Florea and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)

Florea and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2021] AATA 3321 (17 September 2021)
Division:General Division
File Number(s): 2021/2784
Re:Constanta Florea
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
Date:17 September 2021
Place:Brisbane

The decision under review is set aside and substituted with a decision that the Tribunal does not exercise the discretion in s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse to grant the Applicant a Visitor (Class FA) Subclass 600 visa.
...........................[sgd].................................
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
Catchwords
MIGRATION – review of decision under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refusing to grant a Class FA subclass 600 visitor visa – where the visa Applicant does not pass the character test – where there is a substantial criminal record – consideration of Ministerial Direction Number 90 – negligent driving – traffic offences – decision under review set aside and substituted
Legislation
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases
Faavesi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 1872
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454
HZCP and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 273 FCR 121
Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 74 AAR 545
Secondary Materials
Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA
DECISION
REASONS FOR DECISION
ISSUES
DOES THE APPLICANT PASS THE CHARACTER TEST?
SHOULD THE TRIBUNAL EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO GRANT THE VISA TO THE APPLICANT?
The principles in paragraph 5.2
The Primary and Other Considerations
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 1: PROTECTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY
Application of factors in paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction
Criminal offence – bodily injury by negligence
Traffic history
Application of other factors in paragraph 8.1.1 of the Direction
Conclusion on the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s offending
The risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community were the Applicant to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct (8.1.2(2)(a))
The likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct (8.1.2(2)(b))
Conclusions on likelihood of re-offending
Is the risk of harm affected by any of the factors referred to in 8.1.2(2)(c)?
Conclusions on risk
Conclusion: Primary Consideration 1
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 2: FAMILY VIOLENCE
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 3: THE BEST INTERESTS OF MINOR CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIA
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 4: EXPECTATIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY
The Respondent’s contentions
Analysis – Allocation of Weight to this Primary Consideration 4
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
(c) Impact on victims
(d) Strength, nature and duration of ties
1. Impact of non-revocation on the Applicant’s immediate family in Australia
3. Impact on Australian business interests
Weight allocable to Other Consideration 4: links to the Australian community
Findings: Other Considerations
CONCLUSION
Should the Tribunal exercise its power to refuse to grant the Applicant’s visa?
DECISION
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
17 September 2021

Marius Adrian Brindas (“Applicant”) is a 43 year old citizen and resident of Romania.[1] His mother, Constanta Florea, migrated to Australia in 2004.[2] A few years ago, Mr Brindas applied for a Visitor (Class FA) Subclass 600 visa (“Visa”) so that he, his brother, his wife and children could come and visit his mother.[3]
[1]See G, 21.
[2]A5.
[3]G, 20.
On 30 May 2020, a delegate of the of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (“Minister” or “Respondent”) wrote to the Applicant and indicated that the Respondent was considering whether to refuse the Application under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).[4] The letter invited the Applicant to comment on the information that indicated he does not pass the character test and provide reasons why his application should not be refused. It appears from the delegate’s decision that the Applicant did not reply to the 30 May 2020 invitation.[5]
[4]G, 68–71.
[5]G, 15[5].
On 13 April 2021, the Respondent refused the visa under s 501(1) of the Act.[6]
[6]G, 11–12.
The Applicant’s mother, Constanta Florea, applied for review of the refusal decision. This Application came before me for hearing on 2 and 3 August 2021. The written evidence was reduced to an agreed Exhibit List, a true and correct copy of which is attached to these reasons and marked Annexure A.
ISSUES
Section 501(1) of the Act provides that:
(1)…The Minister may refuse to grant a visa to a person if the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.”
There are, therefore, two issues presently before the Tribunal:
(a)whether the Applicant can satisfy the Tribunal that he passes the character test; and, if not,
(b)whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion conferred by s 501(1) of the Act to refuse to grant the visa to the Applicant.
If the Applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he passes the character test, the weight of authority indicates that the Tribunal must grant the visa to the Applicant. If the Applicant does not satisfy the Tribunal that he passes the character test, the Tribunal must consider whether to exercise its discretion to refuse to grant the visa. I will address each of those grounds in turn.
DOES THE APPLICANT PASS THE CHARACTER TEST?
The Applicant fails the character test because he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. [7] He received that sentence for the offence of “negligence causing bodily harm”.[8] It is not material that he was immediately released on probation.
[7]See Act ss 501(6), 501(7)(a).
[8]G, 35.
SHOULD THE TRIBUNAL EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO GRANT THE VISA TO THE APPLICANT?
The Tribunal is bound by s 499(2A) to comply with any directions made under the Act. In this case, Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (“the Direction” or “Direction 90”) has application.[9] The Direction provides guidance for decision-makers on how to exercise the discretion. Relevantly, it states that:
“Informed by the principles in paragraph 5.2, a decision-maker must take into account the considerations identified in sections 8 and 9, where relevant to the decision.”[10]
[9]Direction 90 commenced on 15 April 2021. It revokes Direction No. 79 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA.
[10]Direction, sub-paragraph 6. See also Direction sub-paragraph 4(1) which provides that “decision-maker” includes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in making a decision under s 501 or 501CA of the Act.
The principles in paragraph 5.2
Paragraph 5.2 of the Direction is designed to “provide a framework within which decision-makers should approach their task” under s 501 or 501CA, as the case may be. Summarised where appropriate, the principles are:
(1)Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia.
(2)Non-citizens who engage in, or have engaged in, criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia.
(3)The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they have engaged in conduct in Australia or elsewhere that raises serious character concerns (regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community).
(4)Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non- citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non- citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
(5)Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen’s conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation. In particular, the inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence and the other types of conduct or suspected conduct mentioned in paragraph 8.4(2) (Expectations of the Australian Community) is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient in some circumstances, even if the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
The Primary and Other Considerations
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Direction respectively stipulate four “Primary Considerations”, and four “Other Considerations” which I must be guided by in making my decision.
The Primary Considerations I must take into account are:
“(1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;
(2) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;
(3) the best interests of minor children in Australia;
(4) expectations of the Australian community.”[11]
[11]Direction, paragraph 8.
The Other Considerations which, where relevant, I must take into account “include but are not limited to”:
“a) international non-refoulement obligations;
b) extent of impediments if removed;
c) impact on victims;
d) links to the Australian community, including:
i) strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;
ii) impact on Australian business interests”[12]
[12]Direction, paragraph 9(1).
Paragraph 7 of the Direction also provides guidance as to how to take into account each primary and other consideration. Briefly summarised, the Direction instructs decision-makers that:
(1)information from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight;
(2)Primary Considerations should “generally” be given greater weight than Other Considerations; and
(3)One or more Primary Considerations may outweigh other Primary Considerations.
The guidance in paragraph 7 I have quoted above does not differ materially from the guidance which appeared in former directions. In Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Colvin J said of the former Direction 65 that:
“…Direction 65 [a predecessor to Direction 90] makes clear that an evaluation is required in each case as to the weight to be given to the 'other considerations' (including non‑refoulement obligations). It requires both primary and other considerations to be given 'appropriate weight'. Direction 65 does provide that, generally, primary considerations should be given greater weight. They are primary in the sense that absent some factor that takes the case out of that which pertains 'generally' they are to be given greater weight. However, Direction 65 does not require that the other considerations be treated as secondary in all cases. Nor does it provide that primary considerations are 'normally' given greater weight. Rather, Direction 65 concerns the appropriate weight to be given to both 'primary' and 'other considerations'. In effect, it requires an inquiry as to whether one or more of the other considerations should be treated as being a primary consideration or the consideration to be afforded greatest weight in the particular circumstances of the case because it is outside the circumstances that generally apply.”[13]
[13](2018) 74 AAR 545.
I will now turn to addressing the abovementioned Primary and Other considerations.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 1: PROTECTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY
In considering this Primary Consideration 1, paragraph 8.1(1) of the Direction compels decision-makers to keep in mind the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens. Decision-makers should have particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that this country confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, that they will respect important institutions and that they will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.
In determining the weight applicable to this Primary Consideration 1, paragraph 8.1(2) of the Direction requires decision-makers to give consideration to:
a)The nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date; and
b)The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
Application of factors in paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction
When assessing the nature and seriousness of a non-citizen’s criminal offending or other conduct to date, decision-makers must have regard to the factors set out in paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction.
Any assessment of the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct requires, by definition, reference to the offences he has committed and, where available, the views of judges who dealt with the Applicant.
The Applicant has never been to Australia. Accordingly, he has no traffic or criminal history in this country. His traffic history in Romania is unremarkable. His criminal history in Romania refers to the imposition of a sentence resulting from a motor vehicle collision. He has no further criminal history in Romania or anywhere else.
I will deal with the Applicant’s criminal history and traffic history separately below.
Criminal offence – bodily injury by negligence
On 24 April 2015 in the District Court of Oravita, Romania, the Applicant was convicted of causing bodily injury by negligence.[14] The court issued a formal judgment, which appears somewhat analogous to a judgment or sentencing remarks of a common law court in Australia.
[14]See G, 37–42. See especially G, 40, which records that a subset of the events which occurred on the day of the offence ”meets the constitutive elements of the offence of bodily injury by negligence, provided by Art. 184 para. 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code of 1969.”
Somewhat strangely, a letter from a Romanian lawyer in the material describes the offence as “culpable bodily harm” and does not refer to negligence (See A7, 1).
In summary, the court found that on 23 May 2013 at around 1:30pm, the Applicant and three other people were at a school in Romania, where the Applicant attended night classes. The group got into the Applicant’s VW Golf, and the Applicant was to drive them to their respective houses.
The court described the conditions on the day of the offence, writing: “the road was wet, the sky was cloudy, heavy rain, daylight visibility, the road had generalised bumps and in the road accident area the roadway had a slight slope with longitudinal bumps.”[15] The Applicant, in disregard for the road conditions, drove “with an excessive speed of approximately 120–130KM/h, according to the passengers’ declarations […] without keeping the safety distance from the vehicle in front […]”[16]
[15]G, 38.
[16]G, 38.
Apparently, the vehicle in front of the Applicant “hit the brakes to avoid impact with another vehicle driving slowly because it was about to turn left”. The Applicant swerved into the oncoming lane to avoid the vehicle in front, and collided head-on with an Opel Zafira car. The court found that neither driver was affected by alcohol – they were tested with a breathalyser in hospital, and each returned a “0.00mg/L pure alcohol in the breath” result.
The court found that seven people were injured, to varying degrees. The aftermath of the crash can be summarised as follows.
(i)The Applicant was transported by ambulance. He was diagnosed with chest trauma and left knee trauma, and remained under medical observation.
(ii)The passenger in the right front seat of the Applicant’s car[17] was transported by ambulance. They were diagnosed with “acute and closed craniofacial trauma, excoriations on the right side, trauma in the left maxillary region”, and remained under medical observation.
(iii)The passenger in the centre back seat of the Applicant’s car was transported by ambulance. They were diagnosed with “[r]ight shoulder and bilateral calves trauma”, and remained under medical observation.
(iv)The passenger on the left back seat of the Applicant’s car was transported by ambulance. They were diagnosed with “[c]raniocerebral trauma with occipital concussion wound, left shoulder trauma”, and remained under medical observation.
(v)The passenger on the right back seat of the Applicant’s car was transported by ambulance. They were initially transported to Oravita Hospital and received a preliminary diagnoses of “multiple trauma by road accident, right femur trauma, TCC with multiple wounds on the front region”. They were subsequently transported to Resita County Hospital and diagnosed with “[o]pen acute TCC with wounds and fracture in the upper third of the right femur with movement.” They remained hospitalised, but it is unclear how long that was for.
(vi)The driver of the Opel Zafira was transported by ambulance to Oravita hospital. She was diagnosed with chest trauma. She was not hospitalised.
(vii)The passenger on the right front seat of the Opel Zafira was transported by ambulance to Oravita Hospital. She received a preliminary diagnosis of “TCF with front open wound, right arm trauma”. She was later transported to Resita county hospital and diagnosed with “[c]losed and acute TCC right hummers [sic – presumably a reference to humerus] fracture”.
[17]Remembering that in Europe, the steering wheel is on the left-hand side.
The Applicant’s cross-examination about the circumstances of the motor vehicle collision did not, to my mind, produce anything remarkable. He largely accepted the version of the collision as recorded by the above-described sentencing record of the court. He gave a cogent reason for his speeding. This reason does not, of course, excuse his conduct in exceeding the speed limit and thus being primarily responsible for the collision. Further, the Applicant accepted that if he had not been exceeding the speed limit, the injuries suffered by the victims may well have been less serious.
This is what transpired in the cross-examination:
“MR CUMMINGS: Was it raining on the day of the offence?
INTERPRETER: I’m sorry?
MR CUMMINGS: Was it raining on the day of the accident?
INTERPRETER: Thank you. Yes.
MR CUMMINGS: Do you accept that rainy conditions means that speeding is a particularly bad idea?
INTERPRETER: Yes.
MR CUMMINGS: You knew that in May 2013, didn’t you?
INTERPRETER: Yes.
MR CUMMINGS: Was there any reason for you to be speeding on that day?
INTERPRETER: I was in a hurry to get home. I had a young baby that had been born two months ago. I accelerated at the time, not very much.
MR CUMMINGS: So are those good reasons to speed?
INTERPRETER: Yes, it’s not good reason, indeed the baby was in need of the milk powder and I was in a rush and I did not take into consideration that it was rainy and things like that.
MR CUMMINGS: Do you accept that if you weren’t speeding the accident might not have happened?
INTERPRETER: Maybe yes, maybe no. I tried to avoid the accident - I tried to avoid an accident which was the car in front of me and I also could go into it, and I entered into another (indistinct) by trying to avoid the accident, I generated another accident.
MR CUMMINGS: Do you accept that if you weren’t speeding the injury the victim suffered might have been less serious?
INTERPRETER: Yes, it’s normal.”[18]
[18]Transcript, 29, lines 16–45; 29, lines 1–9.

