Field v Department of Education and Communities - [2014] NSWWCCPD 16

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:	Field v Department of Education and Communities [2014] NSWWCCPD 16
APPELLANT:	Denis Field
RESPONDENT:	Department of Education and Communities
INSURER:	Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd
FILE NUMBER:	A1-15294/12
ARBITRATOR:	Mr G Edwards
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:	11 December 2013
DATE OF APPEAL HEARING:	24 March 2014
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	27 March 2014
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION:	Journey claim; s 10(3A) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; relief teacher hurrying to school because of late notice of requirement to attend; failure to accept unchallenged evidence; whether worker established a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident; relevance of worker’s belief and perception; relevance of principles in Attorney General’s Department v K [2010] NSWWCCPD 76 discussed
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Bill Roche
HEARING:	Oral
REPRESENTATION:	Appellant:	Mr S Hickey, instructed by Shine Lawyers
Respondent:	Mr S Flett, instructed by Leslie Hargrave Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. The Arbitrator’s determination of 11 December 2013 is revoked and the following orders are made in its place: “1.The Commission finds that, as there was a real and substantial connection between the applicant’s employment and the accident or incident out of which the applicant’s personal injury arose, the applicant was, on 23 October 2012, injured on a periodic journey between his place of abode and his place of employment and compensation is payable accordingly. 2. The respondent employer is to pay the applicant worker’s costs of the arbitration, as agreed or assessed, with an uplift for complexity of 25 per cent.” 2. The matter is remitted to another Arbitrator for determination of all outstanding matters. 3. The respondent employer is to pay the appellant worker’s costs of the appeal, assessed at $2,530 plus GST.

INTRODUCTION

A personal injury received by a worker on any journey to which s 10 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) applies is, for the purposes of the 1987 Act, “an injury arising out of or in the course of employment, and compensation is payable accordingly”. The journeys to which the section applies include, among others, daily or other periodic journeys between the worker’s place of abode and place of employment (s 10(3)(a)).
However, for injuries received on or after 19 June 2012, a journey to or from a worker’s place of abode and place of employment is a journey to which s 10(3) applies “only if there is a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident or incident out of which the personal injury arose” (s 10(3A)). This appeal concerns the application and interpretation of s 10(3A).

