Funge Systems Inc v Newcom Technologies P/L (in Liq) (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Applications Under Various Acts or Rules: Civil)

FUNGE SYSTEMS INC AND ANOR v NEWCOM TECHNOLOGIES P/L (IN LIQ) AND ORS (No 2)

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

13 April 2006

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS

Application by respondent seeking a dismissal or a striking out of the notice of appeal - respondent asserted that appeal instituted in breach of a contractual stipulation that no appeal would lie from the final decision of this Court concerning the disposition of certain monies - construction of parties' agreement - whether judgment that is the subject of the notice of appeal is, for the purposes of the agreement, "the final decision" of the court.

Held:  settlement agreement restricts the parties from appealing against the final decision of the Supreme Court which finally determines the disposition of the monies - agreement does not preclude appellant from instituting an appeal concerning issues heard as preliminary issues only - application dismissed.

Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 75.02, r 95.08, referred to.
Funge Systems Inc & Anor v Newcom Technologies Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] SASC 498; Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, considered.

FUNGE SYSTEMS INC AND ANOR v NEWCOM TECHNOLOGIES P/L (IN LIQ) AND ORS (No 2)
[2006] SASC 109

  1. WHITE J: On 22 December 2005, Layton J delivered her decision on certain issues in these proceedings which had been heard as preliminary issues.[1]  On 10 February 2006, pursuant to an extension of time granted by Layton J on 8 February 2006, the second defendant instituted an appeal against that decision.

  2. By the present application, Imbros Corporation (“Imbros”) which was an intervenor in the proceedings before Layton J and is the respondent to the appeal, seeks a dismissal or, in the alternative, a striking out of the notice of appeal.  It submits that the institution of the appeal is in breach of an express term of an agreement to which both the second defendant and it are parties. 

  3. Section 50(1a)(a)(iii) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 provides, amongst other things, that no appeal lies from a judgment which is by agreement of the parties final or without appeal.

  4. Pursuant to r 95.08, the application of Imbros came on for hearing before me sitting as a single judge. The determination of the strike out application involves the construction of a term of the written agreement. Neither party submitted that that course was inappropriate on an application of this kind or that it was inappropriate for me, sitting as a single judge, to hear and determine the application made on that basis.

    Background

  5. It is necessary to recount only a little of the proceedings at first instance.  Those circumstances are set out…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Funge Systems Inc v Newcom Technologies P/L (in Liq) (No 2) involved an application by the respondent to dismiss or strike out a notice of appeal on the basis that the appeal was instituted in breach of a contractual stipulation that no appeal would lie from the final decision of the Supreme Court concerning the disposition of certain monies. The dispute arose from a settlement agreement between the parties regarding the ownership and use of certain intellectual property, which was also the subject of litigation in the United States. The primary issue before the court was the construction of the term in the parties' agreement that restricted appeals against the final decision of the Supreme Court determining the disposition of the monies.

The court considered whether the judgment subject to the notice of appeal was, for the purposes of the agreement, "the final decision" of the court. The court found that the settlement agreement did restrict the parties from appealing against the final decision of the Supreme Court which finally determined the disposition of the monies. However, the agreement did not preclude the appellant from instituting an appeal concerning issues heard as preliminary issues only. Consequently, the application to dismiss or strike out the notice of appeal was dismissed. The court refrained from deciding whether the term in the agreement referred to the last possible decision in the Court, whether at first instance or on appeal. The court ordered that the parties be heard as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Pursuant to r 95.08, the application of Imbros came on for hearing before me sitting as a single judge. The determination of the strike out application involves the construction of a term of the written agreement. Neither party submitted that that course was inappropriate on an application of this kind or that it was inappropriate for me, sitting as a single judge, to hear and determine the application made on that basis. Background It is necessary to recount only a little of the proceedings at first instance. Those circumstances are set out more fully in the decision of Layton J.[2][2] Ibid. The proceedings concerned a dispute about the ownership and use of certain intellectual property. There has also been substantial litigation in the United States concerning the same issues. It seems that the proceedings in this Court were instituted for the purpose of seeking injunctions to restrain the defendants from dealing with the intellectual property in dispute until the issues in the proceedings in the United States had been resolved. On 24 May 2001, Lander J ordered that the first plaintiff in the proceedings pay to its solicitors, Kelly & Co, the sum of $250,000 which sum was to be held by Kelly & Co as security for the undertaking as to damages by the first plaintiff, given to this Court as a condition of the grant of an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from disposing in any way of any interest which they had in the intellectual property. By that undertaking, the first plaintiff agreed to abide by any order which the court or a judge may make as to the damages to which the defendants, or any of them, should be entitled in consequence of sustaining any loss or damage by reason of the grant of the injunction. The $250,000 was paid to the firm of Kelly & Co and is still held by that firm pursuant to the order of Lander J. A compromise of the disputes concerning the intellectual property was reached in the context of the proceedings in the United States. The terms of the compromise are recorded in a written agreement to which the present litigants are parties. Prior to the compromise being reached certain orders concerning the dispute had been made by Judge Mayer in the US Bankruptcy Court on 27 March 2003 and 20 February 2004. The second defendant asserts, in the present proceedings, an entitlement to be paid the sum of $250,000 held by Kelly & Co. Its assertion is that that entitlement arises by one or more of the following:(a)its entitlement to the money has been determined by a US court of competent jurisdiction (the US Bankruptcy Court) and that this Court should enforce the orders made by that Court;(b)an agreement to which each of the present litigants is a party entitles it to payment of the $250,000;(c)it can prove that it has suffered damage amounting to at least $250,000 and as the $250,000 was paid to Kelly & Co to secure the first plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages, this Court should order the payment out to it of that sum.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The possibility that the expression “final decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia” referred to the last possible decision in this Court, ie, whether at first instance or on appeal, was also raised in argument. Neither party seemed to advocate for that construction. I have not had to decide that issue for the purposes of resolution of the present application, and I refrain from doing so.Conclusion For the reasons given above, my conclusion is that the application of Imbros for the dismissal or strike out of the notice of appeal should be dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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