FGF17 v Minister for Immigration
[2020] FCCA 1828
•6 July 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FGF17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 1828 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Visa – Protection Visa – whether failure to get ‘new information’ unreasonable – exceptional circumstances – where purported ‘new information’ already known to decision-maker – whether failure by IAA to request medical report unreasonable – Relocation – whether IAA erred in assessment of reasonableness and practicability of relocation – complimentary protection obligations – no error demonstrated. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2B), 473DC, 473DD |
| Cases cited: CQI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 718 FCS17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 68 |
| Applicant: | FGF17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | ADG 505 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Heffernan |
| Hearing date: | 3 September 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 3 September 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 6 July 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr P Barnes |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Beena Rezaee Legal & Migration |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr T Ellison |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitors |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND SIX DOLLARS ($7,206).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 505 of 2017
| FGF17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘the IAA’) dated 10 November 2017. That decision affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (‘the visa’).
The applicant relies on its Second Amended Application filed on 6 August 2019. The application sets out three grounds as follows:
“Ground 1
The IAA committed jurisdictional error in incorrectly applying ss 473DC and 473DD of the Act in respect of the submission from the Applicant’s representative dated 16 June 2017
Ground 2
The IAA further erred in finding that it was reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to another part of Pakistan pursuant to Section 36(2A) of the Act.
Ground 3
The IAA committed jurisdictional error in failing to consider within the assessment of the real chance of serious harm or real risk of significant harm in Pakistan whether, in order to avoid such a chance or risk, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate, and in particular whether it was practicable for him to do so, but confined his consideration to whether there was a real chance of serious harm in all areas of Pakistan or a significant risk in all areas of Pakistan.”
(Reproduced verbatim - particulars omitted)
The applicant conceded in both his written and oral submissions that ground 3 was contrary to a recent decision of a single judge of the Federal Court on exactly the same point.[1] Counsel for the applicant was aware that there was least one appeal pending in the Full Court that would be required to address the issue and the correctness of the decision in CQI16. For that reason, ground 3 was not pressed except to the extent that the applicant reserved his position with respect to it, pending the publication of the decision from the Full Court. The Full Court has now published its reasons in FCS17 v Minister for Home Affairs.[2] That decision affirms CQI16 and rejects the premise on which ground 3 is based. It is not necessary to consider ground 3 any further and I dismiss it.
[1] CQI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 718.
[2] [2020] FCAFC 68.
Background
I have adapted the background summary below from the written submissions of the first respondent.
The applicant is Hazara Shia, born in Afghanistan, however he is a Pakistani National. He had lived in Quetta. The applicant arrived in Australia on 28 March 2013 and the application for the visa was lodged in July 2016. He made the following claims for protection:
a)He claimed to be owed protection on grounds of both his race and his religion;
b)He identified four matters pertaining to past persecution:
i)In October 2011, his brother had been lined up outside a bus with several others and shot dead by the Taliban;
ii)In November – December 2012, he received a threatening letter cautioning him against spreading Shia propaganda material from his shop. This threat occurred in the context of him selling compact discs playing Shia music and broadcasting it onto the street from his shop;
iii)In late 2012 or early 2013, he had been attacked with gunfire whilst riding in a taxi. The driver of the taxi was killed and two other passengers seriously wounded. He claimed this was a targeted attack; and
iv)In January or February 2013, two masked men attempted to attack him at his shop. He claimed this was a targeted attack.
He alleged more generally that nowhere in Pakistan was safe for Hazara Shia’s and that if he were forced to return he would face torture or be killed at the hands of the Taliban or other Sunni extremists.
Prior to the IAA making its decision, the applicant’s representative sent an email to it dated 16 June 2017 attaching a medical report from the applicant’s general practitioner.[3] The email noted that the report established that the applicant had been seen for psychiatric health issues, had been referred to a psychologist, and provided details of the psychologist. It is appropriate to reproduce both the email and the medical report:
[3] Supplementary Court Book (‘SCB’) 35.
“Dear IAA,
Please find attached a Medical Report from our client’s previous Medical Practitioner.
This report documents that our client was seen for his “psychiatric health issues”, and that our client “was referred to psychologist under the Mental Health Treatment Plan. The psychologist that he was referred to under the Mental Health Treatment Plan was Mehdi Abiyat (contact details redacted). Our client was treated by Mehdi since being referred to him and until he moved to Western Australia in February 2015. We have contacted Mehdi to provide a report on our client’s mental health issues, however the cost of the report is beyond that our client can afford at the moment.
