Fuller v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fuller v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 65

Appeal from: Application for extension of time:  GSMY v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] AATA 263
File number: WAD 147 of 2022
Judgment of: JACKSON J
Date of judgment: 8 February 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION - application for extension of time for judicial review - decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal - jurisdictional error - interests of the administration of justice - factors for consideration in extension of time application - applicant's ties to Australia and length of time spent in Australia - Administrative Appeals Tribunal's consideration adequate - no reasonable prospects of success - application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 476A, 477A, 499, 501, 501CA
Cases cited:

BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569

Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326

KXXH v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 111

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17

Nahi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 29

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26

NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1077

Onyebuchi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1183

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476

Tu'utaKatoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 52
Date of hearing: 1 February 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr CM Beetham
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 147 of 2022
BETWEEN:

JOHN CLIFFORD FULLER

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JACKSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 FEBRUARY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time is dismissed.

2.The applicant must pay the first respondent's costs of the application on a lump sum basis.

3.On or before 4.00 pm AWST on 22 February 2023, the parties must file any agreed minute of proposed orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs.

4.In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs is referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fuller v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs was a case heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Mr Fuller, sought an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding the cancellation of his visa. The key issue before the court was whether an extension of time should be granted, considering the merits of Mr Fuller's proposed grounds for review and the potential for jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision. The court also needed to consider the interests of justice in granting such an extension.

The court examined the merits of Mr Fuller's proposed grounds for review, which included complaints about the AAT's treatment of his ties to Australian society and the situation of his children and grandchildren. The court noted that it was not the function of the Court to consider such matters on their merits but to determine whether the AAT had committed jurisdictional error. The court also considered the explanation for the delay in seeking an extension of time and any prejudice that might result from granting the extension. Ultimately, the court concluded that neither Mr Fuller's proposed grounds, nor the additional possible ground identified by the Minister, had prospects of success. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was dismissed.

In dismissing the application, the court held that the AAT's consideration of Mr Fuller's ties to Australian society and the situation of his children and grandchildren was adequate. The court further noted that the interests of the administration of justice did not favour granting an extension of time, given the lack of reasonable prospects of success for Mr Fuller's proposed grounds of review. The court also found no prejudice to the Minister or any other party if an extension of time was granted. The court ordered that Mr Fuller must pay the Minister's costs of the application on a lump sum basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time is dismissed.

2. The applicant must pay the first respondent's costs of the application on a lump sum basis.

3. On or before 4.00 pm AWST on 22 February 2023, the parties must file any agreed minute of proposed orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs.

