Fullgrabe & Fullgrabe
[2015] FCWA 9
•21 JANUARY 2015
JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: FULLGRABE and FULLGRABE [2015] FCWA 9
CORAM: WALTERS J
HEARD: 14,17,18 & 19 NOVEMBER 2014
DELIVERED : 21 JANUARY 2015
FILE NO/S: PTW 5532 of 2013
BETWEEN: MR FULLGRABE
Applicant
AND
MRS FULLGRABE
Respondent
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – RELOCATION – Where parties reside in Coastal Town A – Where wife wishes to relocate to live in Perth with the two younger children – Where there is a 10 year age difference between the oldest child and the two younger children – Where the oldest child wishes to remain living in Coastal Town A with the father – Where the parties agree that the eldest child should be permitted to determine with whom he resides and the time he is to spend with the other parent – Potential separation of siblings – Where it is in the best interests of the younger children to remain living with the wife – Where the legitimate interests and desires of the wife, as the younger children's primary caregiver, are relevant to the children's best interests – Where it is professionally and financially advantageous for the wife to live in Perth – Where the husband asserts that he is unable to relocate to Perth – Where the Court is of the opinion that there is no reason why the husband could not relocate to Perth when the oldest child completes his secondary education – Whether the husband can have a meaningful relationship with the younger children if relocation is permitted – Relocation permitted
FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – modest asset pool – consideration of parties' contributions – consideration of s 75(2) factors
Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1), s 60B, s 60CA, s 60CC, s 64B, s 61D, s 61DA, s 65DAA, s 65DAC, s 65DAE, s 75(2), s 79(2), s 79(4)
Category: Not Reportable
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Ms Auburn
Respondent: Ms T Farmer
Solicitors:
Applicant: Robertson Hayles
Respondent: Bowen Buchbinder & Vilensky
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Adamson & Adamson [2014] FamCAFC 232, 43
AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 28
B & B [2006] FamCA 883, 31
Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116, 30
Bevan & Bevan [2014] FamCAFC 19, 30
Bolger & Headon [2014] FamCAFC 27, 80
Bonacci & Bonacci [2012] FamCAFC 15, 31
C & C (2005) FLC 93-220, 73
Carlson & Fluvium [2012] FamCA 32, 43
Champness & Hanson (2009) FamCAFC 96, 22
Chapman & Chapman [2014] FamCAFC 91, 30
Chemaisse & The Commission of Taxation & Ors (1990) FLC 92-133, 33
Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595, 81
Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53, 26
Cox & Pedrana (2013) FLC 93-537, 27
Daines & Daines (Costs) [2014] FamCAFC 170, 75
Dearman & Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549, 44
Deiter & Dieter [2011] FamCAFC 82, 30
Dekker & Dekker [2014] FCWA 61, 30
Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154, 80
Dow-Sainter & Dow-Sainter (1980) FLC 90-890, 81
Eades & Wrensted [2014] FCWA 15, 27
Erdem & Ozsoy [2012] FMCAfam 1323, 30
Farnell & Farnell (1996) FLC 92-681, 75
Fielding & Nichol [2014] FCWA 77, 30
G & G [2004] FamCA 1179, 80
Godfrey & Sanders [2007] FamCA 102, 24
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286, 20
Hamish & Brighton [2014] FamCAFC 242, 25
Harrington & Harrington (2007) FLC 93-317, 74
Hart & Hart [2013] FCWA 110, 75
Hayton & Bendle (2010) 43 Fam LR 602, 74
Heath & Heath [2012] FamCA 844, 28
Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143, 31
Hungerford & Tank [2007] FamCA 637, 26
Jets & Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473, 20
Jurchenko & Foster [2014] FamCAFC 127, 19
Kennon v Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757, 78
M & S (2007) FLC 93-313, 26
Mabry & Neilson [2013] FCCA 478, 27
Marsden & Winch (No 3) [2007] FamCA 1364, 23
Mazorski & Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518, 23
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405, 23
McLay & McLay (1996) FLC 92-667, 24
McMahon & McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606, 31
Mills & Watson (2008) 39 Fam LR 52, 20
Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375, 25
Morgan & Miles (2007) FLC 93-343, 29
MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461, 24
Mulvaney & Lane (2009) FLC 93-404, 23
NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204, 74
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 31
OSF & OJK (2004) FLC 93-191, 31
Plastow & Saville [2013] FCWA 105, 27
R & R [2009] FCWA 116, 14
Russell v Russell (1999) FLC 92-877, 31
S & S [2012] FCWA 120, 14
Sayer & Radcliffe [2012] 48 Fam LR 298, 26
Selkin & Artliff-Selkin [2013] FamCAFC 19, 28
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 87 ALJR 74, 30
Starr & Duggan [2009] FamCAFC 115, 26
Steinbrenner & Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193, 81
Taylor & Barker (2007) FLC 93-345, 25
U & U (2002) 211 CLR 238, 30
Waters & Jurek (1995) FLC 92-635, 81
WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL
JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN
CHANGED
Preamble
1This case is about two broad issues. The first comprises the parties' competing applications for property settlement. The second relates to the living arrangements for the two younger children of the parties' relationship, [Child A] and [Child B]. The boys are aged 6 and 4 respectively. Their older brother, [Child C], is 16. No orders of significance are sought in relation to Child C.
2The husband and the wife live in [Coastal Town A]. Child A and Child B live with the wife in rented accommodation. Child C lives with the husband in the former matrimonial home (which was purchased by the parties shortly before separation). The wife proposes that Child A and Child B remain living with her, but seeks that she be permitted to relocate with them from Coastal Town A to Perth. The husband does not seem to oppose the younger children continuing to live with the wife, but seeks orders restraining her from taking them to live in Perth. In practical terms, his case is that they should continue to live with the wife in Coastal Town A. He has a number of reasons for seeking such an outcome, including his desire for the boys to be able to continue to see and spend time with him and Child C, their (paternal) grandparents and others on a regular basis. He was not prepared to commit to move to Perth in the event of the Court concluding that it is in the best interests of Child A and Child B for the relocation to occur.
