Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2013] FCAFC 43

Citation: Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2013] FCAFC 43
Appeal from: Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2011] FCA 619
Parties: ANGELO FERELLA and GUSTAVO FERELLA v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
File number: NSD 1097 of 2011
Judges: DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ
Date of judgment: 7 May 2013
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – s 179 inquiry into conduct of trustee – before primary Judge appellants sought inquiry into 11 questions concerning trustees’ conduct in relation to bankrupt estates – trial Judge declined to order broader inquiry – whether on material available trial judge should have ordered broader inquiry – whether error in the House v The King sense was shown by the appellants

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appellants sought to amend notice of appeal – where notice of appeal delivered after conclusion of hearing – whether grounds of appeal reflected appellants’ oral and written submissions

Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 179
Cases cited:

Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101 applied

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 applied

Date of hearing: 7 March 2012
Dates of last submissions: 14, 27, 29 March 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 82
Counsel for the First and Second Appellants: Mr J Svehla
Solicitor for the First and Second Appellants: Leon M Ratner & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Golledge
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sally Nash & Co

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1097 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ANGELO FERELLA
First Appellant

GUSTAVO FERELLA
Second Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGES:

DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MAY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The time in which the applicants may apply for leave to appeal against the orders of Yates J made on 6 June 2011 be extended until 7 March 2012;

2.        The appellants have leave to appeal accordingly;

3.The appellants file within seven days of the delivery of these reasons, a notice of appeal in the form annexed to these reasons, excluding paras 1c, 1d, 1f and 1g thereof;

4.The appeal be dismissed; and

5.        The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and associated applications.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1097 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ANGELO FERELLA
First Appellant

GUSTAVO FERELLA
Second Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGES:

DOWSETT, FOSTER AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE:

7 MAY 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEAVE TO APPEAL

  1. The judgment under appeal is, in form, interlocutory.  Because of a misunderstanding as to the nature of the judgment, the applicants failed to lodge their notice of appeal within the prescribed time.  They…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Angelo and Gustavo Ferella, sought leave to appeal against orders made by the primary Judge on 6 June 2011, declining to order a broader inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. The appellants sought to appeal the primary Judge's decision to limit the scope of the inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to their bankrupt estates. They argued that the primary Judge should have ordered a broader inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee, covering eleven specific questions, rather than limiting the inquiry to one particular question. The primary issues the court had to decide were whether the primary Judge should have ordered a broader inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to the bankrupt estates, and whether there was an error in the sense of the House v The King.

The court considered the appellants' argument that the primary Judge should have ordered a broader inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to their bankrupt estates. The court noted that the appellants had sought a broader inquiry into eleven specific questions, but the primary Judge had limited the inquiry to one particular question. The court held that the primary Judge's decision to limit the scope of the inquiry was not an error in the sense of the House v The King, as the primary Judge had considered the material available and had reasons for limiting the scope of the inquiry. The court also considered the appellants' application to amend their notice of appeal and found that the amended grounds of appeal reflected their submissions. The court held that the appellants were entitled to leave to appeal out of time and that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants were also ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and associated applications.

In conclusion, the court held that the primary Judge's decision to limit the scope of the inquiry into the conduct of the Official Trustee in relation to the bankrupt estates was not an error in the sense of the House v The King. The court also held that the appellants were entitled to leave to appeal out of time and that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and associated applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time in which the applicants may apply for leave to appeal against the orders of Yates J made on 6 June 2011 be extended until 7 March 2012;

2. The appellants have leave to appeal accordingly;

3. The appellants file within seven days of the delivery of these reasons, a notice of appeal in the form annexed to these reasons, excluding paras 1c, 1d, 1f and 1g thereof;

