EXQ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 974
•27 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EXQ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 974
File number(s): SYG 2681 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 27 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) – whether the IAA’s reasoning was relevantly open to the IAA based upon the material before it – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476 Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 Division: General Number of paragraphs: 28 Date of hearing: 16 June 2025 Place: Sydney Appearing for the Applicant: In person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Pieri of Minter Ellison Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 2681 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EXQ18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LAING
DATE OF ORDER:
27 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LAING:
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) (as it was). The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Temporary Protection (Class XD) (Subclass 785) visa (protection visa).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Lebanon who arrived in Australia in 2013.
In 2016, the applicant applied for the protection visa that is the subject of this proceeding.
On 9 June 2018, the Delegate refused the application. The Delegate’s decision was then referred to the IAA for review.
On 27 August 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.
THE IAA’S DECISION
The IAA accepted that the applicant was a Sunni Muslim from Lebanon. The IAA accepted that the applicant would return to reside where his family lived in North Lebanon (at [8]).
The IAA accepted that it was plausible that the applicant’s home area bordered two conflict areas (Area 1 and Area 2), which I will not identify lest it provide some means of identifying the applicant. The IAA accepted that violence had, on occasion, spilled into the applicant’s home area. The IAA accepted that the applicant’s suburb was close enough that he had friends in Area 2 and visited that area (at [11]).
The IAA considered country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicating that sectarian violence in the general area had historically been limited to the Alawite suburb of Area 2 and the Sunni suburb of Area 1. The IAA noted reports of a suicide bomb attack on a café in Area 2 in January 2015 and the bombing of a Sunni mosque in Area 1 in August 2013. However, the IAA also had regard to DFAT’s assessment that the security situation was “stable” and that there had “been no significant security incidents of violence since a security plan for the area was implemented by the Lebanese Armed Forces in April 2014”. The IAA observed that DFAT had assessed the risk of Sunnis in the broader area facing violence or discrimination as “low” (at [12]).
The IAA considered that there was no claim that the applicant had been involved in violence, that damage to his family home was deliberate, or that the applicant was targeted or injured in any way. The IAA considered it “mere speculation” that violence may escalate again in Areas 1 and 2. If it did, the IAA considered that the chance of the applicant facing any harm in such a conflict was too low to amount to a real chance. This was having regard to the applicant’s unwillingness to become involved in conflict, the location of his house not actually being located in Area 1 or 2, his family’s pattern of leaving the city and the applicant, if not leaving, at least staying indoors during such violence (at [13]).
The IAA was not satisfied on the claims and evidence provided that there was any pressure on the applicant to join any extremist Sunni group or that he was threatened or harmed in any way for not doing so. The IAA did not accept that he would be forced to join a local Salafist group on return, particularly in light of DFAT advice that the security situation in Areas 1 and 2 was “stable and well controlled by the Lebanese Armed Forces” (at [14]).
The IAA found that the chance of the applicant being asked to join a Sunni extremist group was remote, in circumstances where no-one else in his family had been so approached and the applicant was considered to have no profile or interest in such groups. The IAA found that there was not a real chance of the applicant being pressured to join a Sunni extremist group or facing harm due to his unwillingness to do so. The IAA also found, by reference to country information and the applicant’s circumstances, that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm for having left Lebanon (at [15] and [20]).
The IAA did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of harm on account of a prior relationship with an Alawite girl. The IAA found that this was not a relationship the applicant would renew on return, noting that he could not recall the girl’s name at the TPV interview. The IAA found that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm for reason of this past relationship, from either his Sunni community or the Alawite community (at [16]).
The IAA noted a claim that a prominent person in relation to the Alawi party had lived opposite the applicant’s former girlfriend in Area 2. However, the IAA did not accept that this caused any harm to the applicant in the past. The IAA found that it would not cause any harm to the applicant in the future, should the applicant return to Lebanon. The IAA did not accept that it would be known or of interest to anyone that the applicant once knew a girl who lived opposite from the person in question (at [16]).
The IAA found that the possibility of an outbreak of general violence in the area, or in Areas 1 or 2 in particular, to be “just speculation”. The IAA found the risk of the applicant being harmed in general or sectarian violence in his home area to be too low to amount to a real risk (at [21]).
Having regard to the above, the IAA found that the applicant was unable to meet the criteria for the protection visa. Accordingly, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision (at [17]-[22]).
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
The applicant sought judicial review of the IAA’s decision through an application filed on 21 September 2018. The matter remained in the central migration docket for some years and was previously docketed to another judge before being allocated to my docket more recently and listed for hearing. The applicant relied upon the following grounds of review:
1.The Delegate of the Minister failed to accept my fear of harm and the reasons why I escaped Lebanon. The Delegate also failed to understand the animosity between Sunni and Alawite and the terrible sectarian problems in the area.