During cross-examination, the Applicant was pressed about the extent to which he had exceeded the prevailing speed limit in the circumstances of the abovementioned motor vehicle collision.
In answer to a question I put to him, the Applicant told the hearing that to the best of his memory, the applicable speed limit on the subject road was 50 kilometres per hour.[19] During cross-examination, tension arose in the Applicant’s evidence as a result of questions put to him about the speed at which he was travelling at the time of the collision. He was taken to the abovementioned portion of the Romanian court’s sentencing remarks/findings. This is what transpired in the cross-examination:
“MR CUMMINGS: How fast were you driving?
INTERPRETER: Approximately 70 kilometres per hour.
MR CUMMINGS: Can you think of any reason why the passengers in the car you were driving might have thought you were driving 50 kilometres an hour faster than you actually were driving?
INTERPRETER: I’m sorry, I did not understand. (Indistinct). I did not understand you. (Indistinct). Okay. (Indistinct) normal (indistinct) 60 kilometres per hour.
MR CUMMINGS: Right. So let me ask the question again. The judge that sentenced you in 2015 seems to have done so on the basis you were driving 120 to 130 kilometres an hour, but you’ve just said to us that you were driving 70 kilometres an hour.
INTERPRETER: Yes. I (indistinct) 71 as I have already said. That was the speed I was driving at. I also recommended that legal measurement should be done, and that was not proved. And the judge made the decision on the basis of the statement written by the people that were in the car. That is why the 120 to 130.”[20]
[19]See Transcript, 34, lines 3–10.
[20]Transcript, 25, lines 13–34.
Therefore, on the Applicant’s version, he was driving at something in the order of 20 kilometres per hour above the applicable speed limit. On the version propounded by the Respondent, he was travelling at 70–80 kilometres per hour above the speed limit.
During closing submissions, the Respondent contended that the Romanian court “[…] found the visa applicant was driving 70–80 kilometres over the speed limit. […] The tribunal should not make a factual finding that is different to what the Romanian court found.”[21]
[21]Transcript, 48, lines 40–41, 44–45.
The Respondent has not specifically referred to HZCP and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection or any of the cases which preceded it. However, the Respondent’s submission is an invocation of the principles discussed in HZCP. This submission is, with respect, misconceived. In HZCP, a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia wrote:
“The adjudgment of guilt, and the determination of the punishment to be imposed as a consequence (including a sentence of imprisonment), fall within the central conception of judicial power. It is inconsistent with this principle at the heart of the separation of powers to suggest that an administrative decision-maker could come to a factual conclusion contrary to that of a court when making an adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt which is, in turn, the precondition to that administrative decision-maker’s power.”[22]
[22]HZCP and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 273 FCR 121 (“HZCP”), 139[77].
Firstly, in its judgment,[23] the Romanian Court noted “[…] the defendant [Applicant] did not take into account the weather and road conditions, drove with an excessive speed of 120-130KM/h, according to passengers’ declarations, […]” [my emphasis and underlining].[24] To be clear, the Romanian court did make an actual finding about the Applicant travelling at 120-130km/h. Rather, it was reporting what was contained in relevant witness statements before it about the nature of the Applicant’s driving on the day of the collision.
[23]See generally, G, 37–42.
[24]G, 38.
Second, the Applicant’s speed did not form part of the elements of the crime the Applicant was convicted for.[25] The material contains what looks like a report or commentary about the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s abovementioned offence in the context of the Romanian criminal law. The author is a Mr Ion Varzaru, Solicitor/Attorney-at-Law. As best as I understood Mr Varzaru’s report, he operates as a legal practitioner under his own account in Romania. The scope of instructions provided by the Applicant’s mother (who requested Mr Varzaru’s report) can be seen in the first paragraph:
“As requested by you, we make the following brief considerations regarding the severity of the offence of culpable bodily harm, committed by your son, Brandas Marius Adrian”[26]
[25]See HZCP.
[26]A8, 1.
At the beginning of his report, Mr Varzaru refers to the “constitutive elements” of the offence of culpable bodily harm, for which the Applicant was convicted. For a conviction to be secured, only one of the five “constitutive elements” of the offence must be met. None of those five elements refers to a speed threshold. The Court considered that the second of the elements – “traumatic injuries or damage to the health of a person, which required, for recovery, more than 90 days of medical care” – was made out and, on that basis, convicted the Applicant.
With specific reference to the factors appearing at paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction, I do not consider that the above-described offending engages any of the factors particularised at paragraphs 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)–(iii) or (b)(i)–(iv). Accordingly, none of these factors serve to inform me about the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s above-described conduct.
At the conclusion of his cross-examination, I put a specific question to the Applicant about whether he accepted that he was the cause of the motor vehicle collision. He was forthright in accepting liability for causing the collision. He confirmed that he was not under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs at the time of the collision and that, as a professional driver, he does not drink alcohol at all. As best as I understood his evidence, the Applicant was trying to avoid one accident and, in so doing, caused an actual accident:
“SENIOR MEMBER: All right. I just have a couple more questions. Now at the trial the applicant very helpfully said that there was a finding that the accident was his fault. Does he remember that?
INTERPRETER: Yes, I admitted my fault and I knew it was my fault. Practically I wanted to avoid and to do a good thing, I ended up doing a bad thing.
SENIOR MEMBER: At the trial there was no finding or decision that the accident involved the applicant being under the influence of alcohol or drugs?
INTERPRETER: I don’t drink alcohol. I’m a professional driver, I don’t drink - I don’t like it first of all and secondly, when the phone rings I must work so I never have to be drunk and I never drink.
SENIOR MEMBER: All right. So the cause of the accident was the applicant trying to avoid one accident but only causing another accident. That’s what’s happened isn’t it?
INTERPRETER: Yes. I do this every day, I avoid accidents.”[27]
[27]Transcript, 36, lines 27–46.
In his report (as best as I understood it), Mr Varzaru sought to assess the seriousness of the Applicant’s offending on the basis of a number of “days of medical care” required to be administered to the victim/s. Mr Varzaru opines thus:
“Thus, the aspects that determined the increase in the number of days of medical care will be accounted for and an abstract evaluation will be carried out, taking into account the initial situation of the patient, as anticipated if the mentioned circumstances would not have intervened.
In fact, the number of days of medical care also relates to the consequences which the trauma caused to the victim will affect their future.
Therefore, the medical evaluation aims to analyze retrospectively, starting from the damage suffered, the medical evolution of the trauma caused by the harmful event, and an essential role in this operation is played by existing medical documents that confirm and support the objectivity of scientific conclusions.
We note that one of the conditions for the event to constitute an offence is when the victim needs more than 90 days of medical care for recovery.
In this case, the number of 100 days of medical care does not far exceed the threshold prescribed by the law.”[28]
[My emphasis]
[28]A8, 2–3.
In his final analysis, Mr Varzaru seems to suggest that the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s offending would have been at a higher level if the injuries suffered by a victim/s had passed a threshold of permanent disability or damage. He also sought to emphasise that the wholly suspended custodial term indicative of a lower level of seriousness of the offending:
“We consider that the event would have had more serious consequences if the injured party had suffered a disability, a permanent aesthetic damage or an abortion or endangering their life, as these consequences are irreversible.
We also emphasize the fact that the execution of the sentence ordered on the defendant was suspended by the court.”[29]
[29]A8, 3.
I am mindful that paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b) does not limit the range of conduct that may be considered serious for the purposes of making a finding about the nature and seriousness of specific conduct. While the Applicant’s conduct does not engage the componentry of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8.1.1, I nevertheless form the view – based primarily on the report of Mr Varzaru – that the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct can be found to be “moderately serious”. As against that, it should be noted that Mr Varzaru was not called to give evidence and the Respondent did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him on the findings contained in his report.
