prior to bankruptcy. If Mr Heinrich or Ms Teese asserted a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand against the CBA it could have been set up in the proceedings in which the Bankruptcy Notices were issued against Mr Heinrich and Ms Teese. Alternatively, application could have been made by Mr Heinrich or Ms Teese to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice on a ground of a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand equal to or exceeding the sum specified in the Bankruptcy Notice which could not have been set up in the original proceedings. None of these events have occurred. Instead, the respondent asserts, but does not establish, that Mr Heinrich and Ms Teese had counter claims against the CBA which exceeded the CBA’s claim. The respondent also asserts, but does not establish, fraud on the part of the CBA in the procurement of sequestration orders against those persons.Decision The CBA is under no existing obligation to the respondent to pay the respondent any sums by way of penalty in relation to the bankruptcy of Mr Heinrich or Ms Teese. The respondent has not established that he has a genuine and serious claim to receive the penalties which he claims from the CBA and which were the subject of the statutory demand under s 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which the respondent issued against the CBA. To the extent to which the claim has been embodied in proceedings taken by the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales to date, the claim has been dismissed on the grounds that it constitutes an abuse of process. The respondent has misconceived his case and has proceeded on an assumption which the authorities referred to above confirm to be false; namely that he is entitled to commence proceedings against the CBA independently of the ordinary criminal process and obtain a moiety of the penalties to which he says the CBA is liable. The decisions of Adams J and Greg James J confirm that the respondent’s contentions in this respect are misconceived. If the respondent has any prospect of obtaining any share in any penalties which might be imposed on the CBA, should it ever be convicted of an indictable offence, it is only through the ordinary criminal process augmented, should the statute prove to be applicable, by s 122 of the Fines Act. However, as I have indicated there are substantial doubts as to whether and to what extent the respondent can either undertake or benefit from such a process. At best, such a claim is high speculative, and falls well short of demonstrating sufficient cause for dismissing the Creditor’s Petition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J