Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ

FIGGINS HOLDINGS PTY LTD  APPELLANT

AND

SEAA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (M13-1998)
[1999] HCA 20
6 May 1999

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed with costs.

  1. Orders of the Court of Appeal of Victoria be set aside and, in place thereof, order that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria

Representation:

A R Castan QC and G H Golvan QC with A I Strum for the appellant (instructed by Feingold Partners Pty Ltd)

A J Myers QC with M R Pearce for the respondent (instructed by
Phillips Fox)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd v SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd

Real property - Torrens system - Unregistered lease - Variation of lease to reduce rent - Landlord in default under mortgage - Whether payment of reduced rent discharges lessee's rental obligations so as to bind purchaser following exercise of mortgagee's power of sale.

Mortgage - Torrens system - Statutory power of sale - Exercise - Nature of reversionary interest obtained by purchaser upon registration - Whether privity of title or interest exists between registered proprietor and former mortgagor or mortgagee.

Mortgage - Torrens system - Juridical nature of security interest - Comparison with old system mortgage - Rights and remedies of mortgagee under Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), s 81.

Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), ss 135, 138, 141, 151.
Retail Tenancies Act 1986 (Vic), ss 21, 38.
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), ss 42(2)(e), 74, 77, 78, 81.

GAUDRON, GUMMOW AND CALLINAN JJ.

Introduction

  1. This appeal from the Victorian Court of Appeal[1] (Winneke P, Brooking and Charles JJA) arises from a dispute between the present registered proprietor (the respondent) of certain land ("the Land") registered under the provisions of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) ("the Transfer of Land Act") and a lessee (the appellant) under a written but unregistered lease ("the Lease"). The respondent took title to the Land in 1994 from a registered first mortgagee exercising the power of sale conferred by s 77 of the Transfer of Land Act. The Lease was granted in 1988 by the then registered proprietor before it transferred the Land in 1989 to an intervening registered proprietor. It was this party which granted the mortgage, default under which led to the exercise of the power of sale whereby the respondent became registered proprietor of the Land. The appellant, as lessee, disputes the decision of the Court of Appeal that its obligations to the lessor with respect to rent and other moneys due under certain covenants by the lessee in the Lease are not qualified by a deed of variation ("the Deed of Variation") between the lessee and the intervening registered proprietor. The Deed of Variation was entered into in…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCA 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Victoria concerning a dispute between Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (the lessee) and SEAA Enterprises Pty Ltd (the registered proprietor of the land). The core of the dispute involved an unregistered lease, a subsequent variation to reduce rent, a default by the original lessor under its mortgage, and the exercise of the mortgagee's power of sale, resulting in SEAA becoming the registered proprietor. Figgins argued that payments made under the varied lease discharged its rental obligations, binding SEAA as the successor in title.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether a payment of reduced rent, agreed between the original lessor and lessee after the mortgagor's default but before the mortgagee exercised its power of sale, discharged the lessee's rental obligations so as to bind a purchaser upon the registration of a transfer following the mortgagee's sale. The court was also required to consider the nature of the reversionary interest obtained by a purchaser under the Torrens system upon registration after a mortgagee's sale, and whether privity of title or interest existed between the registered proprietor and the former mortgagor or mortgagee in such circumstances. The application of specific provisions of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) and the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), particularly section 81, was central to these considerations.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. The Court reasoned that section 81(1) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) grants a first mortgagee the same rights and remedies as if the legal estate had been vested in them, but this state of affairs, including the mortgagor's right to quiet enjoyment until default, ceases upon the registration of a transfer following the exercise of the mortgagee's power of sale. The court held that a mortgagor in default, prior to the mortgagee exercising its power of sale, does not have the power to vary a lease in a way that binds the mortgagee or a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagee. Therefore, the variation of the lease to reduce rent did not bind SEAA. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal allowed with costs.

2.