We have been advised that (name of applicant redacted), has continued to seek professional help for his various mental health issues. We are in the process of gathering professional reports as evidence of this.
We submit that the attached report from our clients GP should be considered by the IAA as there are exceptional circumstances to justify the new information, it could not have been provided to the minister before a decision was made, and it is credible personal information which was not previously known and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. More specifically, the attached report and our client’s continued mental health issues make it unreasonable for our client to relocate within Pakistan. Firstly, there are insufficient professional assistance in Pakistan for him to rely on. Secondly, and more importantly, his established psychological and mental health issues is another practical barrier to his ability to relocate internally. It is unreasonable to expect a person with a well-established mental health issues to relocate within Pakistan without any family or tribal network to rely on. Our client’s well-established mental health issues impedes his ability to find employment, maintain relationships, and to generally subsist in any proposed place of relocation without any social support.
If you have any questions regarding this matter do not hesitate to contact us.”
(Reproduced verbatim, errors retained from original)
The medical report dated 15 May 2017 stated as follows:
“In reply to you letter dated 17/03/2017 requesting a medical report for the above-mentioned patient, I submit the following. I note the medical authority from the patient received in 08/05/2017 allowing me to release this information.
I hold the degrees of Medical Bachelor and Bachelor of Surgery from the University of Health Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.
To the best of my knowledge, this report was prepared in accordance of the Supreme Court Rule 160 and Supreme Court Practice Direction 5.4.
ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS
Mr (name of applicant redacted) was seen between 13/5/2014 and 10/11/2014 for his psychiatric health issues. Mr (name of applicant redacted) was referred to psychologist under the Mental health treatment plan and was also referred to the psychiatrist. Patient reported improvement in his symptoms with treatment.
Unfortunately since 10/11/2014 the patient has not had any further follow-up with me, therefore I am unable to provide an updated report on his physical and mental health or to provide an updated Mental health treatment plan.
I declare that I have made all the inquiries which, I believe are desirable and appropriate and that no matters of significance other than those specified, which I regard as relevant have, to my knowledge, been withheld from the Court.
Yours Sincerely
Dr (name redacted).”
(Reproduced verbatim, errors retained from original)
In the course of considering whether to have regard to a number of pieces of new information under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) the IAA concluded that the medical report did not meet the requirements of s 473DD.
The IAA found that the applicant was born in Afghanistan and was a national of Pakistan. It accepted that the applicant’s brother had been shot by militants. It accepted that the applicant was involved in an incident where he was a passenger in a taxi which was fired upon but concluded that this incident was an opportunistic attack because the taxi was carrying Hazara’s not because the attackers had any interest in the applicant as an individual. The IAA did not accept that the applicant had been threatened for playing Shia recordings or the claim that he had narrowly escaped being attacked by two masked men who had come to his store.
Whilst acknowledging that sectarian militant groups had made sustained attacks against Hazara Shias in Quetta and accepting that the applicant would face a real chance of being killed or seriously injured in Quetta as a consequence of a sectarian attack based on his race or religion, the IAA concluded that the real chance of harm did not relate to all areas of Pakistan. It found that there was no evidence to indicate a similar trend of attacks upon Hazara Shia Muslims in Lahore. For that reason it concluded that there was not a real chance that he would face harm in Lahore from any Sunni extremist group or militia on the basis of his race or religion, any perceived opposition to Sunni militia or from generalised violence.[4]
[4] Decision Record [40] – [51].
Further, the IAA considered the applicant’s claims that he had no relatives or connections of any kind in Lahore. It found that he may face some low-level discrimination in employment but on the whole was not satisfied that he would face a real chance of serious harm on that basis.[5]
[5] Ibid, [52] – [56].
The IAA made an assessment of complimentary protection requirements. In doing so it considered whether or not it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Lahore. The IAA considered the challenges that the applicant might face if he were to move to Lahore without family or friends noting that he had mental health issues. It concluded that it would be reasonable for him to relocate to Lahore.[6]
Submissions
[6] Ibid, [61] – [73].
Applicant’s submissions
With respect to ground 1, the new information relied on by the applicant is firstly, that contained in the report of his GP to the effect that he had been seen by the GP on an unstipulated number of occasions over the course of six months for mental health issues and had been referred for psychological and psychiatric treatment. Secondly, the information in the email from his representative that he had been seen by a particular psychologist for a period of time until February 2015, but that they could not afford a report from him.
