Ewing and Ewing (No 2)

Case •

[2019] FamCA 804

•

4 November 2019

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EWING & EWING (NO. 2) [2019] FamCA 804

FAMILY LAW – JURISDICTION – Stay application – Where there are similar proceedings between the parties in a court in Singapore and in this Court – Where the husband seeks a stay of the proceedings in this Court – Where both parties have the required connections to each jurisdiction – Where both parties agree that either Court can adequately resolve the dispute – Application of the test set out in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd and Anor (1990) 171 CLR 538 – Where the Court does not accept the husband’s contention that he would not be able to participate in the proceedings in this Court – Where the real property that is subject to the proceedings is located in Australia – Court finds that Australia is not a clearly inappropriate forum for the proceedings – Stay refused.

FAMILY LAW – INJUNCTION – Anti-suit injunction – Where the wife seeks an anti-suit injunction to prevent the husband from continuing the proceedings in Singapore – Where the parties agree that parallel proceedings should be avoided – Where the next court event for the proceedings in Singapore may assist with resolving the forum dispute – Anti-suit injunction refused.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 76, 78

CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia Limited (1997) 189 CLR 345
Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571
Navarro & Jurado (2010) 44 Fam LR 310
Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd (1987) AC 460
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd and Anor (1990) 171 CLR 538

APPLICANT: Ms Ewing
RESPONDENT: Mr Ewing
FILE NUMBER: SYC 3264 of 2019
DATE DELIVERED: 4 November 2019
PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney
PLACE HEARD: Sydney
JUDGMENT OF: Loughnan J
HEARING DATE: 25 October 2019

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Kirk QC
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Lander & Rogers
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Kearney SC
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mills Oakley

Orders

  1. The husband’s application for a stay of proceedings contained in the Application in a Case filed 2 July 2019 is dismissed.

  2. The wife’s application that the husband be restrained in respect of proceedings between the parties in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore, contained in her Response to an Application in a Case filed 7 August 2019 is dismissed.

Note:  The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ewing & Ewing has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER:  SYC3264 of 2019

Ms Ewing

Applicant

And

Mr Ewing

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. There are proceedings before this Court for settlement of property between Ms Ewing (“the wife”) and Mr Ewing (“the husband”).  The husband seeks a stay of the proceedings on a permanent basis or alternatively, pending the outcome of similar proceedings commenced by him in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore.

  2. The wife opposes the husband’s application and seeks that he be restrained from taking any further steps in the Singapore proceedings other than seeking to adjourn or discontinue them.  In the event that the proceedings continue before this Court the wife will seek further interlocutory orders, including interim spousal maintenance, interim costs and exclusive occupation.

Applications

  1. The husband relies on his Application in a Case filed 2 July 2019 in which he relevantly seeks:

    1.That this Application be heard on an urgent basis and that at all times for service be abridged.

    2..That these proceedings be permanently stayed or alternatively be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings commenced by the Husband in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore.

    3.That the Wife pay the Husband’s costs of and incidental to this Application.

  2. By her Response to an Application in a Case filed 7 August 2019 the wife relevantly seeks:

    ….

    2.That the Husband’s Application in a Case filed 1 July 2019 [sic] be dismissed. 

    3.That pending further Order or a final determination of all proceedings in file number SYC 3264/2019 (including any appeal), the Husband be restrained from taking any further steps in relation to his Writ for Divorce filed in the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore in proceedings number …, other than to adjourn or discontinue those proceedings.

    …

Written Evidence

  1. The husband relies on:

    ·Application in a Case filed 2 July 2019;

    ·Affidavit of the husband filed 2 July 2019;

    ·Financial Statement of the Husband filed 17 July 2019;

    ·Affidavit of Ms A filed 7 August 2019;

    ·Further affidavit of Ms A filed 23 October 2019; and

    ·Affidavit of the husband filed 17 October 2019.

  2. The wife relies on:

    ·Initiating Application filed 23 May 2019;

    ·Response to an Application in a Case filed 7 August 2019;

    ·Financial Statement filed 23 May 2019;

    ·Affidavit of the wife filed 7 August 2019;

    ·Affidavit of Mr P filed 7 August 2019; and

    ·Further affidavit of Mr P filed 17 October 2019.

The Hearing

  1. On 22 August 2019, among other orders, orders were made fixing the proceedings for hearing of the forum dispute on 25 October 2019 and for the filing of further evidence for that hearing. 

  2. On 25 October 2019 the forum dispute was heard on the papers.  The parties were each represented by senior counsel.  The wife was present in Court.  The husband was not present but it transpired that he was in Australia for purposes associated with his work.  I think I was told that he was in Queensland.

  3. After oral submissions, on 25 October 2019 the following order was made:

    1.By close on 25 October 2019 Senior Counsel will provide to the associate to Justice Loughnan a statement as to the agreed position regarding:

    1.1the court in Singapore in which the proceedings between the parties are pleading; and

    1.2whether such court is part of the High Court of Singapore.

    2.Otherwise judgment is reserved and the parties and their legal representatives are excused from attending court when judgment is delivered.

Short History

  1. The wife and husband are each 48 years of age.  They were born in Australia and commenced living together in December 1992.  They were married in 1995.  As a result of the husband’s employment in the finance industry, the parties moved over time from South East Queensland, to Melbourne, to Brisbane, to New Zealand and then to Brisbane again.

  2. In May 2009 the family moved to the United Kingdom, again for the purposes of the husband’s work.  In May 2012 the family moved to Singapore in order that the husband could take up a new position.  The parties have continued to live in Singapore since that time.  For the duration of his time in Singapore, the husband has worked with one employer, albeit in different roles.

  3. The parties separated in January 2018.

  4. There are three children of the marriage:

    Mr X is 20 years of age and studies at a university in Queensland, returning to Singapore during university holidays;

    Ms Y is 19 years of age and will commence studies at a university in Queensland in 2020, living on campus there; and

    Z was born in 2002 and is 17 years of age.  She is in the final year of high school in Singapore and intends to graduate in June 2020.  She plans to undertake an internship in Singapore before commencing studies at a university in Queensland in 2021.

  5. The husband commenced proceedings for Divorce and ancillary relief in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore on 16 May 2019.  The wife was served with that process on 18 May 2019.

  6. On 23 May 2019 the wife filed an Initiating Application in this Court at Sydney, seeking orders for property settlement and spousal maintenance.

Background Facts

  1. On 22 August 2019 the following orders were made in these proceedings:

    1.By consent, without admissions and without a concession on behalf of the husband as to forum, and pending further order, orders are made in terms of the document titled “Consent Order” (Exhibit 1 dated 22 August 2019) as set out hereunder:

    1.That pending further Order on a without admissions basis, with no concession made as to forum and pursuant to section 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):

    1.1The Husband and his agents be restrained by injunction from selling, transferring, encumbering, mortgaging or in any other way dealing with the following properties, except with the written consent of the Wife or by Order of this Court:

    1.1.1F Street, Town B NSW, being folio identifier …32);

    1.1.2C Street, Suburb H NSW, being folio identifier …44;

    1.1.3J Street, Suburb K QLD; and

    1.1.4M Street, Suburb D QLD.

    1.2The Husband and his agents be restrained by way of injunction from selling, assigning, disposing, alienating or encumbering any shares held in his sole name or jointly with any other persons or entities, without the written consent of the Wife or by Order of this Court save and except for the annual vesting of long term incentives, which shall be paid into the GBP account..

    1.3That the Husband be restrained by way of injunction from disposing of funds held in his N Bank GBP account.

    1.4The Husband and the Wife be restrained by way of injunction from entering into any loans or debit accounts in excess of $15,000, save and except for debits arising from the Husband’s work expenses for which he will be thereafter reimbursed, and any tax liabilities to be paid by the Husband without the written consent of the other party or by Order of this Court.

    2.That the Husband and the Wife shall each forthwith and within twenty-four (24) hours file a written Undertaking as to Damages, in respect of the injunctive relief sought against the Husband and the Wife in accordance with Order 1 hereof.

    Until Further Order:

    3.That the Husband provide to the Wife on the first day of each month a copy of his transaction history for the N Bank GBP and 360 accounts for the prior month.

    4.That the Wife provide to the Husband on the first day of each month a copy of her transaction history for any of her personal bank accounts in Singapore (if any) and Westpac Bank account for the prior month.

    2.The proceedings be listed for interim hearing, estimated time half a day, on 25 October 2019 in relation to anti suit injunctions/forum proceedings.

