FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen [2011] FCAFC 30

Citation: FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen [2011] FCAFC 30
Appeal from: Bullen v State of Western Australia [2010] FCA 900
Parties:

FQM AUSTRALIA NICKEL PTY LTD (ACN 135 761 465) v ELAINE BULLEN, JENNY WOODS, DIANE CLINCH, VERONICA WILLIAMS-BENNELL, GRAHAM TUCKER, JARMAN JAMIESON, STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA and WA MINISTER OF MINES AND PETROLEUM

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA v ELAINE BULLEN & ORS and FQM AUSTRALIA NICKEL PTY LTD (ACN 135 761 465)

File number(s): WAD 251 of 2010
WAD 252 of 2010
Judges: NORTH, MCKERRACHER AND JAGOT JJ
Date of judgment: 9 March 2011
Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – meaning of registered native title claimant – whether a person continues to be a registered native title claimant after the person has died and pending replacement on the Register of Native Title Claims  
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act1901 (Cth)
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth)
Native Title Amendment (Technical Amendments) Act 2007 (Cth)

Cases cited: Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Weimann [2009] FCAFC 135 Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334
Bullen v State of Western Australia [2010] FCA 900
Chapman v Queensland (2007) 159 FCR 507
Cheedy on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2010] FCA 1154
Edwards v Santos Ltd (2009) 263 ALR 473
Edwards v Santos Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 280
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Johnson on behalf of the Barkandji (Paakantyi) People v Minister for Land and Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [2003] FCA 981
Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland (2001) 108 FCR 453
Lennon v State of South Australia [2010] FCA 743
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
R v Newham London Borough Council; ex parte Dada [1995] 3 WLR 540
Roe v Kimberley Land Council Aboriginal Corporation [2010] FCA 809
Sambo v State of Western Australia (2008) 172 FCR 271
Yunghanns v Candoora No 19 Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 524
Date of hearing: 21 February 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
In WAD 251 of 2010:
Counsel for the Appellant: PD Quinlan SC with RP Steenhof
Solicitor for the Appellant: Blake Dawson
Counsel for the First to Sixth Respondents: VB Hughston SC with D Yarrow
Solicitor for the First to Sixth
Respondents:
Goldfields Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation
Counsel for the Seventh and Eighth Respondents: GJ Ranson with A Warren
Solicitor for the Seventh and  Eighth Respondents: State Solicitors Office
In WAD 252 of 2010:
Counsel for the Appellant: GJ Ranson with A Warren
Solicitor for the Appellant: State Solicitors Office
Counsel for the First Respondents: VB Hughston SC with D Yarrow
Solicitor for the First Respondents: Goldfields Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation
Counsel for the Second Respondent: PD Quinlan SC with RP Steenhof
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Blake Dawson

IN…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd v Bullen, the respondents, who were the current registered native title claimants, sought a declaration that there was a registered native title claimant immediately before the grant of mining leases. The appellants, who were the holders of the mining leases, opposed the application. The dispute was about the existence of a registered native title claimant prior to the mining leases being granted and whether the validity of the mining leases could be challenged if native title was subsequently proven. The court had to decide if the respondents could obtain a declaration regarding the status of the native title claimant before the mining leases were granted, and if such a declaration would be within the scope of judicial power.

The court found that the declaration sought by the respondents was not an advisory opinion and was relevant to the real dispute between the parties. The status of the registered native title claimant before the mining leases were granted involved a real, not hypothetical, question. The declaration would settle the controversy between the parties and had utility beyond its relevance to the validity of the mining leases if native title was found to exist. The court held that the primary judge's discretionary decision could not be challenged based on the appellants' selection of a relevant consideration that was overlooked.

The appeals were dismissed, and the court concluded that the points raised by the appellants were important to the construction of the legislation and were reasonably pursued. Unless written submissions to the contrary were filed within ten days, there would be no order as to costs. The declaration sought by the respondents was within the exercise of judicial power, and the status of the registered native title claimant before the mining leases were granted was a real and not hypothetical question.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. In the absence of written submissions to the contrary within 10 days, there will be no order as to costs.