BACKGROUND

The appellant worker, Denis Field, has worked for the Department of Education and Communities (the respondent) as a casual/relief primary school teacher since about 2000. On 23 October 2012, he suffered a personal injury when he tripped and fell on broken and uneven ground in Yerrick Road, Lakemba, while walking hurriedly to the Hampton Park Public School at Lakemba (the school).
The only issue before the Arbitrator was whether there was a real and substantial connection between Mr Field’s employment and the accident or incident out of which his injury arose (s 10(3A)). If Mr Field satisfied that requirement, there was no issue that, at the time of his fall, he was on a journey to which s 10(3) of the 1987 Act applies, namely, a journey from his place of abode at Strathfield to his place of employment at Lakemba.
Mr Field’s evidence is uncontroversial and was unchallenged at the arbitration. When he was required to fill a vacancy at a school, the respondent, through an agency known as “Casual Direct”, would telephone him, usually between 6.30 am and 7.00 am, and tell him of the name and location of the school where he was needed.
On 23 October 2012, a person from Casual Direct telephoned Mr Field at 7.30 am and asked him to attend at the school. In his statement of 6 June 2013, Mr Field said:
“I had taught there in the past and noted it was [a] strict school; staff were required to be present at the school by 8.30 am in order to be given lessons for the day, shown to the classrooms or given 8.30 am playground duty.”
Mr Field added that his working day started when he received a call from Casual Direct. (That was not a legally correct statement, but nothing turns on it.) That call determined whether he worked that day, where he worked and when he got to work. When he received a call from Casual Direct, he would arrange to take the necessary transport to each particular school.
After receiving the call on 23 October 2012, Mr Field “hurriedly got dressed and ready”. He left home and caught the first bus he could. He added:
“A bus dropped me off near Lakemba Station at around 8.25 am. After getting off the bus I noted the time; I only had a couple of minutes to get to the school so I walked hurriedly. I was half way up Yerrick Road towards Yangoona Rd when I tripped on [the] uneven surface. I fell to the ground heavily, hitting my head, shoulders, knees, and injuring my back.”
Mr Field fell at a point about 100 metres from the school’s back entrance.
Mr Field said that had Casual Direct called him between the “usual times” (6.30 am and 7.00 am), he would not have had to rush to arrive at class on time, he would have had sufficient time to get ready and travel to the school, and he would not have injured himself.
In a second statement, dated 20 November 2013, Mr Field added:
“5. I tripped over the broken footpath because I was hurrying. Whilst hurrying I was looking straight ahead to my destination, as people do when hurrying. I didn’t notice the crack. I was worried about being late.
6. I was walking 3 times quicker than my usual pace.
7. Had I been walking [at] my usual pace, I would not have tripped as I would have seen the crack and I would have avoided it or walked over it in my normal pace.”
Mr Field’s evidence that he was rushing, to get to work on time, is partially corroborated by the report from his general practitioner, Dr Sammy Kochan, in which the doctor said that Mr Field’s injury “may have occurred as a result of him trying to rush to work in order to arrive on time”.
Counsel for Mr Field, Mr Hickey, submitted at the arbitration that the link between the employment and the tripping incident was established by two things: first, the requirement to attend the school at short notice and, second, because Mr Field was walking hurriedly as it was a strict school and staff were required to be at school at 8.30 am.
In rejecting these submissions, the Arbitrator said, in summary:
(a)     causation in workers compensation cases requires a “commonsense test” (Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452; 10 NSWCCR 796 (Kooragang));
(b) the causal nexus in s 10(3A) is the connection between the employment and the incident (Mitchell v Newcastle Permanent Building Society Ltd [2013] NSWWCCPD 55 at [73] (Mitchell));
(c)     because of an absence of evidence, he was unable to find that it was a requirement or a demand of the respondent that Mr Field be at the school by 8.30 am;
(d)     any link between the employment and the incident was Mr Field’s belief or perception that he had to be at the school at 8.30 am, which was not supported by evidence that the respondent required or demanded his attendance at that time;
(e) the link (between the accident and the employment) was far too tenuous to meet the causal requirement of s 10(3A), and
(f) the term “connection” in s 10(3A) could not be construed as meaning a perception by Mr Field of an industrial commitment to pupils and the Principal to be at the school by 8.30 am, without evidence that the perception was of real events, which are not external events (Attorney General’s Department v K [2010] NSWWCCPD 76 at [52]).
Mr Field has appealed. For the reasons explained below, the appeal is successful and the Arbitrator’s decision is reversed.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The “grounds” of appeal, as originally drafted, did not comply with Practice Direction No 6, which requires that the grounds of appeal should be brief and specific. In response to a direction issued by the Commission on 27 February 2014, counsel for Mr Field filed amended grounds of appeal in which he alleged that the Arbitrator erred in that he:
(a) misconceived the extent to which the factual test for satisfaction of s 10(3A) is required and in misapplying the facts when he incorrectly confined the conjunctive “causal” test set out by s 10(3A) of the 1987 Act to exclude Mr Field from its coverage;
(b) failed to find that Mr Field’s injury arose out of his employment even though suffered on a periodic journey;
(c) determined that Mr Field’s evidence was not sufficient to discharge the evidentiary onus on him so as to favourably attract s 10(3A), and
(d) failed to properly take note of the weight of Mr Field’s incontrovertible evidence when referring to the “connection”, as it appears in s 10(3A), not being made out by Mr Field’s evidence and failed to appreciate that the words “real and substantial ‘connection’” are words invoking a wide ranging test, which test was fulfilled by Mr Field’s evidence.
Notwithstanding Mr Hickey’s submission to the contrary, ground (b) above, whether the injury arose out of Mr Field’s employment, was not an issue argued before the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator did not deal with it. In these circumstances, it is not open to argue on appeal that the Arbitrator erred in failing to determine a matter that was never argued (Brambles Industries Ltd v Bell [2010] NSWCA 162 at [22] and [30]). I therefore do not intend to deal with that issue.
At the oral hearing of the appeal counsel agreed that the following issues arose, namely, did the Arbitrator err in:
(a) failing to find that Mr Field was required to be at the school at 8.30 am;
(b) finding that s 10(3A) requires a causal nexus between the employment and the accident or incident, as stated in Mitchell, and
(c) his general approach to the evidence and his reference to Mr Field’s belief and perception.

