Flashback Holdings Pty Ltd v Showtime DVD Holdings Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 15 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Flashback Holdings Pty Ltd v Showtime DVD Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1541

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 102, 103, 115, 116, 120, 121, 125

Bodley Head Ltd v Flegon [1972] RPC 587
Matthews v Doctrieve Corporation Pty Ltd (2003) 59 IPR 155
Nomad Films International Pty Ltd v Export Development Grants Board (1986) 11 FCR 67

FLASHBACK HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED v SHOWTIME DVD HOLDINGS PTY LTD, INTERFREIGHT LOGISTICS PTY LTD and WILLIAM NIGEL HEYDON LESLIE

NSD 680 OF 2008

PERRAM J
17 OCTOBER 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 680 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

FLASHBACK HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
Applicant

AND:

SHOWTIME DVD HOLDINGS PTY LTD
First Respondent

INTERFREIGHT LOGISTICS PTY LTD
Second Respondent

WILLIAM NIGEL HEYDON LESLIE
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 OCTOBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The proceeding is stayed until the Applicant joins Absolute Home Entertainment 2004 Limited as an applicant or as a respondent but is not stayed to the extent necessary for that joinder to occur.

2.The Applicant’s notice of motion filed 9 September 2008 is dismissed with costs.

3.The First and Third Respondents’ notice of motion filed 15 August 2008 is dismissed.  The Applicant is to pay the costs of that notice of motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 680 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

FLASHBACK HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
Applicant

AND:

SHOWTIME DVD HOLDINGS PTY LTD
First Respondent

INTERFREIGHT LOGISTICS PTY LTD
Second Respondent

WILLIAM NIGEL HEYDON LESLIE
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

17 OCTOBER 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The Applicant, Flashback Holdings Pty Limited (“Flashback”) claims to have an exclusive licence to distribute in Australia a range of children’s DVDs and to have the other rights of the copyright owner in Australia.  The First Respondent, Showtime DVD Holdings Pty Ltd (“Showtime”), imported a number of those DVDs into Australia and sold some of them.  Subsequently Flashback commenced proceedings against Showtime and others alleging that the copyright in the films had been infringed by that importation and sale. 

  2. Showtime and the Third Respondent, Mr Leslie, claim that Flashback is obliged to join to the proceedings the licensor from whom it claims to hold its exclusive licence.  So far Flashback has not done this.  Instead it has filed a motion seeking the leave of the Court to proceed with its action without joining the licensor.  Showtime and Mr Leslie have filed a motion seeking to restrain Flashback from continuing with the proceedings unless and until it joins the licensor.  The issue between the parties on these two applications is whether that leave should be granted to Flashback.    

    Facts

  3. Absolute Home Entertainment 2004 Limited (“Absolute”) appears to be an entity having the right of ownership of copyright in a range of about 30 children’s DVDs in Australia.  These DVDs include such…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Flashback Holdings Pty Ltd v Showtime DVD Holdings Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1541
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Flashback Holdings Pty Ltd v Showtime DVD Holdings Pty Ltd, Flashback, the exclusive licensee of Absolute Home Entertainment 2004 Limited, commenced proceedings against Showtime for alleged copyright infringement of children’s DVDs. Showtime and Mr Leslie, a third respondent, sought to restrain Flashback from proceeding with the action unless it joined Absolute, the copyright owner, to the proceedings. The central issue before the court was whether Flashback should be granted leave to proceed without joining Absolute, as required by section 120 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

The court considered whether the statutory requirement to join Absolute could be waived due to the potential prejudice to Absolute, Showtime, and Mr Leslie, and whether the cost of joinder was a sufficient reason to grant leave. The court rejected these arguments, holding that section 120 of the Act explicitly requires the joinder of the exclusive licensor and that the mere expense of joinder is not a sufficient ground to grant leave under section 120. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy when an applicant fails to comply with section 120 is to stay the proceedings until the joinder occurs, rather than to grant declaratory or injunctive relief.