With reference to paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c), it should be noted that the Applicant received a custodial term of one year of imprisonment. That one year was apparently fully suspended for an operative probation period of three years.[30] Further, while I am not sure whether the imposition of an order to made by a Romanian court to pay civil damages to victims of the collision constitutes a “sentence imposed by the courts for a crime or crimes”, I will err on the side of caution and assume that it does.
[30]See G, 42, second and third paragraphs – especially the bold section.
These civil damages were ordered to be paid to specific victims. While I do not profess any expertise in comparative values of currencies at particular points in time, I note for the sake of reference that as at 2015 (the date of the Romanian court’s order), the Romanian currency had a value of approximately one-third of the Australian dollar. As best as I can estimate it, the totality of the sums ordered to be paid by the Applicant to the victims amounted to 16,734 Romanian Leu or approximately $AUD 5,500.
I cannot safely find that an application of this sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction takes the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s offending any further than a level of “moderate seriousness” as I have found pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 8.1.1(1).
Traffic history
The Respondent also calls on the Tribunal to have regard to the following three offences to assess the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct. The material contains references to four entries in the Applicant’s traffic history. One of those four entries is a reference to traffic infringements arising from the above-described motor vehicle collision in May 2013. The rest are described thus:
·21 May 2013 – irregular parking;
·7 November 2013 – exceed speed limit by 31–40km/h;
·7 November 2013 – not using the safety belt/helmet.[31]
[31]G, 34.
The traffic history, in and of itself, is unremarkable. However, six months after the Applicant caused the May 2013 crash, that is, in November 2013 he was detected driving 31–40km/h over the approved speed limit. This is what transpired during cross-examination:
“MR CUMMINGS: I’m looking at page 34 of the G documents again. On that page as I read it, it says you committed two irregularities on 7 November 2013; exceed speed limit by 31 to 40 kilometres an hour and not using the safety belt/helmet. Can you tell us what that means?
INTERPRETER: I remember something but it’s written there, that’s it (indistinct).
MR CUMMINGS: Say that again, sorry, I missed it, I think.
INTERPRETER: I remember I (indistinct) something but it’s written there, that’s it, that may be the case.
MR CUMMINGS: You think you might have been convicted of driving 30 to 40 kilometres over the speed limit but you can’t remember?
INTERPRETER: Yes,
MR CUMMINGS: You think you might have been convicted of driving 30 to 40 kilometres over the speed limit but you can’t remember?
INTERPRETER: Yes, I remember when that happened. I must have been, you know, I can’t tell whether that document’s about anybody speeding at a higher - driving at a higher speed or the detail about the belt. Yes, I can’t remember that document about (indistinct).
MR CUMMINGS: As I read the document it suggests that six months after you got into the accident in May 2013, which led to people’s bones being broken, you got convicted of another speeding offence. Is that what happened or - - -
INTERPRETER: I don’t remember exactly about the incident that followed but I remember having been fined.”[32]
[32]Transcript, 30, lines 11–43.
During his evidence in cross-examination, the Applicant did not appear to cavil with the nature of his abovementioned traffic history. Further, he was candid enough with his evidence to tell the hearing that, in the course of his over-two-decades of working life as a professional truck driver, he has incurred four speeding infringements. I understood these four speeding infringements to be in addition to the traffic history referred to above. None of those four infringements resulted in the loss of any of the Applicant’s driving privileges – either as a professional truck driver or as a driver of his own motor vehicle on Romanian and other European roads:
“MR CUMMINGS: Do you accept that if you commit more speeding offences that might cause accidents in which people get really hurt?
INTERPRETER: I have been driving a truck for 25 years and that means about over 3.5 million kilometres altogether and I was - I received only four fines for speeding.
MR CUMMINGS: Four fines for speeding?
INTERPRETER: Four speeding fines. Yes, I cannot be perfect. I am trying hard to be perfect but I am not perfect.
MR CUMMINGS: So when did - could you tell us the date for each of the four speeding fines?
SENIOR MEMBER: Mr Cummings, could I just stop there. I don’t think this is really going anywhere. The man’s a professional driver, he’s been driving for 25 years and he’s incurred four speeding infringements. I really don’t think that speaks at all to his risk. Now one thing you might ask him which I would be interested in is whether any of those speeding offences were egregious in the sense that they were accessibly over the speed limit such that he lost his driving privileges as a truck driver, for example. That’s relevant. But I’m really not interested in him over 25 years and three and a half million kilometres, which is to the moon and back 10 times, whether he’s been caught for speeding four times at say 10 or even 20 kilometres over a speed limit, driving a large articulated vehicle. So I’m happy to hear about whether any of those four offences were egregious or serious or resulted in a termination, temporary termination of his driving privileges. That’s interesting to me, but in terms of four offences across four million kilometres, I’m just not really sure that that goes that far. But it’s up to you, you can ask as you wish.
MR CUMMINGS: Thank you, Senior Member, that’s helpful. Mr Applicant, the four speeding fines that you received, did any of them result in your losing your licence?
INTERPRETER: No.
MR CUMMINGS: Does that include the offence we’ve been talking about today in May 2013?
INTERPRETER: Yes, I did not lose my licence following the - those four speeding fines, I lost my licence once as a consequence of that accident I had. And I had so many negative consequences for a period of more than two years. The trial was three years long, I had lost a very, very good job. I was driving (indistinct) very good job, I didn’t have any licence. I had two very young children to raise. My mother used to help me as much as she could from where she was. Yes, I didn’t have an income for a long period of time so yes, it was (indistinct).”[33]
[Errors in original]
[33]Transcript, 30, lines 45–46; 31, lines 1–46.
With specific reference to paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c) of the Direction, I note that penalties imposed on the Applicant for the balance of his three traffic offences in Romania (that is, excluding the traffic offence that resulted in the collision), the relevant page of the material that records this traffic history seems silent or otherwise uninformative about the nature and extent of any penalties imposed for the balance of those three offences.[34] Further, there is nothing in the material indicating the nature of the penalties imposed for the Applicant’s four speeding offences committed over his 25 year career as a professional truck driver. Taken in total, I do not consider that whatever penalties may have been imposed on this Applicant for his traffic offences can, to any safe extent, militate in favour of a finding that the totality of his offending has been anything other than moderately serious, at its highest.
[34]G, 34.
Application of other factors in paragraph 8.1.1 of the Direction
Sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction points a decision-maker to the frequency of a non-citizen’s offending and whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness. I am hard-pressed to allocate any level of relevance of this factor to determination of the instant application. I will first make reference to the Applicant’s traffic offending.
I have found that he has committed three traffic offences in Romania (removing the offence arising from the circumstances of the motor vehicle collision) and, in addition, he appears to have accumulated four speeding offences across a 25 year career as a professional truck driver. All of the Applicant’s traffic history in Romania was committed across a six month period in 2013. As best as I understood his evidence, Romania has been his home for his entire life and one can safely assume he has done most of his driving in that country. I do not consider three or four traffic offences across a driving career exceeding two decades and approaching three decades to be “frequent”.
It is to be accepted, of course, that the consequences arising from the Applicant’s criminal offence in May 2013 giving rise to the motor vehicle collision were serious. The authorities in Romania were quite right to suspend the Applicant’s driving privileges consequent upon his driving conduct resulting in the collision. But this is a singular offence, albeit one of moderate seriousness. There is no escalation in seriousness from that offending looking forward from May 2013. The only offending the Applicant appears to have done since May 2013 in Romania involves speeding offence and failure to wear a helmet/seat belt. In addition, he has volunteered his four low-level convictions for speeding in the course of his work as a cross-continental professional truck driver over the last 25 years.
I do not find that the Applicant’s offending displays a trend of increasing seriousness. He did what he did in May 2013 for which the Romanian courts sentenced him. His offending since then comes nowhere near any sort of escalation or increase in seriousness of his conduct that occurred in May 2013.

