Farrell v The Queen - [1998] HCATrans 89

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Hobart No H4 of 1997

B e t w e e n -
ALAN ARTHUR FARRELL
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GAUDRON J

McHUGH J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT HOBART ON TUESDAY, 31 MARCH 1998, AT 10.17 AM

(Continued from 30/3/98)

MR MacGREGOR: Your Honours, we have prepared overnight what we have called a summary of the submissions that we were making yesterday. We do not wish to amend the notice of appeal. The summary suggests that the argument which we have advanced is encompassed by the existing ground 5. May I hand copies up. It is referred to as an amended notice of appeal ground 5. No one should be misled by that. The notice of appeal was amended because it contained a sentence appeal when leave to appeal was not given to appeal against sentence.

Your Honours, I do not propose to read the document but merely to identify the general submission that we make in paragraph 2. In paragraph 3 we stress that there was an independent diagnosis by Dr Sale and other diagnoses by qualified practitioners set out in exhibit 49. In paragraphs 4 through 8 we set out the precise references to the diagnosis and to the consequent sequelae which can be observed in patients suffering from the disabilities which were diagnosed. There are specific statements of the evidence and specific page references given in relation to them.

The general submission that we make is articulated in paragraph 10, that the appellant was entitled to have the relevance and force of Dr Sale’s diagnoses and opinion associated with the reliability of the complainant’s testimony as the credibility of the complainant was central to the defence case. He was entitled to have the evidence which Dr Sale identified as the basis for the diagnosis and the consequences of these conditions and the complainant’s history identified as supportive of the diagnoses. It is submitted that these conditions and their consequences were not, as was clearly recognised by Justice Brennan, as he then was, in Bromley, a matter of general knowledge. To suggest that general knowledge of drunkenness is a substitute for Dr Sale’s expert psychiatric opinion is, we submit, to trivialise the science of psychiatry and to undermine the worth of his evidence.

In answer to the proposition during argument that the judge’s warning was sufficient, it is submitted that the appellant was entitled, for the reasons identified by Justice Brennan in Bromley, to have it vividly and more authoritatively brought home to the jury than merely a judicial warning on the danger of acting upon the witness’s evidence without corroboration because, as the present Chief Justice recognised, “the Courts have no scientific knowledge about the danger of acting on evidence given under the influence of mental disorders of various kinds and degrees, nor have they acquired any experience of the danger…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Farrell v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Farrell v The Queen [1998] HCATrans 89
Case: [1998] HCATrans 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of Farrell against a conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search of the appellant's property, which was conducted without a warrant.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence found during the warrantless search was admissible, notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. This involved an examination of the circumstances under which a search without a warrant could be considered lawful under Australian law, particularly in relation to the powers of police officers to enter and search premises.

The Court analysed the common law powers of police to enter and search premises without a warrant, noting that such powers are generally limited and require specific circumstances to be justified. The judges considered the principles of necessity and reasonableness in the context of police action. They determined that the search in this instance was unlawful as it did not meet the stringent requirements for a warrantless search. Consequently, the evidence obtained as a result of this unlawful search was deemed inadmissible.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders