Express Sales & Marketing Pty Ltd v Snapper Hill Group Pty Ltd
[2022] ATMO 93
•10 June 2022
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONSRe: Application under regulation 9.11 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) by Express Sales & Marketing Pty Ltd for an extension of time to file a notice of intention to oppose the application for removal of trade mark registration number 1212163 for EXPRESS TINTING with device (Class 40) made by Snapper Hill Group Pty Ltd.
Delegate: Blake Knowles Representation: Opponent: Dundas Lawyers.
Applicant: Mott & Associates Solicitors.Decision: 2022 ATMO 93
Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) – request under reg 9.11 for an extension of time to file notice of intention to oppose an application for removal – request for extension granted – statement of grounds and particulars deemed to be filed on time.Background
This decision relates to a request for an extension of time made under reg 9.11[1] by Express Sales & Marketing Pty Ltd (‘Removal Opponent’) to file a notice of intention to oppose (‘NITO’) and statement of grounds and particulars (‘SGP’) in relation to an application made on 14 May 2021 under s 92 (‘Removal Application’) by Snapper Hill Group Pty Ltd (‘Removal Applicant’) for the removal of trade mark number 1212163 (‘Registration’) owned by the Removal Opponent. The Registration is for the following trade mark and services:
(‘Trade Mark’)
Class 40: Window tinting treatment being surface coating
(‘Services’)
[1] Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth). Unless stated otherwise, each reference to a section or regulation is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’).
IP Australia wrote to the Removal Opponent’s recorded address for service on 17 May 2021, enclosing a copy of the Removal Application and advising that the deadline to oppose removal was 17 July 2021. The letter was returned to IP Australia on 2 June 2021 marked as ‘Left address/unknown’. A file note dated 3 June 2021 indicates that an IP Australia staff member conducted a search of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) companies register and determined that the Removal Opponent had been deregistered. On 26 July 2021, IP Australia sent a further letter to the address for service informing the Removal Opponent that the Trade Mark had been removed from the Register in respect of all of the Services. That letter was also returned on 18 August 2021 marked as ‘Left address/unknown’.
On 5 October 2021, a person representing the Removal Opponent called IP Australia enquiring why they had not been contacted regarding the letters that had been returned to IP Australia. The IP Australia representative explained that as research indicated that the Removal Opponent had been deregistered, no further action was taken. The caller advised that the Removal Opponent had since been reregistered. He also advised that he had an account with IP Australia with an email address for correspondence. Investigations by IP Australia indicated the customer account did exist but it was not linked to another IT system that would have caused notification of the Removal Application to be sent by email.
On 7 October 2021, a director of the Removal Opponent, Mr Bruce Judd (who I infer is the same person that contacted IP Australia on 5 October 2021), filed a request for an extension of time of three months (i.e. until 17 October 2021) to file the NITO. The NITO was subsequently filed on 8 October 2021. The declaration supporting the request for extension of time stated:
I am filing this declaration to oppose the Removal Action of the Trade Mark No 1212163 on the grounds that I was unaware I needed to oppose this action as I had not received any notice of the actions being taken by IP Aust. If I had been aware of the actions to remove had been processed I would have definitely opposed this action as my business and my Franchisees use this Trademark on a daily basis. I have become aware of the actions concerning the Trade Mark as it was brought to my attention by my Solicitor who is preparing a case against Snapper Hill Group in the District court in regards to Passing Off, returning intellectual property and monies owed. I am disappointed that IP Aust has taken this action as I believe I should have been informed of these actions Electronically through my IP Aust Portal. As soon as I had been made aware I contacted your office and I have been made aware that the address for service had not been updated and so the notice was returned to your office un opened. This Trademark has been in continuous use uninterrupted since 2007.
On 27 October 2021, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (‘Previous Delegate’) wrote to the parties advising that she intended to grant an extension of time of four months. This four-month period encompassed the three-month extended period requested by the Removal Opponent for filing the NITO, and a fourth month for filing the SGP. The basis for the proposed grant of the extension of time to file the NITO was circumstances beyond the control of the Removal Opponent, namely, the technical issue with IP Australia’s systems which resulted in correspondence being sent by post rather than electronically. The Previous Delegate also decided that an extension for a fourth month should be granted as the Removal Opponent had filed the SGP late due to being given incorrect information by IP Australia.