    3.The parties provide to the chambers of Justice Loughnan and to each other a case outline document by the close of business on 21 October 2019 setting out the documents to relied on and the summary of the arguments to be made in relation to forum.

    4.Any further affidavit evidence be filed and served not later than the close of business on 14 October 2019 or such later time as the parties agree on in writing.

  2. On 2 September 2019 the wife filed an application in the Family Justice Courts of Singapore seeking to stay the Singapore proceedings. 

  3. On 3 September 2019 the parties attended a status conference in the Singapore proceedings.  The conference was adjourned to 24 September 2019 and orders were made requiring the husband to file and serve his evidence in reply by 10 September 2019 and for the wife to reply by 1 October 2019.

  4. By the adjourned conference on 24 September 2019 the husband had not yet filed his evidence in response to the wife’s application and he sought further orders about those documents.  As the parties had agreed to attend a mediation in Singapore on 9 October 2019, no further orders were made about documents and the conference was adjourned to 10 October 2019 to await the outcome of the mediation.

  5. The mediation conducted between the parties in Singapore on 9 October 2019 was not successful.

  6. At the adjourned status conference in Singapore on 10 October 2019 directions were made requiring the wife to file her evidence in reply by 4 November 2019; the parties to exchange written submissions by 11 November 2019; and for the wife’s application to be heard in Singapore later in November 2019.

  7. A significant aspect of the dispute between the parties relates to their property.  The parties’ counsel both referred to a Balance Sheet prepared by the parties which was incorporated into the Case Outline document filed on behalf of the wife.  It will assist in understanding the issues relevant to the forum dispute for reference to be made in these reasons to that Balance Sheet which is as follows:

ASSETS

Owner Description Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
Australia
1  J C Street, Suburb H NSW   E 700,000 700,000
2  H Interest (27.84%) in M Street, Suburb D (from funds loaned to Ms & Mr Q for purchase) 170,000 170,000
3  H J Street, Suburb K  E 600,000 600,000
4  H F Street, Town B NSW  E 1,800,000 2,000,000
5  J E Bank account #...18 (as at 07.10.2019)  26,045 55,000
6  J Westpac account #...08 (as at 07.10.2019)  25,298 24,969
7  W Westpac Choice account #...21 (as at 08.10.2019) 1,397
8  W Westpac Choice account #...93 (as at 07.10.2019)  25,421
9  W Westpac at call account  #...42 (as at 07.10.2019)  44
10 H Westpac cash investment #...80 (as at 30.09.2019) 11,088 11,078
11 H Westpac shares - online investing account #...94 (as per the Husband's Financial Statement filed 18 July 2019)  26,061 26,061
Singapore
12 J E Bank Singapore account number ending …96 (SGD 198,052.04 x 1.08 as at 08.10.2019) 213,896 416,439
13 J N Bank account #80… (SGD 445.43 as at 01.10.2019 x
1.08 as at 3.10.2019 = AUD $479.76) 		E 480 521
14 H N Bank 360 account #10… (SGD 1,543,970.34 as at 01.10.2019 x 1.08 as at 3.10.2019 = AUD $1,662,964.54) E 1,662,965 1,326,132
15 J Household contents Nominal 210,000
16 W Jewellery E 10,000
17 H Motor vehicle 1 E 75,000 75,000
18 H Wine collection and watch E 36,500 20,957
19 H Piano E 9,675
United Kingdom
20 J E Bank UK account number ending …24 (GBP 859.08 x
1.78 as at 07.10.2019)  		1,530 1,574
21 H N Bank Premier Global savings account #...01 (GBP 3,520,101.94 as at 01.10.2019 x 183 as at 3.10.2019 = AUD $6,442,073.21) E  6,442,073 6,086,239
22 H

2017 R Company …91 (26,221 shares held, retention date of 7.06.2020) 

(GBP 666,275.61 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $1,219,338.62) 

E 1,219,339 1,139,150
23 H

2018 R Company …75 (23,800 shares held, retention date of 7.06.2021) 

(GBP 604,758 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD
$1,106,756.39)

E 1,106,756

1,033,971

24 H

2019 R Company …06 (29,337 shares held, retention date of 12.07.2022)

(GBP 745,453.17 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $1,364,240.01)

E 1,364,240

ASSETS

Owner Description Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
Total $        E 15,527,808 $       13,897,091

Liabilities
Owner Description Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
Australia

25

J

Westpac mortgage over C Street #...90 (as at
16.08.2019)

