Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Fussell v Hanrahan [2025] NSWCA 173 Hearing dates: 16 June 2025 Date of orders: 1 August 2025 Decision date: 01 August 2025 Before: Ward P at [1]; Mitchelmore JA at [78]; Harrison JA at [79] Decision: 1. Appeal dismissed with costs.
Catchwords: NEGLIGENCE – causation – professional negligence – where contract for sale of land provided for 5-year deferred settlement and life estate in favour of vendor – where purchaser did not complete on completion date and vendor died two days later – sale contract subsequently rescinded by vendor’s legal representative – where solicitor found to have breached duty of care by failing to identify difficulties with grant of a legal life estate over a portion only of unsubdivided land but primary judge found no loss caused by that breach – whether primary judge erred in concluding that appellants did not discharge their onus of establishing that any negotiations with vendor prior to exchange of contracts in 2012 would likely have resulted in vendor agreeing not to require a life estate – whether primary judge erred in concluding that problem with life estate played no part in the purchaser’s failure to complete in 2017 and was thus not causative of loss – appeal dismissed.
Legislation Cited: Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 23F(2)
Cases Cited: Carolyn Deigan as executrix for the estate of the late James Boyd Lockrey v Barnard James Fussell [2019] NSWCA 299
Fussell v Hanrahan t/as Dignan & Hanrahan Solicitors [2024] NSWSC 1388
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Bernard James Fussell (First Appellant)
Blue Star Trading Corporation Pty Ltd (A.C.N: 156 585 376) (Second Appellant)
Bruce Vincent Hanrahan t/as Dignan & Hanrahan Solicitors (First Respondent)
David James Duncombe t/as Dignan & Hanrahan Solicitors (Second Respondent)
Steven Brown t/as Etienne Lawyers (Third Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
K Smark SC (Appellants)
A H Harding SC with J Norton (First and Second Respondents)
Penhall & Co Lawyers (Appellants)
K & L Gates (First and Second Respondents)
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (Third Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/000466602 Publication restriction: Nil Decision under appeal
- Court or tribunal:
- Supreme Court of New South Wales
- Jurisdiction:
- Common Law Division
- Citation:
- Date of Decision:
- 21 November 2024
- Before:
- Davies J
- File Number(s):
- 2018/138304
HEADNOTE
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
On 10 May 2012, the first appellant (Mr Bernard Fussell), as purchaser, entered into a contract for the sale of land (sale contract), an industrial site at Camellia in New South Wales (the Property) for the sum of $1.7 million with a 5-year deferred settlement date. The second appellant, Blue Star Trading Corporation Pty Ltd, is a company associated with Mr Fussell which was granted a lease of the Property during the period of the deferred settlement and conducted its business from the Property.
In consideration for the vendor (Mr James Lockrey) entering into the sale contract, the contract provided for the grant to the vendor, on completion, of…
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- Case
- [2025] NSWCA 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the appellants had not discharged their onus of proving that any pre-contractual negotiations in 2012 would have resulted in the vendor agreeing not to require a life estate. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the primary judge erred in finding that the difficulties with the life estate did not contribute to the purchaser's failure to complete in 2017, and therefore were not causative of the loss claimed by the appellants.
The Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's findings. The court reasoned that the appellants had failed to establish that the vendor would have abandoned her requirement for a life estate had the issues been raised earlier. The primary judge's conclusion that the problem with the life estate was not a factor in the purchaser's decision not to complete in 2017 was also affirmed, meaning it was not causative of the loss. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Prior to the exchange of contracts in 2012, the Fussells had engaged Mr. Hanrahan, the respondents' solicitor, to act for them in the transaction. The Fussells alleged that Mr. Hanrahan was negligent in failing to identify difficulties with the grant of a legal life estate over a portion only of the unsubdivided land. Specifically, the Fussells argued that Mr. Hanrahan should have recognised that the life estate could not be granted as the land was unsubdivided and unregistered. Additionally, the Fussells claimed that if Mr. Hanrahan had properly advised them, they could have negotiated with the vendor to avoid the life estate requirement. The primary judge, however, found that the Fussells had not discharged their onus of proving that such negotiations would likely have been successful.
The primary judge also concluded that the issue with the life estate did not contribute to the Fussells' failure to complete on the settlement date in 2017. Instead, the primary judge found that the Fussells had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the life estate problem played any part in their inability to complete. The Fussells appealed the primary judge's decision, arguing that the judge had erred in both findings. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with the court upholding the primary judge's conclusions.
The matter of Fussell v Hanrahan came before the court as an appeal from a decision of the primary judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal arose out of a case concerning professional negligence in the context of a sale of land under a contract that included a 5-year deferred settlement and a life estate in favour of the vendor. The purchaser, who was also the appellant in this appeal, did not complete on the settlement date, and the vendor passed away two days later. Subsequently, the sale contract was rescinded by the vendor's legal representative. The appellants contended that their solicitor had breached a duty of care by not identifying difficulties with the grant of a legal life estate over a portion only of the unsubdivided land. Despite the breach being established, the primary judge found no loss caused by that breach. The appellants challenged this finding, arguing that the primary judge erred in concluding that they did not discharge their onus of proving that any negotiations with the vendor prior to the exchange of contracts in 2012 would likely have resulted in the vendor agreeing not to require a life estate. Furthermore, they argued that the primary judge erred in concluding that the problem with the life estate played no part in the purchaser’s failure to complete in 2017, and thus was not causative of loss.
