JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: FALCONER -v- CHIEF HEALTH OFFICER [No 2] [2022] WASC 29
CORAM: ALLANSON J
HEARD: 27 JANUARY 2022
DELIVERED : 3 FEBRUARY 2022
FILE NO/S: CIV 2286 of 2021
BETWEEN: BEN FALCONER
Applicant
AND
CHIEF HEALTH OFFICER
First Respondent
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Other Party
Catchwords:
Judicial review - Practice and procedure - Discovery - Leave to adduce expert evidence - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA)
Public Health Act 2016 (WA)
Result:
Leave to adduce expert evidence refused
Orders for discovery
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | S Prince SC & B Tomasi |
| First Respondent | : | K Pettit SC & B Nelson |
| Other Party | : | K Pettit SC & B Nelson |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Hotchkin Hanly |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Other Party | : | State Solicitor's Office |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1
Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3; (2013) 249 CLR 1
Australian Society for Kangaroos Inc v Secretary, Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning [2018] VSC 88
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; (1949) 78 CLR 353
Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328
Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171
Comcare v Banerji (2019) 267 CLR 373
Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cuneen (2015) 256 CLR 1
Jones v Dunkel (1958) 101 CLR 298
McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 357 CLR 178
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1
Palmer v Western Australia [2021] HCA 5; (2021) 95 ALJR 229
Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA 17; (2019) 265 CLR 285
Roe v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASC 130
Stretton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 559
ALLANSON J:
Introduction
The applicant has applied for orders for discovery in defined categories and for leave to adduce expert evidence at trial.
The respondents oppose orders for discovery and expert evidence, and used the appointment listed to hear those applications to again argue that the action should be summarily dismissed. The court had already heard and determined an application for summary termination of the action. I then held that the remaining grounds of the application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable grounds of success. This is not an occasion to reconsider whether the matter should proceed.
In considering the applications for discovery and leave to adduce expert evidence, the…
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- Case
- [2022] WASC 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the directions were made within the scope of the powers granted under the Public Health Act 2016 (WA) and whether they were lawful. This involved examining whether the directions took into account relevant considerations, were proportionate to the risk they aimed to mitigate, and did not consider irrelevant factors. The court had to consider the principles of legality and proportionality in its analysis.
The court found that the directions were made within the scope of the powers granted under the Public Health Act 2016 (WA) and were lawful. It concluded that the directions were proportionate to the risk of COVID-19 transmission and took into account relevant considerations. The court also found that the directions did not consider irrelevant factors. It held that the Chief Health Officer was entitled to consider the public health benefit of mandating vaccination and the critical function of workplaces in making the directions. The court rejected the applicant's arguments that the directions were unlawful.
The court dismissed the applicant's application and found in favour of the Chief Health Officer. The directions prohibiting unvaccinated police officers from accessing any police premises were upheld as lawful. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The scope of judicial review must be defined not in terms of the protection of individual interests but in terms of the extent of power and the legality of its exercise. That is not to say that the protection of individual interests or rights is irrelevant. For example, in the construction of a statute conferring power, the court will, in an appropriate case, have regard to the principle of legality.[11][11] As explained in Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3; (2013) 249 CLR 1, 30 ‑ 31 [42]. See also Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cuneen (2015) 256 CLR 1, 27 ‑ 28 [54]. The general position at common law is that the person asserting a fact bears the onus of proof. Subject to any modifying statutory provision, that position applies in judicial review proceedings.[12] The applicant bears the onus of proof in establishing the facts necessary to make out the errors he alleges.[13] It is not for the parties seeking to affirm the decision or the validity of an administrative act to demonstrate, by way of evidence or inference that the decision was regularly reached or the act validly done.[14][12] Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA 17; (2019) 265 CLR 285 [39]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 [67].[13] Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA 17; (2019) 265 CLR 285 [39]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 [67].[14] See Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [67] ‑ [68]. Where facts are in issue in judicial review proceedings, the civil standard applies. Where the applicant relies on inferences from proved facts, those facts 'must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may reasonably be satisfied'.[15][15] Jones v Dunkel (1958) 101 CLR 298, 305. I accordingly approach the question of discovery from the perspective that the applicant will be required to establish the facts which form the basis of his challenge to the Directions, sufficient to found any inferences on which he relies. As I noted in an earlier decision in this matter, the Chief Health Officer did not, and was not required to, give reasons for making the Directions. The absence of reasons does not prevent review but may make it harder to establish an evidential foundation for the inferences the applicant would have the court draw. The applicant must rely on the terms of the Directions except to the extent that inferences may be drawn, from other admissible material, such as contemporaneous documents that may be admitted as part of the res gestae, or admissions by the Chief Health Officer as to his reasons. Following my earlier ruling on the State's application for summary dismissal, the applicant filed an amended application in which he relies on the following grounds:1.The Public Health Act 2016 (WA) on its proper construction does not authorise the making of the Direction in that:d.The making of the Direction failed to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration, namely, the precautionary principle; and/or e.The making of the Direction failed to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration, namely, the principle of proportionality; and/orf.The Direction is disproportionate to the stated purpose of the decision maker in making the Direction; and/or g.The making of the Direction involved an irrelevant consideration, namely the rights and liabilities of the Second Defendant as an employer of WA Police Force Workers.2.Further and/or in the alternative, the Direction is ultra vires the Public Health Act 2016 (WA) in that it is legally irrational. ParticularsThe Direction is ultra vires the Public Health Act 2016 (WA) in that it is legally irrational on the basis that: (a)preventing unvaccinated police officers from accessing any police premises is untethered from any risk identified in the Direction; (b)there was no rational basis for extending the prohibition on the presence of unvaccinated police workers at premises beyond the mission critical areas as prescribed by the WA Police Mission Critical Areas (Restrictions on Access) Directions No 3 when there had been no change to the level of risk to public health to which that Direction had been directed; (c)there is no rational basis for differentiating between the treatment of access to police premises by unvaccinated police workers with a medical exemption and those unvaccinated police workers who consciously object to consenting to vaccination; (d)preventing unvaccinated police officers from accessing any and all police premises in the circumstances prescribed is disproportionate to the risk they pose in circumstances where their access to police premises will not materially alter the risk of Covid-19 transmission; (e)preventing unvaccinated police officers from accessing police premises will not limit the spread of Covid-19 in Western Australia; (f)a policy which has the effect of linking vaccination status to employment runs counter the goal of achieving maximum possible vaccine penetration in the community; and (g)it is irrational for the Direction to remain in force in circumstances where there is no ongoing, periodic public health risk assessment which takes into account vaccination rates in the community and the effectiveness of the vaccines against mutations of Covid-19. 3.In making the Direction, the Chief Health Officer took into account irrelevant considerations for the purposes of ss 157(1)(e), 157(1)(k), 180, and 190 of the Public Health Act 2016 (WA), namely: (a)'the strong public health benefit to mandating COVID-19 vaccination for the entire workforce'; and(b)the function of workplaces 'themselves critical to the functioning of our society', in circumstances where providing a strong public health benefit for a particular workforce; nor the control and management of workplaces, is not a relevant consideration for decisions made under the Act.