The Removal Applicant was given until 10 November 2021 to make representations regarding the proposed grant of the extension of time. On 1 November 2021, Mr Chris Butler contacted the Previous Delegate by telephone on behalf of the Removal Applicant. A file note by the Previous Delegate indicates Mr Butler advised that all action regarding the Trade Mark including its removal had occurred while the Removal Opponent was deregistered. The Previous Delegate advised that given the Removal Opponent was once again registered, it is taken as never having been deregistered. On 8 November 2021, Mott & Associates solicitors filed written submissions on behalf of the Removal Applicant objecting to the grant of the extension of time. The letter annexed various documents, which are summarised below.
The first document is an Infotrack Report dated 8 November 2021 containing company registration details for the Removal Opponent. The report indicates the Removal Opponent was deregistered on 18 April 2020 but registered as of the time of the report.
The second document is a letter dated 29 April 2021 sent by ASIC to Mr Butler confirming the Removal Opponent was deregistered on 18 April 2020, and that ordinarily deregistration means that all company property is held, and can only be dealt with, by ASIC. The letter also states that ASIC had written to the former office holders of the Removal Opponent stating that if they have any interest in the trade mark, the company must be reinstated by 30 June 2021. The letter indicates to Mr Butler that it is possible to apply for transfer or sale of a trade mark held by ASIC, but that ASIC will generally only deal with vested property as a last resort. Finally, the letter states that ASIC has no objection to parties applying to IP Australia for the removal of a trade mark, and that the cost of such an application would likely be less than the cost of applying to ASIC to transfer or sell the trade mark.
The third document is a letter dated 12 May 2021 from Connor Hunter Law Firm, acting for the Removal Applicant, to Nyst Lawyers, acting for the Removal Opponent. The letter refers to previous correspondence between the parties and advises that the Removal Opponent was deregistered on 18 April 2020. The letter explains the consequences of deregistration with regards to the Removal Opponent’s trade marks and that the Removal Opponent has no “standing to make demands associated with the allegations raised in your above correspondence”.
The fourth document is an ASIC summary for the business name “Express Sales and Marketing” indicating it was registered on 22 April 2021 to John Patrick Otway.
The Removal Opponent subsequently filed a further declaration made by Bruce Judd on 15 December 2021. Mr Judd declares that the Removal Opponent moved location in September 2018 and had not recorded the change of address with either ASIC or IP Australia. As such, the annual company registration renewal fee was not paid, causing the Removal Opponent to be deregistered. Mr Judd also declares that he first became aware of the Removal Opponent’s deregistration upon receiving the letter of 12 May 2021 from Connor Hunter Law firm. Mr Judd states that on 14 May 2021 he took steps to reinstate the Removal Opponent, and annexes email correspondence with ASIC from this date.
On 2 March 2022, the Previous Delegate wrote to the Removal Applicant advising that she still intended to grant the extension of time. The Previous Delegate cited the technical issues that led to the failure to notify the Removal Opponent of the Removal Application automatically via email, and also the failure to manually send the correspondence to the email address recorded on the file when the physical correspondence was returned to sender. The Previous Delegate also addressed the Removal Applicant’s submissions about the ownership of the Trade Mark by advising that the Removal Opponent had been reinstated prior to removal of the Trade Mark from the Register which occurred on 26 July 2021. The Previous Delegate referred to s 601AH(5) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which provides that upon reinstatement of a company, it is taken to have continued in existence as if it had not been deregistered, and any company property that is still vested in the Commonwealth or ASIC reverts to the company. The Previous Delegate stated that there was no information to suggest that ASIC had disposed of the Registration during the period of deregistration and as such, the Registration had re-vested to the Removal Opponent upon it being reinstated by ASIC. Taking all relevant circumstances into account, the Previous Delegate considered it was appropriate to grant the extension of time.
On 8 March 2022, the Removal Applicant requested to be heard by way of written submissions in relation to the proposal to grant the extension. The hearing was initially scheduled for 29 April 2022 but subsequently deferred until 27 May 2022 to allow the Removal Applicant more time to obtain a document from ASIC supporting its case.