3It is not in dispute that Child C should be able to decide with whom he resides and what contact he should have with the other parent. As indicated above, Child C resides with the husband. It appears that it is his preference to remain there.
4The trial took place in November 2014. Ms Auburn appeared for the husband, and Ms Farmer appeared for the wife.
5Although both parenting and property issues were explored during the trial, Ms Auburn indicated in closing that the husband had instructed her not to make any detailed submissions in relation to property settlement. Ms Auburn said that the parties' contributions (in all their various guises) to what she accepted was a very modest asset pool should be regarded as being equal and that the Court should otherwise feel free to make such orders as it deems just and equitable.
6For much of the trial, the husband had proposed that Child A and Child B should live with him and the wife on an equal time, shared care basis. In closing, however, Ms Auburn said that she was "not going to press the issue for equal time or substantial and significant time, save to say that it can't happen under the mother's proposal and it won't be practicable". Indeed, at no time during her closing address did Ms Auburn present any submissions in support of such orders. The clear thrust of Ms Auburn's submissions on behalf of the husband was that the boys should continue to live with the wife in Coastal Town A and that they should continue to spend time with the husband, Child C and their grandparents in that place; in other words, that the wife should not be "permitted" to relocate to Perth with the boys. When addressing the Court in relation to the subject of "meaningful relationship", Ms Auburn said that, although the husband only sees Child A and Child B approximately once per week, he is "involved in their lives" on a daily basis. Similarly, she said that Child C only sees his younger brothers approximately once per week.
7It follows that Ms Auburn did not deal with subjects such as the practicality of a shared care arrangement or a substantial and significant time arrangement if the wife were to continue to live in Coastal Town A and it was not suggested that such arrangements would be in the best interests of Child A and Child B. To all intents and purposes, the husband conceded that the boys should live predominantly with the wife, whether in Coastal Town A or in Perth.
8As explained later in these Reasons, Ms Auburn also conceded in closing that the husband was a poor witness and an unsatisfactory litigant (in that he had failed to comply with his obligations to make full and frank disclosure and to present his trial material in a timely fashion).
9Ms Auburn's concessions regarding her client's attitude and behaviour, and her decision not to press the issues of equal time or substantial and significant time, were clearly sensible and justified, and reflected a mature and responsible approach to advocacy on her part. Having made the concessions, Ms Auburn argued forcefully that the husband's case in opposition to the wife's application to relocate remained a strong one and that it deserved to be considered on its merits. Put another way, Ms Auburn seemed to be suggesting that the husband should not be "punished" for his attitude and behaviour by the making of orders permitting the relocation. I agree. The Court has no interest in punishing one party or the other, or rewarding one party or the other for that matter. The parenting aspect of the case concerns Child A and Child B, whose best interests comprise the Court's paramount consideration. To punish or reward one party or the other by allowing or refusing the proposed relocation would amount to an abdication of the Court's obligation to make such orders as it considers are most likely to be in the boys' best interests. It would also amount to an obvious failure of the Court to apply the law.
Background
10In these Reasons, and unless otherwise indicated:
a)all statements of fact comprise findings of fact;
b)I have referred to the parties as the husband and the wife (and I mean them no disrespect by doing so), because it is less confusing than referring to them as the applicant and the respondent; and
c)I have not drawn a distinction between proceedings or events in the Magistrates Court, 150 Terrace Road, Perth and proceedings or events in the Family Court of Western Australia (given that the two Courts operate "in tandem" and exercise similar jurisdiction).
11Although the law now refers to a child "spending time" with a person with whom the child does not live, I shall use the obsolete term "contact" from time to time in these Reasons. I have elected to use the superseded term because it is both more convenient and less grammatically challenging to do so.
12The husband was born in [New South Wales] in 1968. It follows that he is now 46. He is a qualified [skydiver] but, because of injuries sustained in a serious accident which occurred while he was [skydiving], it is unlikely that he will return to that occupation. For most of the parties' relationship, the husband worked as a [taxi] driver, but he is currently unemployed.
13The husband's parents live in Coastal Town A. He has one surviving sibling, who lives with her spouse and children [interstate].
14The husband contracted Ross River virus in April 2013. He asserts that he continues to suffer from the illness.
15The wife was born and educated in [Queensland]. She is now 45, having been born in 1969. She is a [nurse]. She currently works on a casual basis with [Company P] in Coastal Town A. She also works part-time as a cleaner and at the local [takeaway].
16The wife's father lives in Queensland. Her mother died in 2000. The wife has two siblings, both of whom live in Queensland with their spouses and children. The wife's sister lost one of her children (the wife's nephew) to leukaemia a few years ago.
17The wife's relationship with her family is a close one.
18The parties met in 1994 and began living together (in Perth) later that year. They married in Queensland [in] 1999. They separated on a final basis in May 2013, but are not yet divorced.
19This was the wife's first marriage. It was the husband's second marriage.
20There are three children of the marriage: Child C, born [in] 1998 (now aged 16), Child A, born [in] 2008 (now aged 6) and Child B, born [in] 2010 (now aged 4). Neither party has children from previous relationships.
21At the time of separation, the parties were living in Coastal Town A.
22By the date of the trial (in November 2014), Child C was living with the husband in the former matrimonial home in Coastal Town A. Child A and Child B were living with the wife in rented accommodation, also in Coastal Town A. Neither party has repartnered.
23The relationship between the husband and the wife appears to have been characterised by a degree of instability. The couple moved relatively frequently in order to facilitate the husband's work commitments, and for other reasons.
24When the parties met in 1994, the husband was working as a taxi driver. The wife was working as a nurse.
25In approximately December 1996, the parties purchased a townhouse in [Suburb N]. They moved into the home shortly afterwards.
26In the early years of the relationship, and after Child C's birth [in] 1998, the husband worked as a taxi driver for a number of employers.
27In or around September or October 2000, the husband was offered a job (as a taxi driver) in Coastal Town A. The offer was received from the husband's father, who was the Operations Manager of [R Company Pty Ltd], a taxi company based in Coastal Town A.