The applicant acknowledges that by virtue of s 473DC the IAA may get documents or information that was not before the Minister but that it does not have a duty to do so. Exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated, but the IAA was obliged to consider at least whether the exceptions to the primary rule might apply.[7] The email sent on 16 June 2017 from the applicant’s representative relating to his mental state and ongoing mental health issues attached a report dated 15 May 2017. It is submitted that the IAA did not properly engage with that material. In particular, the IAA decision record states that it had regard to those parts of the email that engaged in argument with the delegate’s decision.[8] It was submitted that none of the contents of the email engaged in argument with the delegate’s decision and that this is indicative of the fact that the IAA in effect, paid lip service only to the email and the attached report. Jurisdictional error arose because the IAA failed to consider whether the new information contained in the email satisfied s 473DD and should have been received. Refusal to consider the contents of the medical report amounted to a misapplication of s 473DD. That error was compounded by the failure of the IAA to exercise its discretion under s 473DC to get new information in the form of a medical report from the applicant’s treating psychiatrist. The IAA must have been aware that such information would be highly relevant to the question of the ability of the applicant to relocate to another part of Pakistan and it had been specifically put on notice by the applicant that he could not afford to obtain a report from his psychiatrist.
[7] Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2018) 353 ALR 600.
[8] Decision Record [9].
As to ground 2, it was submitted that it was necessary for the IAA to consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to another area of Pakistan where there was not a real risk that he would suffer significant harm pursuant to s 36(2B) of the Act. What was required was an assessment of what was reasonable, in the sense of being practicable, having regard to all of the circumstances of the applicant.[9] Such an inquiry is necessarily fact intensive and must consider what it would be like for the applicant to actually return and live in the place said to be safe.[10] It was submitted that rather than conducting an intensive enquiry, the IAA made a ‘broad brush’ assessment of generalised statements without any consideration of the practicalities if the applicant himself were to return to Pakistan. Those practicalities were said to include a lack of tribal family ties in alternative locations in Pakistan and the lack of available work and accommodation. The effect of the foregoing was that its consideration was inadequate to support the ultimate finding it made. It was submitted that this ground was impacted on by the IAA’s failure to consider obtaining information relating to the applicant’s mental condition. This caused it to fail to have regard to a relevant and potentially critical aspect of the applicant’s ability to relocate safely without suffering significant harm. The IAA had in effect, “disabled itself from considering what was reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, in terms of relocation.”[11]
[9] SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor (2007) 233 CLR 18.
[10] MZANX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 307.
[11] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 235 FCR 475 [82].
First Respondent’s submissions
With respect to ground 1, in the submission of the first respondent, the IAA carried out its task under s 473DD by concluding that the medical report attached to the email 16 June 2017 was new information within the meaning of s 473DD, being information that was not before the delegate. It was satisfied that s 473DD(b)(i) was met because the medical report was dated after the decision of the delegate and self-evidently could not have been provided to him. The first respondent submitted that the IAA then went on to properly consider whether or not exceptional circumstances were met. It concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances because the report had been provided by a doctor who had not seen the applicant for about 2 ½ years and gave no up-to-date information about his medical circumstances. Whereas, the report indicated that the applicant had been referred to a psychologist or psychiatrist under a Mental Health Treatment Plan, no details of the plan or any treatment were provided. The report did not express any opinion as the extent to which the applicant’s symptoms affected his ability to live his day-to-day life. As the information contained within the report related to a period between May and November 2014, it could have been requested in advance of the decision made by the delegate. The first respondent submitted that those considerations demonstrated on their face that the decision of the IAA was reasonable and not irrational or illogical. The conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances which warranted receiving the document was clearly open to it. In any event, given the lack of any up-to-date or detailed information in the report itself, the contents of it could not have had any impact on the ultimate decision made by the delegate.
As to the contention that it was unreasonable of the IAA not to consider obtaining a report from the psychologist named in the email, the first respondent submitted that the history and information contained in the report did not support a conclusion that the only reasonable action for the IAA to take was to obtain a report. It was also relevant in that regard that the applicant’s representative, having noted that the applicant could not afford a report, did not request the IAA to obtain one.
With respect to ground 2 the first respondent acknowledged that when considering internal relocation in the context of complimentary protection obligations, the assessment must be made on the basis of what is reasonable in the sense of being practicable. It submitted that the enquiry conducted by the IAA was fact specific and directly responsive to the circumstances of the applicant. It submitted that the finding as to it being reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Lahore was not based on ‘broad brush’ considerations and could not be said to have been unreasonable. This ground was, properly understood, an invitation to engage in an impermissible merits review.