The court granted a stay of the proceedings until Flashback joins Absolute as an applicant or respondent, dismissed Flashback's motion seeking leave to proceed without joining Absolute, and dismissed Showtime’s motion seeking a declaration and injunction. The court also ordered that Flashback pay the costs of Showtime's motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding is stayed until the Applicant joins Absolute Home Entertainment 2004 Limited as an applicant or as a respondent but is not stayed to the extent necessary for that joinder to occur.

2. The Applicant’s notice of motion filed 9 September 2008 is dismissed with costs.

3. The First and Third Respondents’ notice of motion filed 15 August 2008 is dismissed. The Applicant is to pay the costs of that notice of motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Showtime and the Third Respondent, Mr Leslie, claim that Flashback is obliged to join to the proceedings the licensor from whom it claims to hold its exclusive licence. So far Flashback has not done this. Instead it has filed a motion seeking the leave of the Court to proceed with its action without joining the licensor. Showtime and Mr Leslie have filed a motion seeking to restrain Flashback from continuing with the proceedings unless and until it joins the licensor. The issue between the parties on these two applications is whether that leave should be granted to Flashback. Facts Absolute Home Entertainment 2004 Limited (“Absolute”) appears to be an entity having the right of ownership of copyright in a range of about 30 children’s DVDs in Australia. These DVDs include such classics as “Little Orphan Annie”, “Snow White” and “Black Beauty”. Absolute seems to operate from Glen Eden in Auckland, New Zealand. It is not clear whether it is incorporated in New Zealand although the parties appear to have proceeded upon the basis that it is. Showtime alleges that on 13 June 2007 it entered into a non-exclusive licence agreement to distribute the DVDs in Australia. The terms of that agreement do not appear in Showtime’s defence and they are not otherwise in evidence. Flashback alleges that, some months later on 18 September 2007, it entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with Absolute to distribute the same films in Australia. On its face there is an apparent conflict between these two arrangements. Absolute appears to have granted inconsistent rights. Flashback alleges that since 18 September 2007 (an allegation that is inconsistent with the particulars that were provided) Showtime imported into Australia 90,000 of the DVDs and further that it sold 30,000 of them. The importation and sale of such a copyright work without the licence of the copyright owner is taken to be an infringement of that copyright by reason of ss 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (“the Act”). On 14 May 2008 Flashback commenced proceedings in this Court seeking declarations as to the fact of infringement and damages pursuant to ss 115 and 116 of the Act. Other relief, not presently pertinent, was also sought. It then filed a statement of claim in which it specifically made allegations of infringement against Showtime based upon ss 102 and 103 of the Act. Although it will be necessary to return to its terms in more detail shortly, it suffices for present purposes to note that s 120 of the Act requires that where an action is brought by a person who claims to have concurrent rights in copyright with another that unless the court otherwise grants leave, that person must join the other party with the concurrent right to the proceedings. The evident purpose of the provision is to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. When Flashback commenced the proceedings it did not join Absolute. On 15 August 2008 Showtime and Mr Leslie filed a motion by which they sought a declaration that Flashback was not entitled, other than with the leave of the Court, to continue the proceeding against them unless it joined Absolute. The motion also sought an injunction restraining Flashback from pursuing the proceeding unless that joinder was achieved. On 21 August 2008, Absolute wrote a letter to Showtime in the following terms:I understand that you have applied to the Court to join Absolute in the Proceedings and that you are taking this action for fear that Absolute may also have claims in relation to the Films against you and/or Showtime.The purpose of this letter is to confirm that Absolute has no such claims. Absolute releases you, and Showtime, from all claims and liabilities of any nature that this company may have against you and/or Showtime in relation to the manufacture, marketing, selling or distribution of the Films in Australia. This release applies also to Showtime’s related bodies corporate and their officers, employees and agents.If necessary, Absolute is prepared to provide this release in the form of a deed or by way of an affidavit to the Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRAM J
Showtime also argues that Absolute itself will be prejudiced by having to incur costs to meet the joinder application. That argument must be rejected for the same reason. Section 120 in terms contemplates that the exclusive licensor should be joined to the proceedings. By itself the expense involved in that process cannot be a sufficient reason to warrant a grant of leave under s 120. Conclusion Flashback’s application for leave must be refused. It follows that its motion of 9 September 2008 should be dismissed. Showtime’s motion sought a declaration that Flashback was not entitled, except with the leave of the Court, to proceed with NSD 680 of 2008 without joining Absolute as an applicant or respondent. It also sought an order that Flashback be restrained from proceeding further against it. It seems to me that these orders cannot be made. The effect of the declaration is to do no more than reproduce the effect of s 120 of the Act. There would be no utility in making such a declaration. There also seems to me to be considerable procedural difficulties associated with seeking declaratory relief by way of a notice of motion. Similarly an injunction should not be granted because s 120 does not contemplate that a party who fails to comply with it is to be exposed to contempt remedies. More is this so when the requirements of s 120 may be satisfied by a less intrusive remedy. The proper order where an applicant fails to carry out the joinder contemplated by s 120 is to stay the proceedings until such time as the joinder occurs. Accordingly, I will not grant the relief sought in that motion but will grant a stay of the proceedings until such time as Flashback joins Absolute. If Flashback does apply to join Absolute to the proceedings but is unsuccessful I would entertain another application for leave pursuant to s 120. Where an exclusive licensor successfully avoids being joined to proceedings this may well provide a proper basis for granting leave to proceed in its absence. Indeed, there is much to be said for the view that one purpose of s 120(1) may be to release an applicant from the obligation to join a person holding concurrent rights where, for one reason or another, that joinder is not feasible. Section 120 was inserted into the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) on the recommendation of the Spicer Committee (at [322]) who adopted the views of the Gregory Committee. That Committee had (at [276]) said:In the normal case, however, the copyright owner should be a party to the proceedings, either as Plaintiff or Defendant. So far, our recommendations accord with those made in the Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Patents, which were implemented by the Patents Act, 1949. We realise, however, that the position in regard to patents is somewhat different from that which exists in respect of copyright, since the Register affords an address for service upon the owner of the patent, whereas, in the case of copyright cases may arise in which an exclusive licensee may not be aware of the address of the present owner of the right. We recommend therefore that power should be given to the Court to dispense with service upon the copyright owner, or even the necessity of naming him, where circumstances justify this course. As a consequence of this, we think it would have to be provided that the copyright owner should retain the right to sue for infringements in his own right, but protection would have to be given to meet the case of an infringer being involved in payment of the costs of two actions where one would have been reasonable or convenient.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRAM J