28The wife's mother died in October 2000. After travelling (with Child C) to Queensland for a short time to be with her family, the wife returned to Perth and arranged to sell the townhouse in Suburb N.
29The husband relocated to Coastal Town A in or about November 2000. The wife followed (with Child C) in or about February 2001.
30The wife obtained employment in Coastal Town A on a part-time basis. She worked for Company P Coastal Town A on two days per week.
31In late 2002, the husband's brother passed away, leaving $60,000 to him and $10,000 to Child C. The husband, who desired a career change, used the $60,000 to undertake a course of study to become a skydiver. In order to do the skydiving course, he was required to move from Coastal Town A to [Melbourne, Victoria], which he did in or about early 2003. In effect, he lived and studied at the skydiving school. It took the husband seven months to obtain his skydiving licence.
32The wife travelled to Queensland in December 2002, taking Child C with her. Her nephew was diagnosed with leukaemia shortly afterwards. The wife wished to support her sister. As a result, she remained in Queensland and moved (with Child C) into a rental unit nearby. Her nephew died in March 2003. The wife and Child C lived in Queensland for approximately six or eight months. Child C commenced school there.
33For his part, the husband continued to live in Melbourne and studied and trained for his skydiving licence.
34The wife said in evidence that the parties were separated from 8 April 2003 to 24 February 2004. Irrespective of the period of separation, it seems that the parties reconciled after the husband travelled to Queensland. The wife was in receipt of Government benefits while the parties were separated.
35Following the reconciliation, the wife (and Child C) joined the husband in Melbourne while he completed his course. Child C attended a local school and the wife worked as a nurse at a local [hospital] for a short time.
36The wife was then offered a job in Perth which enabled her to work during school hours. The parties acknowledged that they were only in Melbourne temporarily and, as a result, the wife took the job. She and Child C then travelled to Perth; the husband remained in Melbourne.
37The wife said in evidence that the parties separated again on 21 April 2004 and that they remained separated until 9 April 2005. She said that she received Government benefits during this period.
38The husband joined the wife in Perth later in 2004. Shortly afterwards, the husband was offered a job in [Coastal Town W], New South Wales, [teaching skydiving]. The husband, the wife and Child C then relocated to Coastal Town W – but it was only regarded as a temporary move. The husband had taken the job, which was unpaid or poorly paid, for the purpose of accumulating skydiving hours. The husband later worked in a similar capacity teaching skydiving [in Queensland].
39To supplement the family's income, the husband obtained employment as a taxi driver. It appears that he drove taxis during the week and taught skydiving on the weekends, doing his best to build up his skydiving hours. According to the wife, the husband was not paid for his skydiving activities.
40The wife also worked to supplement the family's income. She obtained relief work in a local hospital.
41In or about May 2006, the husband obtained a job in [County Town M], Queensland, teaching skydiving. The husband travelled there almost immediately; the wife and Child C remained in [Coastal Town T].
42The wife and Child C joined the husband in July 2006, and soon afterwards began part-time work in a local hospital. She worked five hours per day.
43As both parties had stable, paid employment in County Town M, they resolved to remain there and commenced building a house – into which they later moved.
44In April 2007, the husband sustained severe injuries when the [plane] he was [travelling in while skydiving] hit power lines. He fractured his back in a number of places and was unable to work for approximately 18 months. He received workers compensation payments throughout that time. He eventually received a lump sum payout totalling $34,134.75.
45The wife continued to work until the day before Child A's birth [in] 2008. She then took maternity leave for approximately five months, returning to her job in August 2008. Once again, she worked five hours per day. The husband's condition had improved in the meantime.
46In late 2008, the husband's father offered him a job as a taxi driver in Coastal Town A, working night shift. The wife was also offered a job at Company P in Coastal Town A. Thus, the family moved to Coastal Town A in November 2008. They lived with the husband's parents.
47The husband commenced employment as a taxi driver in or about December 2008. He worked night shift. The wife commenced work as a nurse, on a part‑time basis, at about the same time. She worked on weekdays from noon to 4.30 pm. She continued to work on that basis until shortly before Child B's birth [in] 2010.
48The husband looked after Child A in the afternoons while the wife was working. He also looked after Child C after he got home from school.
49An ugly incident occurred in or about March 2009 following an argument between the parties stemming from the wife's discovery that the husband had been in contact with sex workers. The argument expanded and "became physical" (to use the wife's description). The wife, who had been drinking, struck the husband. He retaliated, pushing her to the ground. Although the details of the incident are less than clear, it is apparent that Child A (who was then a very young child) was present, as was the husband's father. During the altercation, the husband gave Child A to his father to hold and the wife attempted to remove the child from him. As she approached her father-in-law, he kicked her away with his feet. The kick resulted in the wife suffering bruising on her left breast.
50Remarkably, the husband made the wife apologise to his father for (presumably) assaulting his foot with her breast.
51The wife conceded that her behaviour had not been appropriate on that occasion.
52In my opinion, none of the adults involved in the incident behaved in a mature and responsible fashion. In itself, the incident is of little relevance to the matters in issue in the proceedings – although the husband's role in it and the antecedent argument is consistent with aspects of his personality to which I shall refer later in these Reasons.
53The wife said in evidence that the parties separated from 8 March 2009 to 26 September 2009. She was working in paid employment during that period and did not receive Government benefits.
54Child B was born [in] 2010.
55In September 2011, the husband commenced taxi work for [Company B in Suburb K]. The family continued to live in Coastal Town A. The husband said that he worked on a two weeks on/one week off basis. I am satisfied that he worked very hard when he was driving; I am not satisfied, however, that he took over the majority of household chores and became the primary caregiver for the children when he was in Coastal Town A. I have no doubt that the wife remained the primary homemaker and caregiver for the children at all times.
56In November 2011, the wife commenced work with [Company M], doing alcohol and drug testing. The work was on an "as required" basis. The wife described the work as being "irregular and sporadic": see wife's trial affidavit at [154].
