Filep v AMP Capital Investors Ltd

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Filep v AMP Capital Investors Ltd & Anor [2016] QDC 300

PARTIES:

ALEXSANDRA FILEP
(applicant)

v

AMP CAPITAL INVESTORS LIMITED
(first respondent)

and

AIRLITE CLEANING PTY LTD
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D111/16

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

25 November 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 November 2016

JUDGE:

Rackemann DCJ

ORDER:

The application is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – TORTS AND PERSONAL INJURY – application pursuant to s 59(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 – discretion – where delay in bringing application – where applicant’s solicitor’s negligent – whether applicant ought to have done more – where claim relates to an incident some 6 years ago – prejudice to the respondents

COUNSEL:

M.J. Smith for the applicant

B.F. Charrington for the first respondent

SOLICITORS:

Parker Simmonds for the applicant

Barry Nilsson Lawyers for the first respondent

Carter Newell for the second respondent

  1. This is an application, pursuant to s 59(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (“PIPA”), for leave to start a proceeding at a time which outside the period of limitation. Section 59 of PIPA provides as follows:

“59       Alteration of period of limitation

(1)If a complying part 1 notice of claim is given before the end of the period of limitation applying to the claim, the claimant may start a proceeding in a court based on the claim even though the period of limitation has ended.

(2)However, the proceeding may be started after the end of the period of limitation only if it is started within—

(a)6 months after the complying part 1 notice is given or leave to start the proceeding is granted; or

(b)a longer period allowed by the court.

(3)Also, if a proceeding is started under subsection (2) without the claimant having complied with part 1, the proceeding is stayed until the claimant complies with the part or the proceeding otherwise ends.

(4)If a period of limitation is extended under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, part 3, this section applies to the period of limitation as extended under that part.

  1. The applicant’s claim relates to an incident said to have occurred in June 2010 when she says she suffered a slip and fall accident in the car park of the first respondent’s shopping centre.  The second respondent was the cleaning contractor at the time.

  1. The incident was described in the notice of claim as follows:

“I parked the car in the upper level car park. I got out of the car and slipped on the car park flooring. I landed on my bottom and rolling onto my side. Following my fall I noticed that the ground was wet.”

  1. In a statutory declaration made much later, on 2 September 2013,[1] the applicant said that she believed the wet area to be a puddle of water over an ‘oily’ substance.

    [1]Affidavit of Simmonds Ex BFS 32.

  1. A notice of claim was given to the first…

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Details
Case
[2016] QDC 300
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Filep v AMP Capital Investors Ltd involved an application for an extension of time to bring a proceeding. The application was made under section 59(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, seeking to allow the claimant to proceed with a claim against the respondent for personal injury. The application was made several years after the incident that allegedly caused the injury. The primary issue before the court was whether the delay in bringing the application should be excused, and if so, whether the applicant had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the prejudice caused to the respondent by the delay.

The court considered the discretionary factors set out in section 59(2) of the Act, which include the length and cause of the delay, the extent to which the applicant had mitigated the prejudice to the respondent, and any other relevant circumstances. The applicant argued that the delay was due to the negligence of their solicitor, and that they had taken all reasonable steps to mitigate the prejudice. The respondent argued that the delay was unreasonable and that the applicant had not done enough to mitigate the prejudice caused. The court found that the delay was significant, and that the applicant had not taken sufficient steps to mitigate the prejudice to the respondent. The court also found that the applicant's solicitor's negligence was not an acceptable excuse for the delay.

The court concluded that the application should be dismissed, as the delay was too significant and the applicant had not taken sufficient steps to mitigate the prejudice caused to the respondent. The court found that the applicant had not discharged the onus of showing that the delay was justified, and that the prejudice to the respondent outweighed any public interest in the applicant being able to bring the claim. The court did not make any orders in relation to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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