Accordingly, this sub-paragraph (d) is of minimal, if any, assistance in the assessment of the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct.
Sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction concerns itself with an examination of the cumulative effect of an Applicant’s repeated offending. Save and except for the circumstances of his traffic offending leading to the circumstances of the abovementioned motor vehicle collision in May 2013, the Applicant has an otherwise unremarkable traffic history. I do not find that this resulting traffic history (ie post-May 2013) is suggestive of negative cumulative effects such as (1) the Applicant having a reckless indifference to the laws governing road usage; (2) that his post-May 2013 conduct has consumed an inordinate level of policing or judicial resources.
For something to be assessed in cumulative terms, there must be successive elements towards some kind of cumulative outcome. Here, apart from his conduct in May 2013, the Applicant has only committed unremarkable traffic offences. This sub-paragraph (e) is therefore neutral in terms of ascertaining the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct.
Sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction points to an inquiry as to whether a non-citizen has provided false or misleading information to the Department, including by not disclosing prior criminal offending. There is evidence in the material which tends to show that the Applicant has provided “false or misleading information to the Department”. For the reasons which follow, even though the Applicant has provided false or misleading information, I do not find that this greatly affects the nature of his conduct or increases its seriousness.
I will deal first with his failure to disclose the four speeding fines which do not appear in the material before the Tribunal, and which were only revealed in the Applicant’s oral evidence. I do not give this non-disclosure great weight for two reasons. First, I am not certain that four relatively low-level speeding offences across a 25 year professional truck driving career constitute “criminal offending”. None of those four offences resulted in the loss of the Applicant’s driving privileges either as a truck driver or as a driver of his own private vehicle. Second, it should be noted that the Applicant is not legally represented and is unsophisticated in the conduct of these types of applications. An unrepresented, non-legally trained person might not have realised the relevance of these additional speeding tickets incurred during his time as a professional truck driver
In any event, he readily volunteered the commission of these four low-level traffic offences during his oral evidence in cross-examination. In closing submissions, the Respondent’s representative did not contend that the non-disclosure of these low-level traffic offences attracted the operation of sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction. As I understood the Respondent’s submissions, they were centred on the Applicant’s level of contrition in the context of his recidivist risk.[35]
[35]See Transcript, 50, lines 25–46.
A perhaps more significant difficulty for the Applicant appears in the Form 80 that he completed. At Question 36, he is asked “have you […] ever […] been convicted of an offence in any country (including any conviction which is now removed from official records?” The Applicant ticked the “no” box.[36] The Form 80 is dated 27 November 2017. The Respondent’s department, upon receipt of the application for the visitor visa, appears to have issued a “Request for More Information” to the Applicant. He responded on 2 December 2017 and made a full disclosure of the circumstances of the motor vehicle collision in May 2013, the fact that charges were brought against him, the fact that he “was on trial” for those charges and, that in April 2015 he received a one year suspended sentence.
[36]G1, 56.
I therefore find that to the extent the Applicant may have misled the Respondent’s department when initially completing the Form 80, this difficulty was, to a significant extent, overcome by his provision of supplementary information in his communication to the Respondent’s department dated 2 December 2017.
During cross-examination, the Respondent sought to establish the provision of false or misleading information to the Respondent’s department on another basis. This is what transpired in cross-examination:
“MR CUMMINGS: I’m looking at a letter you wrote at page 66 of the G documents. It says:
I was involved in a traffic accident on 23 May 2013 in Romania. I tried to avoid a crash with the car in front of me, I hit another car that was coming the opposite way.
Do you think that’s a complete summary of that incident?
INTERPRETER: Yes, yes, I tried to avoid one accident and he said I went into another accident.
MR CUMMINGS: You didn’t mention (indistinct) that you were speeding?
INTERPRETER: Sorry, what (indistinct)?
MR CUMMINGS: You gave a summary of your offence but didn’t mention that you were speeding (indistinct) 20 kilometre speed limit. Do you see how that’s misleading?
INTERPRETER: I don’t think, you know, the driving - a difference in the (indistinct) nobody has ever asked me. I don’t remember being asked about this. It was a long time and I don’t remember everything so well.”[37]
[37]Transcript, 28, lines 39–46; 29, lines 1–14.
I do not think there was any traction in seeking to establish misleading conduct or a failure to make full disclosure by the Applicant via this line of questioning. This is because in his response to the Respondent’s department dated 2 December 2017, the Applicant attached the full translated sentencing remarks/findings of the Romanian court.[38] There was no requirement for the Applicant say anything about the speed at which he was travelling at the time of the collision. Any comments about speed appear in the court’s remarks which I have outlined above.
[38]See G, 37–42.
Therefore, I do not consider that this sub-paragraph (f) militates in favour of any finding about the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct.
Sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction looks for evidence about whether the non-citizen has re-offended since being formally warned about the consequences of further offending in terms of the non-citizen’s migration status. This is a visa refusal matter, not one involving a visa cancellation of an onshore applicant. This Applicant has never been to Australia and has never received any warning from the Respondent or its department about his offending in Romania.
There are only a couple of residual questions in relation to this sub-paragraph (g) which I address out of an abundance of caution. It emerged in the Applicant’s cross-examination that his wife previously applied for a visa to visit Australia, but had been refused.[39] Does this constitute any sort of “formal warning” remotely relevant for the purposes of this sub-paragraph (g)? I think not.
[39]Transcript, 22, lines 15–34.
Further, it emerged in the cross-examination[40] and the written material of the Applicant[41] that the Applicant has on three previous occasions been refused a visitor visa to come to Australia. The first two refusals occurred in 2015 and the third one occurred in 2017. Do these refusal decisions constitute a “formal warning” such as to attract the operation of sub-paragraph (g)? Again, I think not.
[40]See Transcript, 28, lines 30–37.
[41]G, 57.
Therefore, this sub-paragraph (g) is not relevant to the determination of the instant application.
Conclusion on the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s offending
Having regard to the totality of the Applicant’s offending as recorded in the written and oral evidence, I am of the view that the Applicant’s conduct can be found to be “moderately serious”.
The risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
Paragraph 8.1.2(1) provides that in considering the risk to the Australian community, a decision-maker should have regard to the Government’s view that the Australian community’s tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.
Paragraph 8.1.2(2) provides that in considering the risk to the Australian community, a decision-maker must have regard to the three following factors on a cumulative basis:
(a)the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct;
(b)the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:
(i)information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending; and
(ii)evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since the most recent offence; and
(c)where consideration is being given to whether to refuse to grant a visa to the non-citizen – whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the non-citizen’s intended stay, the type of visa being applied for, and whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short stay visa.
The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community were the Applicant to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct (8.1.2(2)(a))
Sub-paragraph 8.1.1(2)(a) compels an inquiry into the risk to the Australian community in the event the Applicant were to re-engage in further criminal or serious conduct. Specifically, this sub-paragraph requires an assessment of the nature of the harm likely to be suffered by or occasioned upon individuals or the Australian community were the Applicant to re-offend.
The circumstances of the Applicant’s conduct leading up to and, in the aftermath of, the subject motor vehicle collision resulted in quite significant injuries to victims. Luckily, none of those injuries were permanent and it would appear that each of the victims has thankfully recovered. It is not a stretch of the evidence to suggest (and find) that there could have been significantly more serious consequences, indeed catastrophic consequences, from the Applicant’s conduct resulting in the collision.
Were he to repeat his driving conduct of May 2013 or his other speeding offences the harm likely to be suffered by individuals or the Australian community would involve any or all of personal injury, property damage, emotional harm, or death.
In its written material, the Respondent has referred to previous authority from this Tribunal that speaks of a need to protect the Australian community from “[…] people whose behaviour constitutes a threat to safety and indeed life itself as a result of their dangerous driving habits [….]”[42] To my mind, the totality of this Applicant’s driving history is not redolent of “dangerous driving habits” of the type the learned Senior Member Puplick AM was referring to in Faavesi. The Applicant in that case was a person who had been before the courts multiple times for drug and drink driving offences, and had never held a drivers’ license.[43] This Applicant committed the singular offence resulting in the circumstances of the subject motor vehicle collision. I have already found that the circumstances of his driving conduct leading to the accident are moderately serious. That said, he was not, and has not been, in the “habit” of committing these type of moderately serious driving offences.
The likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct (8.1.2(2)(b))
[42]See Faavesi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 1872 (“Faavesi”) [22].
[43]Faavesi, [8]–[13].
In its Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (“SFIC”), the Respondent makes five principal submissions about the Applicant’s risk of re-offending. First, reference is made to the Applicant’s comments in the application for a visa where he spoke of the victims suffering “minor injuries” and that they “asked for a lot of money as financial compensation from me”. The contention is put on the basis that because two passengers in the collision sustained broken bones, the Applicant displays little insight into his offending because he described those injuries as “minor”.
There can be no question that the Applicant accepts liability for the circumstances of his driving resulting in the collision. He accepts “[t]he fault was [mine]. I regret that that’s the situation.”[44] While it can be accepted that he did use the word “minor” in describing the injuries, it should also be kept in mind that he readily arranged for the translation of the Romanian court’s sentencing remarks/findings and submitted those seven closely typed and translated pages to the Respondent’s department contemporaneously with lodgement of his application for the subject visa. While the word “minor” was used in his narrative to the Respondent’s department, he did not attempt to (1) conceal the comments of the Romanian court which minutely dealt with the injuries suffered by the victims; or (2) cavil with the Romanian court’s narrative about the injuries.
[44]Transcript, 24, line 47.
Further to that, the Romanian court’s narrative clearly records that the Applicant “acknowledged and regretted” the offences committed and that he “[…] confirmed the evidences [sic] from prosecution and did not request new evidence for his defence.”[45]
[45]G, 39.
Second, the Respondent contends the Applicant “has a history of non-compliance with traffic laws in Romania.” I accept that the Applicant committed a further speeding offence less than six months after the circumstances of his conduct in May 2013 resulting in the collision. While that was not his finest hour, the balance of his traffic history in Romania is unremarkable. We are talking about three offences comprising “irregular parking”, and “not using the safety belt, helmet”. All his Romanian traffic offences were committed in the one year (2013). Across a driving history of something in the order of 25 years, I am hard-pressed to see how these four offences constitute “a history of non-compliance with traffic laws in Romania.”
As I have outlined earlier, the Applicant willingly told the Tribunal about his additional four speeding offences while at the wheel of his professionally-operated motor-truck. He has been working as a professional truck driver for something in the order of 25 years and has traversed a total distance of approximately 3.5 million kilometres in that time.[46] As best as I recall, the Respondent did not cavil with this evidence. Therefore I am also hard-pressed to understand how the commission of four speeding offences during a period of 25 years across a distance of approximately 3.5 million kilometres constitutes a “history” of non-compliance with traffic laws in Romania or anywhere else. Notably, none of these additional four traffic offences as a professional truck driver resulted in the suspension of his truck driving privileges, and thus at no time imperilled his livelihood. The only time his driving privileges were suspended was as a result of his conviction from the collision in May 2013.
[46]See Transcript, 31, lines 1–3.
Third, the Respondent contends the Applicant has never been to Australia and, as a result, there is no evidence that he is familiar with Australia’s traffic laws, were he to drive here. It should be borne in mind that the Applicant is a professional driver. It is not just his business to drive a vehicle. It is also part of his livelihood to know the rules and regulations governing the operation and usage of such a vehicle in whatever country his work commitments may take him. If he has learnt the traffic laws of numerous European countries, there is little to cavil with the proposition that he would be quickly able to make himself familiar with Australian traffic laws, were he to drive here.
Further to that, it was clear from the evidence that the Applicant’s cross-continental road travel has not been limited to his work as a professional truck driver. During his oral evidence at the hearing before me, he spoke of numerous trips with his family in their family car to various destinations across Europe:
“SENIOR MEMBER: Okay. And has he visited other countries in Europe or elsewhere during his life, either on his own or with his family?
INTERPRETER: Yes, by myself, I travelled almost everywhere from north to south and from east to west (indistinct words) up north to Scandinavia - Norway, I think he said. With the family, we travelled only on holidays to Spain, Germany, Austria, and Greece. Yes, and (indistinct words).
SENIOR MEMBER: Okay. And did he do any driving in those countries?
INTERPRETER: Yes.
SENIOR MEMBER: So he did drive a car in those countries, maybe not all of them but a number of them that he visited he did drive; is that right?
INTERPRETER: Yes, in all my trips I am the only driver.
SENIOR MEMBER: Right.
INTERPRETER: I’ve been driving in all of them.”[47]
[47]Transcript, 35, lines 40–47; 36, lines 1–12.
Fourth, there is a contention from the Respondent that there remains a risk of the Applicant re-offending because there is no evidence of any rehabilitation or any traffic-related courses he may have undertaken. The simplistic response is to say that he has at no time been compelled to do so, either by the Romanian court that sentenced him as a result of his driving conduct in May 2013 or consequent upon any other component of his traffic history.
Reference should also be made to (1) the Applicant’s 12 years as a professional truck driver across Europe since the year he accumulated his Romanian traffic history (2013); (2) the relative dearth of traffic infringements across the totality of his professional driving history (25 years); and (3) the distances covered (ie 3.5 million kilometres). Indeed, it could be said that the Applicant’s relatively long career as a professional driver has, in and of itself, served as a rehabilitative mechanism (of sorts) which has moderated his driving to the extent that since 2013, there has not been a remotely similar repetition of the circumstances of his poor driving conduct in May 2013 that caused the collision. It is similarly safe to find that the Applicant did receive a salutary warning about his driving habits from the circumstances and resulting convictions arising from the May 2013 collision.
To my mind, the most convincing response to this fourth contention made by the Respondent about a lack of rehabilitation is to be found in the material before the Tribunal. Exhibit A7 is a translation of certain proceedings of another Romanian court that took place on 10 October 2019. As best as I understood this document, the purpose of the proceeding was to ascertain whether the Applicant had been “judicially rehabilitated”. It is worth quoting the relevant portions of the translated document:
“- The criminal case concerning the [Applicant] is pending before this court of law, and has as subject – judicial rehabilitation.
[…]
- subject of the case – judicial rehabilitation
[…]
Three years and 11 months have elapsed since the final judgment of the criminal sentence in question, during which time the convicted person has not committed another offence.
[…]
In view of the considerations set out above, the court shall grant the request made by the [Applicant] […] and shall find that the [Applicant] has been rehabilitated as of right from the sentence ordered by Criminal Sentence no. 77/24^th April 2015 […].
FOR THESE REASONS IN THE NAME OF THE LAW ORDERS
[…]
Finds that the [Applicant] has been rehabilitated as of right […]”[48]
[My emphasis and underlining]
[48]A7.

