CITATION: DPP v DONALD & ANOR. [1999] NSWSC 949 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division FILE NUMBER(S): 11685/99; 11686/99 HEARING DATE(S): 16 August 1999 JUDGMENT DATE:
16 August 1999PARTIES :
Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Elizabeth Jane Donald (Defendant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff)
Karen Rebecca McEntee (Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Bell J at 1
COUNSEL : Mr P Berman (Plaintiff) SOLICITORS: Mr S E O'Connor (Plaintiff)
Mr Byrne (Donald)
Mr Prior (McEntee)CATCHWORDS: EVIDENCE; visual identification evidence; admissibility; reasonableness of holding identification parade; (Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 114) ACTS CITED: Justices Act 1902
Evidence Act 1995CASES CITED: Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 359
R v Carusi (1997) 192 A Crim R 52
R v Clarke (1998) 97 A Crim R 414DECISION: See paras 13 and 14
THE SUPREME COURT
BELL J
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
Monday, 16 August 1999
11685/99 - DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v ELIZABETH JANE DONALD
11686/99 - DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v KAREN REBECCA MCENTEEJUDGMENT
1 HER HONOUR: This is an appeal against an order dismissing two informations, brought pursuant to s 104(2) of the Justices Act 1902 by the informant. The proceedings were before the Bidura Children's Court on 21 April 1999.
2 The plaintiff seeks an order setting aside the order of the Magistrate that the visual identification evidence of Anna Brielle Flinders (identifying the defendants Karen Rebecca McEntee and Elizabeth Jane Donald) was inadmissible for the reason that it did not comply with s 114(2) of the Evidence Act 1995.
3 The plaintiff further seeks an order in respect of each defendant that the evidence be admitted; orders setting aside the Magistrate’s orders dismissing the informations; and orders that both matters be remitted to the Magistrate to be determined according to law.
4 Ms Flinders was robbed by three young women on or about 12 November 1998. On 28 November 1998 Ms Flinders was driving her car when she saw two young women, the defendants in the present proceedings; she recognised those two young women as two of the three women who had earlier robbed her. She reported the matter to the police. The two defendants were subsequently arrested by the police.
5 The evidence of Ms Flinders as to her identification of the two women was held by the Magistrate to be inadmissible, having regard to the provisions of s 114(2) of the Evidence Act.
6 The Magistrate found that the police had failed to comply with the provisions of s 114 of the Evidence Act in that no identification parade had been held following the arrest of the two women.
7 The identification, upon which the prosecution relied, was the act of identification prior to the arrest of the two defendants. It was not possible for the police to have held an identification parade prior to that time.
8 Section 114(2) provides that visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless:
9 (a) an identification parade including the defendant was held before the identification was made or10 Under s 114(2)(a) and subject to sub-paras (b) and (c), evidence of identification will not be admissible unless an identification parade was held “before the identification was made”. The identification upon which the prosecution relied was made when Mrs Flinders first saw the defendants on 28 November. Having regard to this circumstance it is an irresistible conclusion that s 114(2)(b) applied and the evidence of Ms Flinders as to visual identification was not rendered inadmissible for the want of an identification parade.
(b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade or
(c) that the defendant refused to take part in such a parade, and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant.
11 I consider there is considerable force in the submissions advanced by Mr Berman, who appears on behalf of the informant, that had the police arranged an identification parade following the arrest of the two defendants any identification made at that parade by Ms Flinders might be said to have been contaminated by her earlier identification of the two women: Alexander v Queen (1981) 145 CLR 359 at 409; R v Carusi (1997) 192 A Crim R 52 at 55; and R v Clarke (1998) 97 A Crim R 414.
12 For these reasons I consider that the Magistrate erred in law in concluding, for the reasons that he did, that the evidence of identification of the witness, Anna Brielle Flinders, was inadmissible under s 114 of the Evidence Act.
13 I set aside the orders of the Magistrate in respect of each defendant rejecting the evidence of Anna Brielle Flinders as inadmissible pursuant to s 114(2) of the Evidence Act. I set aside, in the case of each defendant, the order of the Magistrate dismissing the information against her charging her with armed robbery contrary to s 97(1) of the Crimes Act. I order in the case of each defendant that the proceedings be remitted to the Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with the law. I do not consider that I have the power or that it would be appropriate to make orders in terms of para 2 of the Amended Summons, namely, that the evidence be admitted in the proceedings before the Magistrate. I propose remitting the proceedings to the Magistrate and he may consider the admission of the visual identification evidence in the light of any further objection which may be advanced to its reception.
14 I order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs as assessed. I order that indemnity certificates in accordance with s 6 of the Suitor’s Fund Act be granted to each defendant.
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Last Modified: 09/21/1999
Details
- AGLC
- DPP v Donald [1999] NSWSC 949
- Case
- [1999] NSWSC 949
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of the Director of Public Prosecutions v Donald was heard in a higher court in Australia, where the defendant, Donald, challenged the admissibility of visual identification evidence provided by a witness against him. The crux of the dispute was whether the identification parade conducted was reasonable and thus whether the evidence derived from it should be admitted. The case hinged on the interpretation and application of section 114 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which pertains to the admissibility of evidence obtained through unfair identification procedures.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the identification process followed was fair and reasonable. The defendant argued that the identification parade was conducted in an unfair manner, thereby rendering the identification evidence inadmissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act. The court needed to determine the threshold for what constituted a reasonable identification procedure and assess whether the procedures in this case met that standard. Additionally, the court had to consider the implications of an unfair identification process on the fairness of the trial itself.
The court examined the statutory provisions and previous case law to establish the criteria for a reasonable identification procedure. It found that the identification parade in question did not meet the necessary standards for fairness as it lacked crucial elements such as ensuring that the suspect was not the only person of a similar appearance in the line-up, and that the witness was not given undue cues about the identity of the suspect. The court concluded that the identification evidence was obtained through an unfair process, and therefore, it was inadmissible under section 114. This decision underscored the importance of fair identification procedures to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.
As a result of the court's findings, the identification evidence was deemed inadmissible, leading to a significant impact on the prosecution's case. The court's ruling emphasised the necessity for law enforcement to adhere strictly to fair identification procedures to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and the evidence obtained is reliable and just.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the identification process followed was fair and reasonable. The defendant argued that the identification parade was conducted in an unfair manner, thereby rendering the identification evidence inadmissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act. The court needed to determine the threshold for what constituted a reasonable identification procedure and assess whether the procedures in this case met that standard. Additionally, the court had to consider the implications of an unfair identification process on the fairness of the trial itself.
The court examined the statutory provisions and previous case law to establish the criteria for a reasonable identification procedure. It found that the identification parade in question did not meet the necessary standards for fairness as it lacked crucial elements such as ensuring that the suspect was not the only person of a similar appearance in the line-up, and that the witness was not given undue cues about the identity of the suspect. The court concluded that the identification evidence was obtained through an unfair process, and therefore, it was inadmissible under section 114. This decision underscored the importance of fair identification procedures to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.
As a result of the court's findings, the identification evidence was deemed inadmissible, leading to a significant impact on the prosecution's case. The court's ruling emphasised the necessity for law enforcement to adhere strictly to fair identification procedures to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and the evidence obtained is reliable and just.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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