57In November 2012, the wife commenced full-time employment (as a consultant) at [Company S] in Coastal Town A. She worked there for approximately six months but did not enjoy the experience. To use a colloquialism, she felt out of her depth.
58The parties' relationship was placed under further stress in or about February 2013 when the wife discovered that the husband had transferred moneys to a woman in Malaysia. The wife said, and I accept, that the husband told her that he had fallen in love with this woman and wished to pursue a relationship with her. It follows that I am not satisfied that the husband's description of her as "a chat friend" was accurate.
59In April 2013, and after living with the husband's parents since November or December 2008, the husband and wife purchased [Property A] (which I shall call "the former matrimonial home"). The purchase price was $445,000. The parties paid a deposit of $106,000. A further $356,000 was borrowed from Homeside NAB and secured by mortgage. It seems that the purchase of the former matrimonial home was, at least in part, an attempt by the parties to salvage the marriage. It did not work, and the parties separated on a final basis in May 2013.
60Shortly before this (in April 2013), the husband contracted Ross River virus while at [Suburb K]. He said that this made it impossible for him to work. More than 18 months after the initially infection, the husband maintains that the illness still renders him unable to work. The husband claims that he last attempted to work in July 2014 and was unable to do so due to the fatigue caused by the virus. As noted by Ms Farmer in closing submissions, however, there is a paucity of evidence regarding the effect of the Ross River virus on the husband's earning capacity, and regarding the husband's health generally.
61As indicated above, the parties separated on a final basis in May 2013 – although they continued to live in the former matrimonial home. Not surprisingly, tensions within the house increased. The wife said, and I accept, that the husband became increasingly aggressive towards her. Eventually, she applied to the Coastal Town A Magistrates Court for a Violence Restraining Order ("VRO"). The application for a VRO was made in September 2013.
62In early June 2013, the husband had a shoulder reconstruction. He suggested that he did all or the majority of the household chores around this time, notwithstanding the shoulder surgery and the ongoing effects of the Ross River virus (indeed, the husband deposed to being "still ill with Ross River Virus and unable to work" in his trial affidavit at [33]). I do not accept his evidence in this regard, which was not credible.
63The parties appear to have sought legal advice regarding family law matters in or about June 2013. The first exchange of correspondence between their solicitors occurred in July 2013.
64On 9 and 23 July 2013, the wife's solicitors wrote to the husband's solicitors requesting, among other things, that he vacate the former matrimonial home. The wife's desire to relocate to Perth with Child A and Child B was also raised.
65On 25 July 2013, the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which the wife was to be permitted to relocate to Perth with Child A and Child B. As indicated above, the parties had separated some two months previously and were still living in the former matrimonial home, but the wife had not yet applied for the VRO. The agreement (which I shall call "the relocation agreement") was prepared by the husband and comprises annexure 3 to the wife's trial affidavit. It is signed by both parties and reads as follows:
I agree to [Child A] and [Child B] being relocated to Perth with their mother so that [the wife] can obtain full-time employment and further her career subject to parenting plans/orders being in place before the move and approved by the Family Court.
66The husband later changed solicitors and promptly resiled from the relocation agreement. On 3 September 2013, his new solicitors (Frichot & Frichot) wrote to the wife's solicitors (see annexure 4 to the wife's trial affidavit):
… We are instructed that the parties had achieved an overall property settlement as well as parenting orders pursuant to a negotiated agreement, a copy of which you should have in your possession.
Our client is not prepared to allow your client to relocate with any of the children unless it is part of an overall settlement at this stage.
Please let us know whether your client will abide by the agreement previously reached by the parties, failing which we are instructed to commence proceedings in relation to both property and children's matters.
67On 18 September 2013, the wife applied for the VRO on an ex parte basis. The husband opposed the application, which was listed for hearing on 16 October 2013. The hearing did not proceed on that day because the dispute was resolved on the basis of mutual undertakings given on a "without admission" basis.
68The undertakings were to the effect that the parties would not contact or attempt to contact each other directly or indirectly (except by telephone, text message or email in relation to children's issues only), and that they would not behave in "an intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive manner towards each other". The wife said, and I accept, that the husband did not comply with the undertaking: he made contact with her and approached her in relation to property matters. Although the wife remonstrated with him regarding his behaviour in this regard, he could not be dissuaded from continuing with it.
69For her part, the wife complied with the terms of the undertaking.
70In cross-examination, the husband described the VRO as "bogus". I do not accept the husband's evidence in that regard and am satisfied that the wife applied for the VRO in good faith.
71In mid-September 2013, the former matrimonial home was placed on the market. The asking price was $465,000. It appears that there have been a number of offers made on the property, all of which range between $420,000 and $455,000. For reasons that were the subject of cross-examination, but otherwise of no great relevance, the house has yet to be sold.
72The husband commenced proceedings in this Court on 4 October 2013 in relation to parenting and property matters.
73The husband's parents, with whom the parties had been living between late 2008 and approximately April 2013 (when they moved into the former matrimonial home), travelled around Australia in a caravan for approximately six months from April 2014. It follows that the husband did not have the benefit of direct, physical assistance from his parents during this time.
74As noted above, the husband claims that the state of his health does not permit him to work. He is in receipt of Government benefits. The wife is currently employed as a nurse doing relief worker at Company P Coastal Town A. She also works on a casual or part-time basis as a cleaner and as a shop assistant at a [local takeaway]. She is in receipt of Government benefits. I shall deal with the parties' financial circumstances later in these Reasons.
75According to the wife, the income she presently receives is insufficient to provide adequately for Child A and Child B. She has been offered full-time employment in Perth.
76Child C remains living with the husband. Both the husband and the wife acknowledge that he is at an age where he should be able to decide where he lives. It appears that he wishes to continue to live with the husband for the immediate future.
77Child A and Child B live with the wife. They have never spent extended periods of time away from the wife.
Relevant procedural history
78In September 2013, the husband and the wife attended mediation at Relationships Australia. This was unsuccessful.