Prior to the hearing, both parties filed additional declarations and submissions.
The Removal Opponent filed a further declaration of Bruce Judd dated 11 May 2022. That declaration confirmed that the Removal Opponent was reinstated by ASIC on 21 July 2021, and not 1 July 2021 as stated by Mr Judd in his previous declaration.
The Removal Applicant filed a further declaration of Chris Butler dated 12 May 2022. Mr Butler declares that his company purchased the business name “Express Tinting” in May 2020 from another entity that had owned the business name since January 2018. Mr Butler’s declaration also contains various submissions, including that the Previous Delegate had weighted the decision to grant the EOT heavily on the Removal Opponent being reinstated on 1 July 2021, whereas in fact the date of reinstatement was 21 July 2021. The declaration also contains several annexures, including material that had previously been filed. New material annexed to the declaration includes:
-an email from Mr Butler to ASIC dated 1 July 2021 advising that the Removal Opponent remained deregistered past the ‘ASIC deadline of 30/6/21’ and that an application had been made to IP Australia to remove the Registration. An email reply from ASIC acknowledging Mr Butler’s email is also enclosed.
-a letter from ASIC to Mr Butler dated 22 July 2021 confirming that the Removal Opponent had been reinstated and company property had re-vested. The letter concludes by advising Mr Butler that ASIC has no further interest in the trade mark and all future correspondence regarding it should be sent to the Removal Opponent directly.
-an email from ASIC to Mr Butler dated 27 April 2022 confirming that the Removal Opponent was reinstated on 21 July 2021.
The matter has been allocated to me, another delegate of the Registrar, for decision based on the written submissions and declarations filed by the respective parties.
Discussion
Regulations 9.11 and 9.12
Subsection 92(1) allows for the filing of applications for removal of a trade mark from the Register on two grounds set out in ss 92(4)(a) and (b). Subsection 96(1) states that ‘Any person may oppose an application under subsection 92(1) by filing a notice of opposition with the Registrar’. Section 97 states that a trade mark must be removed from the Register if there is no opposition to the application made under s 92(1). Section 98 states that the Registrar must restore a removed trade mark to the Register if the Registrar subsequently extends the period for filing a notice of opposition and a notice of opposition is filed within the extended period.
Under reg 9.7, the components of a notice of opposition are a notice of intention to oppose and a statement of grounds and particulars. Under reg 9.8, a notice of intention to oppose must be filed within 2 months from the day that the application for removal is advertised in the Official Journal. Under reg 9.9, a statement of grounds and particulars must be filed within one month from the day the notice of intention to oppose is filed.
Regulations 9.11 and 9.12 state:
9.11 Extension of time for filing - application
(1) A person who intends to oppose an application for removal may request the Registrar to extend:
(a)the period for filing a notice of intention to oppose under subregulation 9.8(1); or
(b)the period for filing a statement of grounds and particulars under subregulation 9.9(1).
(2) A request under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) may be made within the period for filing the document in question.
Note: See subparagraph (3)(b)(ii) and subregulation 9.12(2) in relation to the consequences of making the request after the filing period has ended.
(3) The request must:
(a) be in an approved form; and
(b) be accompanied by a declaration stating:
(i)the facts and circumstances forming the basis for the grounds;
(ii)if the period for filing the notice of intention to oppose or the statement of grounds and particulars has ended—the reason why the request was not made within the period; or
Note: Regulations 21.6 and 21.7 deal with making and filing declarations.
(4) The request may be made only on either or both of the following grounds:
(a)an error or omission by the person, the person’s agent, the Registrar or an employee;
(b)circumstances beyond the control of the person, other than an error or omission by the person, the person’s agent, the Registrar or an employee.
9.12 Extension of time for filing - grant
(1) The Registrar may grant a request under subregulation 9.11(1) for an extension of time only if the Registrar is satisfied that the grounds set out in the request justify the extension.
(2) However, if the request is made after the period for filing the notice or statement of grounds and particulars has ended, the Registrar must not grant the extension unless the Registrar is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the delay in making the request.
(3) The Registrar must decide the length of the extended period having regard to what is reasonable in the circumstances.