Consideration
In considering ground 1, it should be noted that at the time of his entry interview the applicant claimed to have mental health issues, to be suffering from anxiety and to be taking medication.[12] The Mental Health Treatment Plan referred to by his general practitioner in the report provided to the IAA had been obtained on 26 June 2014 and was before the delegate. In that treatment plan, the general practitioner made a provisional diagnosis of psychotic disorders, anxiety, PTSD and depression.[13] The applicant repeated in very general terms the claim to having a mental health condition in a statutory declaration on 2 July 2016 and stated that this gave him memory problems.[14] The decision record of the Delegate set out in some detail the medical information with which he or she had been provided and expressed serious reservations about the Mental Health Treatment Plan prepared by the general practitioner, noting that he did not hold a specialist qualification in the field of mental health.[15] Further, the delegate considered issues relating to the applicant’s mental health in the context of the reasonableness of expecting him to relocate to Lahore.[16] The potential relevance of the applicant’s mental health was well and truly a live issue at the time of the Delegate’s decision. In addition, it is apparent from the decision record that the Delegate was aware that any relocation to Lahore would mean that the applicant was away from his immediate family group and considered questions of employment and accommodation in Lahore.[17]
[12] Court Book (‘CB’), 10.
[13] CB, 111.
[14] CB, 88.
[15] CB, 172-173.
[16] CB, 185.
[17] CB, 185–186.
In that context it is difficult to see what new information the applicant’s representative was talking about in his email of 16 June 2017. Everything in the email and the medical report had been previously known to the Delegate and would, by virtue of the normal operation of the Act, be automatically provided to the IAA.[18] In fact, the medical report provides less information to the IAA than did the documents previously provided to the Delegate. There is no merit in the assertion of the representative of the applicant that exceptional circumstances could be demonstrated because the report amounted to credible personal information “which was not previously known”. The medical report was new. The substance of it was not. That is exactly the way the IAA approached the question when considering whether to receive the report:
“On 6 June 2017 the applicant’s representative provided a submission to the IAA. Insofar as this engaged in argument with the delegate’s decision based on the information which was before the delegate I have had regard to. Additionally, the submission provides a medical report from the applicant’s former general practitioner, Dr (name redacted), dated 15 May 2017. This is new information. It is submitted that this report could not have been provided to the minister before a decision was made, and that it is credible personal information which was not previously known and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. The submission does not specify precisely what information it is in the report which was not previously known and how, if at all, it may have affected the delegate’s decision. Nevertheless, insofar as this letter came into existence on 15 May 2017 it could not have been provided to the delegate before the date of his decision and I am satisfied that s.473DD(b)(i) is met. It is submitted that there are also exceptional circumstance [sic] to justify considering this new information in that the report illustrates that it would be unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to Pakistan. The report itself states that the author saw the applicant between May 2014 and November 2014 for his psychiatric health issues and referred him to a psychologist under the mental health treatment plan and also to a psychiatrist and that the patient reported improvement in his symptoms with treatment. However, beyond this the report provides no specific information about the treatment the applicant received in these regards or the extent to which the applicant's symptoms did, or did not, affect his ability to live his day-to-day life or even what the applicant’s specific psychiatric health issues were as diagnosed by Dr (name redacted). Further, Dr (name redacted) states that he is unable to provide an updated report as he has had no further contact with the applicant since 10 November 2014, and so the report does not give any indication of the applicant’s current circumstances or what these have been over the past three years. Further, and although this letter came into existence on 15 May 2017, the applicant could have requested and obtained such a letter with information about his 2014 treatment, and provided this to the delegate, before the date of the delegate’s decision. Given all of this, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances for considering this information.[19]
[18] Section 473.
[19] CB, 198 [9].
The above passage demonstrates a close consideration of the s 473DD question and shows the decision to have been made by way of a rational process. It could not be said the have been unreasonable in the relevant sense. I am not satisfied that the IAA erred in finding that there were no exceptional circumstances that warranted it considering the new information. Even if I am wrong about that matter, I accept the submission of the first respondent that even had the IAA been in error not to find exceptional circumstances existed to receive the document, the dearth of information in it meant that it could not have had any impact on the result.[20] The error would not in the circumstances satisfy the requirement of materiality.
[20] Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 151; Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22.
As to the failure to obtain new information in the form of a medical report, s 473DC provides as follows:
“(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information ( new information) that:
(a)were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and
(b)the Authority considers may be relevant.
(2)The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.
