Fowkes v The King

Case [2023] VSCA 160


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2023 0021
TYSON FOWKES Applicant
v
THE KING Respondent

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JUDGES: EMERTON P, PRIEST and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 4 July 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 6 July 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2023] VSCA 160
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v Fowkes (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, 2 November 2022, Judge Hampel)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Identification evidence – Identification from Facebook photographs – Witnesses identified applicant from Facebook photographs after conversations with another person – Trial judge refused to exclude evidence – Whether identification evidence inadmissible under s 114(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 – Whether evidence to be excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 on the basis that probative value of evidence outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed.

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Counsel

Applicant: Mr D I Mence
Respondent: Ms N Rogers SC

Solicitors

Applicant: Garde Wilson Lawyers
Respondent: Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

EMERTON P
PRIEST JA
KAYE JA:

Introduction

  1. Tyson Fowkes, the applicant, faces trial in the County Court on charges of armed robbery (charge 1), false imprisonment (charges 2 and 3) and aggravated carjacking (charges 4 and 5).

  2. The prosecution case is that, on 10 June 2020, the applicant, together with two males — Aaron Burnie (‘Burnie’) and David Owen Jones (‘Jones’) — and a female — Charmayne McEwen (‘McEwen’) — entered the home of Jason Gibson and Alison Gibson in a suburb of Geelong, threatened them with weapons, robbed them of cash, falsely imprisoned them, demanded money from them, compelled them to transfer funds to the four assailants, and ultimately drove away in the Gibsons’ two motor vehicles.

  3. It seems that the Gibsons initially were reluctant to report the matter to the police, and did not make their first statements to police until 25 June 2020, a little over two weeks after the alleged offending. In those statements, they said that they had identified all four assailants from ‘Facebook’ photographs, but provided no detail as to how that had come about. Alison Gibson also said that, when the four assailants came to the house, she recognised Jones, but did not know any of the other three.

  4. The applicant, Jones and McEwen were not arrested and charged until two months after the Gibsons made their first statements. Burnie, Jones and McEwen have all since been dealt with. The applicant, however, denies attending the Gibsons’ residence on 10 June 2020, and denies any involvement in the alleged offending.

  5. To a large extent, the prosecution case rests on the evidence of the Gibsons identifying the applicant as the third of the male assailants, albeit that there is some other evidence potentially linking him to the offending. That evidence is of recorded ‘Arunta’ telephone calls said to be between the applicant and Burnie when Burnie was in custody.[1] Those calls are said to relate to hiding or disposing of the stolen cars, and to…

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Fowkes v The King [2023] VSCA 160
Case
[2023] VSCA 160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Fowkes was charged with a serious offence of armed robbery. The applicant was identified by two witnesses, Alison Gibson and Jason Gibson, after they had viewed his Facebook profile. They had previously had a conversation with another person who had identified the applicant as the offender. The trial judge refused to exclude the identification evidence from being admitted at trial, which led to the applicant seeking leave to appeal. The appeal was allowed, and the identification evidence was excluded.

The legal issues in this case were whether the identification evidence obtained from Facebook photographs was admissible under section 114(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 and whether the evidence should be excluded under section 137 of the Evidence Act 2008. Section 114(2) of the Act states that visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless certain conditions are met. In this case, it was common ground that s 114(2)(b) applied, and therefore, the identifications must have been made without intentional influence. The court had to consider whether the witnesses had been influenced in any way by the conversation they had with the other person who had identified the applicant as the offender.

The court held that the identification evidence should be excluded as it was likely that the witnesses had been influenced by the conversation they had with the other person. The court found that the witnesses' identifications of the applicant were made without them being intentionally influenced to identify the applicant as the offender, but the court held that the evidence should still be excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the applicant.

The court's decision was that the identification evidence should be excluded. The appeal was allowed, and the identification evidence was excluded.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 114 of the Act is concerned with the exclusion of identification evidence.[12] It provides:[13][12]Although not concerned with admissibility, see also the definition of ‘identification evidence’ in s 35 of the Jury Directions Act 2015. [13]Emphasis added.114 Exclusion of visual identification evidence (1) In this section, visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence. (2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless— (a) an identification parade that included the accused was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or (c) the accused refused to take part in such a parade—and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the accused. (3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into account— (a)the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned; and (b) the importance of the evidence; and (c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things— (i) if the accused failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade—to the manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and (ii)in any case—to whether the identification was made at or about the time of the commission of the offence; and (d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among other things, to the relationship (if any) between the accused and the person who made the identification. (4) It is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade if it would have been unfair to the accused for such a parade to have been held. (5) If— (a) the accused refused to take part in an identification parade unless an Australian legal practitioner acting for the accused, or another person chosen by the accused, was present while it was being held; and (b) there were, at the time when the parade was to have been conducted, reasonable grounds to believe that it was not reasonably practicable for such an Australian legal practitioner or person to be present— it is presumed that it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade at that time. (6) In determining whether it was reasonable to have held an identification parade, the court is not to take into account the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making identifications. Each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 114 (2) is expressed in the alternative. The requirement that the visual identification not be intentionally influenced applies to each of those alternative situations. Thus, it applies not only in the case of an identification made in an identification parade, but also in cases in which either, or both, of the alternative situations posited by s 114(2)(b) and (c) occur. In the present case, it was common ground that s 114(2)(b) applied to the identification evidence. Accordingly, in order for the identification evidence of Alison Gibson and Jason Gibson to be admissible, it must be demonstrated that their respective identifications of the applicant were made without them being intentionally influenced to identify the applicant as the offender.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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