As a preliminary matter, I will first address the Removal Applicant’s submissions regarding the period during which ownership of the Trade Mark vested with ASIC. The Removal Applicant seeks to put significant weight on the fact that ownership of the Trade Mark vested in ASIC during the period between when the Removal Application was filed up to and past the deadline for opposing the Removal Application. However, I consider that the period of ownership of the Trade Mark by ASIC ultimately has little relevance to my decision.
There is no requirement under the Act to establish standing to either apply for removal, or oppose removal, of a trade mark from the Register. Section 92 allows any person to apply for removal. Section 96 also allows any person to oppose removal. It is therefore possible for a person with no interest whatsoever in a trade mark to oppose its removal and succeed in that opposition by filing evidence that establishes either relevant use of the trade mark or other compelling reasons why the trade mark should not be removed. Of course, in practice, it is invariably the owner or some other interested party that opposes, and not a stranger. However, it is clear there is no requirement that the registered owner or some other person in whom rights vest must be involved in or consent to an opposition to removal.
The correspondence between Mr Butler and ASIC also confirms that ASIC adopts a passive role as owner of registered trade marks once held by companies that have been deregistered. ASIC does not appoint itself the address for service for these trade marks, nor will it actively oppose their removal. Further, ASIC will not seek to deal with such trade marks in the absence of a request by an interested party that meets certain conditions.[2] When a deregistered company is reinstated, s 601AH(5) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) states that any company property still held by ASIC or the Commonwealth re-vests in the company, and the company is deemed to have continued in existence as if it had not been deregistered. In this case, ASIC expressly confirmed to Mr Butler on 22 July 2021 that the Trade Mark re-vested in the Removal Opponent upon its reinstatement on 21 July 2022, and that ASIC had no further interest in it.
[2] See: You want to buy property owned by a deregistered company (Web Page, 24 January 2013) <
Given that the Act is not concerned with which person opposes removal, and given that in any event the Registration re-vested in the Removal Opponent upon its reinstatement, I consider the period of deregistration of the Removal Opponent has little bearing on my decision regarding the extension of time. I do note the deregistration was considered by IP Australia staff in deciding not to make further enquiries after notifications sent to the Removal Opponent’s address for service were returned to sender. However, if anything, this fact assists the Removal Opponent’s case rather than hinders it.
The relevant questions to be determined in granting the extension to file the NITO are:
(i)whether the Removal Opponent intended to oppose removal,[3]
(ii)whether the request was filed in an approved form accompanied by a declaration stating the the facts and circumstances forming the basis for the grounds, and the reason why the request was not made within the period,[4]
(iii)whether there are grounds that justify the extension, namely either (a) an error or omission by the person, the person’s agent, the Registrar or an employee, or (b) circumstances beyond the control of the person, other than an error or omission by the person, the person’s agent, the Registrar or an employee,[5]
(iv)whether, given the application for extension of time was made after the period ended, there is sufficient reason for the delay,[6]
(v)whether the length of the extended period is reasonable in the circumstances, and[7]
(vi)whether it is appropriate that discretion is exercised to grant the extension.[8]
[3] Reg 9.11(1).
[4] Reg 9.11(3).
[5] Reg 9.11(4) and 9.12(1).
[6] Reg 9.12(2).
[7] Reg 9.12(3).
[8] Reg 9.12(1).
Turning to whether the Removal Opponent intended to oppose removal, this intention could only exist once the Removal Opponent was reinstated and once it became aware (via its director Mr Judd) that the Removal Application had been filed. The Removal Opponent was reinstated on 21 July 2021. However, Mr Judd declares that he only became aware of the Removal Application when it was brought to his attention by his solicitor on or around 1 October 2021, which was after the Trade Mark had been removed from the Register on 26 July 2021. It is arguable that given the Trade Mark was removed from the Register in July, it was not logically possible to form an intention to oppose removal in October, considering that removal had already occurred. However, given that the Act expressly allows for extensions to file oppositions after removal of a trade mark has occurred, and for the reinstatement of removed trade marks to the Register, I am satisfied the requirements of reg 9.11(1) can be met even where the requisite intention to oppose removal is formed after a trade mark has been removed.