It is therefore safe to find that the Applicant has convinced an independent decision-making body of the level of his rehabilitation. On this basis, this fourth contention by the Respondent has no traction.
Fifth, the Respondent takes issue with the statement of the Applicant’s mother that “if necessary, while he will be in Australia, I can drive him everywhere”[49] because it is said to be inconsistent with a support letter she wrote for the Applicant dating from September 2017 in which she said “my husband and I committed to […] give [the Applicant] a car to drive [while the Applicant is in Australia].” There is nothing untoward about a witness changing their evidence to suit the evolving circumstances of a given case. It is to my mind, understandable for the Applicant’s parents to say in a statement dating from October 2017 that they were prepared to offer their son “a car to drive” were the son to come to Australia.
[49]A1, [23].
As this case has evolved, both the Applicant and his parents have realised their cause may be assisted by giving some kind of undertaking that the Applicant will not drive – at all – were he to be granted a visa to visit Australia. This is why in his reply, it is said on behalf of the Applicant that:
“[…] he is happy to commit to no driving during his holiday and I also could vouch to organise other drivers. he can also use Uber, which is a simple and cost-effective option that we did not have in 2017 when I wrote the support letter.
This is to remove all doubt about the risk. We wanted to offer this extra guarantee to the Tribunal, Department of Home Affairs and the wide Australian community in general that it is not just a "measurable risk", but a risk that can be totally eliminated if he does not drive.”[50]
[50]A2, [5].
This is similar to what was said in the Applicant’s SFIC filed in these proceedings on 7 July 2021 where it is said that: “If he is allowed to come to Australia, it will be for a very short time and he has no intention to drive during that time.”[51] During the oral evidence, the Applicant gave similar evidence about promising not to drive were he granted the subject visa to visit Australia.[52] Indeed, the Respondent’s representative assisted the Tribunal by offering to take instructions about whether some kind of “no driving” condition could be added to the visa. Ultimately, those instructions were that such a condition could not be imposed.[53]
[51]A1, [10].
[52]See Transcript, 37, lines 1–19.
[53]See Transcript, 37, lines 21–37; 47, lines 23–35.
Conclusions on likelihood of re-offending
I am of the view that the Applicant provided forthright, honest and transparent evidence with reference to both the circumstances of his most serious offending (May 2013) and the totality of his driving history. While there is no current and contemporaneous clinical assessment about his risk of recidivism, the Tribunal has before it the findings of an independent court charged with responsibility of finding whether or not the Applicant had been “judicially rehabilitated”. On 10 October 2019, the court in Romania found the Applicant had been so rehabilitated. The Respondent has produced no evidence to challenge or otherwise discredit this finding by the Romanian court.
It should also be remembered that the best part of a decade has passed since the year in which the Applicant committed all of his four Romanian traffic offences. He has no traffic offending at all in Romania since 2013. While the chronological sequence of his additional four speeding infractions as a 25-year professional truck-driver is not apparent from the material, it cannot be said that four traffic infringements across 3.5 million kilometres points to any unresolved risk of recidivism or any other likelihood of him re-committing his driving conduct of May 2013.
Therefore, I think it safe to find the Applicant represents a miniscule (and acceptable) recidivist risk.
Is the risk of harm affected by any of the factors referred to in 8.1.2(2)(c)?
Paragraph 8.1.2(2)(c) provides:
“where consideration is being given to whether to refuse to grant a visa to the non-citizen – whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the non-citizen’s intended stay, the type of visa being applied for, and whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short stay visa.”
To my mind, paragraph 8.1.2(2)(c) poses three separate questions:
(a)whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the Applicant’s intended stay;
(b)whether the risk of harm may be affected by the type of visa the Applicant is applying for; and
(c)whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short-stay visa.
In relation to Questions (a) and (b), I am not of the view that the risk of the harm potentially represented by this Applicant is affected by the duration and purpose of the Applicant’s stay in Australia. He is not applying to come here permanently. Whatever miniscule risk of harm he represents is not affected by the duration, purpose or type of visa he seeks.
In relation to Question (c), as best as I understood his evidence, the Applicant wishes to attend Australia with his family to visit his parents here. The Applicant’s mother gave evidence at the hearing. It was suggested to her in cross-examination that she could either travel to Romania to visit the Applicant (as she has done previously) or she could travel to meet him at a mid-point between Australia and Romania.[54] The Applicant’s mother said that travel was now a difficult proposition for her because of a work accident she sustained in mid-2020. According to her evidence, her “[…] knee was broken – a bone of the knee was broken and it was with 52 screws (indistinct) involved just a broken knee.”[55] Treatment for this work injury remains ongoing and the mother’s evidence is, to an extent, augmented by a letter in the material from WorkCover Queensland dated 15 June 2021. It confirms an appointment was made for the Applicant’s mother to see an orthopaedic specialist.[56]
[54]Transcript, 11, lines 37–38.
[55]Transcript, 9, lines 17–18.
[56]A9.
I am of the view that there exist strong compassionate reasons for the grant of a short-stay visa to the Applicant given his mother’s stated medical difficulties in terms of being able to travel from Australia to Romania or to a mid-point between the two countries. This modifies the level of weight I give to Primary Consideration 1 a certain, but not overwhelming amount.
Conclusions on risk
With specific reference to the componentry of paragraph 8.1.2(2), I have reached the following conclusions and make the following findings:
(a)the harm likely to be suffered by individuals or the Australian community would involve any or all of personal injury, property damage, emotional harm, or death;
(b)the likelihood of the Applicant re-committing a similar offence or conduct is miniscule and he otherwise represents an acceptable recidivist risk;
(c)there are strong compassionate reasons for granting this Applicant a short-stay visa.
Conclusion: Primary Consideration 1
Viewed in its totality, I find that the evidence militates in favour of the allocation of a moderate, but not determinative, level of weight to this Primary Consideration 1 in favour of an exercise of the discretion to refuse the short-stay visa sought by the Applicant.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 2: FAMILY VIOLENCE
There is no evidence before the Tribunal that any of the Applicant’s conduct constituted family violence within the meaning of paragraph 4(1) of the Direction. This Primary Consideration 2 is therefore not relevant to determination of the instant application. This view is endorsed by the Respondent in its SFIC.[57]
[57]R1, 8[32].
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 3: THE BEST INTERESTS OF MINOR CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIA
Paragraph 8.3(1) of the Direction compels a decision-maker to make a determination about whether cancellation or refusal under section 501, or non-revocation under section 501CA is in the best interests of a child affected by the decision. There are no relevant minor children in Australia. This Primary Consideration is not relevant. This is endorsed by the Respondent in its SFIC.[58]
[58]R1, 8[33].
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION 4: EXPECTATIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY
The Direction makes clear that the expectations of the Australian community apply regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.[59] The Direction further explains:
“This consideration is about the expectations of the Australian community as a whole, and in this respect, decision-makers should proceed on the basis of the Government’s views as articulated [in paragraph 8.4(1)–(3) of the Direction], without independently assessing the community’s expectations in the particular case”[60]
[59]Direction, paragraph 8.4(3).
[60]Direction, paragraph 8.4(4). Paragraph 8.4(4) codifies the position laid down by the Full Court of the Federal Court in FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454.
In addition to the guidance provided by paragraph 8.4(1) of the Direction, paragraph 8.4(2) of the Direction directs that a visa cancellation or refusal, or non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation of a visa, may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences are such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa. In particular, the Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they raise serious character concerns through conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, of the following kind:
(a)acts of family violence; or
(b)causing a person to enter into, or being party to (other than being a victim of), a forced marriage;