79These proceedings commenced on 4 October 2013, when the husband filed a Form 1 Initiating Application. He sought orders to the effect that Child A and Child B live with the wife, but that she be restrained from taking them to live with her in Perth. He also proposed that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children and that Child C live with him.
80As will become apparent, the husband indicated at trial that he was resistant to any suggestion that he could or should himself relocate to Perth in the event of the wife's proposals being adopted by the Court. It is important to record, therefore, that the husband's approach in this regard was very different at the commencement of the proceedings. In his initiating application filed 4 October 2013, he sought orders in the following terms:
In the event that both parties reside in [Coastal Town A] or both reside in Perth
(5)In the event that any of the children relocate to Perth with (the wife) then the children spend time with (the husband) each alternate weekend from 6 PM on Friday until 6 PM on Sunday or as agreed between the parties jointly in writing, during both school term and school holidays. Both parties to drop off.
(6)The parties spend such further and other time with the children upon written agreement between them.
81The husband also suggested at trial that he was unable to think of any suitable or practical contact arrangements that could be put in place in the event of the wife's proposals being adopted by the Court (and assuming that he continues to live in Coastal Town A). Once again, the husband's approach in this regard was very different to the approach he adopted the time of filing his initiating application. At that time, he sought the following final orders (in addition to those to which reference has already been made):
In the event that one party resides in Perth and the other party resides in [Coastal Town A]
(7)The party who resides in [Coastal Town A] will spend time with the children as follows:
(a) each and every long weekend;
(b) for half of each school holiday;
(c) the time described in (a) and (b) above be spent in [Coastal Town A].
(8)The parties are to be equally the expense of the children's airfares between Perth and [Coastal Town A] in the event that paragraph 7 of these orders applies. The air fare costs are payable or refundable to the other party 7 days prior to travel.
82The husband also sought additional, comparatively detailed orders dealing with contact in the event (relevantly) of the wife living in Perth with Child A and Child B and the husband continuing to live in Coastal Town A with Child C.
83In relation to property issues, the husband sought orders to the effect that the former matrimonial home be sold and that the net proceeds of sale be divided equally between the parties. He also proposed that the remainder of the parties' property (save for their superannuation entitlements) be split equally between them. Each party was to retain his/her own superannuation entitlements.
84On 14 November 2013, the wife filed a response to the husband's initiating application. She sought permission to relocate to Perth with Child A and Child B. She also sought orders to the effect that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility – which was described as "joint parental responsibility" – for all three boys, but that Child C live with the parent he chooses (and spend time with the other parent in accordance with his wishes).
85The wife sought orders providing for Child A and Child B to have certain defined contact with the husband in Coastal Town A, and additional contact in the event of the husband spending time in Perth. She did not deal with the arrangements that should adhere in the event of both parties living in either Perth or Coastal Town A, and no orders were sought in that regard.
86In relation to property, the wife sought orders to the effect that the former matrimonial home be sold, with the net proceeds of sale to be divided in such a way as to achieve an overall division of the parties' property and superannuation entitlements on the basis of 75 per cent to her and 25 per cent to the husband.
87The matter came before the Court on 15 November 2013, and again on 5 December 2013 – when procedural orders were made and the matter was listed for both a conciliation conference and a readiness hearing.
88On 5 December 2013, the Court ordered (by consent) that the husband be restrained, until further order, from changing his principal place of residence from Coastal Town A. The parties agreed to the injunction because the wife had heard that the husband was intending to relocate to Perth to live with his first wife and that he would be taking Child C with him. This information confused the wife as the husband had commenced proceedings some three months previously to prevent her from relocating to Perth with Child A and Child B, and she had become unsure as to whether he was serious in his opposition to the move. Even so, the form of the injunction appears incongruous – and I note that it makes no mention of Child C.
89On 27 February 2014, the husband filed an application in a case in which he sought disclosure of certain documents relating to bank accounts and credit card statements. By way of response, the wife provided the husband with authorities to the relevant financial institutions enabling him to obtain the required information. The authorities were signed by the wife on 2 April 2014 and were expressed to be valid until the close of business on 31 May 2014: see exhibit H10. Some criticism was directed to the wife at trial because the authorities had been given an expiry date. In my opinion, such criticism is misplaced. The husband had ample time to obtain the information the subject of the authorities, and – as the letter dated 6 May 2014 from the wife's solicitors to the husband's solicitors makes clear – the parties were required to have their trial material filed by 26 May 2014: see exhibit W11.
90The husband also suggested that the authorities provided by the wife were "only directed at specific bank branches": see husband's trial affidavit at [54]. I am satisfied, however, that the husband was mistaken in this regard.
91The wife asserted that the husband pursued disclosure issues in a manner that was unreasonable having regard to the value of the property available for distribution between the parties and the comparative lack of complexity of their financial affairs. Given the way in which the trial proceeded and the fact that the husband ultimately instructed Ms Auburn not to make any closing submissions in relation to the subject of property settlement, the wife's approach was probably sensible. I refer in this regard to the ex tempore decision of Thackray CJ in R & R [2009] FCWA 116, although Boland AJ appeared to take a different approach in S & S [2012] FCWA 120 at [284]-[285]. In those circumstances, it is useful to record that Rules 13.07 and 13.08 of the Family Law Rules 2004 are in the following terms:
13.07 Duty of disclosure – documents
The duty of disclosure applies to each document that:
(a)is or has been in the possession, or under the control, of the party disclosing the document; and
(b)is relevant to an issue in the case.
13.08 Inspection of documents
(1)A party may, by written notice, require another party to provide a copy of, or produce for inspection, a document referred to:
(a)in a document filed or served by a party on another party or independent children’s lawyer; or
(b)in correspondence prepared and sent by or to another party or independent children’s lawyer.
(2)A party required to provide a copy of a document must provide the copy within 21 days after receiving the written notice.
92Rule 13.12 deals with documents that need not be produced. Prima facie, it does not exempt from production documents that have been but are no longer in the possession of or under the control of the party disclosing the documents or documents that might reasonably be expected to be in the possession of the other party (assuming those documents have not already been disclosed by the other party).
