Foster & Anor v Longhurst & Anor

Case [2004] QDC 22


DISTRICT  COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Foster & Anor v. Longhurst & Anor [2004] QDC 022

PARTIES:

CLINTON ANTHONY FOSTER (Plaintiff)

v

MARY ROIRI & ELIZABETH GOGGIN (First Defendants)

And

JOHN CLIFFORD LONGHURST & QIC LOGAN HYPERDOME PTY LTD (Second Defendants)

FILE NO:

Appeal No. 4142 of 2002

PROCEEDING:

Application to join a defendant

DELIVERED ON:

26 February 2004

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATES:

5 December 2003

JUDGE:

Judge Brabazon QC

ORDER:

Application dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES OF COURT – PARTIES – OTHER MATTERS – Where the plaintiff seeks to join a defendant after the expiration of the limitation period – Interpretation of UCPR rule 69.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – PERSONAL INJURIES – Where the plaintiff seeks to join another defendant pursuant to s77D or alternatively s59 PIPA – Where the three year limitation period has expired – Whether leave can be granted to proceed.

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, s9, s14, s16, s18, s43, s59, 77D

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld) r69

Bates & Ors v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd & Anor [2001] QSC 083

Kash v SM & TJ Cedergren Builders & Ors [2003] QSC 426

Piper v Nominal Defendant [2003] QCA 557

COUNSEL:

Mr Horvath for the applicant
Mr Harding for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Shane Ellis Lawyer for the applicant

  1. The plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries.  He says that he injured his ankle on 15 October 1999 while stepping on a puddle of water outside a florist shop at the Logan Hyperdome.  The first defendants were the florists at the time. The second defendants were the owners of the shopping centre. 

  1. He now wishes to join a third defendant, Prestige Property Services Pty Ltd.  It was the cleaner at the time of his injury. 

  1. Mr Foster faces two obstacles.  His counsel asked leave to join Prestige Property Services as a defendant, notwithstanding that the three year limitation period for such a proceedings has expired.  Secondly, he asks for the Court’s leave to proceed, notwithstanding his failure to comply with the requirements of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act. 

  1. At the time of his injury Mr Foster was a 23 year old man who worked in the security industry.  He says that his injury did not resolve.  His leg was in plaster for six weeks.  He lost that time from work.  His problems continued, on and off.  In May 2002 he decided to see a solicitor.  He contacted his present solicitors to inquire about pursuing a claim.  He believed he had three years to do that.  He believed that the water he slipped in came from the florist shop, which was close to where the accident occurred.  His solicitors made some investigations, but they were not detailed.  His solicitor had difficulty in completing the required notice of claim, as Mr Foster did not attend on at least three occasions because of transport problems and work call ups.  He had not lodged tax returns, and had few financial records.  Some of his…

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Foster v Longhurst [2004] QDC 22
Case
[2004] QDC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Foster & Anor v Longhurst & Anor, the plaintiffs sought to join a new defendant after the expiration of the limitation period for their personal injury claim. The matter was heard in the District Court of Queensland, where the primary legal issue was whether the plaintiffs could be granted leave to proceed with the addition of the new defendant under either section 77D or section 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). The plaintiffs argued that the court's discretion under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) should allow them to add the new defendant despite the limitation period having lapsed.

The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and the principles of judicial discretion under the UCPR. It was noted that the plaintiffs' argument hinged on whether the court could exercise its discretion to permit the addition of a new defendant when the statutory limitation period had expired. The court considered the statutory objectives behind the limitation period and the discretion available to it under the rules. Ultimately, the court held that the discretion under the UCPR was not to be exercised where the statutory limitation period had expired, as doing so would undermine the fundamental purpose of such periods. Therefore, the plaintiffs' application to join the new defendant was dismissed.

In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiffs could not be granted leave to proceed with the addition of the new defendant after the limitation period had expired. The application was dismissed, and no orders were made to allow the plaintiffs to join the additional defendant. The reasoning focused on the statutory objectives of limitation periods and the appropriate exercise of judicial discretion under the UCPR.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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