(c)commission of serious crimes against women, children or other vulnerable members of the community such as the elderly or disabled; in this context, ‘serious crimes’ include crimes of a violent or sexual nature, as well as other serious crimes against the elderly or other vulnerable persons in the form of fraud, extortion, financial abuse/material exploitation or neglect;
(d)commission of crimes against government representatives or officials due to the position they hold, or in the performance of their duties; or
(e)involvement or reasonably suspected involvement in human trafficking or people smuggling, or in crimes that are of serious international concern including, but not limited to, war crimes, crimes against humanity and slavery; or
(f)worker exploitation.
I also note, based on the principles in paragraph 5.2 of the Direction, that:
·the Australian community has a low tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community for only a short period of time;[61]
·Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct to a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of their life;[62]
·the nature of a non-citizen’s conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify a visa outcome that is not adverse to the non-citizen.[63]
[61]Direction, paragraph 5.2(4).
[62]Direction. 5.2(4).
[63]Direction, paragraph 5.2(5).
The Respondent’s contentions
The Respondent contends that this Primary Consideration 4 “weighs heavily in favour of refusal”,[64] and argues that:
“Regard must be had to the Principle that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they will breach this trust or where the non-citizen has been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere, the Australian community (as a norm) expects the government (and the Tribunal standing in the shoes of government decision-makers) to not allow such a person to enter Australia (paragraph 8.4(1) of Direction 90).”[65]
[My emphasis and underlining]
[64]R1, 9[37].
[65]R1, [34].
As best as I understood this contention, it operates thus:
·the Respondent makes reference to paragraph 5.2(3) of the Direction and, in particular, the specific phrase “[…] if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns”;
[My emphasis and underlining]
·the Respondent then makes reference to the words in paragraph 8.4(1) of the Direction “the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia”; and
[My emphasis and underlining]
·the Respondent then seeks to import or transpose the words in paragraph 5.2(3) comprising “or elsewhere” next to the words “while in Australia” as those latter words are stated in paragraph 8.4(1).
To my mind, and respectfully, to adopt this course is to misconstrue the operative effect of paragraph 6 of the Direction, which says that in exercising the relevant discretion, a decision-maker must take into account the Primary and Other considerations, “informed by the principles in paragraph 5.2”. Being “informed” by those principles in the course of whether or not to exercise the discretion does not, to my mind, involve, for present purposes, the importation of language of one particular principle appearing in paragraph 5.2(3) into the wording of paragraph 8.4(1) of the Direction.
It seems that the reference to serious conduct “elsewhere” is more relevant to the part of 8.4(1) which relates to the “risk” of a person breaching the expectations of the Australian community’s expectations in the future.
Analysis – Allocation of Weight to this Primary Consideration 4
With reference to the propositions in paragraph 8.4(1) of the Direction, the architecture of this sub-paragraph can, to my mind, be expressed thus:
(a)the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia; and
(b)as a norm, where a non-citizen has either:
(i)breached the expectation in the immediately preceding sub-paragraph (a); or
(ii)there is an unacceptable risk that the non-citizen will breach the expectation in the immediately preceding sub-paragraph (a);
– then, the Australian community expects that the Australian government will not allow such a non-citizen to enter or remain in Australia.
The Applicant has never been to Australia, so it is logically impossible for him to have breached the expectation in sub-paragraph (a).
To my mind, contrary to the Respondent’s contention, the Applicant’s law-breaking in other countries is only relevant to the second part of the question. That is, whether there is an unacceptable risk that the non-citizen will not obey Australian laws while in Australia. Given my finding in relation to Primary Consideration 1 that the Applicant represents a miniscule (and acceptable) risk of re-offending, I am not of the view that the Applicant poses an unacceptable risk of breaching Australian laws while in Australia.
Therefore, this Primary Consideration 4 carries a certain, but not determinative, level of weight in favour of refusing the visa.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
It is necessary to ascertain whether weight, if any, is allocable to the Other Considerations listed at paragraph 9 of the Direction.
The Applicant is offshore. Logically, it is not possible for him to be “removed” from Australia. Therefore, none of Other Considerations (a)–(b) are relevant. I will therefore only address Other Considerations (c) and (d) directly.
(c) Impact on victims
Paragraph 9.3(1) states that decision-makers must consider the impact of the section 501 or 501CA decision on members of the Australian community. The Applicant has never been to Australia, and there is no evidence that any of the victims of the traffic crash in May 2013 were members of the Australian community. Therefore, this Other Consideration (c) is also not relevant.
(d) Strength, nature and duration of ties
An initial observation is that the second paragraph of this paragraph 9.4.1 is not relevant to the instant application. It is predicated on an applicant seeking relief from a “cancellation of their visa” or “non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation their visa”. Here, the Applicant seeks relief from a decision to “refuse” a visa. Paragraph 9.4.1(2) is therefore not relevant to determination of the instant application.
I will therefore limit my consideration to the componentry of paragraph 9.4.1(1) of the Direction.
1. Impact of non-revocation on the Applicant’s immediate family in Australia
The Applicant has the following immediate family members in Australia:
·his mother; and
·his step-father.
Both are citizens of Australia. This is made plain in the “Application for a Visitor Short Stay Visa”.[66]
[66]See G, 26–27.
The next question is to what extent will a visa refusal decision (for the Applicant) impact upon the mother and step-father. As best as I understood the evidence, the extent of the impact upon the Applicant’s mother is affected by medical issues that she has. She argues she cannot readily travel to Romania to be with her son and his family. The mother makes reference to the claimed medical issues confronting her in her written statement which appears in the material:
“This refusal and all the associated events cause great pain to both me and my husband.
As we get older, it is very difficult for us to travel. Last year, I had problems with one knee, which required surgery and screws. It's getting harder and harder to think that I can travel such a long distance to see him. I can't sit in a chair for long hours because of the pain.
The fact that I may not see my son again because he will no longer receive a visa is an overwhelming thought for me. It will also be almost impossible to see my two grandchildren (Adrian's sons).
I am open to any options that would make this possible. If necessary, I would also accept him to come for a shorter period or to make a commitment that he will not drive at all while he is here.”[67]
[67]A5.
During the hearing, the Respondent’s representative sought to challenge the mother on the extent to which these claimed medical issues prevented her (and the step-father) from travelling either to Romania, or for the family to meet at some mid-point such as Dubai. The Respondent concedes that “[i]t is obvious that the applicant’s mother and stepfather would enjoy a visit from him and his family to Australia.”[68]
[68]Transcript, 53, lines 11–13.
The Respondent seeks to differentiate this case from other section 501(1) refusal matters on the basis that in a number of such matters, refusal of a visa may mean a permanent separation of the visa applicant from their family in Australia. The argument goes that “[t]his case not like that. If the tribunal refuses the visa application, the visa applicant and his mother and stepfather will reunite in Romania.”[69]
[69]Transcript, 53, lines 18–19.
While the Respondent acknowledged that Mrs Florea has certain medical issues and restrictions making flying difficult for her, the contention was put that “[t]he injured knee does not mean she cannot fly to Romania.” The Respondent’s representative took issue with the fact that the Applicant’s mother had not sought to make some type of other arrangements with airlines that would allow someone with a problematic knee to travel from Australia to Romania and to return here.
This contention seems to be grounded on four factors. First, that the Applicant’s mother has continued to work 38 hours per week in a physical labour job, which tends to show she is reasonably capable of making the trip to Romania. Second, reference is made to the Applicant’s mother having an assessed overall physical impairment as a result of her knee trouble at 5%.[70] Third, it is said that, in economic terms, return travel from Australia to Romania does not present a prohibitive cost to the Applicant’s mother and his step-father because she has made the trip before. Fourth, it is contended that the Applicant and his family could meet his mother and his step-father in a third country.
[70]See Transcript, 9, lines 34–40.