THE ARBITRATOR’S DECISION

The Arbitrator accepted, based on Mitchell, that s 10(3A) requires a causal nexus between the employment and the accident or incident concerned.
He noted Mr Hickey’s submission that there was a “link” between the employment and the incident because of the requirement to attend the school at short notice and because Mr Field was hurrying, as it was a strict school, and staff were required to be at the school at 8.30 am. He also noted Mr Hickey’s submission that an inference of “urgency” should be drawn that Mr Field was required to meet an industrial commitment, as demanded by the respondent, that he be at the school by 8.30 am to meet his obligations to the pupils and the Principal.
The Arbitrator said he was unable to accept that an inference should be drawn, based on Mr Field’s belief or perception, that he was required to be at the school by 8.30 am. He noted that Part 4 of the Application to Resolve a Dispute (the Application) alleged that, during the phone call (from Casual Direct), Mr Field had been “notified of the urgency of the request” and that he was “asked to arrive at work by 8.30 am”.
The Arbitrator said he was able to infer from the evidence that Mr Field was to provide relief teaching for that day, because of an absence of a permanent teacher, and that Mr Field would learn of his duties on arrival at the school. However, because there was no evidence, he was unable to make a finding that “it was a requirement or a demand of the respondent that Mr Field be at the school by 8.30 am when he received the telephone call from Casual Direct” ([64]).
The Arbitrator thought it was “unlikely that the respondent would expect a relief teacher to attend school by 8.30 am with an hour’s notice” ([65]). He said that Mr Field gave no evidence that Casual Direct had directed him to be at the school by 8.30 am. The evidence was that Mr Field was “asked to attend Hampden Road [sic] Public School Lakemba” to provide relief teaching for that day ([66]).
The Arbitrator said, at [67]–[70]:
“67.Mr Field in his statement says that he taught at this school in the past: it is a strict school, staff are required to be at the school by 8.30 am in order to be given lessons for the day; shown to the classrooms or allocated 8.30 am playground duty.
68.I think I can infer from Mr Field’s statement that permanent or regular staff, including casual teachers, are expected to be at school by 8.30 am, but I do not think I can find that a relief teacher in the position of Mr Field was required to be at the school at 8.30 am when contacted by Casual Direct at short notice.
69.There is no evidence that Mr Field was requested by the respondent through its agent to be at the school at 8.30 am or as a result of previous conversations with the school’s Principal or some other person authorised by the respondent that he was to attend the school at 8.30 am after being contacted by Casual Direct.
70.There is no evidence from Mr Field as to when he previously taught at the school or that he had been given directions that as a casual teacher he had to be at the school at 8.30 am after being contacted by Casual Direct.”
At [71], the Arbitrator observed that walking to the school, after being dropped off by the bus, was something that Mr Field would normally have done and there was no evidence that that was not Mr Field’s normal mode of travel to the school. In the Arbitrator’s view, any “link” that may arguably exist between the employment and the incident was “Mr Field’s belief or perception that he had to be at the school at 8.30 am” ([72]). That “belief or perception” was not supported by evidence that the respondent had required or demanded Mr Field’s attendance at that time. In the Arbitrator’s view, the link was “far too tenuous to meet the causal requirement that the subsection, properly construed, requires” ([72]).
The Arbitrator concluded (at [73]) that the discussion in Mitchell that a “connection” may encompass some other association with the employment could not:
“be construed as meaning a perception by Mr Field of an industrial commitment or obligation to pupils and the principal to be at the school at 8.30 am without evidence that the belief or perception was of real events, which are not external events, rather than imaginary (see discussion by Deputy President Roche as to the meaning of perception of real events in the workplace in Attorney General’s Department v K [2010] NSWWCCPD 76 at [52]).”

