FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2013] FCAFC 43
Citation: Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2013] FCAFC 43 Appeal from: Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2011] FCA 619 Parties: ANGELO FERELLA and GUSTAVO FERELLA v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY File number: NSD 1097 of 2011 Judges: DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ Date of judgment: 7 May 2013 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – s 179 inquiry into conduct of trustee – before primary Judge appellants sought inquiry into 11 questions concerning trustees’ conduct in relation to bankrupt estates – trial Judge declined to order broader inquiry – whether on material available trial judge should have ordered broader inquiry – whether error in the House v The King sense was shown by the appellants
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appellants sought to amend notice of appeal – where notice of appeal delivered after conclusion of hearing – whether grounds of appeal reflected appellants’ oral and written submissions
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 179 Cases cited: Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101 applied
Date of hearing: 7 March 2012 Dates of last submissions: 14, 27, 29 March 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 82 Counsel for the First and Second Appellants: Mr J Svehla Solicitor for the First and Second Appellants: Leon M Ratner & Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Golledge Solicitor for the Respondent: Sally Nash & Co
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1097 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ANGELO FERELLA
First AppellantGUSTAVO FERELLA
Second AppellantAND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent
JUDGES:
DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 MAY 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time in which the applicants may apply for leave to appeal against the orders of Yates J made on 6 June 2011 be extended until 7 March 2012;
2. The appellants have leave to appeal accordingly;
3.The appellants file within seven days of the delivery of these reasons, a notice of appeal in the form annexed to these reasons, excluding paras 1c, 1d, 1f and 1g thereof;
4.The appeal be dismissed; and
5. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and associated applications.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1097 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ANGELO FERELLA
First AppellantGUSTAVO FERELLA
Second AppellantAND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent
JUDGES:
DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ
DATE:
7 MAY 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEAVE TO APPEAL
The judgment under appeal is, in form, interlocutory. Because of a misunderstanding as to the nature of the judgment, the applicants failed to lodge their notice of appeal within the prescribed time. They…
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- Case
- [2013] FCAFC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the appellants' argument that the primary Judge should have ordered a broader inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to their bankrupt estates. The court noted that the appellants had sought a broader inquiry into eleven specific questions, but the primary Judge had limited the inquiry to one particular question. The court held that the primary Judge's decision to limit the scope of the inquiry was not an error in the sense of the House v The King, as the primary Judge had considered the material available and had reasons for limiting the scope of the inquiry. The court also considered the appellants' application to amend their notice of appeal and found that the amended grounds of appeal reflected their submissions. The court held that the appellants were entitled to leave to appeal out of time and that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants were also ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and associated applications.
In conclusion, the court held that the primary Judge's decision to limit the scope of the inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to the bankrupt estates was not an error in the sense of the House v The King. The court also held that the appellants were entitled to leave to appeal out of time and that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and associated applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time in which the applicants may apply for leave to appeal against the orders of Yates J made on 6 June 2011 be extended until 7 March 2012;
2. The appellants have leave to appeal accordingly;
3. The appellants file within seven days of the delivery of these reasons, a notice of appeal in the form annexed to these reasons, excluding paras 1c, 1d, 1f and 1g thereof;
4. The appeal be dismissed; and
5. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and associated applications.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In other words, there was to be an inquiry into the matters raised in question 7 and the consequences thereof (pursuant to question 10), but not as to any of the other matters identified in the eleven grounds document. On appeal the appellants press only their application for an inquiry into the matters raised in questions 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 and into the consequences thereof pursuant to question 10.THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES The administrations commenced on 14 October 2005. Although the appellants were discharged on 3 December 2008, the administrations have not yet been completed. Over that period, the appellants and associated persons and corporations have been involved in quite an acrimonious dispute with the respondent. The primary subject of dispute has been the beneficial ownership of real property at Point Piper in Sydney’s eastern suburbs (the “Point Piper land”) and the proceeds of its eventual sale. At one stage the land was said to have an estimated value of $9 million. At the date upon which the sequestration orders were made, the appellants were the registered proprietors of the Point Piper land. They had previously been involved in substantial litigation with members of the Otvosis family (the “Otvosis family”) concerning the proposed development of that land. The Otvosis family owned neighbouring land. On 27 April 2005 the Otvosis family obtained orders for costs against the appellants in the sum of $74,656. The sequestration orders were based upon bankruptcy notices demanding payment of that judgment debt. At the date of the sequestration orders the Point Piper land was mortgaged to Key Nominees Pty Ltd (“Key Nominees”). In May 2006 Key Nominees sold the land (presumably as mortgagee in possession) for about $7.95 million, of which sum the respondent received $1,788,532 (the “Point Piper funds”), representing the excess of the sale price over the amount of Key Nominees’ debt and associated expenses. In the original statement of affairs in each bankruptcy, the Point Piper land was shown as being held by the appellants as trustees of the Cavallino Unit Trust. However, in late 2005 and early 2006 the respondent came into possession of information which caused it to doubt that proposition. As a result, it placed a caveat on the Point Piper land. On 4 March 2006 Angelo Ferella, purportedly on behalf of the Cavallino Unit Trust, wrote to the respondent, asserting that the Cavallino Unit Trust had been prejudiced by the lodgement of the caveat. The alleged prejudice was said to be delay in re-financing the Point Piper land. The primary Judge understood that the purpose of the proposed re-financing was to facilitate annulment of the bankruptcies. It is not clear whether this proposed use of allegedly trust assets was one of the bases for the respondent’s concern as to the beneficial ownership of the Point Piper land at the time at which the sequestration orders were made. Mr Ferella asserted that the respondent knew that he and his father had not been trustees of the trust for almost two years. Mr Ferella produced to the respondent certain documents said to show that the Point Piper land was a trust asset. The documents included:·a letter from the Commonwealth Bank addressed to the appellants as “trustee for the Ferella Unit Trust”;·a contract for the sale of the Point Piper land which indicated that the appellants had purchased the property as trustees for a trust called the Modena Unit Trust;·a letter from Suncorp Metway to Angelo Ferella setting out the terms of an offer of a loan in the amount of $6.3 million for the purpose of assisting with the refinancing of the Point Piper land and the development of two luxury villas on that property, the borrower being described as Angelo Ferella and Gustavo Ferella as trustees for the Cavallino Unit Trust;·a deed of trust for the Ferella Unit Trust dated 10 January 1995, identifying the appellants as trustees; and·financial reports of the Cavallino Unit Trust for the years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2005 recording the existence of fixed assets comprising unidentified land,