275,474

275,474

26

J

Westpac Mastercard account number ending …37 (as at 07.10.2019)

0

500

27

H

Westpac mortgage over Suburb K #...75 (as at
13.08.2019)

7,000

7,000

28

H

Westpac mortgage over Town B #...29 (as at
20.08.2019)

9,420

9,419

Singapore

29

H

Tax liability as at 07.10.2019 (SGD 544,190.85 x 1.07 as at 07.10.2019 = AUD $582,284.21) 

E 582,284

30

H

Estimated tax liability for 2019 financial year (SGD 1,516,886 x 1.07 as at 1.10.2019 = AUD $1,627,459.40)

E 1,627,459

31

H

E Bank Visa infinite account #...90 (SGD 19,901.84 as at 18.08.2019 x 1.07 as at 01.10.2019 = AUD $21,352.58)

E 21,353

21,863

32

H

N Bank Premier Voyage Card (SGD 1,720.15 as at
01.10.2019 x 1.08 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $1,852.72) 

E 1,853

2,000

Total $ E 2,524,843 + NK $ 316,256

SUPERANNUATION

Member Name of Fund Type of Interest Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
Australia
33 W

Super Fund 1 (as at

07.10.2019)

NK 26,129 26,622
34 H Super Fund 2 (as at 31.07.2019)  NK 892,759 813,900
35 H Super Fund 1 #...43 (as at
18.07.2019)  		NK 8,333 E 7,981
Total $            E 927,221 $           848,503

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Owner Description Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
United Kingdom
36 H

2017 LTIP …71 (45,586 shares granted vesting date of 07.06.2020) 

(GBP 1,158,340.26 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $2,119,857.01)

E 2,119,857 NK

16

FINANCIAL RESOURCES
Owner Description Wife (AUD) Husband (AUD)
37 H

2017 PSU …58 (67,233 shares granted vesting date of 07.06.2020) 

(GBP 1,708,390.53 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $3,126,493.79)

E 3,126,494 NK
38 H

2018 LTIP …87 (42,208 shares granted vesting date of 07.06.2021) 

(GBP 1,072,505.28 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $1,962,772)

E 1,962,772 NK
39 H

2018 PSU …56 (61,026 shares granted vesting date of 07.06.2021) 

(GBP 1,550,670.66 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $2,837,853.59)

E 2,837,854 NK
40 H

2019 PSU  …34 (75,225 shares granted vesting date of 12.06.2022)

(GBP 1,911,467.25 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $3,498,140.73)

E 3,498,141 NK
41 H

2019 PSU …36 (34,972 shares granted vesting date of 12.06.2022)

(GBP 888,638.52 x 1.83 as at 03.10.2019 = AUD $1,626,280.86)

E 1,626,281 NK
42 H Leave entitlements with Experian  NK NIL
43 H E Bank Rewards Points (977,066 points as at 18.08.2019) NK
Total $E 15,171,399 + NK $                   0
NET TOTAL ASSETS (including superannuation) $E 29,101,585 + NK $ 14,429,338

Relevant Law

  1. These are in the nature of forum proceedings.  In general terms the husband seeks that the proceedings about the legal consequences of the breakdown of the parties’ marriage, including for settlement of property, be conducted in Singapore and the wife seeks that they be heard in this Court.  Not only have each of the parties instituted family law proceedings in their preferred jurisdiction, they have each sought a stay of proceedings in the other jurisdiction and orders restraining the other party in pursuing those proceedings.

  2. There is no controversy between the parties about the relevant legal considerations.

  3. In a forum dispute involving proceedings pending before this Court, the proceedings may be stayed where this Court is found to be “a clearly inappropriate forum”.  That may be found where the maintenance of the Australian proceedings would be vexatious or oppressive.  See Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571 (“Henry”) by the majority (Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

  4. The “clearly inappropriate forum” test applied in Australia is different to the “more appropriate forum” test established by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd (1987) AC 460. Relevantly, the latter test is applied in Singapore.

