EWX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EWX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 235

Appeal from: EWX17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 2705
File number(s): NSD 1874 of 2018
Judge(s): BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia refusing extension of time under s 477(2) – whether primary judge obliged to consider matters not advanced by the applicant – held: application dismissed  
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(3)(a), 477(2)

Cases cited:

CKX16 v Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCA 400
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585
SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224

Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; 217 FCR 55

Date of hearing: 13 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 18
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr O Jones
Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr L Leerdam of DLA Piper Australia

Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent made no appearance and filed no submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1874 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EWX17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE STREET IN HIS CAPACITY AS A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to rely upon an amended originating application be refused.

2.The originating application be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J:

  1. The applicant seeks judicial review of orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). His Honour dismissed an application under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of time in which to bring an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. Under s 476A(3)(a) of the Migration Act there is no right of appeal from that decision. Hence the applicant’s resort to s 39B.

  2. The limits on judicial review of a decision to refuse an extension of time under s 477(2) are formidable. In short, the applicant must demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the primary judge, because that is what s 39B requires when judicial review is sought of a judicial decision and there is no assertion of non-jurisdictional error on the face of…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 235
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

EWX17 brought an application for review of a decision made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, who refused to grant an extension of time under section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the judge should have considered certain matters not advanced by the applicant, which could have influenced the decision. The matter was heard by the Federal Court, which was tasked with determining whether the primary judge was obliged to consider matters not put forward by the applicant and whether there was any error in the decision-making process.

The court examined the grounds of review proposed by the applicant, which were based on the argument that the primary judge should have considered additional matters. The court found that the applicant did not demonstrate any error in the Authority's reasoning or any jurisdictional error. The court held that there was nothing wrong in the Authority perceiving a discrepancy between the applicant's initial entry interview and the subsequent statutory declaration, and that the change in circumstances from reporting every three months after an interrogation of seven days to three months in detention was a significant change that the Authority could rely upon in assessing the applicant’s credibility.

The court concluded that neither of the proposed grounds of review could possibly succeed. Consequently, leave to rely upon them was refused, and the originating application was dismissed with costs. The court held that the primary judge was not obliged to consider matters not advanced by the applicant, and there was no demonstrated error in the decision-making process.

The court ordered that leave to rely upon an amended originating application be refused, the originating application be dismissed, and the applicant pay the first respondent's costs as assessed or agreed. This decision is in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which deals with the entry of orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to rely upon an amended originating application be refused.

2. The originating application be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this case, the applicant did not come close to showing that the Authority was not entitled to reason as it did. To the contrary, I see nothing wrong in the Authority perceiving a discrepancy between the answer given at the initial entry interview and what was said in the subsequent statutory declaration. Nor do I see anything wrong in regarding a change from three months of reporting after an interrogation of seven days, to three months in detention after such an interrogation as a significant change, and therefore an inconsistency that it could rely upon in assessing the applicant’s credit. No error is demonstrated, and certainly no jurisdictional error. The third hurdle must also fail.Conclusion Neither proposed ground of review can possibly succeed. Leave to rely upon them must therefore be refused. The originating application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established