Flaherty v R; R v Flaherty

[2016] NSWCCA 188

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

Flaherty v R; R v Flaherty [2016] NSWCCA 188

Hearing dates:

13 July 2016

Date of orders:

24 August 2016

Decision date:

24 August 2016

Before:

Hoeben CJ at CL at [1]
Simpson JA at [31]
Price J at [121]

Decision:

(1) Appeal against conviction dismissed.
(2) Crown appeal dismissed.
(3) Leave granted to the appellant to appeal against sentence.
(4) Appeal allowed.
(5) In lieu of the sentence imposed in the District Court, the appellant is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 2 years, commencing on 24 August 2016, with a non-parole period of 3 months, to expire on 23 November 2016.
(6) Direct that the appellant be released on parole at the expiration of the non-parole period.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – conviction appeal – historic sexual offence – indecent assault on male – whether error in summing up – whether onus of proof reversed – no error disclosed – conviction appeal dismissed

 

CRIMINAL LAW – application for leave to appeal against sentence – Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(c), s 6(3) – pleas of guilty to three of five offences – whether sentencing judge failed to apply sentencing practices of the time offences committed – whether sentencing judge had adequate regard to appellant’s age, ill health and delay – grounds of appeal do not disclose error

 

CRIMINAL LAW – Crown sentence appeal – Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5D – whether sentencing judge engaged in two-stage approach – whether sentencing judge made finding of special circumstances on matters already taken into account –– whether sentencing judge erred by determining that sentences for two offences be served concurrently – whether sentencing judge failed to have regard to general deterrence – whether sentence manifestly inadequate – three grounds of appeal disclose error

 

CRIMINAL LAW – Crown sentence appeal – residual discretion to dismiss Crown appeal – Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 – impugned sentence within range – Crown appeal dismissed

CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601 – error of principle identified by Crown – whether error can be used to advantage of appellant – application of Kentwell to sentencing affected by error of principle regardless of who identifies error – Crown’s duty of fairness – obligation of Crown to draw error to attention of court or offender – integrity of criminal justice system – where error established, role of appellate court is not to assess effect of error – role of appellate court to recommence sentencing process – leave to appeal granted – appellant’s appeal allowed – appellant re-sentenced

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) - s 81
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) - ss 44(1), 53A, 76
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) - ss 5(1)(c), 5D, 6(3)

Cases Cited:

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571
Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; 254 ALR 504
Jones v R [1997] HCA 12; 191 CLR 439
Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601
Mackenzie v R [1996] HCA 35; 190 CLR 348
Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50
Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; 196 CLR 297
Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282
R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531
R v Achurch [2011] NSWCCA 186; 216 A Crim R 152
R v Dudgeon [2014] NSWCCA 301
R v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172
R v Higgins [2002] NSWCCA 407; 133 A Crim R 385
R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; 52 NSWLR 82
R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; 54 NSWLR 368
R v RAT [2000] NSWCCA 77; 111 A Crim R 360
R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587
R v Sopher (1993) 70 A Crim R 570
R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383
R v Tripodina [1998] 35 A Crim R 183
R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 20; 62 NSWLR 346
Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Robert Flaherty – Applicant
Regina – Respondent Crown

Representation:

Counsel:
Ms L Rowan/Mr B White – Applicant/Respondent
Ms V Lydiard – Respondent/Applicant

  Solicitors:
Benetatos White Solicitors – Applicant/Respondent
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions – Respondent/Applicant

File Number(s):

2013/201461

Publication restriction:

Non-publication of any information or material that may lead to the identification of the complainants (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 578A; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A)

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of NSW

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Citation:

R v Robert Flaherty [2016] NSWDC 124

Date of Decision:

25 February 2016

Before:

Cogswell SC DCJ

File Number(s):

2013/201461

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

In July 2013 the appellant was charged with five counts of indecent assault on a child. All of the offences were historic, having been committed between 1972 and 1981 and were contrary to s 81 of the Crimes Act 1900, which applied at the time the offences occurred. The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts and on 26 August 2015 stood trial for the other two counts.

At trial the Crown case was that the appellant, who at the material times was a Catholic Priest, performed fellatio on the victim (count 1) and inserted an object into the anus of the same victim (count 2). The offences occurred on the same evening at approximately the same time.

On 7 September 2015, the appellant was convicted of both offences. On 25 February 2016, the appellant was sentenced for all five offences. Pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) the sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 2 years and 3 weeks, with a non-parole period of 6 months.

The appellant appealed against his conviction on the ground that the primary judge erred in directing the jury as to the correct approach when dealing with multiple counts. The appellant argued that by directing the jury that their verdicts must be “logically consistent”, the primary judge invited the jury to render a verdict not based on the evidence which related to each count but on their decision in relation to a previous count. The appellant argued that this reversed the onus of proof and that as a consequence of this error, the trial miscarried.

Pursuant to s 5(1)(c) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), the appellant sought leave to appeal against the severity of the sentence. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to apply the sentencing standards of the time the offences were committed. He also argued that the sentencing judge did not have adequate regard to his age, ill health and the delay in bringing the proceedings.

Pursuant to s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), the Crown appealed against the sentence on the following grounds:

His Honour’s sentencing discretion miscarried by reason of him engaging in sequential reasoning, rather than him sentencing by instinctive synthesis.

His Honour erred by making a finding of special circumstances based on matters that had already been taken into account.

His Honour erred by determining that the two offences against DA would be served concurrently because they occurred on the same occasion and against the same victim.

His Honour erred in failing to have any regard to general deterrence.

The aggregate sentence passed by his Honour was manifestly inadequate.

Held

In the conviction appeal

Hoeben CJ at CL (Simpson JA and Price J agreeing) dismissing the conviction appeal:

No objection to the direction was taken at trial. This enlivens rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules. The fact that no objection was made at the time also indicates that when the direction was made counsel saw no injustice or error: at [15]-[16].

R v Tripodina [1998] 35 A Crim R 183 considered.

The direction given by the sentencing judge was in accordance with R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; 52 NSWLR 82. Such a direction was appropriate because this was a “word against word” case where the offences occurred at almost the same time: at [19]-[20]

R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; 52 NSWLR 82 applied.

Leave pursuant to rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules was refused because the appellant failed to demonstrate that the ground was arguable or that a miscarriage of justice occurred: at [28]-[29].

In the Crown sentence appeal

Simpson JA (Hoeben CJ at CL agreeing at [30]), dismissing the Crown appeal:

Three of the five grounds of appeal pleaded by the Crown disclose error in sentencing. The sentencing judge erroneously engaged in a two-stage approach and the appellant was correct to concede this error: at [75]-[77]

Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 applied.

The sentencing judge erred by taking into account the appellant’s age and ill health with respect to both the selection of the sentence and the question of special circumstances. The appellant was correct to concede this error: at [78]

The sentencing judge erred by failing to have regard to general deterrence: at [83]-[84]

Notwithstanding the errors identified by the Crown, the residual discretion of the Court should be exercised to dismiss the Crown’s sentence appeal. The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was within the range of sentences that could justly be imposed for the offences in the circumstances of the case: at [85]-[86].

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 applied.

Price J dismissing the Crown appeal:

Three of the five grounds of appeal pleaded by the Crown disclose error: at [122].

The Crown has demonstrated that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. However, the residual discretion of the Court should be exercised to dismiss the Crown appeal on compassionate grounds: at [123].

In the appellant’s application for leave to appeal

Simpson JA (Hoeben CJ at CJ agreeing at [30]) granting leave to appeal and allowing the appeal:

None of the appellant’s grounds of appeal discloses error. The appellant was sentenced in accordance with sentencing standards as at the dates of the offences. The sentencing judge gave full weight to the appellant’s personal circumstances: at [72]-[74].

R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; 54 NSWLR 368 applied;

Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 considered.

The error of principle identified by the Crown (which was conceded by the appellant) means that the appellant has not been sentenced according to law. It would be a distortion of justice for the Court to find that there has been an error in sentencing but to not intervene because the error has been exposed by the Crown rather than the appellant: at [91]-[92]

In criminal matters the Crown has a duty of fairness and a duty of candour to the Court. Accordingly, the Crown has an obligation to draw an error to the attention of the Court or to the offender even if that opens the potential for a reduction in sentence. The integrity of the criminal justice system is sustained by the Crown accepting this obligation to correct error: at [96]

The statements in Kentwell apply to sentencing affected by error of principle, by whomever the error is exposed; once error is established it is not the role of the appellate Court to assess the effect of the error on the outcome: at [93], [97].

Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601 applied.

Notwithstanding that the appellant’s grounds of appeal do not disclose error, the appellant should be granted leave to appeal and the appeal should be allowed: at [98].

The appellant should be re-sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 2 years, with a non-parole period of 3 months: [117].

Price J granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appellant’s appeal:

None of the appellant’s grounds of appeal have been made out: at [122].

While the Crown occupies a special position in criminal matters and is obliged to correct error, the errors identified by the Crown which indicate the inadequacy of the sentence cannot be used to reduce the sentence. There is no distortion of justice where the errors identified by the Crown indicate that, absent those errors, a longer sentence may have been imposed by the sentencing judge: at [125].

There is nothing in Bugmy which suggests that after the Crown identifies a specific error but the Crown appeal is dismissed, the Court is obliged to re-sentence an appellant. The statements in Kentwell should not be construed so as to require this Court to re-sentence an appellant where any specific error in sentencing is identified even though that error benefited the appellant: at [126]-[127].