  5. In relation to the different tests, in Navarro v Jurado (2010) 44 Fam LR 310 O’Ryan J observed at [127]:

    1.The two tests are not identical and the difference lies in the emphasis placed on the appropriateness of the local forum rather than the appropriateness of any available foreign forum. The clearly inappropriate test avoids a mere comparison between the competing forums and focuses on the extent to which the continuation of the proceedings in the Australian court should be regarded as inappropriate. The question of whether an Australian court is a clearly inappropriate forum requires attention to be directed to the inappropriateness of that court and not to the appropriateness or comparative appropriateness of the foreign forum. As the majority (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) observed in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA and Another v Zhang [2002] HCA 10; (2002) 210 CLR 491 at 503: “Thus, it should at once be noted that a court is not an inappropriate forum merely because another is more appropriate”.

  1. In Henry the majority said:

    36. It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed.  However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", or, vexatious, in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment".  And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation.

  2. Commencing at [39], the majority in Henry identified a non-exhaustive list of considerations which should properly be taken into account in determining whether the local court is clearly inappropriate in a dispute arising from a matrimonial relationship.  Those considerations are:

    Considerations relevant to a stay of proceedings between husband and wife with respect to their marital relationship

    39. Some of the matters properly to be taken into account in a case such as the present emerge from what has already been written. To start with, no question arises unless the courts of the respective countries have jurisdiction with respect to the parties and their marriage. And if there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, it may be necessary to adjourn the local proceedings to enable the foreign court to determine that question. However, if both have jurisdiction, it will be relevant to consider whether each will recognise the other's orders and decrees. If the orders of the foreign court will not be recognised in Australia, that will ordinarily dispose of any suggestion that the local proceedings should not continue. However, if the orders of the foreign court will be recognised in Australia, it will be relevant to consider whether any orders may need to be enforced in other countries and, if so, the relative ease with which that can be done (50). As well, it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy.

    40.Other considerations include the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the stage which they have reached and the costs that have been incurred. It will also be relevant to consider the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and to have regard to the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions. Moreover, it will be relevant to consider whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing. The list is not exhaustive. Rather, the question whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum is one that depends on the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved.

  3. In Navarro v Jurado (2010) 44 Fam LR 310 O’Ryan J at [166] cited the following extract from Nygh’s Conflict of Law in Australia:

    [I]t seems fairly clear from the court’s emphatic statement in Zhang that the primary judge should not weigh the relevant factors against one another.  In Voth itself, the majority said that the primary judge’s focus should be ‘upon the inappropriateness of the local court and not the appropriateness or comparative appropriateness of the suggested foreign forum, a phrase recently repeated with approval by the majority in Puttick v Tenon Ltd.  Although primary judges occasionally express their conclusions using metaphors of balancing and weighing, the process is not one of weighing those factors that point towards a stay against those that point away from a stay, but rather of assessing whether there are enough factors indicating that the forum is clearly inappropriate, in which case a stay should be granted.  If there are significant factors pointing to the conclusion that the chosen forum is appropriate, it is immaterial that there may be many factors suggesting that another forum might also be appropriate or even more appropriate.  The factors are not to be weighed to see where the balance lies because that would, in effect, be a Spiliada-like ‘more appropriate forum’ test. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)

  4. As is referred to above, the parties have taken reciprocal positions.  The first limb of the forum proceedings is the husband’s application for a stay of Australian proceedings.  Therefore it is necessary to determine whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.

Discussion

  1. Although a hearing is fixed before the Singapore Court in respect of forum issues in November, it is common ground that this Court and the Singapore Court each have jurisdiction to determine the substantive disputes between the parties.

  2. The parties are agreed that the proceedings should not be shared between this Court and the Singapore Court and that ultimately a choice must be made between the two courts.

  3. It is not disputed that this Court has the power to grant a stay and the injunctions of the type sought by the husband.

  4. As to the matters to be taken into account, the parties addressed the following matters:

Recognition of orders and decrees

  1. The majority in Henry observed at [39]:

    …. If the orders of the foreign court will not be recognised in Australia, that will ordinarily dispose of any suggestion that the local proceedings should not continue

  2. The only real property owned by the parties is in Australia.  It is common ground that the Singapore Court could not make effective orders in rem in respect of the Australian property.  However, as was submitted on behalf of the husband, there is no need for orders in rem as there is no controversy about the fate of the Australian properties.  It is common ground that the Town B property will be retained by the wife and that the Suburb H and Suburb K properties will be retained by the husband.  There was no demur to those propositions on behalf of the wife.

  3. Finally, the husband undertakes through his counsel to cooperate with any necessary transfers or other registrable dealings necessary to give practical effect to a determination or agreement about those properties.  

