Ferraro v Woodward - [1978] HCA 7

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs A.C.J., Mason, Jacobs, Murphy and Aickin JJ.

FERRARO v. WOODWARD

(1978) 143 CLR 102

22 March 1978

Contempt of Court

Contempt of Court—Royal Commission—Form and content of warrant of committal—Royal Commissions Act, 1923 (N.S.W.), s. 18—Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Pt I, r. 11, form 66.

Decision

March 22.
THE COURT delivered the following judgment:-
The first ground taken in support of this application for special leave to appeal was not taken before the Court of Appeal. Normally, we should not entertain such a ground but in the present case, where the applicant is in prison, we must depart from our general rule. (at p105)

2. The applicant was a witness before Woodward J., who was sitting as a Royal Commissioner under the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (N.S.W.) as amended. During the proceedings an application was made to commit the applicant for contempt. The Commissioner dealt with the application and decided it by holding that he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been guilty of a contempt of the Commission and he directed that the applicant be committed to prison until he had purged his contempt or until further order. Thereupon, a warrant was issued. The warrant, which bore the heading of the Royal Commission, was in the following terms:

"TO THE SHERIFF:- Take Vincent Peter Ferraro to the Reception Centre, Malabar and deliver him to the Superintendent of that prison.
TO THE SUPERINTENDENT of the Reception Centre, Malabar Receive Vincent Peter Ferraro into your custody and keep him there until the further order of this Court. Dated at Sydney this Twenty-fifth day of November, 1977. (Sgd.) P. M. Woodward J.

Judge" (at p105)

3. The applicant contends that the warrant is invalid on the ground that it does not show on its face either that the applicant had been adjudged guilty of contempt or the nature of the contempt. There is no doubt that it is necessary that an order of committal made by an inferior court should set out the cause of the commitment, including the nature of the contempt (McIlraith v. Grady (1968) 1 QB 468, at pp 477-478 ). However, the argument submitted by the respondent in the present case is that the Commissioner was placed in the same position as the Supreme Court of New South Wales and that a warrant for committal issued by that Court need not set out the cause of the commitment. Form 66 of the forms made under the Supreme Court Act, 1970 (N.S.W.) which, according to Pt I, r. 11 of the Rules, may be used where applicable, does not set out the cause of commitment and has obviously been the model of the form used in the present case. By s. 18 of the Royal Commissions Act, it is provided as follows:

"18. (1) For the purposes of the inquiry the commissioner shall have all such powers, rights, and privileges as are vested in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ferraro v Woodward

Details

AGLC: Ferraro v Woodward [1978] HCA 7
Case: [1978] HCA 7
Decision Date: 22 March 1978

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Ferraro v Woodward*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause in a deed of settlement, which the appellant, Mr. Ferraro, argued had been breached by the respondent, Mr. Woodward. The core of the disagreement lay in whether Mr. Woodward had fulfilled his obligations under the settlement agreement.

The central legal issue before the Court was the proper construction of clause 3(b) of the deed of settlement. This clause stipulated that Mr. Woodward was to pay Mr. Ferraro a sum of money, contingent upon the successful completion of a particular transaction. The Court was required to determine whether the conditions precedent to Mr. Woodward's obligation to pay had been met, thereby triggering his liability under the deed.

The Court analysed the language of clause 3(b) in light of the surrounding circumstances and the overall purpose of the deed. It applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasizing the importance of giving effect to the plain meaning of the words used by the parties, unless such a meaning would lead to an absurd result or contradict the clear intention of the agreement. The majority found that the transaction had not been completed in the manner contemplated by the parties, and therefore the condition precedent to payment had not been satisfied.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the court below and ordering that the respondent pay the appellant's costs.

Orders