Ford v Child Support Registrar

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ford v Child Support Registrar [2009] FCA 328

JOHN PATRICK FORD v CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR

VID 412 of 2007

RYAN J
9 APRIL 2009
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 412 of 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

JOHN PATRICK FORD
Applicant

AND:

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 APRIL 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application by way of appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 412 of 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

JOHN PATRICK FORD
Applicant

AND:

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

9 APRIL 2009

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 23 April 2007, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) handed down a decision which, effectively, denied the applicant access to various documents, and stopped him from making, without the Tribunal’s leave, further claims to those documents;  John Patrick Ford and Child Support Registrar [2007] AATA 1242. The question now before the Court is whether, on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (“the FOI Act”) and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“AAT Act”), the Tribunal was correct in denying the applicant access to those documents.

  2. An appeal lies from the AAT to this Court under s 44 of the AAT Act, on questions of law only:  see Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241 at 254 per Weinberg, Bennett and Edmonds JJ, and the authorities cited by their Honours. That being the nature of the appeal, there are three questions currently before the Court:

    · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in affirming a decision to uphold an exemption under s 37(1)(c) of the FOI Act;

    · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in affirming a decision to uphold an exemption under, in the alternative, s 41(1) of the FOI Act; and

    · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in making a direction under s 42B of the AAT Act.

    Before analysing each of those provisions, it is convenient to set out a little of the background to this matter.

    Factual Background

  3. The following facts, recited by Senior Member Handley in the Tribunal, are not contentious. On 2 November 2005, the applicant made the following request of the respondent;

    ‘My request for access to documents is for all emails and any other correspondence to, from, or between H (AKA Jenkins/ Epstein) and Shaun Epstein, from or to any other person or entity, according to that which I may have access…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ford v Child Support Registrar and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] FCA 328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ford v Child Support Registrar involves an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal pertains to the AAT's affirmation of decisions made by the Child Support Registrar regarding the refusal of a request for documents under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act and the subsequent direction under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (AAT Act). The applicant, Ford, sought extensive documentation from the Registrar, which was refused on the grounds that it would unreasonably divert resources and because the documents did not exist or could not be found. The appeal challenges the correctness of the AAT's decision on these points, specifically regarding the application of certain exemptions and the making of a direction under the AAT Act.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the AAT correctly applied the law in affirming the Registrar's decisions to uphold exemptions under sections 37(1)(c) and 41(1) of the FOI Act and whether the AAT correctly made a direction under section 42B of the AAT Act. The court needed to determine if the AAT appropriately interpreted and applied the statutory provisions in question, ensuring that the legal principles were correctly understood and applied in the context of the appeal.

The Federal Court held that the AAT's reasoning and its final order under section 42B of the AAT Act were correct. The court found no errors in the AAT's formulation or application of the law, confirming that the AAT had correctly interpreted and applied the relevant sections of the FOI Act and the AAT Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, which are to be taxed if the parties cannot agree on the amount.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application by way of appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

An appeal lies from the AAT to this Court under s 44 of the AAT Act, on questions of law only: see Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241 at 254 per Weinberg, Bennett and Edmonds JJ, and the authorities cited by their Honours. That being the nature of the appeal, there are three questions currently before the Court: · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in affirming a decision to uphold an exemption under s 37(1)(c) of the FOI Act; · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in affirming a decision to uphold an exemption under, in the alternative, s 41(1) of the FOI Act; and · Whether the Tribunal stated and applied the law correctly in making a direction under s 42B of the AAT Act. Before analysing each of those provisions, it is convenient to set out a little of the background to this matter. Factual Background The following facts, recited by Senior Member Handley in the Tribunal, are not contentious. On 2 November 2005, the applicant made the following request of the respondent; ‘My request for access to documents is for all emails and any other correspondence to, from, or between H (AKA Jenkins/ Epstein) and Shaun Epstein, from or to any other person or entity, according to that which I may have access under the Freedom of Information Act. This includes anything deleted or recoverable and for the period 30 August 2005 to 30 November 2005 inclusively.’In correspondence, an officer of the respondent advised that the request had been interpreted as “being for documents wherein you or your circumstances are mentioned in any way, either explicitly or by reference”, to which the applicant responded: ‘I concur with your interpretation of my request, and add that it extends to documents that might be read in the context of me or my circumstances, i.e. that which has relevance. The context includes and is not limited to the criminal proceedings, relationships, the workplace, civil debt proceedings, FOI matters and so on. Documents include emails, texted documents or attachments to emails…The qualification of to from or between also includes to or from any other person or institution, and does not restrict the scope to Epstein and H.’ The use of the acronym “H” occurred when, after handing down the Tribunal’s decision in this matter, Handley SM published a corrigendum, the effect of which was to remove a person’s name from all public documents relating to this case. I have continued the use of the same acronym which designates a member of the respondent’s staff. As can readily be observed, the applicant’s request as formulated was extremely wide. On 2 February 2006, the respondent advised by letter that it had been decided to refuse the request under s 24(1) of the FOI Act because the request “would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of [the respondent] from its other operations”. On 21 March 2006, the applicant having refused to narrow or to refine his request, the respondent repeated its refusal under s 24(1), and added another ground of refusal invoking s 24A, which provides that “[r]equests may be refused if documents cannot be found or do not exist”. The delegate of the respondent then added that, even if the documents did exist, “their retrieval from backup tapes would be a substantial and unreasonable diversion of [the respondent]’s resources.” Later, in its Statement of Facts and Contentions in the Tribunal, the respondent amplified its reliance on s 24A, contending that the applicant’s application was “futile” because the documents he had sought did not exist.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J
As neither the Tribunal’s process of reasoning nor its final order under s 42B discloses any error in the formulation or application of the law, this ground of appeal must also fail.Conclusion For the reasons outlined above, the first ground of the appeal has not been made out, the second ground does not require to be determined and the third ground also fails. The application by way of appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J

Full text does not contain this section.