  4. It is submitted on behalf of the husband, without complaint on behalf of the wife, that the stamp duty exemption that would be attracted by final property settlement orders made under the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) would also attract the NSW stamp duty exemption if the settlement arose from orders of the Singapore Court. That arises because the exemption is attracted by the nature of the settlement rather than the forum by which it comes about.

  5. The wife has applied for a splitting order in respect of the husband’s superannuation.  The imbalance of superannuation is more than $800,000 in the husband’s favour.  An issue said to be relevant to rebut the husband’s contention that the Australian Court is a clearly inappropriate forum is the fact that only the Australian Court is able to make an effective order to split an interest in an Australian superannuation fund.  It is conceded that the Singapore Court is not able to make an effective order to split the husband’s superannuation interests.

  6. However, it is submitted on behalf of the husband that the wife’s claim to superannuation could be properly satisfied in practical terms by her receiving an appropriate adjustment for the imbalance of superannuation but paid out of non-superannuation assets.  It was further submitted that if the wife wanted to hold those funds in the form of superannuation, she would be able to rely on aspects of the Australian legislation to put something of the order of $300,000 of her property settlement into a superannuation fund in her own name.  In that way, it is submitted for the husband, the wife would achieve her aim of retaining a significant interest in Australian superannuation.  By way of reply it was submitted that the wife’s entitlement to superannuation (which she seeks to retain in the form of superannuation) may exceed the $300,000 odd that she would be permitted under Australian law to contribute to her own superannuation interest.

  7. In any event this consideration would not support a finding that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.

If recognised, will orders need to be enforced and what would be the relative eases of that enforcement in Australia or Singapore?

  1. As the order made on 25 October 2019 indicates, there was a dispute between the parties about the status of the Family Justice Courts of Singapore.  I understand that the recognition of Singaporean orders will depend on whether they are orders of the High Court of Singapore. 

  2. As a result of the orders made on 25 October 2019, on 29 October 2019 a joint minute was provided by senior counsel for the parties recording the following agreed position:

    …

    1.1The Court in Singapore in which proceedings is the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore [the Family Justice Courts].

    1.2The Family Justice Courts is not part of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore [the High Court].

    1.3As a result, Orders of the Family Justice Courts are not able to be recognised in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth).

    1.4However, as the value of the matrimonial assets of the parties is above S$5 million, the final hearing of the ancillary matters in the pending proceedings (being the final orders relating to property settlement and maintenance) will be transferred to the Family Division of the High Court.  Pending final ancillary matters hearing in the Family Division of the High Court, the interim applications and orders (such as applications for interim maintenance, interim injunctions, discoveries and in interrogatories, etc) will be made by the Family Justice Courts.

    1.5Final Orders made in respect of the ancillary matters in the proceedings by the Family Division of the High Court will be able to be recognised in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991.

  3. I take then, that for all practical purposes, it is common ground that both jurisdictions will allow for any necessary recognition and enforcement.  This would not support Australia being a clearly inappropriate forum.

Which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy

  1. I refer to the limits of the powers of the Singapore Court to make effective orders about real property and superannuation located in Australia.

  2. Suffice it to say that this factor does not support the husband’s contention that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.

The order in which the proceedings were instituted

  1. The husband commenced the Singapore proceedings on 16 May 2019.  The wife commenced the proceedings in this Court on 23 May 2019 and apparently by way of reaction to being served with the husband’s application on 18 May 2019. 

  2. However, it is the wife’s case that the husband engineered the situation whereby he was first in time, using the pretext that his lawyers were seeking his instructions on the wife’s pre-action communication.  It was submitted on behalf of the wife, without complaint on behalf of the husband, that the wife’s Australian lawyers wrote to the husband in April 2019 by way of the Australian pre-action procedures, providing notice and seeking disclosure and concessions.  The husband’s Singapore solicitors wrote back, asking the wife to hold off taking action.  There was no further response from the husband to the wife until he filed in the Singapore Court on 16 May 2019.

  3. The husband gives no evidence about the communication between solicitors immediately prior to him commencing the Singapore proceedings.

  4. In those circumstances there is no significance in the fact that the husband commenced the Singaporean proceedings before the wife filed in Australia. Again, this does not support a finding that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.