93I need not discuss the duty of disclosure in financial cases further because I do not consider it essential to the determination of the current proceedings.
94On 9 May 2014, the wife was ordered to provide to the husband copies of various documents referred to in the husband's application in a case.
95The conciliation conference took place on 26 June 2014. Both parties attended with their legal representatives. The file note records as follows:
No agreement but negotiations are continuing. Neither party has filed all evidence for trial. [The wife's] documents will be filed tomorrow. [The husband's] documents will be amended and filed after the procedural conference.
96Procedural orders made at the conciliation conference included the following:
a)the wife was to file her trial material by 27 June 2014;
b)the husband was to file his trial material by 8 August 2014;
c)the proceedings were included in the Callover to occur on 15 August 2014; and
d)the conciliation conference was adjourned to 10 July 2014.
97As will shortly become apparent, the wife complied with these orders, but the husband did not. His "amended trial affidavit" was filed on 5 September 2014, nearly a month late. His "amended financial statement", and a supplementary affidavit, were sworn and filed on 10 November 2014, just four days before the commencement of the trial. Indeed, the trial had been listed to commence on 12 November 2014 but was stood over to 14 November 2014 as a consequence of the rolling list.
98The trial commenced on 14 November 2014. It continued on 17 and 18 November, and concluded on 19 November 2014. After hearing closing addresses, I reserved my decision.
99The most pressing issue at the completion of the trial related to the time the boys were to spend with the parties during the 2014/15 Christmas school holiday period. The wife sought orders to the effect that she be permitted to spend time with the boys in Queensland from 9 December 2014 to 11 January 2015. She said that her father had agreed to pay for her and the boys to travel to Queensland to spend time with her family. The husband opposed the orders sought by the wife and argued that the boys should spend Christmas 2014 with him because they had spent Christmas in 2013 with the wife. He suggested that the wife's family members could spend time with her and the boys in Western Australia.
100In all the circumstances, I decided that the Queensland holiday should go ahead (but for a shorter period than that proposed by the wife). I accepted that the husband was entitled to feel frustrated that he had been unable to see the boys at Christmas for two consecutive years and, as a result, added a notation dealing with Christmas 2015 arrangements. Thus, the following orders were made on 8 December 2014 (emphasis in original):
1)Notwithstanding any previous parenting orders, the wife be permitted to spend time with [the three boys] outside Western Australia (and primarily in [Queensland]) for the period from 9 December 2014 to 3 January 2015.
2)The wife must cause the children to be returned to their principal places of residence in Western Australia by not later than 10 PM on 3 January 2015.
AND IT IS NOTED THAT:
3)Although these orders do not deal with other parenting issues or contact (spend time) arrangements for periods other than 9 December 2014 to 3 January 2015, the Court's decision in the substantive proceedings has been reserved and comprehensive orders relating to such matters will be made as soon as practicable. In the meantime, the Court notes that orders will be made to the effect that the children will spend the period from 11 AM on 23 December 2015 to 11 AM on 27 December 2015 with the husband.
Documents relied upon
101Unusually, the parties' papers for the judge were almost as long as their trial affidavits. Equally unusually – given the nature of the proceedings before the Court – the parties' trial affidavits (and the short supplementary affidavit from the husband referred to below) comprised the totality of the affidavit material relied upon. It seems that both parties thought that some form of compromise could be reached and that the matter would not actually proceed to trial.
102Thus, the wife relied on her trial affidavit and financial statement sworn 25 June 2014. The husband relied upon what was described as his amended trial affidavit (sworn on 2 September 2014), a very brief supplementary affidavit (sworn on 10 November 2014) and his amended financial statement (also sworn 10 November 2014).
103It should be recalled that the trial commenced on 14 November 2014.
104The husband also sought to rely on affidavits sworn by his parents on 31 October 2014. Ms Farmer objected to the affidavits. She argued that they had been filed unacceptably late and that no adequate explanation had been provided for the delay. After hearing submissions from both counsel, I ruled that the affidavits could not be relied upon.
105It follows that the only witnesses in the proceedings were the parties themselves.
106Clearly, neither party relied upon expert evidence in relation to parenting issues. Similarly, there was no independent children's lawyer to represent the children's interests. It was not suggested, however, that the absence of these resources comprised any form of impediment to the proper determination of the parenting case. I shall return to this subject later in these Reasons.
The husband's proposals
107The husband's proposals were set out in a minute of proposed orders attached to his papers for the judge filed 12 November 2014. Broadly speaking, he sought that:
a)the parties have equal shared parental responsibility (described as "joint parental responsibility") for all three children;
b)Child C continue to live with whichever parent he chooses;
c)the wife be restrained from removing Child A and Child B from Coastal Town A until the Child B is 12 years old; and
d)Child A and Child B spend equal shared time with each parent on a week about basis.
108In relation to the property matters, the husband sought that:
a)the wife transfer to the husband all her right, title and interest in the former matrimonial home and, "in consideration of the transfer", the husband pay $20,000 to the wife; and
b)the wife receive $30,000 from the husband's superannuation.
109In addition, the husband sought orders regarding certain chattels or personalty.
110The minute of orders sought by the husband is relatively detailed, but there is no need to reproduce all its terms in these Reasons. It speaks for itself.
111The husband's proposals have changed since that time. In her closing address, Ms Auburn said that the husband still opposed the wife relocating to Perth with Child A and Child B, but that he no longer pressed for orders to the effect that the boys live with him and the wife in a shared care arrangement. Indeed, Ms Auburn indicated that he no longer pressed for orders to the effect that he should spend substantial and significant time with the children.
112I shall refer to the husband's parenting proposals, including his direct or indirect concession to the effect that Child A and Child B should continue to live with the wife in Coastal Town A, as "the [Coastal Town A] proposal".
113The husband's minute of orders sought contained in his papers for the judge does not deal with his contact proposals in the event of the Coastal Town A proposal being rejected. I have discussed this subject elsewhere in these Reasons.
