Forbes v Jingle

Case [2014] QDC 204


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Forbes v Jingle [2014] QDC 204

PARTIES:

CONSTABLE BENJAMIN FORBES
(appellant)

v

DOUGLAS WAYNE JINGLE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Cairns DC 41 of 2014

DIVISION:

District Court

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Weipa

DELIVERED ON:

17 September 2014

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 July 2014

JUDGE:

Harrison DCJ

ORDER:

1. Appeal dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

OFFENCE OF FAILING TO STOP MOTOR VEHICLE PURSUANT TO S 754 FO THE POLICE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ACT 2000 – Respondent sentenced to 12 months probation – whether s 754, on its ordinary meaning, excluded imposition of probation orders – Statutory interpretation .

Justices Act 1886 (Qld)
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)
Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Bill 2013(Qld)
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992(Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)

Commissioner of Police Service (Qld) v Magistrate Spencer & Ors [2013] QSC 202
Uittenbosch v Department of Corrective Services [2005] QCA 300

COUNSEL:

M Dickson (Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions)

(appellant)

J Sheridan (instructed by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service)

(respondent)

  1. This is an appeal against sentence by the original complainant pursuant to the provisions of s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (“the JA”).

  1. On 19 February 2014 the respondent, Douglas Wayne Jingle, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court at Weipa to an offence of failing to comply with a direction to stop a motor vehicle pursuant to the provisions of s 754 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (“the PPRA”).

  1. He was convicted, placed on probation for a period of 12 months, and disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers' license for a period of two years. 

  1. The appellant has appealed on the basis that:

1. the Magistrate erred in law by holding that it was open for the Court to impose a period of probation, which it was argued was contrary to the provisions of s 754 of the PPRA; and

2.          as a result, the sentence was manifestly inadequate.

  1. Section 754 of the PPRA, insofar as is relevant, provides:

“(1) This section applies if, in the exercise of a power under an Act, a police officer using a police service motor vehicle gives the driver of another motor vehicle a direction to stop the motor vehicle the driver is driving.

(2) The driver of the motor vehicle must stop the motor vehicle as soon as reasonably practicable if a reasonable person would stop the motor vehicle in the circumstances.

Minimum penalty—

(a) if the driver is a participant in a criminal organisation within the meaning of the Criminal Code, section 60A—100 penalty units or 100 days imprisonment served wholly in a corrective services facility; or

(b) otherwise—50 penalty units or 50 days imprisonment served wholly in a corrective services facility.

Maximum penalty—200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment.

(3) If a court convicts a person of an offence against subsection (2), the court, in addition to imposing a penalty, must disqualify the…

Continue reading Forbes v Jingle

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Forbes v Jingle [2014] QDC 204
Case
[2014] QDC 204
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Forbes v Jingle involved the respondent being charged with an offence under section 754 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 for failing to stop a motor vehicle when directed to do so by a police officer. The respondent was sentenced to 12 months of probation. The question before the court was whether the statutory provision, on its ordinary meaning, precluded the imposition of a probation order as a penalty for the offence. The court had to interpret the relevant legislation to determine if the statutory language permitted probation as a sentence for this type of offence. The court's reasoning focused on the language and structure of the statute, considering whether the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 754 excluded probation as a permissible penalty. After examining the relevant statutory provisions and the ordinary meaning of the words used, the court concluded that the statutory language did not exclude the imposition of a probation order. The court held that the ordinary meaning of the statute did not preclude the imposition of probation and therefore dismissed the appeal. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's sentence of 12 months probation was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.