SUBMISSIONS

As the parties’ submissions have been recorded, I will only set out a brief summary of their main points. However, in reaching my conclusion in this matter, I have considered all of the points argued.
Mr Hickey submitted that Mr Field’s evidence, as summarised by the Arbitrator at [67], was uncontested and it was that evidence that provided the basis for Mr Field’s belief that he had an obligation to reach the school by 8.30 am. Based on this evidence, the Arbitrator erred in not concluding that Mr Field was hurrying to arrive at the school by 8.30 am. The Arbitrator wrongly thought that Mr Field’s understanding ought to be seen as not based on fact. It was not necessary for there to be evidence from the school or the respondent. The test in s 10(3A) was satisfied by Mr Field’s uncontested evidence and the Arbitrator erred in not accepting that evidence.
Mr Hickey argued that, based on Mr Field’s evidence of his past experience at the school, there was good reason why he was hurrying to arrive at the school by 8.30 am and that provided a sound reason to apply the test in s 10(3A) in favour of Mr Field and to find the connection required by the subsection to be satisfied. That was because of Mr Field’s evidence that there was an obligation to arrive at work at 8.30 am and because the requirement to hurry, due to the late notice to attend the school, was causative of the trip and fall. Relying on Dewan Singh and Kim Singh t/as Krambach Service Station v Wickenden [2014] NSWWCCPD 13 (Wickenden), Mr Hickey contended that word “connection” in s 10(3A) is a wider concept than causation.
Counsel for the respondent, Mr Flett, submitted that Mr Field failed to prove that the school (or the respondent) “required” him to be at work at 8.30 am. He said the Arbitrator correctly found that he could not draw an inference that Mr Field had been asked to arrive at the school by 8.30 am. Even if there was such a requirement, there was no evidence that Mr Field was required to rush or hurry. How he got to work, whether he walked quickly or slowly, and what route he took, was entirely his decision.
Mr Flett argued that Mr Field’s belief was not sufficient to establish the required link between the employment and the fall because the evidence:
(a)     only reflected Mr Field’s belief based on past experiences;
(b)     did not disclose how many times Mr Field had worked at the school;
(c)     did not disclose what was meant by “required”;
(d)     did not disclose how Mr Field came to know that he was required to be at the school by that time, and
(e)     did not disclose what was required on the day of the injury.
In the alternative, Mr Flett contended that, even if Mr Field proved that he had to be at the school by 8.30 am, the link between the employment and the accident was too tenuous to satisfy s 10(3A). He said that the present case could be distinguished from Wickenden because, in that case, the evidence was that the employer had “required” the worker to work until it was dark, thus making the worker’s journey home, on a narrow country road, more dangerous than would otherwise have been the case.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

There are a number of problems with the Arbitrator’s decision.
The Arbitrator based his decision on the premise that Mr Field had to prove that his employment caused the accident or incident (the trip and fall). That follows from his reference to, and reliance on, Mitchell and Kooragang. That was an error. For the reasons explained in Bina v ISS Property Services Pty Ltd [2013] NSWWCCPD 72 (Bina) at [102] and [114] and Wickenden at [37], s 10(3A) may, but does not necessarily, require a causal connection between the employment and the accident. It follows that I accept Mr Hickey’s submission that the word “connection” in s 10(3A) involves a wider concept than causation.
However, the question remains as to whether the Arbitrator’s incorrect approach has affected the outcome. Mr Flett has submitted that it has not because, unlike Wickenden, where the worker was “required” to work longer hours, Mr Field was not “required” to hurry to the school on the morning he fell. I do not accept that submission.
The Arbitrator erred in stating that, based on Mr Field’s “belief or perception”, he could not draw an inference that Mr Field was required to be at the school by 8.30 am. Such a finding did not require the drawing of an inference. Mr Field’s direct and uncontested evidence was that, based on his experience, “staff were required to be present at the school by 8.30 am in order to be given lessons for the day, shown to the classrooms or given 8.30 am playground duty”. It could not seriously be disputed that, on the day of the accident, Mr Field was part of the school’s staff, he having been directed by Casual Direct, the respondent’s agent, to work at the school on that day.
There is no rule of law that an Arbitrator must accept unchallenged evidence (Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA v Checchia [2011] NSWCA 101 at [139], citing Precision Plastics v Demir [1975] HCA 27 at 365). However, if an appellate court concludes that, in the circumstances of the case, the trial judge (or Arbitrator) was wrong to reject unchallenged evidence, it may overturn the decision on the basis of error of fact (per Mansfield and Gilmour JJ in Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15 at [78], citing Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 at 587–588).

