Garda Capital Limited v Herron Todd White (Sydney) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Garda Capital Limited v Herron Todd White (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 79

PARTIES:

GARDA CAPITAL LIMITED ACN 095 039 366 (FORMERLY NAMED “OPUS CAPITAL LIMITED”)

(Plaintiff)

v
HERRON TODD WHITE (SYDNEY) PTY LTD
ACN 089 112 416

(Defendant)

FILE NO:

SC No 12334 of 2013

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

23 April 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 April 2018

JUDGE:

Bowskill J

ORDER:

The application is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND –  PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – AMENDMENT – Whether amendments made to a defence, in circumstances where leave was not required, ought to be disallowed

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) rr 5, 378, 379

AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Hartnett v Hynes [2009] QSC 225

Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd v Sanrus Pty Ltd as trustee of the QC Trust & Ors [2014] QCA 267

COUNSEL:

J W Peden QC with M Byrnes for the plaintiff (applicant)

R P Jackson QC with M Jones for the defendant (respondent)

SOLICITORS:

Macpherson Kelley for the plaintiff (applicant)

Hall & Wilcox for the defendant (respondent)

  1. In December 2013 the plaintiff, now called Garda Capital Limited, in its capacity as the manager of and responsible entity for a public managed fund, the Opus Income and Capital Fund No. 21, commenced proceedings against the defendant, Herron Todd White (Sydney) Pty Ltd, valuers, claiming damages as a result of allegedly negligent valuations.

  2. There have been various iterations of the pleadings since then. A fairly significant amendment was made to the plaintiff’s statement of claim in January 2017, followed by another amendment in May 2017. Amended defences were filed in June and October 2017. On 2 March 2018 defendant filed a third further amended defence. The plaintiff applies under r 379 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 for an order that amendments introduced by the third further amended defence be disallowed.

  3. As no request for trial date had yet been filed in this matter, the defendant did not require leave to make the amendments to its defence (r 378). However, r 379 enables the plaintiff to apply to disallow the amendments. Under r 379(2), on the application, the court may make the order it considers appropriate.

  4. Both the entitlement of a party to amend pursuant to r 378, and the discretionary power of the court to disallow an amendment, are subject to the overriding purpose of the rules, set out in r 5 of the UCPR, to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense, in the interests of the parties, the court and other litigants.[1]  

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 79
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Garda Capital Limited versus Herron Todd White (Sydney) Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Garda Capital Limited, sought to challenge amendments made to the defendant’s defence without prior leave. The Supreme Court of Queensland was tasked with determining whether the amendments should be allowed to stand. The dispute centred on specific alterations made to the defence, particularly concerning allegations of misrepresentation and contributory negligence.

The legal issues before the court revolved around the appropriateness of the amendments to the defence, including whether they were clear, sufficiently particularised, and whether they complied with the requirements set out in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The plaintiff argued that certain phrases in the amended defence were unclear, lacked sufficient detail, and introduced illogical time frames. The court needed to assess whether these concerns were valid and whether the amendments should be disallowed.

The court found that while some parts of the amended defence were convoluted and could be re-pleaded more clearly, they did not fundamentally misstate the defendant’s position or prejudice the plaintiff’s case. The phrase “significant influence” was deemed clear and sufficiently particularised, and the time frames, although not perfectly aligned with the plaintiff’s expectations, did not render the allegations illogical. The court also noted that the cascading set of circumstances pleaded in one part of the defence could be re-pleaded for clarity. However, the overall amendments did not necessitate disallowance.

The application by the plaintiff to disallow the amendments was dismissed. The court ruled that while some parts of the amended defence could be improved for clarity, they did not justify disallowance. The amendments were allowed to stand, and the case proceeded with these changes incorporated.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In terms of the parts of the pleading emphasised in oral submissions, I note the following:1.In relation to [5C(c)], the plaintiff complains about the words “Mr Goakes and Mr Moody exerted significant influence over the investment decisions of the plaintiff”, in two respects: first, that the meaning is clear; second as to the scope of disclosure that it triggers. I have dealt with the second point above. As to the first, the defendant submits the words “significant influence” bear their natural and ordinary meaning, and that the allegation is sufficiently particularised. I accept that. The allegation is a specific one, with the position of influence said to be inferred from the particularised matters. It is not an allegation at large, so to speak. 2.In relation to [5C(f)], the plaintiff submits there is a structural problem, in relation to the matters set out below (iii) (articulating the matters from which it is to be inferred Mr Goakes, Mr Moody and Mr Kelly anticipated that the proposed data centre business would be profitable and would generate income), because it is not clear if they are material facts or particulars. The defendant says the matters pleaded below (iii) are pleaded to comply with r 150(2) of the UCPR, to plead facts from which a state of mind is to be inferred. It also says that it removed the heading “particulars” in response to a complaint from the plaintiff in the r 444 letter. Perhaps as a matter of form, those matters could bear their own (sub) paragraph number – but otherwise there does not seem to be a basis for complaint.3.In relation to [5C] generally, the plaintiff submits there is a temporal illogicality, given the opening words “at all material times to this proceeding”. It seems those words were added to the draft fourth amended defence, in response to a complaint by the plaintiff in its r 444 letter to the opening words “as at and prior to the date of the First Option Agreement”. The primary complaint of the plaintiff seems to be that material times to this proceeding extends up to 2012 when the property was sold – but it is illogical to consider the allegations in [5C] by reference to that time frame. It seems to me that is the answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. However, it would not be difficult for the defendant to be more specific about the time frame focussed on in [5C].4.In relation to [7A(e)], the plaintiff complains about the form of this sub-paragraph, which pleads a cascading set of (three) circumstances. This is a somewhat convoluted part of the pleading, which I accept would be difficult, from a pleading perspective, to respond to. It would be fair to require the defendant to re-plead this in a more straightforward way.5.In relation to [44.3], the plaintiff suggested there was some confusion about the words which have been added to the end, and which part of [44] they relate to. On my reading of that paragraph, I regard it as clear that the words “each of those matters in the circumstances pleaded at paragraphs 5C to 5H and 7A above” relate only to [44.3] and, further, that the allegation of contributory negligence at [44.3] remains at it was previously pleaded, an allegation of acting in a manner inconsistent with best practice, in the three respects identified. The addition of the cross-reference to the new paragraphs [5C] to [5H] and [7A] is a pleading that that occurred in a particular factual context. Counsel for the defendant confirmed this.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established