Orders of the Court of Appeal of Victoria be set aside and, in place thereof, order that the appeal to that court be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal presents issues concerning the operation of the Torrens system with respect to privity between the lessee and successors in title of the lessor where there has been an intervening variation in the terms of the lease, default by the mortgagor and the exercise by the first mortgagee of its power of sale. In particular, there are issues as to the application of Div 5 of Pt 2 (ss 136‑154) of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) ("the Property Law Act") and Div 9 of Pt 4 of the Transfer of Land Act (ss 74‑87), particularly s 81. It is convenient to set out the text of the relevant provisions later in these reasons. Something further now should be said of the facts.The facts Since 14 February 1994, the respondent ("SEAA") has been the registered proprietor of the Land, which is that contained in Certificates of Title Vol 9530 Folio 153 and Vol 9569 Folio 716 and which is situated in the central business district of Melbourne at 167‑173 Collins Street. By contract dated 23 December 1993 ("the Contract"), SEAA purchased the Land from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia ("the Bank"), which is the successor in law of the State Bank of Victoria ("the State Bank"). This successorship was brought about, with effect from 1 January 1991, by the combined operation of the Commonwealth Banks Restructuring Act 1990 (Cth) and the State Bank (Succession of Commonwealth Bank) Act 1990 (Vic). By instrument dated 12 January 1988, the appellant ("Figgins") took a lease of two shops ("the Premises") in an arcade in premises on the Land which were known as the "Shop of Shops". The lessor was the then registered proprietor of the Land, Gembleng Pty Ltd ("Gembleng"). The First Schedule to the Lease specified a term of four years from 26 October 1987. Clause 4.07 provided for options to renew for successive periods of four years. The lessee covenanted to pay the rent of $63,665 per annum calendar monthly in advance. There was a covenant to pay to or reimburse the lessor all rates, taxes and charges separately assessed in respect of the Premises (cl 2.01.02) and a covenant to pay a proportion of the wide variety of operating costs set out in the Third Schedule to the Lease (cl 2.02). The lessee was obliged by cl 4.08 to contribute each year to a fund for the promotion of the arcade. Clause 3.04 stipulated that, if any person other than Gembleng became entitled by operation of law or otherwise to receive the rent, such person was to have the benefit of all the covenants and agreements on the part of the lessee under the Lease. Division 5 of Pt 2 of the Property Law Act expressly (by force of s 136) applies to leases of land under the Transfer of Land Act. Section 141 provides for the rent reserved by a lease and the benefit of the lessee's covenants, "having reference to the subject‑matter thereof"[2], to run with the reversionary estate in the land (or in any part thereof) immediately expectant on the term granted by the lease. By this means, the benefit of the covenants by Figgins in their form at the time of the registration of the transfer to SEAA has passed to SEAA. It will be necessary further to consider this aspect of the matter later in these reasons. [2]This phrase imports the requirement that the covenants "touch and concern" the land: Breams Property Investment Co Ltd v Stroulger [1948] 2 KB 1 at 7.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAUDRON, GUMMOW AND CALLINAN JJ HUGH J (dissent) KIRBY J
Somewhat similar provisions were introduced in Western Australia by ss 116 and 117 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)[55]. In the course of construing these provisions in Connolly v Ryan[56], Higgins J observed that in s 116 (as in s 81(1)) there was no express reference to a fixed day for payment or even to a demise. His Honour considered that it might be that the words of the section avoid the result at common law that the covenant for quiet enjoyment would not operate as a re‑demise where no term for payment was fixed[57]. It is unnecessary for the purposes of the present appeal to determine whether the reasoning of Higgins J should be accepted.[55]These were stated to apply not merely to first mortgages but to mortgages generally, and were described by Hogg as "illogical, since a second mortgagee cannot be in the position of a mortgagee with the legal estate under the general law": Hogg, The Australian Torrens System, (1905) at 961‑962.[56](1922) 30 CLR 498 at 506.[57](1922) 30 CLR 498 at 507.Conclusions The vital considerations respecting the operation of s 81 upon the rights between SEAA and Figgins lie elsewhere. It will be observed that s 81(1) deems there to be a state of legal affairs which otherwise would not exist. It does so through the medium of the words "a first mortgagee shall … have the same rights and remedies at law and in equity as he would have had if …". When answering in the negative the question whether Lamina, as a mortgagor in default, had power to vary the Lease in a way that bound the Bank, Hayne J said[58]:"It was submitted on behalf of [Figgins] that until the [B]ank chose to take steps to enforce its rights the mortgagee might continue to exercise powers it had before the occurrence of the default. However, the mortgagor's right to quiet enjoyment is a right that subsists only until default and no notice or act on the part of the mortgagee is necessary to bring that right to quiet enjoyment to an end. Upon default the position of the mortgagor is that of (or similar to) a tenant at sufferance."However, his Honour prefaced the statement of his reasons leading to that conclusion by saying[59]:"Section 81(1) provides that until the happening of certain events (none of which has happened here) a first mortgagee shall have the same rights and remedies at law and in equity as he would have had if the legal estate in the mortgaged land had been vested in him as mortgagee." (emphasis added)[58][1994] 2 VR 505 at 511.[59][1994] 2 VR 505 at 510. By the time SEAA gave the Notice, which set in train the arbitration giving rise to the present appeal, one of the "certain events" mentioned by Hayne J had in fact occurred. The transfer upon the sale to SEAA had been registered. The point may be made by reference to a commentary upon the provision corresponding to s 81 which is made by The Real Property Act of Manitoba[60]. Of that provision it has been said "a first mortgagee has these rights and powers only so long as the security is on foot as a security and the ownership of the land is consequently vested in the mortgagor"[61]. The state of legal affairs brought into existence by s 81(1), including the requirements of sub‑s (3) of consent by the mortgagee to action by the mortgagor, comes to an end upon the registration of a transfer upon the sale[62].[60]Ch 220 of the Revised Statutes of Manitoba, (1954). Section 112 states:"A first mortgagee, for the time being, of land under this Act, shall, during the currency of his mortgage, have the same rights and remedies at law and in equity as he would have had, had the legal estate in the land or term mortgaged been vested in him, with a right in the owner of the land of quiet enjoyment thereof until default in the payment of money secured thereby, or in the performance of a covenant expressed or implied therein." (emphasis added)[61]Thom's Canadian Torrens System, 2nd ed (1962) at 512. In Victoria, after the completion of foreclosure, s 87 of the Property Law Act operates, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, to extinguish any action by the mortgagee to recover on the mortgagor's personal covenant the outstanding balance of the moneys secured. At general law, equity does not restrain such an action when brought after exercise of an express power of sale: see Gordon Grant & Co v FL Boos [1926] AC 781 at 785‑786; Cheah v Equiticorp Finance Group Ltd [1992] 1 AC 472 at 476; Waldock, The Law of Mortgages, 2nd ed (1950) at 246‑248; Sykes and Walker, The Law of Securities, 5th ed (1993) at 132‑136.[62]See Taylor v Wolfe & Co (1892) 18 VLR 727, a decision with respect to ss 124 and 125 of the Transfer of Land Act 1890 (Vic).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAUDRON, GUMMOW AND CALLINAN JJ, KIRBY J

Full text does not contain this section.