Turning to whether the request is in an approved form and supported by an appropriate declaration, I am satisfied this is the case. The Removal Opponent used IP Australia standard forms. The declarations of 5 October 2021 and 15 December 2021 also set out the circumstances which Mr Judd relies on as justification for the extension. Incorrect information regarding the date of reinstatement of the Removal Opponent given in the declaration of 15 December 2021 is clarified by information given in the declaration of 11 May 2022. In any event, nothing turns on the date of reinstatement of the Removal Opponent. It is sufficient to note that reinstatement occurred prior to the filing of the request for extension and the NITO.
Turning to whether there are grounds to justify the extension, I consider there was an omission by the Removal Opponent, namely, the failure to update the Removal Opponent’s address for service when the Removal Opponent moved office in September 2018. If the address for service had been updated at this time, it is more likely than not that the Removal Opponent would have received notification of the Removal Application and filed the NITO within the relevant period. I agree with the Removal Applicant that there is an onus on trade mark owners to keep their details up to date with IP Australia. However, oversights are relatively common, particularly given that trade marks are registered for ten-year periods and are therefore rarely front of mind. The omission by the Removal Opponent is a causative error, notwithstanding that it could have been avoided had the Removal Opponent been more diligent. I also note that once Mr Judd became aware of the Removal Application, he expeditiously took steps to contact IP Australia and file the request for an extension of time and the NITO.
Turning to whether there was sufficient reason for the delay in seeking the extension, I note that there was a period of just under three months between the end of the period for filing the NITO (17 July 2021), and Mr Judd filing the request for an extension (7 October 2021). Mr Judd states in his declaration of 5 October 2021 that the removal of the Trade Mark was brought to his attention by his solicitor who was preparing a case against Snapper Hill Group. I am satisfied with this explanation given there does not appear to be any reason to doubt the truth of Mr Judd’s evidence or any tactical advantage to be gained by delaying the filing of the NITO.
Turning to whether the length of the requested extension is reasonable in the circumstances, I note that the extension to file the NITO is less than three months, which is a relatively short period of time and well within the normal bounds of extensions often considered reasonable by IP Australia.
Turning finally to whether it is appropriate to grant the extension, I note that reg 9.12(1) states that the Registrar ‘may’ grant an extension of time. The use of the word ‘may’ in some cases will confer upon the Registrar a discretion to exercise a power. In Re Richard Hall, Hearing Officer Murray discussed the considerations relevant to exercise of a discretion:
The decisions of the courts concerning the approach to be taken to the exercise of a discretion to extend time are now well established and include:
· in the absence of nominated factors against which the discretion is to be exercised, regard should be had to the "subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act" - per Mr Justice Mason (as he then was) in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40. A further exposition of this is provided by the comments of Mr Justice Davies in Chalk v Commissioner for Superannuation [1994] FCA 1063; (1994) 50 FCR 150 at 154 where he said "...the discretion should be exercised by reference to the words of the statute and the context within which the discretion is conferred";
· it is "more important to consider the consequences of extending or refusing to extend time than to debate the reasons why the act was not done in time" (per Davies J in Chalk's case, at 156, with whom Chief Justice Black and Mr Justice Cooper agreed. Similar comments are to be found in Comcare v A’Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 119 ALR 85, particularly at 88);
· a legislative provision providing for the exercise of a discretion to extend time is beneficial in nature and should be applied beneficially (Davies J in Chalk's case at 155).[9]
[9] [1997] ATMO 69.
The policy of Part 9 of the Act is to facilitate removal of unused trade marks, which is consistent with the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the Register. The policy is usually considered in the context of the exercise of discretion not to remove a trade mark from the Register.[10] However, I consider it is equally relevant to decisions on whether to grant an extension of time to oppose removal of a registered trade mark.
[10] See E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2008] FCA 934 (Flick J).
In the present circumstances, the consequence of refusing the extension of time would be that the Removal Opponent would no longer have statutory rights in the Trade Mark which has been registered since 2007. Assuming that the Trade Mark has been in continuous use, as claimed by the Removal Opponent, the removal may encourage another trader to adopt and use a substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark, potentially causing confusion amongst the public. Further, the registration of a substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark by another person with a claim to rights that is inferior to that of the Removal Opponent may detrimentally affect the integrity of the Register. As such, there is an obvious public interest in the Trade Mark remaining registered if there has been relevant use of the Trade Mark by the Removal Opponent in relation to the Services.