Note:

Decision

Reasons for decision

Similarly, the appellants’ related submission that the primary judge failed to have regard to a relevant consideration in the discretionary exercise (namely, the prevention of the fragmentation of proceedings in circumstances where proceedings have been on foot in the Federal Court since 1998 about the existence of native title in the subject area, being proceedings which, the appellants said, “could properly determine all issues in relation to the mining leases) is unsustainable. No complaint is made in the appeals that the primary judge’s reasons are inadequate due to some failure to have dealt with a material issue between the parties. Given the nature and breadth of the discretion relating to the making of declarations, it is not open to persons in the appellants’ position to select one possible relevant consideration as having been overlooked and thereby seek to impugn the primary decision on that basis. The nature and the breadth of the discretion do not permit any one consideration to be elevated to the status of a matter that the primary judge was bound to consider. It follows that the primary judge’s discretionary decision cannot be challenged on appeal in this way (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505).CONCLUSIONS The grounds of appeal cannot be sustained and the appeals will be dismissed. Although the appeals are to be dismissed, the points raised by the appellants were important to the construction of the legislation and were reasonably pursued. Unless there are written submissions to the contrary filed within ten days, there will be no order as to costs having regard to s 85A of the Native Title Act (see Cheedy on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2010] FCA 1154).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question in the present case is whether there was a registered native title claimant immediately before the grant of the mining leases. For the reasons given above that question, on the facts of the present case, should be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the respondents to the appeals. In reaching that answer it is not necessary to give precedence to abstract notions of the beneficial construction of remedial statutes or the value to native title parties of the right to negotiate; the answer follows from the language of the statute construed in context.Declaration? The appellants’ reliance on Edwards v Santos is misplaced. In Edwards v Santos the applicant sought declarations to the effect that the grant of petroleum leases would not be a “pre-existing rights based act” within the meaning of Subdiv I of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Native Title Act, and would not be valid pursuant to s 24ID of that Act unless the requirements of Subdivision P of Div 3 of Pt 2 (the right to negotiate provisions) had been satisfied. The difficulty for the applicant in Edwards v Santos was that the petroleum leases proposed to be the subject of the declarations had neither been granted nor, indeed, been the subject of any actual or even impending application. The declarations did not concern a matter, existing or contingent, but a speculative possibility. The present case is different. The mining leases have been granted. The declaration sought concerns the existence of a fact – the status of persons as registered native title claimants immediately before that grant – which is real and not hypothetical. According to the State of Western Australia, the grants were premised on another, assumed, fact – that there were no registered native title claimants in existence at that time. The respondents – the current registered native title claimant – dispute that assumed fact. The dispute has potential legal and practical consequences. As the primary judge said at [27]:If the respondents are right, the validity of the mining leases cannot be impugned on the basis that the applicant in the Esperance Nyungar native title determination subsequently proves native title rights of a character which affect the rights conferred on the holder of the mining leases. If, on the other hand, the respondents are wrong, then the respondents run the risk of the validity of the mining leases being impugned to the extent that the applicant in the Esperance Nyungar native title determination application subsequently proves that native title of a character which affects the rights conferred on the holder of the mining leases [exists]. Given that the mining leases in question exist, the status of persons as registered native title claimants immediately before their grant involves a real not hypothetical question. In Lardil Peoples v State of Queensland (2001) 108 FCR 453 the applicants sought a declaration that an authority granted to install a mooring buoy was invalid (in addition to injunctive relief). The validity of the authority, however, depended on its grant being a future act – that is, an act which affects native title. As that question remained undetermined, the declaration sought could not be granted. The form of the declaration sought in the present case is different. It does not depend on the assumed existence of native title. It is true that the declaration would be relevant to the validity of the mining leases if native title is found to exist. But that is simply an aspect of its utility. It does not place the making of the declaration beyond the exercise of judicial power as a mere advisory opinion. There are other aspects of utility in any event. The mining leases have been granted. New persons have been appointed as the applicant for the claim and thus are registered native title claimants. There is a real dispute between those persons and the appellants as to whether there was a registered native title claimant immediately before the grant of the mining leases. The declaration quells that controversy.