IN THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE Appeal No. SA11 of 2004
File No. ADF2373 of 2002
IN THE MATTER OF: G
Appellant/Wife
AND: G
Respondent/Husband
CORAM: KAY, WARNICK, O’RYAN JJ
DATE OF HEARING: 23 JUNE 2004
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22 DECEMBER 2004
JUDGMENTOF THE COURT
Appearances: Ms Pyke of Counsel instructed by John G McGinn, Solicitors, Level 4, 22 Grenfell Street, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000 appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Mr Berman of Counsel instructed by Howe Martin & Associates, Solicitors, Level 20, 74 Pirie Street, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000 appeared for the Respondent
Name of Appeal
G and G
Appeal Number
SA11 of 2004
Date of Appeal Hearing
23 June 2004
Date of Judgment
22 December 2004
Coram
Kay, Warnick and O’Ryan JJ
Catchwords: PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Marriage spanned 30 years - Trial Judge determined that a 60/40 division in the husband’s favour was appropriate – APPEALS – Majority decision – Essentially the appeal was a challenge to the weight that the trial Judge gave or failed to give to particular factors, it being asserted that his decision fell outside “the reasonably generous ambit of discretion” – APPEALS – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – The trial Judge identified a number of imbalances in financial contributions including what was introduced by each party at the outset of cohabitation -–Adjustment to husband represented virtually a full “re-imbursement” to the husband of what he introduced (other than superannuation and long leave) – The trial Judge was careful in identifying all the non-financial contributions of each party – Once the trial Judge reached an assessment his Honour “stood back” and considered the justice and equity of the result – His Honour took each and every step the law asked of him – Full Court (Warnick and O’Ryan JJ – Kay J dissenting) – While a 20% differential between the parties is at the edge of the ambit, it cannot be said to be manifestly excessive (Warnick J) – In all the circumstances of this case the outcome was within “the generous ambit” of discretion (O’Ryan J) – Appeal dismissed
Appeal Dismissed. Appellant Wife to pay the Respondent Husband’s costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed, and in default of agreement, as taxed.
KAY J:
In this matter I have had the opportunity to read the proposed reasons for judgment of Warnick J. I am in general agreement with all of the matters canvassed by Warnick J up to and including paragraph 99 of his Honour's reasons for judgment. Unlike his Honour, however, I am of the view that the assessment by the trial Judge of the contributions of the parties that evaluated the husband’s contributions as being one and a half times greater than the wife’s (6/10ths v 4/10ths) was manifestly outside the generous range of discretion afforded to the trial Judge.
This is a marriage that spanned 30 years. The wife was the primary caregiver…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
G & G [2004] FamCA 1179
Case
[2004] FamCA 1179
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The judgment concerns an appeal from a discretionary decision. The court, comprising Kay, Warnick, and O’Ryan JJ, revisited established principles governing appeals from such judgments, emphasising the broad discretion afforded to trial courts and the caution appellate courts must exercise.
The central legal issue was the standard of review applicable to an appeal from a discretionary judgment. The court considered when an appellate body is entitled to interfere with a decision made by a primary judge exercising their discretion.
The court affirmed that appellate courts should be slow to overturn a primary judge's discretionary decision, particularly when the grounds for appeal involve conflicting assessments of matters of weight. The reasoning stressed that a discretionary judgment is only appealable if it exceeds the "generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible" and is "plainly wrong." This caution is particularly relevant in cases involving the Family Court, given the intensely personal nature of property division and child welfare decisions, where differing conclusions can be reached by different decision-makers with integrity upon the same material.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
The statements of principle applicable to appeals from discretionary judgments are familiar. Revisiting those statements, one is struck by the regularity with which the width of discretion of the trial court and the caution that the appeal court should exercise, are stressed. This is demonstrated by adding emphasis within some of the often quoted statements of principle. In Bellenden (formerly Satterthwaite v Satterthwaite) (1948) 1 All,ER 343 at 345, Asquith LJ stated the rationale of an appellate court’s approach:“…We are here concerned with a judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable. It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere.” (emphasis added) In Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; (1986) FLC 91‑712 at 75,178 Brennan J stated:“The “generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible” is wide indeed when there are a number of factors to be taken into account and the comparative weight to be attributed to those factors is not clearly indicated by uniform standards and values of the community. The generous ambit of reasonable disagreement marks the area of immunity from appellate interference.” (emphasis added) Kitto J in Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v. The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627 said:“…there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is clearly wrong.” In Gronow & Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 520, Stephen J said:“…an appellate court should be slow to overturn a primary judge’s discretionary decision on grounds which only involve conflicting assessments of matters of weight.” Finally, in CDJ & VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 231, touching upon the features applicable to the exercise of discretion in the Family Court, Kirby J said:“1. …The reference to ‘plainly wrong” is designed to remind the appellate court of the need to approach an appeal with much caution in a case where an error of principle cannot be clearly identified.2. Such reasons for appellate restraint…have particular relevance to appeals within, and from, the Family Court of Australia. This is because of the functions and purposes of that Court and the difficulty and evaluative decisions which it often has to make. The peculiar nature of decisions relating to the intensely personal questions of the division of the property of parties to a failed marriage and the welfare of their children makes it essential that those who decide appeals respect the onerous responsibilities of those whose decisions they review. They need to recognise that it is of the very nature of such decisions, including those relating to the residence of children, that any two decision-makers may, with complete integrity and upon the same material, often come to differing conclusions.” (emphasis added)