Judgment

1. HOEBEN CJ at CL:

CONVICTION APPEAL

Offences

On 7 September 2015 the appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault pursuant to s 81 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) at the Parramatta District Court following a jury trial before Cogswell SC DCJ. The offences were historical, occurring between 2 August 1977 and 16 November 1978 at Mollymook in the State of New South Wales. The complainant was 11 – 12 years old at the time of the offences.

2. At trial the Crown case was that the appellant, who was at all material times a Catholic priest, performed fellatio upon the complainant (Count 1) and inserted an object into his anus (Count 2). The offences occurred on the same evening at approximately the same time.

3. At trial the only evidence of the actual offences was that of the complainant. There was evidence of complaints, the earliest in time being approximately six years after the occurrence of the offences.

4. The appellant has appealed against his conviction on the following grounds:

Ground 1A – His Honour erred in directing the jury as to the correct approach to dealing with multiple counts on the indictment.

Ground 1B – It is submitted that as a consequence the trial miscarried.

Factual background

5. In order to understand the basis for the appeal, it is necessary to set out in some detail the evidence of the complainant and those parts of the summing up to which objection has been taken.

6. The relevant evidence of the complainant in relation to the specific charges can be found at T.27.8.2015, p 8.40 – 10.10.

“CROWN: Q. What happened?

A. I woke up through the night and I had a wet sensation on me penis and I put me arm down to see what it was and I felt somebody's face and he was what I now know was having oral sex with me.

Q. He. Who is he?

A. Father Flaherty.

Q. How did you know it was him?

A. By the size of him in the house. He was the biggest person in the house.

Q. When you say that he was having oral sex with you, what was he doing? A. He had his - he had my penis in his mouth and he was holding the bottom of my penis and he was bobbing his head up and down.

Q. What happened then?

A. I didn't know what to do and I just laid there on me back and he - I froze type, didn't know what to do, what was happening or anything. He - after some time I ejaculated and he wiped the sperm on me and yeah. I don't know how much detail you want to know.

Q. Whatever you can recall please.

A. I know that I woke up during it and as I put my hand down like I - I felt as so I may have peed me pants or at that stage and I've put me hand down just to feel and that's when I felt his head and yeah I just laid there in - laid there not knowing what to do and then he - he proceeded till I ejaculated and then I remember him - I remember the sperm landing on me stomach and on me - and on me thigh. I remember him playing with the end of me - end of me penis, rubbing his thumb over the top of my penis.

Q. What's the next thing you can recall?

A. He then - he then proceeded to roll me over so I was facing the wall.

Q. Can I just stop you there? Facing the wall. Is that the wall where the door is?

A. Yes. The same door where the wall is. I know that I ended up in a position where my left leg was straight and my right leg was bent so to speak and I remember that it was the first time that I physically touched me own - me own semen. I remember that it was a sticky feeling that reminded me of honey. That sounds stupid, I know, but that was what I thought of at the time. And I remember him playing - he - when I was in that position, I remember he lifted my cheek of my bum and I felt something being inserted into my bum.

Q. Now, I'm just going to stop you there, we'll come back to that. When you went to bed that night, what were you wearing?

A. My pyjamas.

Q. When you say that you felt something inserted into your bottom, what were

you wearing?

A. Nothing. My T-shirt.

Q. Did you take your pyjamas off?

A. No.

Q. Where was Father Flaherty in relation to you when you felt something inserted into your bottom?

A. Behind me.

Q. Can you tell me what happened next?

A. He inserted something into my bottom. I assume, I assume it was his finger, but that I'm not sure of, and then, after awhile, he inserted something much bigger and I assume it was his second finger or a third finger, and that's when I let it be known that I was awake.

Q. How did you do that?

A. I yelled.

Q. What did you yell?

A. I don't know. "Stop." I really don't know what I yelled, but it was very clear

to him that I was awake.”

7. The relevant parts of the summing up are as follows. I have underlined those portions to which the Grounds of Appeal apply.

“Now let us go back to number 2, the burden and standard of proof, you have heard a lot about that but it is so important and it has to come from me, that is very important, the onus of proof means the responsibility of proving the case against Mr Flaherty is always with the prosecution. That applies in all criminal trials, all juries are hearing the same things from Judges, Magistrates apply it when they are sitting by themselves here in cases. If I am sitting by myself hearing a case the same applies, it is always the prosecution that has the responsibility of proving the case against the accused’s person.

I remind you, as I said, 12 of you, me, everyone in this courtroom including Mr Flaherty, are pres umed innocent, so we start as presumed innocent and it is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the case against us and in this case against him. It is not for him to prove anything and there will be a couple of directions that I give you a bit further down that list which will flesh out that a little bit, how that onus of proof always on the prosecution works out in certain specific instances.

The extent to which you have to be satisfied of the guilt of Mr Flaherty on each of the charges that he faces is beyond reasonable doubt. Beyond reasonable doubt. It means the prosecution does not have to prove absolutely everything beyond reasonable doubt, it has to prove the essential, what we call elements of the crimes and I will come to those in a moment. So the ultimate issue in any criminal trial including this one, is has the prosecution satisfied you beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused? So you ask yourselves that - each of you asks yourself that question for charge 1 and for charge 2, has the prosecution satisfied me beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Flaherty is guilty of charge 1 and the same question in respect of charge 2.

If all 12 of you agree then we have verdicts which can be taken. Now let us go to - on more than one charge, you have two charges here, I don’t want to get my notes mixed up. It means you have to give separate consideration to each of the charges so that you will be asked for two verdicts, you will be asked for a verdict on count 1 and a verdict on count 2, so you give individual attention to each of the two charges, they both occurred at the same time according to DA [the complainant], the principal prosecution witness, one immediately after the other. It is open to you to bring in verdicts of not guilty on one and guilty on the other if there is a logical reason for you to do that.

If you think that there is an argument that you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Mr Flaherty in respect of one of the charges but you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt in respect of the other, that is open to you, provided there is a logical reason for it. That is another thing, by the way, about your decision, you do not all have to agree on your reasons for the verdicts that you ultimately come to, some of you may have reasons for being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt or not being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt which are different to the others in the 12.

That is okay provided your verdicts are unanimous, the 12 of you have to be unanimous on the verdicts. Let us go back to more than one charge, and it is important to bear this in mind too, if looking at one of the two charges you have a reasonable doubt about one of them because of - to do with the reliability of the account given by DA or some other piece of evidence you have a reasonable doubt about one which challenges the reliability of the account given by DA regarding one of them, you can take that reasonable doubt into account in the other one.

That sort of makes sense, I hope, that if you have a reasonable doubt about count 2 or count 1 you can take that reason and you think, yes, reasonable doubt, not guilty, now let us turn to the other one, consider that, one of the factors you can bring to bear is that well hang on, we had a reasonable doubt about the other one so we bring that to bear on this one to see whether it remains relevant or not. So bear that in mind.

So that is another way of saying that the verdicts, whether they are both guilty or whether they are not guilty, whether one is guilty, one is not guilty, they need to be logically consistent provided you have, as I have said, a logical reason for making a distinction then you may find that one is guilty and the other is not guilty, it is entirely up to you. It goes without saying but it is important to say it, you do not think well half of us think guilty, half of us think not guilty, so let us compromise and we will find him guilty of one and not guilty on the other, that is not discharging your responsibility at all.

There is no sort of compromise or deal making within the jury room. It is a hard task, as counsel have said, you have to look at the evidence and look at the arguments and listen to the directions and make up your minds unanimously, one way or the other, in respect of each of one. And you ask yourself that question for each of the two - am I satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution of the guilt of Mr Flaherty, if the answer is yes then the verdict - and all 12 of you agree, the verdict is guilty, if the answer is no the verdict is not guilty and your reasons for answering that question do not have to be the same.

I have here what has to be proved for the charges and what has been admitted, number 5, they are charges, each is the same offence, a breach of the same law and it is called indecent assault, as the law was in 1981 or at least 1977, ‘78 I should say, and what you have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt is that there was an indecent assault on a male person.

The law gets very technical, obviously, there is no suggestion that DA is not a man, no argument against that, so that is uncontroversial and there is no suggestion, you have not heard Ms Rowan argue something like, oh well look this happened but it was not indecent. Her argument was you cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what DA said happened actually happened. She is not taking some technical point that something happened but it was not indecent, but you still have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that if you find what DA said happened did happen, those two specific things that he said happened, you have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that that was an assault in each case and that it was an indecent assault.

…

The real issue in the case and the way it has been fought is are you satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what DA said happened, happened and what you have to be careful of here too and this is one of the things that, as I have said, about the onus and standard of proof, it is not a question of whom I believe one way or the other. You have to be careful about that. Do I believe DA or do I believe what Mr Flaherty said in his record of interview? It is not that. The question is am I satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution that what DA said happened, happened.” (SU 5.9 – 9.9)

Appellant’s submissions

8. The appellant submitted that by directing the jury in those terms his Honour effectively reversed the onus of proof so that a miscarriage of justice occurred, necessitating a retrial. In support of that proposition the appellant relied upon the suggested direction in the Judicial Bench Book at 1-490 which provides:

“[Where there are multiple charges add]

It is alleged by the Crown that [the accused] committed a number of offences. Those charges are being tried together as a matter of convenience. However, you will, in due course, be required to return a verdict in relation to each of them. You will need to consider each charge separately. There is no legal requirement that the verdicts must all be the same but this will become more apparent when you and I are aware of the issues that you have to determine.”

