SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted
No. 8169 of 1994
JOHN FEO & JOHN FEO TRANSPORT PTY.LTD.
Appellants
v
PIONEER CONCRETE (VIC) PTY. LTD. & ORS.
Respondents
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| JUDGES: | WINNEKE, P., CALLAWAY and BATT, JJ.A. |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATES OF HEARING: | 26 and 27 October 1999 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 12 November 1999 |
| MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: | [1999] VSCA 180 |
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Defamation – Slander – Qualified privilege – Malice – Slander of a corporation in the way of its business actionable per se – Appeal against trial judge’s findings of fact – Trial judge’s advantage of seeing witnesses.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellants | Mr. D.B. Baker | Peter H. Cash |
| For the Respondents | Mr. A.A. Monichino | Cornwall Stodart |
| WINNEKE, P. |
The appellants John Feo and John Feo Transport Pty. Ltd. (whom I shall variously call “Feo”, “the appellants” or “the defendants”) were defendants to defamation proceedings brought against them in the Supreme Court by the respondents Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty. Ltd. (“Pioneer”); John William Forbes and Jim David Rowlands (in these reasons, they will be variously described by name or as “respondents” or “plaintiffs”). At the trial it was alleged that the first named appellant, acting for and on behalf of his transport company (the second appellant) published 6 separate slanders of and concerning the respondents between late 1993 and August 1994. It was contended that the gist of the slanders against the respondent company was that its practices in allotting cartage work to its contractors were riddled with corruption. It was further alleged that the gist of the slanders uttered against the personal respondents was that they, as senior executive officers of the respondent company or its holding company, had participated in the corrupt practices of the company and had received secret commissions for favours granted.
In accordance with reasons given on 18 December 1997, Southwell, J. found in favour of each respondent. He found that the words published by Feo were untrue and defamatory of each of them and were not spoken on occasions of privilege and that, even if they were, the privilege was defeated by malice. He further found that, because the words were calculated to disparage the respondent company in its trade or business by reflecting on the management of that business, the slanders were actionable at its suit in the absence of proof of special damage. Likewise his Honour found that the defamatory utterances against the individual respondents were actionable per se because the words spoken were calculated to injure those respondents not only in the way of their trade or calling, but by suggesting that they had engaged in criminal conduct.
His Honour’s findings translated into awards of damages as follows:
(a) The Respondent Company
His Honour found that four of the slanders (which were described as “the Temby Slander”, “the second Temby Slander”, “the Stagnitti Slander” and “the second Casey Slander”) were actionable at the suit of the respondent company. He awarded sums of $1,500, $1,000, $2,000 and $1,000 respectively…
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- Case
- [1999] VSCA 180
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court included whether Rowlands' statements to Feo were defamatory, if the communications were made with actual malice, and if the qualified privilege defence was applicable. The court needed to determine if the defamatory statements, if any, were actionable without proof of special damage due to the nature of the business of the respondent company. Another aspect was the assessment of the trial judge's findings of fact, considering the advantage the trial judge had of seeing the witnesses.
The court reviewed the evidence and found that Rowlands' statements to Feo were not defamatory. It was determined that the statements were made without actual malice and within the bounds of qualified privilege, given they were part of an internal grievance process. The court upheld the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the advantage of hearing the witnesses firsthand. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the trial judge's decision was affirmed.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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