The court considered the statutory requirement under s 120 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which mandates that where a person claiming to have concurrent rights in copyright brings an action, they must join the other party with concurrent rights unless the court grants leave. The purpose of this provision is to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. In this case, Flashback, who commenced proceedings without joining Absolute, sought leave to proceed without Absolute. The court found that the evident purpose of s 120 is to require the joinder of the exclusive licensor and that the expense involved in joinder cannot be a sufficient reason to warrant a grant of leave. The court rejected Showtime's argument that Absolute would be prejudiced by the joinder process, as the provision itself contemplates such joinder.

The court declined to make a declaration as to the need for joinder, finding it unnecessary and procedurally difficult to seek such relief by way of a notice of motion. It also dismissed the application for an injunction, noting that s 120 does not provide for contempt remedies for non-compliance and that a stay of proceedings is a more appropriate remedy. The court held that the proper order where an applicant fails to comply with s 120 is to stay the proceedings until such time as the joinder occurs. This approach aligns with the recommendations of the Spicer Committee, which emphasized that the copyright owner should typically be a party to the proceedings. The court stayed the proceedings until Flashback joins Absolute but did not stay the proceedings to the extent necessary for that joinder to occur.

The court also noted that if Flashback applies to join Absolute and is unsuccessful, another application for leave under s 120 may be appropriate. The decision highlights the importance of following the statutory requirements for joinder in copyright infringement cases and the court's role in ensuring that proceedings are not multiplied unnecessarily.