2.Contrary to the comments of the Delegate of the Minister I will face inhuman treatment and will be subjected to serious harm if I return to Lebanon.
To the extent that the applicant sought judicial review of the Delegate’s decision, as I explained at the hearing, this Court does not have the power to undertake such a review: s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). I have understood the applicant’s complaints in his application to be, rather, directed to the decision of the IAA. This was confirmed by the applicant at hearing, although he did object to the Delegate’s reasoning that his home area was not in the vicinity of the conflict areas. However, the IAA did not reason in this manner and expressly departed from this assessment by the Delegate (at [11] of its decision).
At the hearing before the Court, I also discussed with the applicant the role of this Court and how it is different from the role of the IAA. Whilst the IAA was able to assess the applicant’s claims for protection, this is not what the Court does. The role of the Court is limited to determining whether the decision of the IAA was affected by legally relevant error.
What may be legally relevant was discussed with the applicant, within the context of the grounds that he had raised. In particular, it was explained that this Court has no power to set aside a decision of the IAA by reference to disagreement alone. In some cases, relevant error may be demonstrated if the IAA’s reasoning in relation to an applicant’s claims is not logically open on the evidence, or if it demonstrates some fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence before the IAA. However, where evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning, or if logical, rational or reasonable minds may differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from evidence, then a reviewing court is unable to find that a decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable “simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131] per Crennan and Bell JJ.
I am not persuaded that the IAA’s findings in relation to whether the applicant faced a real chance of relevant harm were relevantly closed to the IAA. The IAA’s reasoning in relation to the applicant’s claims is summarised above. Essentially, the IAA:
(a)did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of harm on account of sectarian conflict or generalised violence. This was having regard to the applicant’s circumstances and country information that was before the IAA; and
(b)did not accept the applicant’s claim to face harm arising from his relationship with an Alawite girl. This was considering (amongst other things) that the applicant had not been in the relationship for some time, could not recall the girl’s name and had not been harmed in the past due to her proximity to a prominent person associated with the Alawi party (who no longer lived in the area).
The above reasoning is comprehensible. It has not been demonstrated that it was relevantly closed to the IAA, or represented some fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence that was before the IAA.
There is a potential tension in the country information considered by the IAA at [12] of its decision. The IAA considered that the DFAT report indicated that “[n]otable events” included a suicide bomb attack on a café in Area 2 in “January 2015”, which killed 9 people. However, the IAA also recorded DFAT advising that there had been “no significant security incidents of violence since a security plan for the area was implemented by the Lebanese Armed Forces in April 2014”. It is unclear why DFAT would not have considered a suicide bomb a “significant security incident… of violence”. In any event, even if there is some tension in this information said to have been sourced from DFAT, this does not mean that the IAA’s reasoning was not open to it based upon the material before it. The IAA acknowledged the January 2015 bombing incident at [12] of its decision. It was nonetheless open to the IAA to find that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm, by reference to his personal circumstances and country information. That information included DFAT’s assessment that the risk of Sunnis in the area more generally of facing violence or discrimination was “low” and DFAT’s assessment of the security situation as “stable”.
In coming to its conclusion, the IAA did not doubt that there was animosity between Sunni and Alawite residents, or that this had historically resulted in violence on some occasions. However, the IAA did not accept, having considered the applicant’s personal circumstances and the country information before it, that the applicant faced a real chance of harm on this basis.
The applicant may well disagree with the IAA’s assessment. However, it has not been demonstrated that it was relevantly closed to the IAA to reason as it did on the basis of the material that was before it. As explained above, this Court has no power to set aside the IAA’s decision based upon disagreement alone.
FURTHER MATTERS RAISED AT HEARING
At the hearing before the Court, the applicant explained that he has a child born in Australia and that his wife is pregnant with his second child. He stated that he could not go back to Lebanon because of the situation there and because of his children. The applicant asked the Court to refer the matter for Ministerial intervention.
As I discussed with the applicant at the hearing, it may well be open for him to make an application for Ministerial intervention based upon his personal situation. I encouraged him to seek advice in this regard. However, the role of this Court in this type of proceeding is limited to assessing whether or not the decision of the IAA is affected by legally relevant error. Whether the applicant makes an application for Ministerial intervention will be a matter for him and his family. Whether that application is granted will be a matter for the Minister.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, I am not persuaded that the IAA’s decision is affected by any legally relevant error that would empower the Court to set the decision aside. The application before the Court must therefore be dismissed.
I will hear from the parties in relation to costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing. Associate:
Dated: 27 June 2025
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