4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs is referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition to those grounds counsel for the Minister has, properly, identified a potential error in how the Tribunal dealt with the weight to be given to possible impediments Mr Fuller would face on return to New Zealand. But for the following reasons, neither that nor any of Mr Fuller's stated grounds have prospects of success sufficient to justify an extension of time, so the application will be dismissed.Factual background Mr Fuller is 52 years old. He was 16 when he came to Australia with his parents. He has not been back to New Zealand or otherwise outside Australia since then. His parents and all other persons he is close to live here, and he has only distant relatives in his country of origin. Mr Fuller has been convicted of over 100 offences since coming to Australia. The Tribunal found that these included (para 250):hindering police, assault, providing a false name and address, various driving offences, driving unregistered vehicles, driving uninsured vehicles, aggravated assault, disorderly behaviour, failing to comply with a restraining order, being armed with an offensive weapon at night, stealing, damage to property and driving with a prohibited drug in blood. Mr Fuller's first recorded conviction was for assault, and the Tribunal found (para 253) that his offending 'was serious from the start'. The first recorded conviction was in October 1988, when he was 17. According to the Tribunal, Mr Fuller admitted in cross examination that he has a history of violent offending, including aggravated assaults against women and assaults against police officers in performance of their duty. He also admitted that he has a history of breaching domestic violence orders, breaching bail, and failing to comply with the terms of a suspended sentence. Before the Tribunal, Mr Fuller agreed that he had been using methylamphetamine almost daily for ten years and 'that his habit grew to the point that he used much [sic] as he could get' (para 88). The Tribunal accepted, however, that at the time of the hearing before it, Mr Fuller had not used drugs for about two years, although he agreed that this was explicable on the basis that he had been incarcerated during that time. The offences which led to the cancellation of Mr Fuller's visa were aggravated robbery and supply of cannabis in less than a commercial quantity, for which (after appeal) he was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of two years 11 months. The visa was cancelled in October 2020. The decision not to revoke that cancellation was made on 16 November 2021. The Tribunal held a hearing on 9 February 2022 and affirmed the decision not to revoke on 18 February 2022. Mr Fuller's application for an extension of time to seek judicial review was accepted by this Court on 29 July 2022, some four months after the expiry of the 35 day time limit for such applications imposed by s 477A of the Migration Act.Relevant considerations for an extension of time The Court has power to grant an extension of time under s 477A of the Migration Act if an application for that order has been made in writing specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order, and if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so: s 477A(2). On its face, the power is unfettered save, in substance, by the requirement for the Court to form that state of satisfaction. The interests of the administration of justice comprise the sole mandatory relevant consideration: see Tu'utaKatoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 at [11]‑[12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ), [35], [39], [62] (Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ). The requirement that an extension of time be 'necessary in the interests of the administration of justice' is 'deliberately broad', as is the discretion that the provision confers: Katoa at [36], [39]-[40]. The two judgments in Katoa each gave a similar, evidently non-exclusive list of matters to which the Court may have regard:… the length of the applicant's delay, the reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application.(Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [12])and… the length of the delay; the explanation for the delay; any prejudice to the administration of justice as a result of the delay; and the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the application or the 'strength or weakness of the case … sought to be advanced and the utility of advancing that case'.(Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ at [40], footnotes removed)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Nor does the Minister point to any prejudice he or anyone else will suffer if an extension of time is granted. The Minister opposes the extension of time on the basis that neither Mr Fuller's proposed grounds, nor the additional possible ground identified by the Minister, have prospects of success.Relevant aspects of the Tribunal's decision If an extension of time were to be granted, Mr Fuller would need to establish jurisdictional error in order for the Court to have power to quash the Tribunal's decision: see Migration Act s 476A (read with definition of 'privative clause decision' in s 474); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [75]‑[78]; Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326 at [43]. In order to assess the prospects of success of Mr Fuller's proposed grounds of review it is necessary to describe certain aspects of the Tribunal's decision. Broadly, the grounds complain about the Tribunal's treatment of Mr Fuller's ties to Australian society and its treatment of the situation of his children and grandchildren, and to the asserted fact that he has lived here 'all my life', which on the evidence must be taken to refer to his late teenage years and entire adult life. Mr Fuller expanded on this last point in particular in his oral submissions. However, as I sought to explain to him at the hearing, it is not the function of this Court to consider such matters on their merits, as important as they may be to him. The function of the Court is to determine whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error. Mr Fuller's oral submissions therefore did not advance his position on the application for an extension of time. Another matter Mr Fuller raised was what appeared to be a recently promulgated ministerial direction which, he submitted, said that the government would take into consideration connections to Australia that outweigh connections to New Zealand. However in considering Mr Fuller's application in February 2022 the Tribunal was required (under s 499(2) of the Migration Act) to apply, not that more recent direction, but Direction No. 90 - Migration Act 1958 - Direction under section 499 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (Direction 90). So it is the terms of Direction 90 that are relevant here. The direction required the Tribunal to treat as primary considerations the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence, the best interests of minor children in Australia, and the expectations of the Australian community. An overview of Mr Fuller's criminal record appears above. The Tribunal found that the protection of the Australian community weighed substantially against revocation of the cancellation of Mr Fuller's visa. Similarly, it found that the expectations of the Australian community weighed heavily against the revocation of the cancellation of the visa. Mr Fuller has not criticised these conclusions. The Tribunal also found that family violence was not a relevant consideration.The interests of children under 18

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The visa was cancelled in October 2020. The decision not to revoke that cancellation was made on 16 November 2021. The Tribunal held a hearing on 9 February 2022 and affirmed the decision not to revoke on 18 February 2022. Mr Fuller's application for an extension of time to seek judicial review was accepted by this Court on 29 July 2022, some four months after the expiry of the 35 day time limit for such applications imposed by s 477A of the Migration Act.Relevant considerations for an extension of time The Court has power to grant an extension of time under s 477A of the Migration Act if an application for that order has been made in writing specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order, and if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so: s 477A(2). On its face, the power is unfettered save, in substance, by the requirement for the Court to form that state of satisfaction. The interests of the administration of justice comprise the sole mandatory relevant consideration: see Tu'utaKatoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 at [11]‑[12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ), [35], [39], [62] (Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ). The requirement that an extension of time be 'necessary in the interests of the administration of justice' is 'deliberately broad', as is the discretion that the provision confers: Katoa at [36], [39]-[40]. The two judgments in Katoa each gave a similar, evidently non-exclusive list of matters to which the Court may have regard:… the length of the applicant's delay, the reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application.(Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [12])and… the length of the delay; the explanation for the delay; any prejudice to the administration of justice as a result of the delay; and the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the application or the 'strength or weakness of the case … sought to be advanced and the utility of advancing that case'.(Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ at [40], footnotes removed) As far as the merits of the underlying application go, it will often be appropriate to assess them at a reasonably impressionistic level because, depending on other relevant factors, 'the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit': Katoa at [17]. This has also been described as considering the merits at 'a threshold level - inquiring whether the proposed grounds of review enjoy reasonable prospects of success': Katoa at [62]. But it is within the Court's jurisdiction under s 477A(2) to have regard to the merits in such manner as it considers appropriate in the circumstances: Katoa at [19] and see also [40], [62]. For reasons given by Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ at [46]‑[61], it will not be a jurisdictional error for the Court to conduct a substantive rather than impressionistic assessment of the merits of a proposed application: see also [63]. There will be circumstances where it is appropriate to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment and circumstances where it is necessary to have regard to the merits of the underlying application in greater detail: Katoa at [18], [63].Explanation for delay and prejudice