9. The appellant submitted that the correct approach when dealing with multiple charges was that set out in the “suggested direction” in the Judicial Bench Book, i.e. that each count has to be considered individually and the evidence in respect of each count has be weighed and considered by the jury to determine whether the prosecution has discharged their onus in respect of that count and established the essential elements of that count beyond reasonable doubt.

10. The appellant submitted that by directing the jury that their verdicts must be “logically consistent”, the trial judge invited the jury to render a verdict not based on the evidence in respect of that count, but on their decision in relation to a previous count. He submitted that if it be accepted that the jury ought to have approached their task by considering the evidence for and against each count on its own terms and if it be accepted that a jury may properly have come to differing conclusions with respect to each of those counts, it followed that a direction in the terms employed by the trial judge invited or required the jury to engage in a compromise of their verdicts or to seek a consensus in circumstances where such a consensus might involve a departure from the burden and onus of proof.

11. The appellant submitted that the invocation by the trial judge of the principle of “logical consistency” between the verdicts introduced an impermissible risk that the consideration of the jury in respect of one count might improperly be affected by the desire to render that consideration consistently with their position or approach in the remaining count. The appellant submitted that it was not possible to determine the extent to which that may have occurred in this trial so therefore the verdicts in relation to each count must be tainted and therefore set aside. This was because it was not possible to determine which of those verdicts might have been impacted by the quest for a “logical connection with the other”.

12. The appellant submitted that as a general principle, a verdict on any individual count properly considered might not be “logical” at all. An accused might as a matter of logic appear guilty and the jury might believe that, but if the evidence did not establish the elements of that count, and if the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, then the appropriate verdict properly considered by the jury was one of not guilty irrespective of any logic or logical consistency.

13. The appellant submitted that by directing the jury that they might render a verdict of “guilty” in one count and “not guilty” on another “if there is a logical reason for it” or “if they are logically consistent” the trial judge effectively reversed the onus of proof. In other words, his Honour effectively directed the jury that if they found the accused guilty [or not guilty] of count 1, then they must render the same verdict on the remaining count unless the jury could come up with a compelling reason not to do so. The appellant submitted that by phrasing the direction in the manner in which he did, his Honour elevated the jury’s finding with regard to one count to the level of evidence that they must consider in regard to their determination of the remaining count. The appellant submitted that by doing so, the trial judge inadvertently extended the definition of “reasonable doubt” by adding a new criterion whereby if the jury found the accused guilty on one count but not on the other, there must then be a “logical reason” for that finding.

Consideration

14. As a preliminary matter, Rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules applies to these Grounds of Appeal. Rule 4 provides:

“4   No direction, omission to direct, or decision as to the admission or rejection of evidence given by the Judge presiding at the trial, shall without the leave of the Court, be allowed as a ground of appeal or an application for leave to appeal unless objection was taken at the trial to the direction, omission, or decision by the party appealing or applying for leave to appeal.”

15. It is clear from the transcript that no such objection was taken at trial and the appellant accepts that he requires leave to raise this ground. The appellant submitted that because the direction gave rise to a miscarriage of justice, leave under r 4 should be granted.

16. The fact that no objection was taken at trial does, however, give rise to a further consideration beyond the requirements of r 4. This was referred to by Yeldham J in R v Tripodina [1998] 35 A Crim R 183 at 191 where his Honour said:

“ … as has been pointed out on many occasions and over a great many years, the fact that no objection is taken to a procedural step adopted by the trial judge, or to matters put or omitted by him in his summing up, is cogent evidence indeed, in most cases, that counsel absorbed in the atmosphere of the trial saw no injustice or error in what was done.”

17. Given the factual circumstances of this case, i.e. that the two charges related to events which occurred at almost the same time on a single occasion, the observation of Yeldham J must carry considerable weight.

18. Only limited weight can be given to the suggested direction in the Bench Book. That direction is no more than one way of expressing a particular principle. It is not the only way of so doing. Moreover, the particular direction upon which the appellant relied was intended to be given at the opening of a trial following the empanelment of the jury. It is not a suggested direction for use in the summing up. In any event, what the trial judge in this case said following the jury’s empanelment was in accordance with the suggested direction:

“There are, I will just borrow the indictment back. Two charges, the same person and indeed it is the same occasion that the prosecution alleges the two offences occurred on the same occasion against the same victim. Remember he is an alleged victim until you are satisfied – until and unless you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Mr Flaherty. They are being tried together for convenience. It makes no sense when you think about it that it wouldn’t be very sensible or efficient to empanel you to hear the first charge and then empanel another jury to hear the second charge. So at the end of the day you’ll be asked for two separate verdicts because there are two charges. And it wouldn’t surprise me if the issues are similar in both cases, namely that both charges, that it didn’t happen at all, so I imagine the issues on each one will be similar but you’ll be asked for two verdicts.” (T.27.8.15, p 4.45 – 5.7)

19. The direction which his Honour gave in the summing up was fully consistent with the “Markuleski” direction which is set out in the Bench Book at 5-1590 as follows:

“Giving separate consideration to the individual counts means that you are entitled to bring in verdicts of guilty on some counts and not guilty on some other counts if there is a logical reason for that outcome.

If you were to find the accused not guilty on any count, particularly if that was because you had doubts about the reliability of the complainant’s evidence, you would have to consider how that conclusion affected your consideration of the remaining counts.”

It follows that to the extent that the guidance in the Criminal Bench Book is relevant to these grounds of appeal, the trial judge complied with it.

20. An analysis of the decision of this Court in R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; 52 NSWLR 82 makes it clear that his Honour’s direction was in accordance with the guidance provided by that case and that no miscarriage of justice has occurred. By way of background, R v Markuleski was a decision of a five judge bench (Spigelman CJ, Wood CJ at CL, Grove and Simpson JJ and Carruthers AJA) which considered the giving of directions in a case involving multiple counts when different verdicts could be entered by a jury in relation to such counts in word on word cases and where the central issue is the credibility of the complainant. In particular, the Court had to consider what was said to be an apparent conflict between two High Court decisions Jones v R [1997] HCA 12; 191 CLR 439 and Mackenzie v R [1996] HCA 35; 190 CLR 348.

21. A central part of the reasoning in Jones v The Queen is at p 453 where the plurality (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) said:

“It is difficult then to see how it was open to the jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant with respect to the first and third counts. There is nothing in the complainant's evidence or the surrounding circumstances which gives any ground for supposing that her evidence was more reliable in relation to those counts than it was in relation to the second count.”

22. This led to trial judges adjusting their directions to juries as did Dunford J in R v RAT [2000] NSWCCA 77; 111 A Crim R 360 as follows:

“46 If I am correct in my understanding of the effect of Jones, then I believe consideration needs to be given to the directions regularly given to juries in such trials. Juries are constantly told that they should consider each count in the indictment separately and also that they may accept part of a witness' evidence and not accept other parts of the evidence of that same witness. But Jones appears to establish a qualification to these directions to the effect that in sexual cases, where the only direct evidence of the commission of the offences is that of the complainant, if they are for any reason not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant is telling the truth in relation to one count, it is not open to them to be satisfied to the criminal standard that she (or he) is telling the truth in relation to any other count; and therefore in such cases (i.e. where there is no independent evidence of the commission of the offences) if they find an accused not guilty on one count, they must also find him not guilty on all counts. They should also be warned specifically that if they return different verdicts where there are no distinguishing features in the evidence, such verdicts are liable to be regarded as a compromise and the guilty verdicts set aside.”

23. Spigelman CJ (with whom Wood CJ at CL and Carruthers AJA agreed) said in Markuleski in relation to such an approach:

“65   In my opinion this is not what the High Court intended. Whether or not the failure of the jury to accept the complainant’s version in one respect or to have led to the jury to have a reasonable doubt with respect to other matters, must depend on the full range of relevant circumstances. The High Court held in Jones that on the facts of that case the acquittal necessarily undermined the credibility of the complainant’s evidence about other alleged incidents. By reason of the wide range of matters of fact and degree that must be considered in making a credibility finding, that conclusion does not in my opinion follow in every case unless the Court is positively satisfied that there is some relevant difference in the quality of the complainant’s evidence.”

24. Having reviewed the authorities Spigelman CJ set out his conclusions as follows:

“185    Nevertheless, the case law on inconsistent verdicts, particularly in the context of sexual assault cases but not limited to that context, indicates that there is a recurring difficulty in this respect. It may appear to be obvious that a reasonable doubt about one aspect of a complainant’s evidence ought to be taken into account when assessing that witness’s evidence on other matters. However, there have been a significant number of cases in which courts of criminal appeal have acted on the basis that the jury may have failed to do so.

186   In the light of the number of cases it is desirable that the traditional direction as to treating each count separately is supplemented in a word against word case. Some reference ought to be made to the effect upon the assessment of the credibility of a complainant if the jury finds itself unable to accept the complainant’s evidence with respect to any count.

…

188 It is not necessary to specify any precise words for such a direction. That will depend on the circumstances of the case. It will often be appropriate to direct a jury that where they entertain a reasonable doubt concerning the truthfulness or reliability of a complainant’s evidence in relation to one or more counts, that must be taken into account in assessing the truthfulness or reliability of the complainant’s evidence generally.

189 On other occasions it may be appropriate for a judge to indicate to the jury, whilst making it clear that it remains a matter for the jury, that it might think that there was nothing to distinguish the evidence of the complainant on one count from his or her evidence on another count.