While, to an extent, the components of this contention may be sustainable, they nevertheless place the financial onus squarely on the mother and step-father (at least initially) and then on both families (ie, the son’s family plus the mother and step-father) to resolve the travel issue. The mother’s issues with her knee would obviously make any prolonged international air-travel difficult for her. Short of incurring the cost of business or first-class air travel, I am hard-pressed to see what sort of relief or comfort any reasonably resourced airline could offer the Applicant’s mother at the level of economy class travel. As for the impairment rating, there is limited evidence before the Tribunal about what that impairment rating means and how it affects Mrs Florea’s ability to travel. This is what she said in closing submissions:
“And the last point that that the government solicitor mentioned is that I'm still working. Yes, I have to work. I have no choice. WorkCover paid me until recently and I have to continue working. If there isn't anything to say. Well, I have to work and if you do not accept the fact that I have to work, I have to sue someone for compensation, what you said about my knees is not fair.”[71]
[71]Transcript, 56, lines 10–14.
As for the third and fourth bases of the contention, it is somewhat trite to expect that the Applicant’s Australian citizen parents will not find it an economic impost to travel either to Romania or at some mid-point country to meet up with the Applicant and his family. Simply because the mother has made the trip in the past does not necessarily mean she finds it economically straightforward to do so. Indeed, in her evidence, she did not give the impression of a middle-late age spendthrift who readily took international trips on a whim. Denying the Applicant a visa also denies the parents the opportunity of showing the Applicant the life they have built in Australia:
“In relation to me saying that money is not a problem for me. I mean, meeting in a third country. What type of holiday could I offer to my family in a third country, let's say Singapore, when they have everything here where I live.”[72]
[72]Transcript, 55, lines 16–18.
I have had regard to each party’s submissions about the impact on the Applicant’s mother and step-father were he to be refused the subject visa. Taking into account the circumstances of the totality of the Applicant’s traffic history said to militate against the grant of the visa, I am of the view that greater consideration should be given to the impact upon his parents were this Applicant and his family either never to see his parents in Australia or, if they are to physically see them at all, that either or both the parents or the Applicant and his family be compelled to travel to a third country for that purpose.
Accordingly, I am of the view that this element to paragraph 9.4.1 of the Direction militates in favour of a finding that the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant’s ties to immediate family members in Australia warrants the allocation of a strong level of weight in favour of the Tribunal not exercising its discretion to refuse to grant the visa he seeks.
3. Impact on Australian business interests
I am mindful that paragraph 9.4.2(3) compels an assessment of the Applicant’s employment links to Australia with particular reference to any impact his removal may have on “Australian business interests”. This phrase is sought to be given some measure of definition in the text of paragraph 9.4.2(3) because weight can “generally only” be allocated in this instance where a non-revocation decision “would significantly compromise the delivery of a major project, or delivery of an important service in Australia.”
The Applicant lives with his family and works as a cross-continental truck driver in mainland Europe. He has no interest in doing any work for remunerative employment in Australia and only seeks the visa to visit (with his family) his mother and step-father in this country. The visa he applies for precludes him from working while here. There is no evidence that any Australian business would be adversely affected by a decision to refuse this Applicant a visa. It is thus of neutral weight to determination of the instant application.
Weight allocable to Other Consideration 4: links to the Australian community
With specific reference to the first part of this Other Consideration (the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant’s ties to Australia), I am of the view that having regard to the relevant components of this first part of Other Consideration 4, the totality of the evidence points to a strong level of weight in favour of the Applicant. As mentioned, the second part of this Other Consideration (impact on Australian business interests – paragraph 9.4.2(3)) is not relevant to determination of the instant application.
Findings: Other Considerations
The weight allocable to the Other Considerations relevant to the present matter can be summarised as follows:
(a)international non-refoulement obligations: not relevant;
(b)extent of impediments if removed: not relevant;
(c)impact on victims: not relevant; and
(d)links to the Australian community: strong weight in favour of the Applicant.
CONCLUSION
Should the Tribunal exercise its power to refuse to grant the Applicant’s visa?
As I have noted and found above, the Applicant does not pass the character test. Having regard to the Direction and to the totality of the evidence before me, I am of the view that this Tribunal should not exercise the power conferred by s 501(1) to refuse to grant the subject visa to the Applicant.
This is an Applicant who earns his living as a professional driver who has traversed the best part of four million kilometres, across 25 years, in his role as a cross-continental driver of heavy articulated vehicles in Europe. He has voluntarily told the Tribunal that across those four million kilometres he has incurred but four speeding infringements, none of which imperilled his driving privileges. His Romanian traffic history has been fulsomely outlined above. Aside from his “bad year” in 2013, during which the abovementioned motor vehicle collision occurred, the balance of his traffic history in Romania is unremarkable. His Romanian traffic history has not precluded him from earning his living as a cross-continental truck driver. While he may not be a man of considerable means, it is clear that he can afford to travel to Australia with his family for one month to see his mother and step-father.
In reaching that conclusion, I have had regard to the considerations referred to in the Direction. I find as follows:
·Primary Consideration 1 carries a moderate, but not determinative, level of weight in favour of refusal;
·Primary Consideration 2 is not relevant;
·Primary Consideration 3 is not relevant;
·Primary Consideration 4 carries a certain, but not determinative, level of weight in favour of refusing the visa; and
·I have outlined the weight attributable to the Other Considerations. I consider that the totality of the strong weight I have attributed to Other Consideration (d)[73] outweighs the weight I have allocated to the relevant Primary Considerations;
·A holistic view of the considerations in the Direction therefore favours the grant of the visa sought by the Applicant;
·Consequently, I do not exercise the discretion to refuse to grant the Applicant’s visa.
[73]Specifically, paragraph 9(1)(d)(i).
DECISION
The decision under review is set aside and substituted with a decision that the Tribunal does not exercise the discretion in s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to refuse to grant the Applicant a Visitor (Class FA) Subclass 600 visa.