I note that the Removal Applicant filed its own application (trade mark number 2197284) to register the word mark “Express Tinting” on 26 July 2021 for services that are identical to those of the Registration. To the extent that the Removal Applicant intends to use and register a similar trade mark for the same services, it has an interest in the Trade Mark being removed from the Register. Having regard to the interests of the respective parties, I am required to consider whether the balance of convenience in granting or refusing the extension favours the Removal Opponent or Removal Applicant.
The Removal Opponent seeks to establish that the Trade Mark should not be removed from the Register based on its claim that it has been used continuously since 2007. The Removal Applicant seeks removal of the Trade Mark in order to eliminate an obstacle to use and registration of a recently filed similar trade mark. I consider the balance of convenience favours the Removal Opponent who is seeking to maintain their statutory rights in the Trade Mark, and who claims that the Trade Mark has been in continuous use. While it is possible the Removal Applicant may have made business decisions based on the removal of the Trade Mark, such decisions are always subject to a degree of risk. The Act provides for late extensions of time and for restoration of removed trade marks to the Register. Further, removal of a registered trade mark does not eliminate rights in the trade mark that may exist at common law. These factors should be considered by any trader who seeks to remove a registered trade mark on the grounds of non-use and then use and/or apply to register a similar trade mark. There is also a public interest, being the maintenance of integrity of the Register and prevention of possible confusion amongst consumers, in the Removal Application being determined on its substantive rather than procedural merits.
On balance, I consider that the Removal Opponent has satisfied the requirements of reg 9.11 and 9.12 with regards to the request for an extension to the period for filing the NITO. Further, to the extent that reg 9.12(1) confers a discretion, I consider that discretion should be exercised beneficially in the Removal Opponent’s favour.
I now turn to the SGP, which was filed on 25 October 2021. Under reg 9.9, the SGP must be filed within one month of the filing of the NITO. The NITO was filed on 8 October 2021, meaning the SGP was filed within the one-month period required by reg 9.9.
However, the Previous Delegate advised the Removal Opponent that the SGP was filed out of time. The file is unclear as to why the Previous Delegate considered that the SGP had not been filed on time, given that reg 9.9 allows one month from the filing of the NITO to file the SGP. The Previous Delegate’s decision was likely based on a particular interpretation of s 98. Section 98 requires a trade mark to be restored to the Register if a notice of opposition to removal is filed within the extended period. Given the notice of opposition comprises both the NITO and SGP, the Previous Delegate likely concluded that s 98 requires the filing of both documents within the extended period requested by the Removal Opponent. However, I consider the extended period referred to in s 98 to be the period for the filing of the NITO plus the one-month period allowed by reg 9.9 for filing the SGP (or that period as separately extended). The granting of an extension entitles the person receiving it to its full benefit. Reg 9.9 clearly allows the Removal Opponent an additional one month for filing the SGP after the filing of the NITO. There is nothing in the Act or Regs to suggest that this one-month period only applies in cases where a trade mark is yet to be removed from the Register. The wording of s 98, which concerns the restoration of a trade mark to the Register after an extension is granted and a notice of opposition has been filed, does not to my mind alter the clear wording of Reg 9.9. However, I consider that it would be reasonable for a delegate of the Registrar to defer consideration of a request for an extension to file a notice of intention to oppose until after the statement of grounds and particulars has also been filed, given that such an extension would serve no purpose if the prospective opponent does not file a statement of grounds and particulars within the period required.
For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the Opponent should be granted an extension of time of three months to file the NITO. I am also satisfied that the SGP was filed on time, and it is not necessary to consider the application of reg 9.11 and 9.12 in relation to the SGP.
Decision
I allow the extension of time until 8 October 2021 to file the NITO.
The SGP filed on 25 October 2021 will now be assessed for adequacy. If the SGP is determined to be adequate, the Removal Applicant will be provided with a copy and notified of the deadline for filing a notice of intention to defend.
Blake Knowles
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
10 June 2022
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Commercial Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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