190 Or it may be appropriate to indicate that, if the jury has a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s credibility in relation to one count, it might believe it difficult to see how the evidence of the complainant could be accepted in relation to other counts.

191 The precise terminology must remain a matter for the trial judge in all the particular circumstances of the specific case. The crucial matter is to indicate to the jury that any doubt they may form with respect to one aspect of the complainant’s evidence, ought be considered by them when assessing the overall credibility of the complainant and, therefore, when deciding whether or not there was a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s evidence with respect to other counts.”

25. Wood CJ at CL made observations to similar effect:

“257 On the other hand, there is merit, as a matter of common sense, in reminding the jury that the existence of a question mark in their minds concerning the credibility, or reliability of the evidence given by a complainant or central witness in relation to one count, may properly be taken into account, in conjunction with all the other circumstances of the case, when they consider the reliability or credibility of the evidence of that complainant or witness in relation to the other counts.

…

261   I see no reason to confine the direction to reliability. It is equally, if not more, applicable in relation to credibility or truthfulness. Moreover, I see no reason to do more than bring to the attention of the jury the circumstance that, depending upon the nature of, and the degree of, any question which arises in relation to the evidence going to the count in respect of which they have a reasonable doubt, it is both permissible and proper for them to take that into account when considering the evidence of the complainant or central witness upon the remaining counts.”

26. Moreover, the test identified in Mackenzie by the plurality (Gaudron Gummow and Kirby JJ) was one of “logic and reasonableness”:

“3   Where, as is ordinarily the case, the inconsistency arises in the jury verdicts upon different counts of the originating process in a criminal trial, the test is one of logic and reasonableness. A judgment of Devlin J in R v Stone is often cited as expressing the test:

"He must satisfy the court that the two verdicts cannot stand together, meaning thereby that no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion, and once one assumes that they are an unreasonable jury, or they could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand."”

27. Given the facts of this case, there was nothing misleading or contrary to principle in his Honour’s direction. Because this was a word against word case in which the offences occurred at almost the same time, a Markuleski direction was appropriate, as was the qualification that if the jury were to find different verdicts, there had to be a logical basis for such a finding. Such a direction in the circumstances of this case was quite unexceptionable. It was expressed in simple and easily understood language and was directly relevant to the evidence. It could not be said that the appellant lost a reasonable chance of an acquittal.

28. Leave to rely upon an error to which no objection has been taken at trial pursuant to r 4 will be granted only where the appellant can demonstrate that the ground is arguable and that a miscarriage of justice has resulted so that this Court should grant leave to permit the ground to go forward (R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531 at 536; 56 A Crim R 424; Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; 196 CLR 297 at 319 [72]; R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 20; 62 NSWLR 346 at [22] – [24]).

29. For the reasons indicated, I am not satisfied that the appellant has an arguable case nor that the trial judge made an error of law, nor am I satisfied that his conviction involves a miscarriage of justice. I would not grant leave pursuant to r 4. The appeal against conviction should be dismissed.

30. I have had the advantage of reading the draft judgment of Simpson JA in relation to the sentence appeals. I agree with the conclusion of her Honour and the orders which her Honour proposes. I agree with her Honour’s conclusion that in the particular circumstances of this case, identification of error by the Crown requires that this Court re-sentence the applicant even though the Crown appeal against sentence is dismissed.

31. SIMPSON JA: I have read in draft the judgment of Hoeben CJ at CL. I agree with his Honour that the appeal against conviction ought to be dismissed, for the reasons he gives.

Sentence

32. Pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Procedure Act”), the sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 2 years and 3 weeks, commencing on 26 February 2016, with a non-parole period of 6 months. As will be seen, that sentence incorporated more offences than the two on which the appellant stood trial, the subject of the appeal against conviction. The sentencing judge granted bail to the appellant pending appeal. The appellant has therefore served no part of that sentence.

33. The Crown has, pursuant to s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), appealed against what it asserts to be the manifest inadequacy of the sentence. The appellant (having regard to the proliferation of proceedings, it is convenient to continue to refer to Mr Flaherty as the appellant) has sought leave to appeal against what he asserts to be the manifest excess of the sentence (Criminal Appeal Act, s 5(1)(c)).

34. In all, the appellant stood to be sentenced for five offences. All were offences against s 81 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which, at the relevant times, provided:

“81  Indecent assault on male

Whosoever commits an indecent assault upon a male person of whatever age, with or without the consent of such person, shall be liable to penal servitude for five years.”

35. The appellant entered pleas of guilty to three counts, and pleas of not guilty to two. The facts relevant to those to which he pleaded guilty were put before the sentencing judge by way of two Agreed Statements of Facts. The facts of the two offences to which he pleaded not guilty, but was convicted after trial, of course, emerge from the evidence given in the trial. They are alluded to in the judgment of Hoeben CJ at CL, but may, for the purpose of considering the sentence appeals, be more fully stated as follows.

The facts

36. Chronologically, the first two offences were committed in about September 1972, against a victim to whom I will refer as SC. SC was then aged 15, and actively involved in the church, and a regular attender at Mass. On occasions, the appellant (who, it will be recalled, was a priest of the Catholic church) drove SC home after church activities. He often raised the subject of masturbation. On one such occasion, the appellant parked his motor vehicle, and asked SC to touch his penis. SC complied, and then exposed his own penis. The appellant masturbated SC’s penis for a brief period. On another occasion, at the presbytery, the appellant invited SC into his room and asked him to sit on the bed. He placed his hand over SC’s penis, outside his clothing, for a short time. The appellant entered pleas of guilty to each of these counts in the Local Court on 16 September 2014.

37. The third and fourth offences were committed on a single occasion, between August 1977 and November 1978, against a victim to whom I will refer as DA. The appellant entered pleas of not guilty to each of these counts. These counts were the subject of the trial and the conviction appeal.

38. DA’s age is not disclosed with any precision in the evidence, but it can be deduced that he was between 11 and 13 years of age. The appellant owned a holiday house in a south coast town, to which he invited DA and others, including DA’s sister. DA and another boy slept in separate beds in one bedroom. The appellant slept on a stretcher between the beds. During the night, and while DA was asleep, the appellant engaged in fellatio upon him. DA woke. He did not know what to do, and lay still. The appellant continued to fellate DA to ejaculation. He then masturbated DA. The appellant then rolled DA over, so that he was facing the wall, and he inserted something into DA’s anus. (It is not clear whether this was a body part or another object, but the likelihood is that it was a finger.) DA told the appellant to stop. The appellant told DA not to make a noise. The next day, he told DA not to tell anybody what had happened, and that, if he did tell his parents, they would not believe him. A couple of weeks later, at the church, the appellant again told DA not to tell anybody what had happened.

39. The fourth and fifth offences were committed in 1981, against PI, then aged about 14. They were committed in similar circumstances to those against DA. PI’s family were regular churchgoers. The appellant invited PI, his younger brother, and several other boys to the south coast house. Three of the boys slept in one room, PI in a single bed, the other boys in double bunks. The appellant slept on a stretcher bed between the boys’ beds. The other boys slept in another room. The appellant talked about sexual matters (“the birds and the bees”) and about masturbation. During the night, the appellant reached from his stretcher bed to PI’s bed, and rubbed PI’s genital area. PI pushed the appellant’s hand away, and the appellant replaced it and continued rubbing. PI again pushed his hand away, and turned over to face the other way. PI was very frightened. The appellant entered pleas of guilty to each of these counts in the Local Court on 16 October 2014.

40. Before the sentencing judge were Victim Impact Statements by SC and DA. Each wrote convincingly of the profound effect on his life of the abuse, in ways it is not necessary to detail.

41. After the jury verdict the appellant wrote a document headed:

“PETITION TO COURT AND APOLOGY TO [DA]

May it please your Honour for me to acknowledge your diligence and fairness in the conduct of my Trial in the matter of [DA]. May I likewise acknowledge the integrity of the jurors and their decision based upon the evidence as presented.

I cannot recall the assaults of which I have been found guilty. If these took place I express my sincere apology to [DA] and his family.”

The appellant’s personal circumstances

42. Also before the Court was a great deal of material concerning the appellant’s personal circumstances. This consisted of medical reports, one report of an experienced forensic psychologist, and a Pre-Sentence Report to which was attached a comprehensive psychological report prepared by a senior psychologist of Community Corrections (Corrective Services NSW).

43. What emerges from this material can be summarised as follows.

44. The appellant was born in June 1943. After completing the Leaving Certificate he entered a training college for the priesthood. He completed his training at the Manly seminary at about the age of 23. He was then sent to various parishes. He retired at 67.

45. He was 28 years of age at the time of the earliest of the offences, 38 at the time of the last, and 72 at sentencing. He was arrested in July 2013 (when he was 70 years of age, 42 years after the first of the offences, and 32 years after the last). He was granted conditional bail and has to date spent no time in custody.

46. His physical and mental health are both parlous. On 27 January 2015, a geriatrician, Dr Sasi Sasikaran itemised, on a “problem list” 10 separate conditions. That included:

• chronic pain syndrome in back and shoulder;

• depression with social isolation;

• chronic renal failure (stable);

• cardiomyopathy (stable);

• prostate problems, without malignancy.

47. The appellant is under the care of a specialist cardiologist, Dr John England, who reported on 14 September 2015 (almost a year ago) as follows:

“Because he has chronic renal failure and hypercalcaemia this will accelerate the vascular disease and he could be at risk of stroke or accelerated coronary artery disease …

He had morbid obesity … together with sleep apnoea and this nocturnal breathing condition accelerates the risk of stroke, hypertension, renal failure and heart disease, separate from the diabetes and causes of risk of at least 80% more than the general population.