I certify that the preceding 136 (one hundred and thirty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis

............................[sgd]...............................
Associate
Dated: 17 September 2021

Date(s) of hearing: 2 & 3 August 2021

Advocate for the Review Applicant Self-represented

Advocate for the Respondent: Mr S Cummings, Senior Associate

Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
ANNEXURE A

EXHIBIT

DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE

DATE OF DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED

G1 Section 501 G-Documents
(G1-G13, paged 1-94) - 11 May 2021

R1 Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (paged 1-10) - 2 July 2021

R2 Movement History of Visa Applicant
(1 page) 18 May 2021 2 July 2021

A1 Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (paged 1-3) (unsigned) - 7 June 2021

A2

Applicant’s Reply to the Respondent’s SFIC
(4 pages)

-

29 July 2021

A3 Statement of Review Applicant (paged 1-5) - 14 May 2021

A4 Medical Certificate by Dr Sanda Bonchis
(1 page) 11 May 2021 14 May 2021

A5 Statement from Review Applicant
(5 pages) – duplicate of A3 - 7 June 2021

A6
Letter from Visa Applicant – (4 pages)

·     Letter translated from Romanian to English

·     Letter composed in Romanian

·     Certificate of Translation Accuracy
7 June 2021 8 June 2021

A7
Criminal Sentence – (4 pages)

·     Translated from Romanian to English

·     Romanian original

·     Certificate of Translation Accuracy
4 June 2019 8 June 2021

A8 Letter from Romanian Attorney (Translated from Romanian to English)
(6 pages) 14 July 2021 16 July 2021

A9 WorkCover Queensland Claim S20CJ716382 letter (2 pages) 15 June 2021 16 July 2021

[2021] AATA 3321

17 September 2021

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Jurisdiction

Standing

Remedies

Date(s) of hearing:	2 & 3 August 2021
Advocate for the Review Applicant	Self-represented
Advocate for the Respondent:	Mr S Cummings, Senior Associate
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Sparke Helmore Lawyers

EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	DATE RECEIVED
G1	Section 501 G-Documents (G1-G13, paged 1-94)	-	11 May 2021
R1	Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (paged 1-10)	-	2 July 2021
R2	Movement History of Visa Applicant (1 page)	18 May 2021	2 July 2021
A1	Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (paged 1-3) (unsigned)	-	7 June 2021
A2	Applicant’s Reply to the Respondent’s SFIC (4 pages)	-	29 July 2021
A3	Statement of Review Applicant (paged 1-5)	-	14 May 2021
A4	Medical Certificate by Dr Sanda Bonchis (1 page)	11 May 2021	14 May 2021
A5	Statement from Review Applicant (5 pages) – duplicate of A3	-	7 June 2021
A6	Letter from Visa Applicant – (4 pages) · Letter translated from Romanian to English · Letter composed in Romanian · Certificate of Translation Accuracy	7 June 2021	8 June 2021
A7	Criminal Sentence – (4 pages) · Translated from Romanian to English · Romanian original · Certificate of Translation Accuracy	4 June 2019	8 June 2021
A8	Letter from Romanian Attorney (Translated from Romanian to English) (6 pages)	14 July 2021	16 July 2021
A9	WorkCover Queensland Claim S20CJ716382 letter (2 pages)	15 June 2021	16 July 2021