(3)Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:
(a)in writing; or
(b)at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.”
The test is whether it has been established by the applicant that it was unreasonable in the legal sense for the IAA not to consider getting documents or information from the psychologist who had treated the applicant.[21] The practical application of the test was considered by the Full Court in the matter of CRY16:
“… The legislature is to be taken to intend that the Authority’s statutory power in s 473DC will be exercised reasonably. The failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power lacks an evident and intelligible justification in circumstances where the Authority knew that it did not have, but the respondent was likely to have, information on his particular circumstances and the impact upon him of relocation to Beirut. The Authority did not have that information because the question of relocation, either at all or to Beirut, was not explored, or the subject of findings, by the delegate. The Authority’s failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power meant that it disabled itself from considering what was reasonable, in the sense of “practicable”, in terms of relocation. In our opinion, as a consequence, the review by the Authority under s 473CC miscarried for jurisdictional error.”[22]
[21] CRY16, Op cit [70] & [82].
[22] Ibid, [82].
I do not understand the decision in CRY16 to mean that every failure to consider whether to exercise the discretion to get new information will necessarily amount to jurisdictional error on the basis of unreasonableness. It will depend on the factual background against which the failure to consider exercising the discretion occurred. To my mind there is an obvious difference between the factual background in CRY16 and that complained of here. In that matter the IAA decided to affirm the Delegate’s decision but on a different basis. It concluded that relocation was reasonable, but of course, the applicant had not had an opportunity to comment or put material before any decision maker as to why it would not be reasonable in the sense of being practicable for him to be required to relocate. His views on the matter were likely to be inherently relevant to the question of practicability. In that context, the conclusion of the Full Court that the failure to consider the exercise of the discretion lacked an evident or intelligible justification is, with respect, readily understandable.
However in this matter, the psychologist from whom the applicant says the IAA should have sought new information, had not seen the applicant for two years. There was nothing in the email from the representative to suggest what might be established by a report from the psychologist. The Delegate had considered the relevance of the applicant’s mental health to the question of the reasonableness of relocation on the basis of materials the applicant had already provided.[23] Unlike CRY16, it could not be said that the relocation decision here was made without the applicant being given an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The IAA also had before it medical information from a doctor in Western Australia who had seen the applicant more recently than the psychologist.[24] Nothing about that letter could objectively be said to indicate a need for a report to be obtained from a psychologist in particular one who had not recently treated the applicant. Further, the applicant’s representative did not only not request the IAA to obtain a report, he failed to provide any information to the IAA which might have had a bearing on the reasonable exercise of its discretion under s 473DC, such as the time frame within which the psychologist might be able to prepare a report, the cost it might entail, or even the preparedness of the psychologist to do so. I am not satisfied that it has been demonstrated that the failure to consider exercising the discretion under s 473DC lacked an evident and intelligible justification. It was not unreasonable in the relevant sense for it to fail to do so.
[23] CB, 185.
[24] CB, 106, 220 [68].
I dismiss ground 1.
As to ground 2, I am not persuaded that the IAA’s approach to the reasonableness of relocation could be dismissed as being ‘broad brush’. It took into consideration matters relating to his level of fluency and literacy in Urdu and Punjabi;[25] the availability of employment and accommodation in Lahore to a person in the applicant’s position in the context of societal nepotism and patronage in Pakistan;[26] his past history of employment and resourcefulness in obtaining employment;[27] and a detailed consideration of his medical history including his claimed mental health problems.[28] It specifically addressed the mental health issues in the context of relocation to Lahore.[29] To suggest that the approach in this matter was ‘broad brushed’ would be to fail to observe the stricture in Wu Shan Liang[30] against reading an administrative decision with an eye too keenly focussed on the perception of error. It is not sufficient to simply call in aid the decision of Mortimer J in MZANX as the applicant does. In that matter, the reviewer was found to have failed to consider reasonable practicability in the context of particular facts and risks it had accepted the applicant faced. With respect, the decision was simply an application of established principles to the matter before it. In that matter the reviewer was found not to have engaged in the necessary fact specific enquiry. I am not able to reach the same conclusion about the decision of the IAA in this matter. No error has been demonstrated.
[25] CB, 217 [63].
[26] CB, 218 [64].
[27] CB, 218 [63], 221 [72].
[28] CB, 219 [65] – 221 [71].
[29] CB, 221 [72].
[30] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259.
I dismiss ground 2.
I make the orders to be found at the beginning of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding thirty (30) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Heffernan
Associate:
Date: 6 July 2020
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