Throughout the proceedings, various applications and interlocutory orders were made. The appellants filed a notice of appeal against the primary judge's decision, and the court considered this appeal. The appeal process included the submission of written and oral arguments by both parties. The primary judge’s findings and the evidence presented in the lower court were carefully reviewed. The court examined whether the primary judge appropriately assessed the onus of proof and the causative link between the alleged breach of duty and the loss suffered. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the primary judge's conclusions on the issues of causation and loss.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the appellants did not discharge their onus of establishing that any negotiations with the vendor prior to the exchange of contracts in 2012 would likely have resulted in the vendor agreeing not to require a life estate?
2. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the problem with the life estate played no part in the purchaser’s failure to complete in 2017 and was thus not causative of loss?
3. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the solicitor's failure to identify difficulties with the grant of a legal life estate did not result in loss to the appellants?
4. Was the appellant's loss, if any, caused by the solicitor's breach of duty of care, and if so, was it a foreseeable loss?
5. Did the primary judge correctly assess the causation of the loss in this professional negligence claim, and did the appellants provide sufficient evidence to establish causation?
6. Did the primary judge correctly determine that the appellants did not prove that the breach of duty by the solicitor was a cause of the failure to complete the purchase in 2017?
Held
1. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the appellants did not discharge their onus of establishing that any negotiations with the vendor prior to the exchange of contracts in 2012 would likely have resulted in the vendor agreeing not to require a life estate?
The court concluded that the appellants failed to demonstrate that negotiations with the vendor prior to 2012 would likely have resulted in the vendor agreeing to not require a life estate. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the problem with the life estate played no part in the purchaser’s failure to complete in 2017 and was thus not causative of loss?
The court held that the primary judge did not err in concluding that the problem with the life estate did not contribute to the purchaser's failure to complete the purchase in 2017 and was not causative of loss. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
3. Did the primary judge err in concluding that the solicitor's failure to identify difficulties with the grant of a legal life estate did not result in loss to the appellants?
The court concluded that the primary judge correctly found that the solicitor’s failure to identify difficulties with the life estate did not result in loss to the appellants. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
4. Was the appellant's loss, if any, caused by the solicitor's breach of duty of care, and if so, was it a foreseeable loss?
The court held that even if there was a breach of duty by the solicitor, it did not cause the appellant's loss, and any loss was not foreseeable. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
5. Did the primary judge correctly assess the causation of the loss in this professional negligence claim, and did the appellants provide sufficient evidence to establish causation?
The court found that the primary judge correctly assessed the causation of the loss in the professional negligence claim and that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence to establish causation. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
6. Did the primary judge correctly determine that the appellants did not prove that the breach of duty by the solicitor was a cause of the failure to complete the purchase in 2017?
The court held that the primary judge correctly determined that the appellants failed to prove that the breach of duty by the solicitor was a cause of the failure to complete the purchase in 2017. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the appellants did not discharge their onus of establishing that any negotiations with the vendor prior to the exchange of contracts in 2012 would likely have resulted in the vendor agreeing not to require a life estate. The court found that the appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that negotiations would have led to a different outcome regarding the life estate. The primary judge's conclusion was upheld as the appellants did not establish that the vendor would have agreed to a sale without a life estate, thereby maintaining the primary judge's determination that the appellants' onus was not discharged.
Next, the court assessed whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the problem with the life estate played no part in the purchaser's failure to complete in 2017 and was thus not causative of loss. The court considered that the purchaser's decision to not complete was influenced by financial and other considerations, not solely by the life estate issue. The court found that the primary judge's assessment was supported by the evidence, which indicated that the life estate was not the sole or primary reason for the failure to complete. Thus, the court affirmed the primary judge's conclusion that the life estate problem did not cause the failure to complete in 2017.
The court then addressed whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the solicitor's failure to identify difficulties with the grant of a legal life estate did not result in loss to the appellants. The court held that the solicitor's failure to identify the difficulties was a breach of duty of care, but this breach did not cause the appellants' loss. The court reasoned that the appellants failed to establish a causal link between the solicitor's breach and the financial and other issues that led to the failure to complete the purchase. Therefore, the primary judge's conclusion that the solicitor's failure did not result in loss to the appellants was upheld.
In examining whether the appellant's loss, if any, was caused by the solicitor's breach of duty of care, and if so, whether it was a foreseeable loss, the court determined that the appellants' loss resulted from multiple factors, including financial difficulties and the vendor's death. The court held that even if the solicitor's breach contributed to the appellants' decision-making process, it was not the sole or primary cause of the loss. The court also found that the loss was not a foreseeable consequence of the solicitor's breach, as the appellants did not demonstrate that the life estate issue would have been resolved in a manner that would have led to completion.
The court further considered whether the primary judge correctly assessed the causation of the loss in this professional negligence claim and whether the appellants provided sufficient evidence to establish causation. The court found that the primary judge correctly assessed that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the solicitor's breach and the loss incurred. The court emphasized that causation in professional negligence claims must be clearly established, and in this case, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the solicitor's breach was a necessary condition for the loss that occurred.
Finally, the court examined whether the primary judge correctly determined that the appellants did not prove that the breach of duty by the solicitor was a cause of the failure to complete the purchase in 2017. The court upheld the primary judge's determination that the appellants did not establish the requisite causal link. The court concluded that the appellants' failure to complete the purchase was due to a combination of factors, and the life estate issue, while relevant, was not the primary cause. Therefore, the primary judge's conclusion that the breach of duty by the solicitor was not a cause of the failure to complete the purchase in 2017 was correctly made.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that in professional negligence claims involving real estate transactions, the plaintiff must establish a clear causal link between the solicitor's breach of duty and the loss incurred. Where multiple factors contribute to the loss, and the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the solicitor's breach was a necessary condition for the loss, the court will uphold the primary judge's determination that no loss was caused by the solicitor's breach. The court also emphasized the necessity for the plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence to establish causation in professional negligence claims.