…

More recently, he has developed prostate cancer and has had rectal bleeding thought to be due to diverticulitis but he deferred all these investigations and colonoscopy whilst the Court Case was proceeding … going into a Custody situation he will need to have intensive nursing care and regular Doctor Consultations. I feel that his mental state will be effected [sic] if he were placed in custody and he would be at risk of self-harm and a certain risk of suicide or sudden death.

In my previous report of 6th August I said his overall prognosis is guarded in terms of months to years and you ask me for more clarity in relationship to his prognosis and I feel that his prognosis is 6-12 months regardless of any medical intervention.

…

The MRI of the brain shows disease and atrophy close to the hippocampus region of the brain which is linked to vascular dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease. He has widespread small vessel vascular damage in the white matter of the brain which makes him more at risk of stroke.”

48. The psychologist (Mr Tim Watson-Munroe) considered the appellant to be depressed and anxious with a remote prospect of re-offending. Having regard to the appellant’s educational qualifications, he considered that there had been a significant decline in the appellant’s cognitive capacity. As an experienced forensic practitioner, he considered that the appellant would have “an exceptionally difficult time in custody” due to his age, the nature of the offending, his general vulnerability, and the unlikelihood that he would, in custody, receive the type of specialist care he is currently receiving from Dr England.

The Remarks on Sentence

49. The sentencing judge outlined, in some detail, the factual circumstances of each offence, and, also in some detail, the two Victim Impact Statements. He recognised that it was necessary that he sentence in accordance with the prevailing sentencing regime (including sentencing patterns) at the time of the offences (see below for a discussion of this principle). (In this respect he was assisted by a collection of sentencing decisions relating to offences committed at, or close to, the times of the present offences, put before him by the legal representatives of the parties.)

50. He assessed, individually, the objective gravity of each of the offences. With respect to the offences against SC, he categorised the first (touching SC’s exposed penis) as “not at the lowest end of seriousness for this sort of crime … [but] far from being the most serious example of this sort of crime and would be towards the lower end but not at the lower end”, and the second (putting his hand on SC’s penis outside his clothing) as “towards the lower end, or towards the lowest end”.

51. He assessed both offences against DA as being “in the upper level of seriousness”; that was because “both involved penetration”. He assessed the offence against PI also as being “towards the lower level of seriousness”. These assessments generally reflected acceptance of the submissions made on behalf of the Crown, and not contested on behalf of the appellant. He recognised however, that each offence involved a breach of trust, an aggravating feature.

52. The sentencing judge assessed the risk of re-offending as “very low”. He referred, again in detail, to the medical and psychological evidence, including the Pre-Sentence Report. He did not treat the appellant’s post-trial letter as evidence of remorse. After reviewing the submissions of counsel, he turned to consider the appropriate sentences. Somewhat contradictorily of his earlier assessment, he categorised the first offence against SC, and the single offence against PI, as “more serious examples” of crimes against s 81, each deserving of imprisonment for 1 month, which he subsequently reduced by 25 per cent to take account of the appellant’s early pleas of guilty: see R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383. The second offence against SC he considered to be less serious, adequately punishable by a good behaviour bond. He recognised that the offences against DA were serious, but not in the category of “worst case”. He determined that:

“57  … a starting point for each of them is a sentence of four years imprisonment.”

He then said:

“59.  Having regard to an appropriate starting place of four years imprisonment for the serious offences committed against [DA], it is here that I come to balance the ‘criminality of the conduct ... and any damage to health or shortening of life’ as the Court of Criminal Appeal said in Sopher [(1993) 70 A Crim R 570] at 373.

60.  Despite regarding an appropriate sentence as one being four years, I would reduce that sentence because of the obvious fact that [the appellant] is going to have a much harder time in prison and because of his age, to one of two years imprisonment for each of the offences.”

53. He rejected a submission that the sentences be suspended, and went on:

“63.  Because he has committed offences against different victims, I am going to fix the various sentences to be served concurrently [sic]. The overall sentence will be one of two years and three weeks. It will commence today …

64.  I think the real impact of the state of [the appellant’s] health and age, particularly the prognosis given to him by Dr England and the impact of the prison sentence which Mr Watson-Munro thinks it will have on him must be reflected in the non-parole period. I am going to fix a non-parole period of six months …

65.  … there are special circumstances for the non-parole period being significantly shorter than that envisaged by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Those special circumstances are the state of [the appellant’s] health and the observations by medical practitioners and Mr Watson-Munro about the impact of prison.”

54. It appears that, during the process, his Honour had a change of mind. Notwithstanding his earlier indication that he would “fix the various sentences to be served concurrently” he then stated that he would impose an aggregate sentence under s 53A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, and, as required by sub-s (2)(a) thereof, indicated the individual sentences he would otherwise have imposed. These were not precisely as he had earlier proposed. The indicative sentences in relation to the first offence against SC and the offence against PI were, respectively, imprisonment for 2 weeks and imprisonment for 1 week, giving a total of 3 weeks. He indicated that, in respect of the second offence against SC he would have imposed a good behaviour bond. In respect of the offences against DA he stated that the indicative sentences were of 2 years to be served concurrently.

55. He then proceeded to sentence the appellant to imprisonment for 2 years and 3 weeks, and specified a non-parole period of 6 months.

The grounds of appeal

The Crown appeal

56. The Crown identified five grounds of appeal. These were pleaded as:

“Ground 1:  His Honour’s sentencing discretion miscarried by reason of him engaging in sequential reasoning, rather than him sentencing by instinctive synthesis.

Ground 2:  His Honour erred by making a finding of special circumstances based on matters that had already been taken into account.

Ground 3:  His Honour erred by determining that the two offences against DA would be served concurrently because they occurred on the same occasion and against the same victim.

Ground 4:  His Honour erred in failing to have any regard to general deterrence.

Ground 5:  The aggregate sentence passed by his Honour was manifestly inadequate.”

Grounds proposed by the appellant

57. The grounds proposed on behalf of the appellant were pleaded as follows:

“1.  The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in his approach to the sentencing exercise.

2.  The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in applying the correct sentencing regime at the time of sentence.

3.  The learned Sentencing Judge gave inadequate weight to the subjective circumstances of the appellant.”

Relevant statutory provisions

58. The statutory provisions permitting appeals against sentence by the Crown, and appeals against severity by offenders, are not framed in identical terms.

59. Section 5(1)(c) of the Criminal Appeal Act provides:

“(1)  A person convicted on indictment may appeal under this Act to the court [of Criminal Appeal]:

…

(c)  with the leave of the court against the sentence passed on the person’s conviction.”

60. Section 6(3) provides for the disposal of such an appeal. It provides:

“(3)  On an appeal under section 5(1) against a sentence, the court, if it is of opinion that some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed, shall quash the sentence and pass such other sentence in substitution therefor, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.”

61. Section 5D(1) provides:

“(1)  The Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions may appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against any sentence pronounced by the court of trial in any proceedings to which the Crown was a party and the Court of Criminal Appeal may in its discretion vary the sentence and impose such sentence as to the said court may seem proper.”

The appellant’s application for leave to appeal

62. It is convenient to deal first with the appellant’s application.

63. Ground 1 as framed is obscure. However, in written submissions, it was acknowledged that the sentencing judge dealt appropriately with most, if not all, of the relevant sentencing considerations. What emerged from the submissions was that Ground 1 as argued was essentially co-extensive with Ground 2. The complaint was that, contrary to the majority decision in R v MJR [2002] NSWCCA 129; 54 NSWLR 368, the sentencing judge failed to sentence in accordance with the sentencing practices that prevailed at the time the offences were committed. It is established by MJR (at least unless and until the High Court comes to rule on the question) that, in sentencing for what have come to be called “historical” offences, a court must endeavour to sentence in accordance, not only with historical statutory provisions, but also historical sentencing patterns. While the dissenting judgment of Mason P makes compelling reading, that question was settled by the majority. Grounds 1 and 2 were pursued, notwithstanding recognition that his Honour expressly stated the principle. At [20] of the Remarks on Sentence, he said:

“… I must of course sentence Mr Flaherty according to the law that he broke when he committed these crimes, not according to the law as it is now which he has not broken. In those days, the maximum sentence for each of the five crimes he committed was five years imprisonment. Even then when the sentences were, relatively speaking, more lenient for these kinds of crime, Parliament regarded them as so serious that it would expose an offender to some years imprisonment for these sorts of crimes …”

64. In Magnuson v R [2013] NSWCCA 50 Button J, with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Bellew J agreed, reviewed in detail sentencing patterns applicable to sexual offences committed against children in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It must be recognised that the review in Magnuson does not constitute a statement of principle that ought, in the interests of judicial comity (unless a subsequent court considered it to be “plainly wrong” – see Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; 254 ALR 504) be regarded as binding. Rather, the product of the review is closer to a finding of fact, dependent upon the evidence adduced in the particular case. While bearing that in mind, the judgment contains useful historical data for subsequent courts faced with the same issue, allowing them to avoid the need for repetitive presentation of what amounts to evidentiary material to establish a fact common to many cases. Counsel for the appellant referred, in her written submissions, to Magnuson; it was not suggested by the Crown that reliance ought not to be placed upon it. In those circumstances, and being conscious of the reservation I have mentioned, I propose to treat the findings in Magnuson as permitting a conclusion that, at the times relevant to the current offences, sentencing for sexual offences against children was significantly more lenient than it is at the present time. Not least is that because of the limited range of statutory offences, and the maximum penalty applicable to the offences with which the appellant was charged.