114The husband's proposals in relation to property settlement were also modified during Ms Auburn's closing address. She invited the Court to make such property settlement orders as it considers appropriate having regard to the evidence that had been presented. She said that she had been instructed by the husband not to address the Court in relation to the issue of property settlement (although she added that the parties' contributions should be treated as being equal).
The wife's proposals
115The wife's proposals were set out in a minute of proposed orders attached to her papers for the judge filed 10 November 2014. In relation to the parenting aspect of the proceedings, the wife sought that:
a)the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for all three children;
b)she be permitted to relocate Child A and Child B from Coastal Town A to Perth;
c)Child C continue to live with whichever parent he chooses; and
d)Child A and Child B live with her and spend time with the husband; and
e)she be permitted to take Child A and Child B to Queensland to spend Christmas 2014 with her family.
116In relation to the property matters, and in broad terms, the wife sought that:
a)the former matrimonial home be retained by the husband – on the basis that she is to be relieved from any liability under the mortgage encumbering the property (by, for example, the husband refinancing the mortgage); and
b)the husband pay her "a sum to be calculated and agreed upon by the parties' lawyers so that the wife receives 75 per cent of the net assets and financial resources".
117If the husband is unable to refinance the mortgage, then the wife proposes that the former matrimonial home be sold and that the net proceeds of sale be divided between the parties on the basis that the wife is to receive an amount "representing a 75 per cent division of the net assets and superannuation of the parties … adjusted to include the actual figures for the net sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home", and the husband is to receive the remaining 25 per cent.
118The wife also sought orders regarding certain chattels or personalty.
119The minute of orders sought by the wife is also relatively detailed, but, once again, there is no need to reproduce all its terms in these Reasons. It speaks for itself.
120I shall refer to the wife's parenting proposals, including her proposal to the effect that Child A and Child B should live with her in Perth, as "the Perth proposal".
121The wife's minute of orders sought contained in her papers for the judge does not deal with her proposals in the event of the Perth proposal being rejected. It was clear, however, that she strongly opposed an equal shared care arrangement, irrespective of whether she is to live with the boys in Perth or in Coastal Town A. I have discussed this subject elsewhere in these Reasons.
122Notwithstanding that the wife's immediate family live in Queensland, it is apparent that she seeks to live in Perth with Child A and Child B. She has a number of cousins in Perth, at least two of whom appear to have a close relationship with her. She has arranged to obtain full-time employment as a nurse in Perth.
123If the Perth proposal is adopted, the wife proposes to enrol Child A and Child B at [Primary School L]. If the Coastal Town A proposal is adopted, she proposes that the children continue to attend [Coastal Town A Primary School].
124Again, if the Perth proposal is adopted, the wife proposes to obtain suitable rental accommodation in the [Suburb M] area. If the Coastal Town A proposal is adopted, she will continue living in rental accommodation in Coastal Town A and will continue to work as a nurse in a hospital in Coastal Town A – on either a part-time or casual basis.
125In relation to contact arrangements, the wife conceded that there is "a lot of driving" involved in transporting the children between Perth and Coastal Town A. She said that she is prepared to do half the driving and meet the husband mid-way between the two places, such as at [Country Town H].
126In cross-examination, the wife said that she would be prepared to stay in Coastal Town A for a further two years if the Court were to be unwilling to allow the proposed relocation at this stage. Although the Court is not bound by the parties' proposals (provided that it does not embark upon some form of frolic of its own, as it were), its primary focus should be on the proposals presented by the parties. I give little weight to the wife's concession in this regard. In other words, I am not prepared to elevate her concession to the status of a "competing proposal": see, for example, Jurchenko & Foster [2014] FamCAFC 127 at [104] to [106] and [109].
Parenting Orders
127The following summary of the law is based on similar summaries in my decisions in Mills & Watson (2008) 39 Fam LR 52 and Jets & Maker (No 2) [2011] FMCAfam 1473.
128Applications concerning children (or, more accurately, applications for parenting orders) are dealt with in Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 ("FLA").
129The Full Court carefully analysed the structure and effect of Pt VII in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 (“Goode”). It began by identifying the types of orders that fall within the category of "parenting orders", and by referring to s 64B (which includes, among other things, a list of the matters with which a parenting order may deal). For example, orders allocating parental responsibility for a child, specifying the person with whom a child is to live or defining the time a child is to spend (or the communication a child is to have) with a person, are all parenting orders.
130Parenting orders dealing with the allocation of parental responsibility for a child can also deal with "the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child" [s 64B(3)]. Such issues include (but are not limited to) important questions regarding a child's education, religious and cultural upbringing and health. A proposed change to a child's name, or proposed changes to a child's living arrangements which would make it significantly more difficult for the child to spend time with one of his or her parents, are also regarded as major long-term issues. But a parent's decision to form a relationship with a new partner is not, of itself, a major long-term issue in relation to a child ─ even though such a decision could involve a major long-term issue if the new relationship requires the parent to move to another place (thereby making it more difficult for the child to spend time with the other parent): see the definition of "major long-term issues" in s 4(1).
131If a parenting order provides that parents (or others) are to share parental responsibility for a child, and if the exercise of that responsibility involves the making of a decision about a major long-term issue regarding a child, then the relevant decision must be made jointly. Further, an order for equal shared parental responsibility requires those in whose favour the order has been made to consult with each other in relation to any relevant major long-term issue, and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision [s 65DAC]. Such consultation is not required in relation to issues that are not major long-term issues, and a parent with whom a child is spending time will not normally need to discuss minor matters (such as what a child eats or wears) with the other parent [s 65DAE].
132As has long been the case, the child's best interests remain the paramount consideration in the making of parenting orders. That principle is set out in s 60CA:
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
133The objects of Pt VII, and the principles underlying it, are set out in s 60B. They are:
… to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
•ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
•protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
•ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
•ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of the children.
134The principles underlying these objects are set out in s 60B(2). They are:
... that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests):
•children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
•children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
•parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
•parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
•children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).