The stage which the proceedings have reached and the costs that have been incurred

  1. It is common ground that the proceedings in each jurisdiction are at an early (“embryonic”) stage.

The connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions

  1. It is not disputed that the parties have the required connection with each of the proposed forums.

  2. The parties were born in Australia and are Australian citizens.  The husband has been employed and the parties have lived in Singapore for the last seven years.  The parties have only temporary rights of residence in Singapore.  Each of the parties currently lives in Singapore and intends to continue to do so if practicable, at least in the medium term.  The husband has temporary residence status as a result of his employment and intends to seek the right to permanently reside in Singapore.  However, the wife’s residence status is linked to that of the husband and could be jeopardised by action taken by the husband’s employer.  The husband deposes that he does not intend any action that would prevent the wife from living in Singapore.  Even if she is permitted to remain in Singapore, the wife intends to relocate to Australia in 2021 when the youngest child of the marriage is ready to join her siblings at a university in Queensland.

  3. The parties have extended family in Australia and one child at a university in Queensland.  Their second child will start at that University in 2020.

  4. The only real estate owned by the parties is located in Australia.  The parties have superannuation in Australia.

  5. It is counterintuitive that people who live in Singapore would litigate in Australia but there are relevant connecting factors to Australia.  In my view this consideration marginally supports a finding that Australia is an inappropriate forum.

The issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions

  1. Nothing was specifically raised by the parties in this regard that would assist with the present dispute.  For example it was not argued that there is a juridical advantage offered to one party over the other by the law applied in either jurisdiction.

Whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing

  1. The relevant question here is not one of resources or understanding or language, but one of practicability.  Therefore this consideration does not support the granting of a stay.

  2. The list in Henry is not exhaustive and “… the question whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum is one that depends on the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved”.  Here, a very important issue is raised in the husband’s case.  It is his case and his evidence that he would be unable to maintain his employment and be present and available in Australia to defend the proceedings commenced by the wife.  If that is true, then, in my view, the proceedings in this Court should be stayed.  The husband receives a salary of $16,300 per week and has the prospective benefit of a bonus scheme linked with his ongoing employment.  I assume therefore that the loss of that employment would be of significance to the husband and, given her claim for financial support, for the wife also.  If the husband is not able to both maintain his employment and be present and available in Australia to defend the proceedings, then Australia would be a clearly inappropriate forum.  However, I am not satisfied that the husband is correct. 

  3. The husband’s case on this point is set out in the written submissions prepared by his counsel:

    3.6Husband’s Work Commitments

    The Husband’s position as Senior Manager of R Company involves, as one would expect, a “heavy schedule and working commitments” such that he would be “unable to maintain (his) employment and be present and available in Australia to defend the (Wife’s proceedings)”.  Whilst some of the need to be involved could be handled by telephone/video link, such will put the Husband at a considerable disadvantage.  Put another way, it would be difficult for the Wife to assert that her proceedings in Australia are other than “seriously and unfairly burdensome” to the Husband.  She concedes in her affidavit (W Aff #45) that his employment is “quite demanding” and that he “travelled frequently in connection with his employment”.

    3.7It should (we submit) be recognised that it has been the Husband’s employments that have been the major source of the net asset pool that exists.  No doubt the Wife would not want there to be any impediment to its continuation seeking (as she does) spouse maintenance of $317,720 pa in after tax dollars for 5 years.

  4. The husband’s evidence on this point is largely by way of bare assertion.  In his affidavit filed 17 October 2019 the husband deposes:

    29.

    …

    (b)I primarily travel twice a year to Australia for business and when my schedule permits, I take a few days to visit family in Brisbane. ..

    In the circumstances of my heavy schedule and working commitments, [I am] unable to maintain my employment and be present and available in Australia to defend litigation in this jurisdiction.

  5. Opinion evidence is not generally admissible to prove the existence of a fact asserted in the opinion[1].  There is an exception permitted in respect of lay opinions whereby:

    [1] Section 76 of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth).

    Section 78 The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if:

    (a)  the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and

(b)  evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person's perception of the matter or event.

  1. It is not entirely clear what the husband means by his opinion.  It could mean that by his own assessment, the husband would be unable to properly discharge his duties to his employer as well as attending in Australia to defend proceedings here.  Without more, that opinion is not probative.

  2. On the other hand the husband could mean that his employer would not permit him to retain his employment if there is a risk that he needed to attend Court in Australia to defend proceedings here.  In my view the husband’s opinion on that matter would not be admissible.