65. There are practical difficulties in applying MJR. One such difficulty is that sentencing options have, quite dramatically, changed. For example, from 1971 until 2010 an option of periodic detention, in one form or another, was available: see Periodic Detention of Prisoners Act 1970 (NSW); Sentencing Procedure Act Pt 5 (no longer in force in its previous form). Since 2010 periodic detention has not been available as a sentencing option. Other non-custodial options such as intensive correction orders and home detention that are now available as alternatives to fulltime custody were not then available.

66. The dictates of sentencing legislation have also changed; s 44(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act specifies the order in which the non-parole period and the balance of term are to be set. Section 44(1) specifies (subject to variation) a proportion between the non-parole period and the total sentence. Aggregate sentencing under s 53A was not, until 2010, a sentencing option.

67. A strict application of MJR would suggest that none of the modern sentencing options is available in respect of “historical” sexual offences. Yet there is no alternative to sentencing in accordance with s 44(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, at least to the extent of first setting the non-parole period, and then the balance of term. And there is no suggestion that aggregate sentencing is not available in respect of “historic” offences.

68. It must also be remembered, that, in Magnuson, Button J concluded:

“154  … Even allowing for the historical aspects of the matter, it is incumbent upon this Court to impose sentences that reflect the objective gravity of what the applicant has done.”

69. The appellant’s submissions focussed upon the “starting point” of 4 years with respect to the offences against DA; that, it was argued, indicated that the sentencing judge, although he correctly stated the MJR principle, did not adequately put it in to effect. Counsel posed the appropriate question for the sentencing court as:

“… what would a sentencing court in 1982, presented with these exact offences, consider an appropriate penalty for a man of advanced years, with numerous complex medical issues, a prognosis of 6-12 months to live and a diagnosis of vascular dementia, consider to be an appropriate penalty? In addition, the 1982 Sentencing Court should also be aware that there had been a subsequent period of over 35 years without reoffending and the prospects of reoffending in the future were negligible. What then would be the appropriate sentence? It is submitted that a penalty other than a fulltime custodial sentence would not only have been considered, it would have been appropriate.”

70. Counsel argued, therefore, that, while the offences against DA called for a custodial penalty, they did not, taking into account his current personal circumstances, call for such a sentence to be served in fulltime custody. Suggested options available were home detention and the suspension of any sentence imposed.

71. The complaint under Ground 3 was that the sentencing judge failed to have adequate regard to the appellant’s age, state of physical ill health, dementia, and the delay in the bringing of the charges.

Resolution

72. Accepting, as I must, that the judge was obliged to sentence, as nearly as possible, in accordance with sentencing standards of the dates of the offences, I am not satisfied that it has been shown that he failed to do so. He expressly acknowledged the principle. He had explicit regard to the objective seriousness of all offences, especially those against DA. In respect of DA, he was sentencing, not for one, but for two, offences. Even in 1977 and 1978, the offences against DA would have been regarded as serious instances of indecent assaults. Grounds 1 and 2 must be rejected.

73. Although, as will be seen, it was erroneous to nominate a starting point of 4 years, by reference to objective gravity and the maximum sentence, and then reduce that specifically by reference to circumstances personal to the appellant, so as to impose an aggregate sentence of 2 years and 3 weeks, with a non-parole period of 6 months, the erroneous process demonstrates clearly that the full weight was given to the appellant’s personal circumstances. That is, the reduction from the starting point of 4 years to 2 years and 3 weeks by reason only of “subjective circumstances” shows conclusively that due weight was given to those circumstances. Ground 3 also must be rejected.

74. In my opinion, none of the grounds identified by the appellant can succeed.

The Crown appeal

75. With respect to the grounds raised by the Crown, on behalf of the appellant error was conceded in two respects, those raised in Grounds 1 and 2. In each case, the concession was correctly made. Why that is so may be briefly explained.

76. In Wong v The Queen; Leung v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:

“74  … the reasons of the Court of Criminal Appeal suggest a mathematical approach to sentencing in which there are to be ‘increment[s]’ to, or decrements from, a predetermined range of sentences. That kind of approach, usually referred to as a ‘two-stage approach’ to sentencing, not only is apt to give rise to error, it is an approach that departs from principle. It should not be adopted.

…

76  … So long as a sentencing judge must, or may, take account of all of the circumstances of the offence and the offender, to single out some of those considerations and attribute specific numerical or proportionate value to some features, distorts the already difficult balancing exercise which the judge must perform.” (italics in original)

77. This is a clear case of sentencing by the forbidden “two-stage” approach, as revealed by [57] to [60] of the Remarks (extracted above). Error is therefore demonstrated.

78. Similarly, the same matters (that is, the applicant’s age and state of ill health) have been taken into account with respect to both the selection of the sentence, and the question of special circumstances. In R v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172 Spigelman CJ cautioned against such “double counting”. (That error affects the selection of the non-parole period.)

79. By Ground 3 the Crown complains that the sentencing judge determined that the sentences for the two offences against DA be served concurrently. It argued that the seriousness of the offences called for a measure of accumulation.

80. Two answers may be made to this contention. The first is that the indicated intention that the sentences be served concurrently was made at a time when, it seems, his Honour proposed to impose individual sentences; it was overtaken by his subsequent decision to impose an aggregate term of imprisonment. The question of accumulation or concurrency thus became irrelevant. The very nature of an aggregate sentence is that the sentences for all offences are served concurrently. The central question is whether the aggregate sentence adequately meets the totality of the offending. That is the question raised by Ground 5.

81. The second answer to the contention is to be found in Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37; 252 CLR 601 (discussed in another context below). At [43] the High Court said:

“… Nor is the Court required to re-sentence in a case in which it concludes that a lesser sentence is appropriate for one or more offences, but that a greater sentence is appropriate for another or other offences, with the result that the aggregate sentence that it considers warranted in law exceeds the aggregate sentence that is the subject of appeal …”

The observation is of limited relevance, but it does suggest that, in appropriate circumstances, an appellate court may properly look at the overall result, rather than minutely dissecting each individual sentence.

82. By Ground 4, the Crown complains of error in the failure of the sentencing judge to have regard to general deterrence.

83. It is incontestable that no reference was made in the sentencing remarks to this sentencing consideration. It is an important factor in respect of most, if not all, offences, but may be thought to have particular importance in the case of sexual offences against children. That is in part because such offences are, ordinarily, committed in private, without witnesses, and, as is now known, child victims are hesitant to reveal the offending, meaning that the offences are difficult to expose.

84. Counsel for the appellant sought to resist this ground on the basis that, in the circumstances, no questions of personal deterrence arose, and the personal circumstances of the appellant rendered general deterrence of little or no weight. The former proposition may be accepted; the latter may not. It was an error to fail to have regard to an important sentencing consideration.

85. My conclusion, therefore, is that three of the five grounds pleaded by the Crown have been made out. That does not dictate the result of the Crown appeal. In Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571, the High Court said:

“24  … The authority of the Court of Criminal Appeal to substitute a sentence for that imposed by [the sentencing judge] was not enlivened by its view that it would have given greater weight to deterrence and less weight to the appellant’s subjective case. The power could only be engaged if the Court was satisfied that [the sentencing judge’s] discretion miscarried because in the result his Honour imposed a sentence that was below the range of sentences that could be justly imposed for the offence consistently with sentencing standards. In that event, the Court was required to consider whether the [Crown’s] appeal should nonetheless be dismissed in the exercise of the residual discretion …” (internal citations omitted)

86. Notwithstanding the errors shown, I am not satisfied, in the circumstances, that the sentence imposed was below the range of sentences that could justly be imposed for the offences consistently with (relevant) sentencing standards. Even if I were, for reasons that follow, I would exercise the discretion that resides in this Court to dismiss the Crown appeal. I now turn to those reasons.

87. It will be observed that, although I have proposed that the Crown appeal be dismissed, and I have concluded that the grounds pleaded by the appellant should fail, I have not proposed an outcome to the appellant’s application for leave to appeal.

88. In Bugmy, in the passage set out above, the High Court stated the questions that arise on a Crown appeal under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act. Those questions are not entirely consonant with those that arise in an appeal for which leave has been granted under s 5(1)(c). It is s 6(3) that specifies the approach to be taken in those circumstances.

89. In Kentwell, the High Court said of s 6(3):

“35  … Notwithstanding the breadth of its language, it was settled at an early stage that the appellate court’s authority to intervene is dependent upon demonstration of error. The significance to the function of the appellate court of the distinction between specific error, of any of the kinds identified in House v The King [[1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499], and the conclusion of manifest excess or inadequacy is explained by Hayne J in AB v The Queen [[1999] HCA 46; 198 CLR 111]. In the case of specific error, the appellate court’s power to intervene is enlivened and it becomes its duty to re-sentence, unless in the separate and independent exercise of its discretion it concludes that no different sentence should be passed. By contrast, absent specific error, the appellate court may only intervene if it concludes that the sentence falls outside the permissible range of sentences for the offender and the offence.