It is no answer to a witness’s evidence to say that it cannot be accepted because “it is only his or her belief or perception”. Virtually all evidence from a witness (apart from things or real evidence) is based on the witness’s perception of the particular event or situation he or she is describing. That does not mean that, for that reason alone, it cannot or should not be accepted. It is for the tribunal of fact to assess the reliability of the evidence against the “contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events” (Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118 at [31]).
There were no relevant contemporary materials or objectively established facts in the present case. However, the logic of Mr Field’s evidence was and is compelling. He explained the basis for his assertion that staff were required to be at the school by 8.30 am, namely, his past experience. He also explained why staff had to be present by that time. His reasons were logical and plausible. The respondent called no evidence to rebut Mr Field’s evidence and did not challenge it in cross-examination. As his evidence was not “inherently illogical or unreliable” (Hamod v State of New South Wales and Anor [2011] NSWCA 375 at [338]), or defective in some other material way, the Arbitrator erred in not accepting it.
It follows that I do not accept Mr Flett’s submissions at [31] above. First, that Mr Field’s evidence as to the need to be at the school by 8.30 am was based on his past experience does not undermine the probative value of that evidence. That is especially so when the respondent called no evidence to suggest that Mr Field’s account was wrong.
Second, how many times Mr Field had previously worked at the school was irrelevant. His evidence was not challenged to suggest that his past experience was no longer relevant, or that the situation had changed.
Third, it is true that the evidence did not disclose what was meant by “required”. In the absence of evidence, there is no reason why “required” would not be given its usual dictionary meaning of “to call on authoritatively, order, or enjoin (a person, etc) to do something: to require an agent to account for money spent” (Macquarie Dictionary). The precise meaning is not critical: the evidence discloses that, because the school was “strict”, and for the other reasons noted at [36] above, there was an expectation that staff would be present by 8.30 am.
Fourth, the evidence did disclose how Mr Field came to know that he was required to be at the school by 8.30 am: he knew that from having taught at the school previously. That evidence was unchallenged.
Last, it is correct that there was no direct evidence of what was required on the day of the accident. However, if Mr Field’s evidence based on his past experience was wrong, it was a simple matter for the respondent to call contradictory evidence. It did not do so.
In the circumstances, Mr Field’s unchallenged evidence was logical and probative of the matters he asserted and the Arbitrator erred in not accepting it. It is prudent to bear in mind that Mr Field only had to establish his case on the balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt. His unchallenged evidence comfortably established that, for reasons that he explained, he was required to be at the school by 8.30 am.
Mr Flett contended that, even if it were accepted that Mr Field was required to be at the school by 8.30 am, s 10(3A) was not satisfied because it was Mr Field’s decision to hurry, and as to which route to take, and there was no evidence that the respondent required him to hurry or to use Yerrick Road. This submission is based on the false assumption that, to satisfy s 10(3A), Mr Field had to prove that the employer required him to hurry, or to use Yerrick Road.
It is true that the evidence in Wickenden established that the employer required the worker to work until it was dark and that darkness played a role in the accident (that role being sufficient to establish a real and substantial connection between the accident and the employment, but not sufficient to establish that the accident arose out of the employment). However, that does not mean that, as a pre-requisite to satisfying s 10(3A), Mr Field had to call evidence that the respondent “required” him to hurry or to use a particular road. Each case depends on its own facts.
Section 10(3A) only requires a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident or incident out of which the injury arose. As observed in Bina (at [120]), citing The State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 68 SASR 97, whether, and in what circumstances, s 10(3A) will be satisfied will be a question of fact, applying the words of the provision in a commonsense and practical manner in each case.
In the present case, the uncontested evidence established that staff were required to be present at the school by 8.30 am. As I have already noted, on the evidence, the only logical conclusion is that that requirement applied to Mr Field. It is true that, as Mr Flett submitted, the decision to hurry, and to use Yerrick Road, was Mr Field’s decision and that there was no express direction that he hurry or use any particular road.
However, Mr Field was hurrying because of the late notice he received from the respondent’s agent, Casual Direct, to attend at the school on the day of the accident and because he had to be at the school by 8.30 am to be given lessons for the day, shown to the classrooms or be given playground duty. These reasons were perfectly plausible and logical and, more importantly, were unchallenged. In these circumstances, the only conclusion open is that Mr Field was hurrying because of reasons that were directly connected with his employment as a relief teacher with the respondent.
Given this background to the accident, Mr Field’s unchallenged evidence that he tripped and fell “because [he] was hurrying” (to get to the school on time), and was therefore “looking straight ahead” and did not notice the crack in the footpath that caused him to trip, comfortably establishes a real and substantial connection between his employment and the accident. That is, the connection between the accident and the employment was real and of substance.
To suggest that Mr Field cannot succeed because there is no evidence that the respondent “required” him to hurry, or to use Yerrick Road, is artificial and unrealistic. The need for Mr Field to hurry arose directly because of the late notice from Casual Direct and from the school’s requirement that staff be at the school by 8.30 am. There is no contest that Mr Field was using one of the most direct routes to the school. That there may have been other routes available to him that did not have cracked or damaged footpaths is irrelevant.
The above matters are sufficient to dispose of the appeal. However, I make the following observations about the Arbitrator’s reference to Attorney General’s Department v K, which clearly influenced his assessment of Mr Field’s evidence. That case concerned a claim for compensation for a psychological injury where the respondent employer had argued that the worker could not succeed because the injury resulted from a “misperception” of real events. That argument was contrary to accepted authority (State Transit Authority (NSW) v Chemler [2007] NSWCA 249; 5 DDCR 286) and was rejected.
Nothing in Attorney General’s Department v K, or the authorities cited in it, provides any assistance in the assessment or resolution of the issues in the present matter and the Arbitrator erred in relying on it. The Arbitrator was required to assess the case on the evidence called. That evidence included the uncontested and logical evidence from Mr Field as to the connection between his employment and the accident. There was no suggestion that his evidence involved a “misperception” of real events and it should have been assessed on its merits.

