Feo v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted

No. 8169 of 1994

JOHN FEO & JOHN FEO TRANSPORT PTY.LTD.

Appellants

v

PIONEER CONCRETE (VIC) PTY. LTD. & ORS.

Respondents

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JUDGES: WINNEKE, P., CALLAWAY and BATT, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATES OF HEARING: 26 and 27 October 1999
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12 November 1999
MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [1999] VSCA 180

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Defamation – Slander – Qualified privilege – Malice – Slander of a corporation in the way of its business actionable per se – Appeal against trial judge’s findings of fact – Trial judge’s advantage of seeing witnesses.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellants  Mr. D.B. Baker Peter H. Cash
For the Respondents  Mr. A.A. Monichino Cornwall Stodart
WINNEKE, P. 
  1. The appellants John Feo and John Feo Transport Pty. Ltd. (whom I shall variously call “Feo”, “the appellants” or “the defendants”) were defendants to defamation proceedings brought against them in the Supreme Court by the respondents Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty. Ltd. (“Pioneer”); John William Forbes and Jim David Rowlands (in these reasons, they will be variously described by name or as “respondents” or “plaintiffs”). At the trial it was alleged that the first named appellant, acting for and on behalf of his transport company (the second appellant) published 6 separate slanders of and concerning the respondents between late 1993 and August 1994. It was contended that the gist of the slanders against the respondent company was that its practices in allotting cartage work to its contractors were riddled with corruption. It was further alleged that the gist of the slanders uttered against the personal respondents was that they, as senior executive officers of the respondent company or its holding company, had participated in the corrupt practices of the company and had received secret commissions for favours granted.

  2. In accordance with reasons given on 18 December 1997, Southwell, J. found in favour of each respondent. He found that the words published by Feo were untrue and defamatory of each of them and were not spoken on occasions of privilege and that, even if they were, the privilege was defeated by malice. He further found that, because the words were calculated to disparage the respondent company in its trade or business by reflecting on the management of that business, the slanders were actionable at its suit in the absence of proof of special damage. Likewise his Honour found that the defamatory utterances against the individual respondents were actionable per se because the words spoken were calculated to injure those respondents not only in the way of their trade or calling, but by suggesting that they had engaged in criminal conduct.

  3. His Honour’s findings translated into awards of damages as follows:

    (a)        The Respondent Company

    His Honour found that four of the slanders (which were described as “the Temby Slander”, “the second Temby Slander”, “the Stagnitti Slander” and “the second Casey Slander”) were actionable at the suit of the respondent company. He awarded sums of $1,500, $1,000, $2,000 and $1,000 respectively…

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Details
Case
[1999] VSCA 180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Feo v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd was heard in the court, involving a dispute concerning defamation, specifically slander, and the applicability of qualified privilege, malice, and slander of a corporation in the way of its business actionable per se. The appellants, Mr. Feo and his company, had been engaged by the respondent company, Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd, as cartage contractors on a fixed contract basis. The appellants alleged defamatory statements were made by the respondent company’s general manager, Rowlands, and other executives.

The primary legal issues before the court included whether Rowlands' statements to Feo were defamatory, if the communications were made with actual malice, and if the qualified privilege defence was applicable. The court needed to determine if the defamatory statements, if any, were actionable without proof of special damage due to the nature of the business of the respondent company. Another aspect was the assessment of the trial judge's findings of fact, considering the advantage the trial judge had of seeing the witnesses.

The court reviewed the evidence and found that Rowlands' statements to Feo were not defamatory. It was determined that the statements were made without actual malice and within the bounds of qualified privilege, given they were part of an internal grievance process. The court upheld the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the advantage of hearing the witnesses firsthand. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the trial judge's decision was affirmed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The Facts Before considering the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to turn briefly to the facts, as disclosed in evidence, and found by the trial judge. The “Pioneer Group” of companies is a large manufacturer of concrete for pouring and, for that purpose, owns and operates quarries throughout the country. The respondent company is a member of the Group and, relevantly, it engages in activities in Victoria which involve the quarrying of sand and stone and the movement of those materials to batching plants, including plants at Werribee and Geelong. For these purposes it uses a large number of tip-trucks – some which it owns and operates and others provided by contractors who are either retained on a “fixed” contract basis or casually engaged. The appellants (Mr. Feo and his company) were, from 1992, engaged by the respondent company as cartage contractors on a “fixed contract”. Some years before he obtained that contract, Feo had been engaged as an “owner-driver” of his truck on contract to Enzo Transport, which in turn had a contract from Pioneer. It seems that in the course of carrying out his duties for Enzo between 1988 and 1992, Feo became aware of certain activities which suggested that an executive of Pioneer (one Montgomery) was engaging in improper dealings with Enzo. As a result of the information provided by Feo, Enzo lost its contract and Montgomery and other personnel employed by Pioneer had their services terminated. The respondent, Rowlands, who was then general manager of the “Quarry Group” regarded Feo’s information as “valuable” to the company and offered the appellants a “fixed contract” for 4 years with an option for a further 2↔ years. The routes, which the contract specified were to be worked by the appellants, were routes to be “shared” with another contract carter of which one Krestas was the proprietor. His Honour found that it did not take long for Feo to form a belief that he was receiving less favourable treatment in the manner in which the respondent company was allocating work – both as to the number of trips allocated and the manner of allocation. In his Honour’s view – and he heard the witnesses including Feo – Feo became obsessed with the idea that corruption was rife throughout the company, and that such corruption spread to its senior executives, specifically Rowlands and Forbes. This belief in respect of the former stood in stark contrast to the view which Feo had formed of Rowlands in October 1992 when he had written of his “honesty and integrity”. By mid 1993, as his Honour found, Rowlands had been informed of 12 to 14 occasions upon which Feo had made allegations of “bad practice” within the company and which had been made to and about employees and officers of the company. Rowlands determined to speak to Feo but was unable to do so. He then compiled a facsimile to him in strong words on 15 June 1993 in which, inter alia, he wrote: “I have had enough of your use of my name in threats being made to personnel in the transport division. I am satisfied of the integrity of the people involved in this division and will not have you canvassing your misguided beliefs any longer. … You are almost the highest earner of all time within the company, a fact you don’t seem to appreciate. Cause me any more of your stupid trouble and I will make you the lowest earner faster than you could imagine. …” Feo made no response to these asseverations.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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