…

42  … When a judge acts upon wrong principle, allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect the determination, mistakes the facts or does not take into account some material consideration, the Court of Criminal Appeal does not assess whether and to what degree the error influenced the outcome. The discretion in such a case has miscarried and it is the duty of the Court of Criminal Appeal to exercise the discretion afresh taking into account the purposes of sentencing and the factors that the [Sentencing Procedure Act], and any other Act or rule of law, require or permit. As sentencing is a discretionary judgment that does not yield a single correct result, it follows that a range of sentences in a given case may be said to be ‘warranted in law’. A sentence that happens to be within the range but that has been imposed as the result of a legally flawed determination is not ‘warranted in law’ unless, in the exercise of its independent discretion, the Court of Criminal Appeal determines that it is the appropriate sentence for the offender and the offence …

44  … The appellant is entitled to be sentenced according to law. The issue for the Court's consideration was whether upon the hearing of the appeal it might conclude, taking into account the full range of factors including the evidence of the appellant’s progress in custody and current mental state, that a lesser sentence is warranted in law.” (some internal citations omitted)

90. I am conscious that Kentwell was decided in the context of s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act, and not with specific reference to s 5D of that Act. It cannot, however, be overlooked that the appellant has not been sentenced according to law. The Crown has demonstrated, and the appellant conceded, that the sentencing judge acted “on wrong principle”; the sentencing process was flawed at the outset in that he engaged in the prohibited two stage process. It is neither possible nor appropriate to enquire what (if any) impact that error had on the outcome.

91. But that is an error that was pleaded by the Crown in its appeal. Although it was conceded on behalf of the appellant to be an error, it was not adopted on behalf of the appellant as an independent ground of his proposed appeal. A question arises therefore, whether the identification of error by the Crown can be turned to the advantage of the appellant.

92. It would, in my opinion, be a distortion of justice if this Court were to find error of principle, to find that the appellant had not been sentenced according to law, but nevertheless refrain from intervention because the error has been exposed, not by the appellant, but the Crown.

93. There is no reason why the statements in Kentwell do not apply to sentencing affected by error of principle, by whomever the error is exposed. In those circumstances, in my opinion, this Court must proceed to set aside the sentence imposed and re-sentence the appellant. That means granting leave to appeal and allowing the appellant’s appeal.

94. I recognise that proposing a reduction in sentence after upholding a ground of appeal advanced by the Crown might seem a little odd. It is necessary, however, to have close regard to the terms of s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act. That section permits this Court (where error is shown) to vary the sentence imposed and substitute “such sentence as to [this] Court may seem proper”.

95. That parallels the re-sentencing discretion conferred by s 6(3) following an appeal under s 5(1)(c). The Court is not limited, in such an appeal, to re-sentencing by the imposition of a lesser sentence (although, it is well established, before imposing a more severe sentence it must give fair warning to the offender: Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282.

96. In criminal matters the Crown occupies a special position. It is not a party-party litigant, but a litigant having an obligation of fairness, and an obligation of candour to the Court. Where it identifies error, it is the obligation of the Crown to draw that error to the attention of the Court, or to the offender, even if that opens the potential for a reduction in sentence (or, in the case of error in conviction, if it opens the potential for a re-trial or acquittal). It is the fact that the criminal process has miscarried that is of importance; that miscarriage must be corrected. The integrity of the criminal justice system is sustained by the Crown accepting the obligation to correct error, even where correction appears to be against its immediate interests. The longer term interests of the Crown lie in maintaining that integrity.

97. In [42] of Kentwell it was made clear that, once error is established, it is not the role of this Court to assess the effect of the error on the outcome. The role of this Court is to recommence the sentencing process.

Re-sentencing

98. It was made clear in Kentwell that, where error in sentencing is established, unless the error is such that it does not affect the exercise of the sentencing discretion, the duty of this Court is to exercise the discretion independently, taking into account all relevant matters. Importantly, that discretion is to be exercised on the basis of circumstances as they exist at the time of re-sentencing. (I take that to be what the majority of the High Court meant when they added “including evidence of events that have occurred since the sentencing hearing” at first instance (at [43])). Re-sentencing must be, so far as possible, on standards as they existed in 1972, 1977 and 1978, and 1981.

Objective gravity

99. All of the offences were committed at a time when the statutory provisions concerning sexual misconduct were, by current standards, unsophisticated. They were contained in the Crimes Act. The principal sexual offence was that known as “rape”, the application of which was limited to female victims. Offences against male victims were provided for by s 81 and s 79 (“the abominable crime of buggery”), s 80 (“attempts to commit buggery”) and s 81A (“outrages on decency” which involved acts of indecency on males – that is, homosexual acts falling short of “buggery”).

100. An understanding of these provisions is relevant and necessary, in order to permit a proper assessment of the objective gravity of each of the appellant’s offences, having regard to the maximum sentence. Section 81 covered a wide range of offences: it encompassed indecent assaults on males of all ages, whether consensual or not (I do not pause to reflect upon what a consensual assault might be – see s 81); it encompassed all manner of sexual assaults (as distinct from consensual conduct covered by s 81A) falling short of “buggery”.

99. The age of a victim of an indecent assault plainly is, and was, relevant in the assessment of objective gravity. So also are the circumstances in which such an offence is committed. Where, as here, it is committed in breach of trust by a person representing a church, who parents have trusted to deal with their children, and, in the case of DA and PI, to whose care away from home parents have committed their children, the offence must be viewed as grave. Also relevant is the nature of the assault. In the circumstances of the second offence against SC, and the offence against PI, the actual assault was at a relatively low level, aggravated, however, by the ages of the victims, and the position of trust occupied by the appellant. In the case of the first offence against SC, involving direct contact with the penis of the victim, the offence was objectively more serious.

100. The offences against DA were at a very much higher level of objective gravity, involving as they did taking advantage of the victim while he was asleep, and amounting to what now would be called sexual assault. The second offence involved penetration. Relevant in this consideration is the appellant’s injunction to the victim not to tell his parents. Also relevant is the harm done to the victims, specifically as expressed in the Victim Impact Statements. These offences must be considered as being at the upper end of the scale of objective gravity offences against s 81.

Other sentencing considerations

103. Conventionally, both general and specific deterrence are regarded as important sentencing considerations. While general deterrence remains relevant, having regard to other factors to which I am about to turn, and to the opinion of Mr Watson-Munroe that the appellant poses a low risk of re-offending (an assessment I would accept), the question of specific deterrence is of limited importance.

104. The principal issue is the age and health of the appellant. At 73, his age alone would not speak against a custodial sentence. His health, however, is another matter. That evidence has been recounted in some detail above; it need not be restated. Eleven months ago his specialist cardiologist (Dr England) assessed his life expectancy at 6-12 months. Dr England considered him a “certain risk of suicide or sudden death” if imprisoned. The appellant suffers from dementia.

105. This is not the first time this Court has been confronted with a sentencing exercise that needs to balance appropriate recognition of the objective gravity of an offence against the powerful evidence pointing to a merciful outcome: see, for example, R v Sopher (1993) 70 A Crim R 570; R v Achurch [2011] NSWCCA 186; 216 A Crim R 152; R v Dudgeon [2014] NSWCCA 301.

106. In Sopher, the offender had, over 16 years, systematically and methodically defrauded the social security system. When he came to be sentenced (at almost 71 years of age) he had been diagnosed as suffering from a variety of physical ailments, some of them apparently serious. He was also suffering from “situational stress reaction” and “severe reactive depression”. This Court said:

“Health and age are relevant to the length of any sentence but usually of themselves would not lead to a gaol sentence not being imposed if it were otherwise warranted. Much depends on the circumstances. For example, a person may have but a short period to live or need intense treatment which cannot be provided in gaol. There may be circumstances where to keep a person in gaol will probably lead to his early death and this would not otherwise occur. The variety and combination of circumstances are legion. An appropriate balance has to be maintained between the criminality of the conduct in question and any damage to health or shortening of life …” (at p 573)

107. In Achurch, the offences were of drug supply, in large quantities. The offender was 51 years of age at sentencing. By that time he, too, was suffering from a number of physical conditions, including chronic kidney disease, vascular disease and congestive heart failure. The prognosis was that “prolonged incarceration” would significantly reduce his life expectancy, although to what extent was not quantified. After an extensive review of the authorities, Johnson J (with whom Macfarlan JA and Garling J agreed) concluded that it had not been reasonably open to the sentencing judge to find (as he had) that this was an exceptional case which permitted the offender’s medical condition to become the dominant and controlling factor on sentence at the expense of the objective seriousness of his crimes.

108. In Dudgeon, the offender committed two offences of aggravated break, enter and steal. In each case the feature of aggravation was the infliction of violence on victims, in one case by tying the victim’s wrists and ankles, and placing a bag over his head. Evidence on appeal (not known at sentencing) was that the offender was suffering from terminal cancer, with a life expectancy “measured in months” from the date of publication of the judgment on appeal. Although the sentence imposed at first instance was described as “very lenient”, it was further “moderated”, although it still incorporated a non-parole period of 11 months. Beazley P, agreeing with the primary judgment of Fullerton J, said:

“5  This has presented the court with a difficult sentencing task. Had the sentencing task involved a free standing discretion, the court may well have considered that it was appropriate that the applicant be immediately released to parole. However, the court is required to sentence the applicant in accordance with proper sentencing principles. Whilst that task is appropriately evaluative, it does not entitle the court to disregard, amongst other things, the seriousness of the offending conduct, including that it was committed whilst the applicant was on bail …”

109. The various authorities referred to by Johnson J in Achurch, and those to which I have just referred, show a consistency in the statement of applicable principles. It is drawn from R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587 at 589, and from the passage in Sopher extracted above. Notwithstanding the recognition that, in appropriate circumstances, a sentence may be mitigated, even to the point of being non-custodial, by reason of ill health, the decisions show that, generally, this Court has taken a hard line in its application. For example, in R v Higgins [2002] NSWCCA 407; 133 A Crim R 385 where the offender had been infected with the HIV virus, and where his medical condition had been taken into account by the sentencing judge, the court declined further to reduce the sentence in order that it be wholly non-custodial.