135Given that all the expressed objects of Pt VII are directed towards ensuring that a child's best interests are promoted, and given that the court must always regard the child's best interests as the paramount consideration in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the question of how a court determines what is or may be in a child's best interests is crucial. The subject is dealt with in s 60CC, which directs the court to consider a relatively lengthy list of factors before determining what is in a child's best interests. The list is divided into two parts, the first comprising "primary considerations", and the second comprising "additional considerations".
136The primary considerations are set out in s 60CC(2). They are:
a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of his or her parents; and
b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
137The additional considerations are set out in s 60CC(3). They include:
a)any views expressed by the child, and any factors that the court thinks are relevant in determining the weight that should be given to those views;
b)the nature of the child's relationship with each of his or her parents and other relevant people (including grandparents and other relatives);
c)the extent to which each parent has taken (or failed to take) the opportunity to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues regarding the child, and to spend time or communicate with the child;
d)the extent to which each parent has fulfilled (or failed to fulfil) his or her obligations to maintain the child;
e)the likely effect of any changes in the child's circumstances (including as a result of any separation from a parent, sibling or grandparent with whom the child may have been living);
f)the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent (and the effect of such difficulty and expense on the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis);
g)the capacity of each of the parents, and of any other relevant person, to provide for the child's needs (including his or her emotional and intellectual needs);
h)the child's maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including the child's culture and traditions);
i)in the case of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child, the child's right to enjoy his or her indigenous culture;
j)the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the parents;
k)any relevant family violence, or family violence order;
l)whether it would be "preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child"; and
m)any other fact or circumstance that the court considers relevant.
138The long list of additional considerations makes it clear that the court is required to focus on – among other things – each party's "track record" as a parent.
139Although the primary considerations are listed before the additional considerations, they will not always "outweigh" them: see Champness & Hanson (2009) FamCAFC 96 at [101]. Clearly, the primary considerations "should be accorded particular importance in determining what order will best promote the interests of the child", but they will not always determine the outcome of the proceedings. Thus, in Marsden & Winch (No 3) [2007] FamCA 1364, the Full Court said at [78]):
…[the Court is] obliged to take into account all of the relevant considerations identified in the legislation, giving each of them such weight as [it thinks] appropriate in arriving at the result most likely to promote the child's best interests. … [Particular emphasis must be placed on the primary considerations] not only because the legislature has identified them as "primary" but also because they are manifestly of the utmost importance in determining what outcome will best advance the child's best interests.
140In considering the first of the primary considerations (being the benefit to a child of having a meaningful relationship with both of his/her parents) the "preferred" approach is to "consider and weigh the evidence at the date of the hearing and determine how, if it is in a child's best interests, orders can be framed to ensure the particular child has a meaningful relationship with both parents": see McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405 at [119]. The Full Court described this as "the prospective approach". Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, a slightly different approach (which the Court described as "the present relationship approach") may also be relevant. The present relationship approach suggests that a court should consider the benefit to a child of having a meaningful relationship with his/her parents by examining the nature of the relationship as it exists at the date of the hearing and proceeding to make orders which reflect its findings in that regard: see McCall & Clark (supra) at [117] to [122]. Irrespective of the approach to be adopted, the benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship with his/her parents is not a legislatively defined presumption, or even an assumption.
441The husband, on the other hand, will be required to pay less moneys to the wife than would otherwise be the case. In practical terms, instead of paying the wife $116,669, he will be obliged to pay her $80,087. I accept that this may make little difference to the husband's ability to refinance and thereby acquire the former matrimonial home, but I suspect that he would be in a similar position irrespective of the proportion of his superannuation entitlements to be allocated to the wife. On the other hand, if the former matrimonial home is to be sold as a result of the husband's inability to pay the amount due to the wife, then the net proceeds of sale will not fall far short of meeting the amount the husband is obliged to pay the wife. In any event, I am of the view that it would not be just and equitable to allocate any more, or any less, to the wife by way of superannuation split.
Structure of property settlement orders
442Having regard to the matters discussed above, it is apparent that orders should be made to the following effect:
a)The wife is to retain or receive items 5, 9, 10, 14, 22, and 26 in the property schedule (being her bank accounts and credit cards, motor vehicle, GESB superannuation entitlements and her paid legal fees), together with $36,582 from what are currently the husband's National Mutual Retirement Security Plan superannuation entitlements (item 23). These items total $96,232. In addition, the husband is to pay her $80,087, bringing the total value of her overall entitlements to $176,319.
b)The husband is to retain or receive items 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 24 and 27 in the property schedule (being the former matrimonial home subject to the mortgage, his bank account and credit cards, motor vehicle with debt attached, the quad bikes, his paid legal fees and his Colonial Mutual superannuation entitlements), together with $19,481 from his current entitlements under the National Mutual Retirement Security Plan (item 23). These items total $164,982 – but he must pay the wife $80,087, leaving him with overall entitlements valued at $84,895.
c)If the husband is unable to pay $80,087 to the wife within 90 days, then the former matrimonial home is to be sold and the net proceeds utilised in part payment of the amount due to the wife.
d)If the husband is to retain the former matrimonial home, then he must, at his expense, procure the release of the wife from her obligations under the mortgage presently encumbering the former matrimonial home.
e)Similarly, the husband must indemnify the wife in relation to all outgoings for the former matrimonial home.
f)The husband is to deliver up to the wife – within seven days – the chattels and effects he agreed to give her during the course of the trial (in good repair and condition).
g)The husband is to give back to the wife her wedding and engagement rings (in good repair and condition).
h)A superannuation split is to occur in respect of the husband's National Mutual Retirement Security Plan superannuation entitlements, pursuant to which the wife is to receive $36,582 from those entitlements and the husband is to retain the balance.
i)The parties are to otherwise retain all property (and superannuation entitlements) presently in their possession.
Orders
443As indicated above, I propose to hear the parties' legal representatives in relation to the precise parenting and property orders necessary to give effect to these Reasons.
I certify that the preceding [443] paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment delivered by this Honourable Court
Associate
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