4. The appeal be dismissed; and

5. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and associated applications.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The judgment under appeal is, in form, interlocutory. Because of a misunderstanding as to the nature of the judgment, the applicants failed to lodge their notice of appeal within the prescribed time. They now apply for leave to appeal out of time. The application is not opposed. We are inclined to grant leave and, on that basis, have heard argument on the merits. The applicants had, prior to the hearing of their application for leave, delivered a draft notice of appeal. After the applicants’ submissions and in the course of the respondent’s submissions, a member of the Court observed that the draft grounds of appeal had little relationship to the applicants’ actual submissions, suggesting that the Court might direct them to file grounds of appeal which reflected their submissions. Following submissions in reply, the Court asked counsel for the appellants whether he stood by the draft notice of appeal. Counsel responded that he did not stand by it, and that he wished to adopt the approach suggested, namely to provide grounds of appeal which reflected his submissions. He sought leave accordingly. The appellants were given seven days in which to serve their proposed grounds on the respondent. In the event that the respondent had no objection, a notice of appeal was to be filed within a further two days. A draft amended notice of appeal was subsequently served on the respondent. The respondent objected to certain of the grounds, asserting that they went beyond the applicants’ submissions. The parties have supplied written submissions on the point. Consideration of such submissions necessitates a detailed consideration of the issues and the submissions made at the hearing of the appeal. For that reason we will consider the respondent’s objections to the proposed grounds of appeal after we have considered the substantive submissions. In those circumstances we will, hereafter, refer to the applicants as the “appellants”. As the draft notice of appeal was delivered after the hearing, it has not been formally incorporated into the record. We will attach it to these reasons.BACKGROUND On 14 October 2005 a Federal Magistrate made sequestration orders pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy Act”) against the estates of the appellants. Gustavo Ferella is Angelo Ferella’s father. The respondent became the trustee of each bankrupt estate. On 3 December 2008 the appellants were discharged from bankruptcy by operation of law. On 11 November 2009 the appellants applied pursuant to s 179 of the Bankruptcy Act for orders that there be inquiries into the respondent’s conduct in relation to both bankrupt estates. On 6 June 2011 the primary Judge ordered that there be a limited inquiry into such conduct. The appellants now appeal against his Honour’s orders, effectively asking that this Court extend the ambit of the proposed inquiry. Proceedings at first instance were commenced by application. Pleadings were exchanged. The relief claimed in the amended application was as follows:pursuant to section 179 of the Bankruptcy Act, … an order that an inquiry be made by the Court into the conduct of the respondent in relation to the bankruptcies and for consequential orders.A.DETAILS OF CLAIM2.Pursuant to section 179, an order that an inquiry be made by the Court into the conduct of the respondent in relation to the bankruptcies, with a view to consequential orders effecting:(a)Removal of the respondent from office and the appointment of a registered trustee either nominated by the applicants or directed the Court.(b)A declaration to the effect that neither the costs incurred by the respondent, nor those costs of the applicants (and others) ordered to be paid by the respondent in Supreme Court proceedings 4820 of 2006 and 40326 of 2008 on appeal, are proper costs of the administrations and are not to be borne by either estate, save and except the sum referred to in order 5(m) made by that Court on 24 July 2008 and varied by it on 17 July 2009.(c)A declaration to the effect that, in the circumstances of the case, any remuneration to which the respondent would otherwise be entitled to from March 2006, be withheld permanently.(d)To the extent the Court thinks proper, an order that the respondent make good any loss to the estates occasioned by its conduct, including but not limited to:(i)an order that the respondent pay an amount equivalent to interest at the Court rate on any funds held by it in the Common Fund from March 2006; and(ii)an order that the respondent reimburse the estates for any interest which may be payable to creditors of the estates from March 2006.(e)Subject to order (d), an order that the respondent release to the first applicant and the second applicant the funds deposited with or received by the respondent on or about 1 December 2005 and 13 March 2006 totalling $323,977.54 whether held in the Common Fund or otherwise.(f)An order that the respondent release to the first applicant and the second applicant all other funds held by it in connection with the estates of the first applicant and the second applicant, whether held in the Common Fund or otherwise.3. Such further or other orders as the Court deems appropriate.4.Costs together with any interest thereon, including an order that the respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the application, without recourse to the funds of the bankrupt estates of the applicants, as agreed or taxed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In other words, there was to be an inquiry into the matters raised in question 7 and the consequences thereof (pursuant to question 10), but not as to any of the other matters identified in the eleven grounds document. On appeal the appellants press only their application for an inquiry into the matters raised in questions 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 and into the consequences thereof pursuant to question 10.THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES The administrations commenced on 14 October 2005. Although the appellants were discharged on 3 December 2008, the administrations have not yet been completed. Over that period, the appellants and associated persons and corporations have been involved in quite an acrimonious dispute with the respondent. The primary subject of dispute has been the beneficial ownership of real property at Point Piper in Sydney’s eastern suburbs (the “Point Piper land”) and the proceeds of its eventual sale. At one stage the land was said to have an estimated value of $9 million. At the date upon which the sequestration orders were made, the appellants were the registered proprietors of the Point Piper land. They had previously been involved in substantial litigation with members of the Otvosis family (the “Otvosis family”) concerning the proposed development of that land. The Otvosis family owned neighbouring land. On 27 April 2005 the Otvosis family obtained orders for costs against the appellants in the sum of $74,656. The sequestration orders were based upon bankruptcy notices demanding payment of that judgment debt. At the date of the sequestration orders the Point Piper land was mortgaged to Key Nominees Pty Ltd (“Key Nominees”). In May 2006 Key Nominees sold the land (presumably as mortgagee in possession) for about $7.95 million, of which sum the respondent received $1,788,532 (the “Point Piper funds”), representing the excess of the sale price over the amount of Key Nominees’ debt and associated expenses. In the original statement of affairs in each bankruptcy, the Point Piper land was shown as being held by the appellants as trustees of the Cavallino Unit Trust. However, in late 2005 and early 2006 the respondent came into possession of information which caused it to doubt that proposition. As a result, it placed a caveat on the Point Piper land. On 4 March 2006 Angelo Ferella, purportedly on behalf of the Cavallino Unit Trust, wrote to the respondent, asserting that the Cavallino Unit Trust had been prejudiced by the lodgement of the caveat. The alleged prejudice was said to be delay in re-financing the Point Piper land. The primary Judge understood that the purpose of the proposed re-financing was to facilitate annulment of the bankruptcies. It is not clear whether this proposed use of allegedly trust assets was one of the bases for the respondent’s concern as to the beneficial ownership of the Point Piper land at the time at which the sequestration orders were made. Mr Ferella asserted that the respondent knew that he and his father had not been trustees of the trust for almost two years. Mr Ferella produced to the respondent certain documents said to show that the Point Piper land was a trust asset. The documents included:·a letter from the Commonwealth Bank addressed to the appellants as “trustee for the Ferella Unit Trust”;·a contract for the sale of the Point Piper land which indicated that the appellants had purchased the property as trustees for a trust called the Modena Unit Trust;·a letter from Suncorp Metway to Angelo Ferella setting out the terms of an offer of a loan in the amount of $6.3 million for the purpose of assisting with the refinancing of the Point Piper land and the development of two luxury villas on that property, the borrower being described as Angelo Ferella and Gustavo Ferella as trustees for the Cavallino Unit Trust;·a deed of trust for the Ferella Unit Trust dated 10 January 1995, identifying the appellants as trustees; and·financial reports of the Cavallino Unit Trust for the years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2005 recording the existence of fixed assets comprising unidentified land,