110. What must be acknowledged, however, is that in only one of the decisions was the medical condition of the offender comparable, in terms of life expectancy and the anticipated impact on the offender of a custodial sentence, as in the present case. That one case was Dudgeon.

111. In this case, the Crown did not attempt to challenge the assessment nor the prognosis of Dr England. Nor did it adduce any evidence of what arrangements could be made for the care and treatment of the appellant in custody. This Court cannot make any assumptions about the level of care that could be anticipated in the prison system.

112. There is no doubt that the appellant’s offences, even by the more lenient or relaxed standards of the 1970s and 1980s, called for a significant custodial sentence. The length of that overall sentence must be measured against the maximum penalty of 5 years (for each offence), and the relation the gravity of the offences bears to a “worst case”. In this respect, the offences against DA, given the age of DA, the appellant’s breach of trust, and of the stealthy way he went about the offences, must be seen as grave. But the sentence must also take into account the extreme medical condition of the appellant.

113. The Crown did not suggest that the sentencing option of an aggregate sentence under s 53A of the Sentencing Procedure Act was not available in this case. It is a convenient manner in which to approach this difficult case.

114. The sentence that I am about to propose is very considerably less than the objective circumstances of the offences warrant. This was, and is, a difficult sentencing exercise because of the conflicting sentencing considerations. Had the appellant committed the offences more recently, he would have been charged with different offences, carrying far more severe maximum penalties. The maximum penalty of 5 years applicable to those offences dictates that current sentencing practices are inapplicable. Recognition of the harm done to children by sexual offenders, currently central to the sentencing exercise, does not appear to have featured heavily in the sentencing regime of the 1970s and 1980s. Even so, the harm to these victims should not pass unnoticed. Against that is the medical evidence that calls for a measure of compassion.

115. I would have considered the alternative option of a sentence to be served by way of home detention under s 76 of the Sentencing Procedure Act. However, by s 76(b), such an order is not available in respect of sexual offences involving children and, in any event, the legislation requires an assessment of the offender’s suitability for such an option (s 78(2)). Time would not permit such an assessment.

116. I also would have considered the partial suspension of a longer non-parole period. Partial suspension is no longer an available option (Sentencing Procedure Act, s 12).

117. I propose that the appellant be sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 2 years commencing on 24 August 2016, with a non-parole period of 3 months which will expire on 23 November 2016. Pursuant to s 50 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, the appellant is entitled to be released at the expiration of the non-parole period.

118. Pursuant to s 53A(2)(a) I indicate that the sentences I would have imposed for the individual offences are:

(i)  For the first offence against SC: imprisonment for 6 months;

(ii)  For the second offence against SC: imprisonment for a fixed term of 3 months;

(iii)  For the offence against PI: imprisonment for a fixed term of 3 months;

(iv)  For the first offence against DA: imprisonment for 18 months;

(v)  For the second offence against DA: imprisonment for 18 months.

119. Of course, had those sentences been imposed individually, it would have been necessary to determine questions of accumulation and concurrence.

120. The orders I propose are:

(1)  Appeal against conviction dismissed.

(2)  Crown appeal dismissed.

(3)  Leave granted to the appellant to appeal against sentence.

(4)  Appeal allowed.

(5)  In lieu of the sentence imposed in the District Court, the appellant is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 2 years, commencing on 24 August 2016, with a non-parole period of 3 months, to expire on 23 November 2016.

(6)  Direct that the appellant be released on parole at the expiration of the non-parole period.

121. PRICE J: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgments of Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson JA. I have no hesitation in agreeing that the appeal against conviction ought to be dismissed. My concern lies with the orders proposed by Simpson JA that dismiss the Crown appeal and allow the appellant’s appeal against the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, despite her Honour concluding that none of the appellant’s grounds of appeal can succeed (see [72] – [74] above).

122. I should immediately mention that I agree that none of the appellant’s grounds of appeal have been made out. Such a conclusion would normally result in the appeal being dismissed. However, in the present case, the Crown’s appeal pursuant to s5D Criminal Appeal Act against the manifest inadequacy of the sentence contained five grounds of appeal. Simpson JA found that Grounds 1, 2 and 4 pleaded by the Crown had been made out and I agree that the errors of law identified by the Crown in these grounds have been established.

123. I do not agree with her Honour’s view that the Crown has failed to demonstrate that the sentence imposed was outside the range of available sentences in all the circumstances of the case. However, I would exercise the residual discretion on compassionate grounds and dismiss the Crown appeal. As this is a minority view, there is no need to dilate further on these issues.

124. The focus of my concern is that following the dismissal of the Crown appeal, her Honour re-sentenced the appellant thereby reducing the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, notwithstanding that the appellant failed in making out any of his grounds of appeal. In my respectful opinion, it defies logic and common sense to use the grounds of appeal successfully argued by the Crown as pointing to the inadequacy of the sentence as a springboard to ultimately reduce the same sentence. It is hardly surprising that the appellant did not adopt any of the Crown’s grounds of appeal.

125. As Simpson JA observes, the Crown occupies a special position in criminal matters and is obliged to correct error, even where correction appears to be against its immediate interests. However, there is no distortion of justice where the errors identified by the Crown indicate that, absent those errors, a longer sentence may have been imposed by the sentencing judge. Considering the sentencing judge’s remarks on sentence as a whole, it is evident, in my opinion, that the two-stage process adopted by the sentencing judge, in combination with “double counting” and his Honour’s failure to have regard to general deterrence, infected his reasoning and resulted in a lesser sentence.

126. Kentwell did not did not involve a Crown appeal under s5D Criminal Appeal Act. In my view, there is nothing in Bugmy which suggests that, after the identification of specific error by the Crown but the Crown appeal is dismissed, this Court is then obliged to re-sentence an appellant, where the errors identified favour the Crown’s complaint of manifest inadequacy of sentence.

127. It would be unfortunate, it seems to me, that what was said by the High Court in Kentwell (see [89] above) should be construed so as to require this Court to re-sentence an appellant where any specific error affecting the sentencing discretion is identified, even though that error benefited the appellant. The task of sentencing should primarily remain with sentencing judges.

128. In any event, I find myself in disagreement with the sentence proposed by Simpson JA which in my opinion falls well short of an appropriate sentence.

129. I am grateful for her Honour’s detailed exposition of the facts of the offences and the appellant’s personal circumstances. As her Honour enunciates, the offences against DA must be considered at the upper end of the scale of objective gravity for offences contrary to s81 Crimes Act. The appellant did not plead guilty to these offences and no allowance could be made for remorse. General deterrence remains a relevant consideration.

130. Without question, the appellant’s parlous physical and mental health are an important consideration. However, I do not agree with Simpson JA’s opinion that “[t]his Court cannot make any assumptions about the level of care that could be anticipated in the prison system” (see [111] above). In Achurch, Johnson J (with whom Macfarlan JA and Garling J agreed) said:

“125 Justice Health is a statutory health corporation, with functions including the provision of health services to offenders and persons in custody: s.236A CAS Act [Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW)]. The Chief Executive Officer of Justice Health has a statutory right to have free and unfettered access at all times to correctional centres, medical records and offenders to ensure that statutory provisions relating to Justice Health are being complied with: s.236B CAS Act.

126 Accordingly, the Court should approach an appeal such as this upon the basis that the contemporary statutory regime entrusts and empowers Justice Health to take all necessary steps to provide health services to an inmate such as the Respondent whilst in custody…”

131. Furthermore, I do not consider that it was incumbent on the Crown to adduce evidence of the arrangements that could be made for the appellant’s care and treatment in custody.

132. The appellant bears the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that Justice Health could not provide him with medical care that was reasonable and appropriate. There was no evidence before the sentencing judge or this Court that discharged the evidentiary onus. The psychologist’s opinion that the appellant was unlikely to receive the type of specialist care he was receiving from Dr England in custody amounts to no more than speculation.

133. Both Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson JA agree that the appellant should be re-sentenced to an aggregate term of 2 years, with a non-parole period of 3 months. Regrettably, I am unable to understand how such a sentence can be fixed without the appellant’s ill-health being taken into account both in the determination of the length of the aggregate sentence and as a special circumstance justifying such a significant variation in the statutory ratio between the balance of term and the non-parole period. “Double-counting” was the subject of the Crown’s successful complaint in Ground 2.

134. Bearing in mind the legislative guidepost of the maximum sentence, the objective circumstances of the offences, the subjective features of the appellant and the sentencing patterns at the time of the offences, I consider that an aggregate sentence of 3 years with a non-parole period of 1 year 6 months would have been an appropriate sentence. Such a non-parole period would adequately reflect the criminality involved in the appellant’s offending. I have previously indicated that it is my view that the Crown has established that the aggregate sentence passed by the sentencing judge was manifestly inadequate, but the residual discretion should be exercised.

135. Accordingly, the orders I propose are:

1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.

2. Crown appeal dismissed.

3. Leave granted to the appellant to appeal against sentence.

4. Appeal dismissed.

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Decision last updated: 24 August 2016