CONCLUSION

The Arbitrator erred in his approach and conclusion. The evidence comfortably established a real and substantial connection between Mr Field’s employment and the accident or incident out of which his injury arose. It follows that the Arbitrator’s determination must be revoked and new orders made in its place.
Mr Hickey submitted that, in the event that the appeal succeeded, the Commission should order the payment of weekly compensation as claimed in the Application. However, as the claim for weekly compensation in the Application ($1,391.44 per week from 23 October 2012 to date and continuing) is inconsistent with the wages schedule filed on 21 November 2013, and as the parties have made no submissions on the nature of Mr Field’s current incapacity, if any, the proper course is for the matter to be remitted to another Arbitrator for all outstanding issues to be determined.

DECISION

The Arbitrator’s determination of 11 December 2013 is revoked and the following orders are made in its place:
“1. The Commission finds that, as there was a real and substantial connection between the applicant’s employment and the accident or incident out of which the applicant’s personal injury arose, the applicant was, on 23 October 2012, injured on a periodic journey between his place of abode and his place of employment and compensation is payable accordingly.
2. The respondent employer is to pay the applicant worker’s costs of the arbitration, as agreed or assessed, with an uplift for complexity of 25 per cent.”
The matter is remitted to another Arbitrator for determination of all outstanding matters.

COSTS

The respondent employer is to pay the appellant worker’s costs of the appeal, assessed at $2,530 plus GST.

Bill Roche
Deputy President

27 March 2014

I, KATHRYN CAMP, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE