FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Fair Work Ombudsman v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G 564
File number(s): BRG 81 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN Date of judgment: 29 June 2023 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Imposition of pecuniary penalties – where union official was no longer the holder of a right of entry permit – where union had taken steps to educate its officials as to how to appropriately exercise entry rights – relevant principles – orders accordingly. Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 499, 500, 546, 550, 793.
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) ss. 117 and 118.
Cases cited: Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Fair Work Ombudsman [2023] FCA 72
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union(the Titan Cranes Case) [2022] FCA 774
Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080
Singtel Optus Pty Ltdv Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20
Fair Work Ombudsman v AJR Nominees Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2014] FCA 128
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 24 Date of last submission/s: 2 June 2023 Date of hearing: 2 June 2023 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M McKechnie Solicitor for the Applicants: K&L Gates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr H Clift Solicitor for the Respondent: Hall Payne ORDERS
BRG 81 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN
Applicant
AND: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Respondent
DEAN LESLEY RIELLY
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE EGAN
DATE OF ORDER:
29 June 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to the provisions of sections 546(1) and (3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act):
(a)The First Respondent pay a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $37,500.00 to the Commonwealth of Australia Consolidated Revenue Fund on or before 4:00pm on 27 July 2023 by reason of its contravention, pursuant to sections 793 and 550(2)(c) of the FW Act, of sections 499 and 500 of the FW Act.
(b)The Second Respondent pay a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $5,500.00 to the Commonwealth of Australia Consolidated Revenue Fund on or before 4.00pm on 27 July 2023 by reason of his contravention of the provisions of sections 499 and 500 of the FW Act.
2.The Applicant have liberty to apply on the giving of two (2) days’ notice by it to the Respondents in the event of any failure on the part of either the First Respondent or the Second Respondent to comply with the orders of the Court as set out in paragraph 1 hereof.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Fair Work Ombudsman v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mini... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 564
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the CFMMEU and the training provided to its officials constituted sufficient mitigating factors to warrant a reduction in the penalties. The court considered the affidavit of Mr Brian Lacy AO, who had provided training to the CFMMEU officials, highlighting their understanding of the legal requirements and their commitment to future compliance. The court also evaluated the history of non-compliance by the CFMMEU and balanced this against the recent efforts to rectify the situation through targeted training.
In its reasoning, the court acknowledged that while the acknowledgements of wrongdoing and the training were positive steps, they did not entirely negate the CFMMEU's history of non-compliance. The court emphasised that penalties should reflect the need for deterrence and to uphold the rule of law, while also considering the efforts made by the CFMMEU to address the issues. Ultimately, the court found that the penalties should be set at a level that would effectively deter future misconduct, taking into account both the mitigating actions and the need for a strong deterrent effect.
The final orders of the court reflected its determination, imposing penalties on the CFMMEU and its officials that were deemed appropriate given the circumstances. The penalties were calculated to serve both as a deterrent and to reflect the seriousness of the contraventions, while also recognising the steps taken by the CFMMEU to address the underlying issues.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union(the Titan Cranes Case) [2022] FCA 774 at [43] – [47] inclusive, Logan J recognised that the Union understood that there was a behavioural problem on the part of some of its officials which required corrective action. His Honour held as follows: [43]The acknowledgements of contravention were not made at the earliest possible opportunity. The evolution of the pleadings is eloquent proof of that. But they were made. And they were made before it was necessary for affidavit or other evidence to be prepared and filed. Moreover, I am persuaded that the acknowledgements do carry with them, in the overall circumstances, an element of understanding on the part of the CFMMEU and the individual respondents that their conduct was not just unlawful, for that it certainly was, but completely unacceptable in a society governed by the rule of law.[44]The reason why I hold that view is apparent in an affidavit made by Mr Brian Lacy AO, which was read on behalf of the CFMMEU. Mr Lacy is a distinguished Australian. He held particular responsible positions, in his youth, in Defence Signals, in which necessarily he must have been invested with a high degree of trust and confidence in respect of our nation’s most sensitive national security classified material. He was admitted to the Bar in later life, with a particular expertise in industrial law. His postnominal AO bespeaks a high recognition in our national honour system. He served a term as a senior deputy president of the Industrial Commission’s predecessor, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Moreover, he held, at what must have been a difficult time, the highly responsible position of Administrator of the Christmas Island and Cocos and Keeling Islands territories of the Commonwealth[45]Mr Lacy was commissioned by the CFMMEU, via its industrial officer, to give very particular training indeed to each of the individual respondents about their industrial law responsibilities. There was some controversy as between the parties about what was or was not relevant or admissible in Mr Lacy’s affidavit. As to that, though, I hold exactly the same view as did Snaden J, who was also the beneficiary of like evidence from Mr Lacy, in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (The Monash Freeway Widening Case) (No 2) [2021] FCA 1101 (the Monash Freeway Widening Case). His Honour observed, at [49] – [59], as follows:[49]The respondents led evidence in the form of an affidavit affirmed on 7 April 2021 by Mr Brian Lacy AO. Parts of that affidavit were objected to in ways to which I shall shortly come; but, in summary, it attested to some training that the Union engaged Mr Lacy AO to provide to its officials, including Simpson, concerning the nature and limits of the rights of entry conferred by part 3-4 of the FW Act. That training, it was said, reflects some effort on the part of the respondents (and in particular the Union) to understand the limits of those statutory powers and to ensure that they are not breached in the future.[50]Mr Lacy AO is a barrister and a former presidential member of what is now the Fair Work Commission. He is well known to and well respected by those who have practiced in the field of industrial law over recent decades. His expertise undoubtedly extends to the nature and limits of the rights of entry conferred by part 3-4 of the FW Act. The Commissioner did not contend otherwise.[51]By a report that he provided to the Union after conducting his training session with Simpson, Mr Lacy AO recorded that:(1)he met with Simpson on 18 January 2021 for the purposes of administering that training;(2)that meeting lasted for approximately 65 minutes;(3)during their session, he explained to Simpson why his conduct at the Eumemmering Creek Site on 29 and offended ss 499 and 500 of the FW 30 April 2017 Act;(4)further, he explained to Simpson why his conduct at the Gate 3 Site on 9 May 2017 contravened s 500 of the FW Act; (5)during and/or as a result of the training he undertook, Simpson:(a) agreed that “...it is important that he [Simpson] has a good knowledge and understanding of his responsibilities and obligations under industrial and work health and safety laws”;(b)stated that he appreciated the opportunity to undertake training in order that he might “...better understand those responsibilities and obligations”;(c)appeared, to Mr Lacy’s AO observations and from comments that he (Simpson) made during their discussions (but upon which Mr Lacy AO did not elaborate), to understand “...why his conduct contravened sections 499 and 500 of the FW Act”;(d)struck Mr Lacy AO as “...contrite about the events of April/May 2017 and genuinely committed to compliance in future”; and(e)appeared to understand “...the steps he needs to take to ensure he does not contravene right of entry provisions in future”.[52]Before preparing his report, Mr Lacy AO “...read, understood and complied with[,] and agree[d] to be bound by the [Federal Court of Australia] Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT)”.[53]Attached to Mr Lacy’s AO expert report was correspondence that the Union sent to him on 22 December 2020, by which it requested that he provide training to Simpson. Amongst other things, that correspondence recorded that:(1) the Union wished to retain Mr Lacy AO to provide to Simpson training “...about his responsibilities and obligations under workplace laws”;(2) the purpose of that training was “...to ensure Mr Simpson understands and has a good knowledge of his responsibilities and obligations under applicable industrial and work health and safety laws, to assist him to comply with these laws in future”;(3)the Union wished “...to ensure that Mr Simpson has sufficient knowledge to facilitate his compliance with the law in the future”;(4)Mr Lacy AO was asked, in particular, to focus upon the circumstances of this case and:(a)why Simpson’s conduct on 29 and 30 April 2017 was found to have contravened ss 499 and 500 of the FW Act;(b)why Simpson’s conduct on 9 May 2017 was found to have contravened s 500 of the FW Act; and(c)what steps Simpson needs to take in future “...to ensure that contraventions of ss 499 and 500 do not occur”;(5)Mr Lacy AO was requested to prepare a report in respect of the training provided to Simpson; and(6)any report so prepared would be provided to the court in connection with the penalty hearing that took place on 28 April 2021.[54]The Commissioner objected to the passages of Mr Lacy’s report that purported to record Simpson’s state of mind or the matters that he appeared, to Mr Lacy, to “understand”. He submitted that those observations were expressions of opinion that did not fall within Mr Lacy’s AO field of expertise and that the court should take no account of them. Broadly, those objections were fairly advanced. To the extent that Mr Lacy AO purported to state in his report what he thought Simpson understood or believed, he trespassed beyond his acknowledged expertise and, respectfully, little if anything can be made of his opinions. To the extent that his observations were products of what Simpson told him, they are admissible under s 66A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. It is difficult to ascertain into which category some of Mr Lacy’s AO observations fall. They are of limited, if any, assistance presently.[55]It doesn’t much matter. Respectfully, the Commissioner’s objections are largely a distraction. The state of Simpson’s knowledge or understanding after having completed his training is one thing; his apparent willingness to undertake it speaks also to the deterrent effect that the setting of penalties in the present case must strive to achieve. Likewise, it is clear from the brief given to Mr Lacy AO that the Union, having orchestrated the training, should be understood to have exhibited a desire to ensure that Simpson and its other organisers conduct themselves lawfully in the future.[56]The Commissioner urged the court to approach the training provided by Mr Lacy AO with some caution. It was, he said, comprised of a single, hour-long training session and was, on the documentation available, designed and intended to assist the Union in proceedings such as this one. He described it as an exercise in self-interest.[57]With respect, that is undoubtedly so; but so to observe is not to acknowledge any relevant want of sincerity on the respondents’ part. The respondents were entitled to take steps to educate themselves with a view to ensuring, first, that they in future avoid the predicament in which they currently find themselves; and, second, that they (and the Union, in particular) can demonstrate why penalties to be imposed upon them in the present circumstances needn’t be as high as they might otherwise need to be (for example, in the Union’s case, because the attitude of belligerence that its history of statutory non-compliance demonstrates is ameliorated, at least to some extent, by a contemporary willingness to ensure that its officials adhere to the requirements of the law).[58]It may be that history vindicates the Commissioner’s scepticism that the union’s poor record of compliance with the right of entry provisions of part 3-4 of the Fair Work Act continues unabated, and that the training provided by Mr Lacy is exposed over time as something of a stunt designed to dupe the court into imposing lower penalties than might otherwise have been thought appropriate. If that occurs, it might well serve as a circumstance of which future courts take account in assessing the level of penalty necessary to deter repetition of statutory misconduct.[59]For now, however, I do not share the Commissioner’s cynicism. The training that Mr Lacy AO has administered can only be seen as a welcome development, and as one that reflects well on the union for organising it and on Mr Simpson for agreeing to take it. It reflects an acknowledgment, on the respondents’ part, of wrongdoing – of a problem requiring corrective action. It weighs against other considerations, most obviously, the union’s poor history of statutory contravention, which, in the balance, inform the deterrent effect that the court must strive to achieve through the imposition of penalties in this case.[46]Making due substitution for the reference by Snaden J, in the passage quoted to Mr Simpson, to the individual respondents in this case, and due amendment of relevant dates, I respectfully agree with everything that his Honour has stated in relation to the evidence of Mr Lacy and regard it as exactly applicable in the present case.[47]Once again, in the present case, the training which Mr Lacy has administered to each of Mr Seiffert, Mr Murdoch and Mr Rapata can only be seen as a welcome development, or perhaps more aptly, a further welcome development. It is a development that reflects well on the CFMMEU for organising it, and it reflects well on Mr Seiffert, Murdoch and Rapata for agreeing to undertake it. I accept it reflects an acknowledgement on the part of both the individual respondents, as well as the CFMMEU of a problem requiring corrective action. As in the case before Snaden J, it weighs against other considerations, once again, and most obviously, the CFMMEU’s shameful history, as I once observed in Broadway on Ann, of statutory contravention.Consideration of Submissions as to Penalty