  3. As to the husband’s evidence at [29(b)] there is no indication of the meaning of “primarily” nor about who determines his schedule.  I was not taken to the husband’s evidence to establish that he has a “heavy schedule”. 

  4. The husband does not explain what aspect/s of the proceedings would require his presence in Australia.  Ironically, he was present in Australia at the time of the hearing before me albeit not in Court.  The husband has been able to instruct solicitors in Australia and through them, to successfully participate in procedural disputes.  There has already been a mediation and therefore there may be no need for any further mediation to occur or if that be required, that it occur in Australia.  A conciliation conference could be waived or conducted by telephone or video-link. 

  5. The most likely need for the husband to travel to Australia in respect of proceedings in this Court, would be to attend a final hearing.  Hearings are fixed by reference to the Court’s availability but consideration can and is usually given to the convenience of the parties, their lawyers and important witnesses.  In that way, within reason, the work demands on the husband’s time could be accommodated.  Not that it matters for present purposes but there would probably never be such a hearing.  Seventy five percent of final proceedings in the Family Court of Australia are resolved prior to the commencement of a final hearing, with only 15 percent requiring a judgment.  I gather from the affidavit of Ms A that there would be a not dissimilar expectation for proceedings in the Singaporean Court.  I appreciate however that a decision about forum must contemplate the worst case rather than the most likely outcome.

  1. Finally, the husband does not tease out the aspects of the location of the forum that would impose on his employment.  Presumably in either forum, if a final hearing is required, the husband would be required to attend at Court and for that time, would be unable to attend to his work.  Presumably in either forum, the husband would have some capacity to attend to his work responsibilities before and after Court hours.  The major difference would seem to be the time lost in travelling between Singapore and Australia.  Even then it may be possible for the husband to attend to pressing business during the travel.  Unfortunately, the husband has not explored these issues in his evidence and therefore it is difficult to understand the gravamen of his concerns.

  2. Here the husband is expressing an opinion about an issue relevant to a controversy about which he has a particular view.  He does not have an independent mind on the issue.  With the best will in the world that must make it difficult for him to fairly assess the competing considerations.  In those circumstances it is relevant that no effort was made by the husband to explain the likely practical impact on his work of the litigation being conducted in Australia.  It is also relevant that no evidence was offered to corroborate the husband’s opinion about not being able to maintain his employment if required to be “present and available in Australia” to defend these proceedings.  Without any detail, that suggests that the husband’s job security is tenuous.  The husband has been with this employer for more than seven years.  Perhaps there is no evidence from the husband’s employer to support the husband’s contention because the husband does not wish to jeopardise his already fragile job security.  However, that is not the husband’s evidence.  Perhaps the husband is so consumed by the demands of his employment that he can only discharge his duties by attending to them all of the time.  That would mean that he cannot take leave nor permit any interruption for non-work purposes.  Again, that is not the husband’s evidence and there is no basis for inferring that to be the case. 

  3. On the other hand, the husband may have exaggerated the position out of an eagerness to support his case. 

  4. Of course the wife is not in a position to give probative evidence on this topic.  All the greater need for the husband to properly support his argument.

  5. As to the general reliability of the husband’s opinion, in the same affidavit the husband also asserted:

    (f)It would be impractical for Ms Ewing and I to travel from Singapore to Australia to attend Court or participate in mediation.

  6. At least in respect of the wife, that proved to be an incorrect assessment.  The wife was able to attend the hearing before me. 

  7. If the husband’s evidence about this consideration was accepted, that would support the granting of a stay.  However, I do not accept the husband’s evidence.

Conclusion

  1. On the basis of the considerations discussed above, the husband has not established that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum.  I will not order that the Australian proceedings be stayed.

injunction

  1. Given that the husband’s application was not successful I must consider the wife’s application for an anti-suit injunction in respect of the Singapore proceedings.  I will set out the written submissions of the parties in full.

  2. It is submitted on behalf of the wife:

    Relevant principles – injunctive relief

    21.The classic statement of the principle to be applied is that of the House of Lords in Carron Iron Co v Maclaren (1855) 5 HLC 416 (extracted with approval by the High Court in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 393) as follows:

    One well established category of case in which an injunction may be granted in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction is that involving proceedings in another court, including in a foreign court, which are, accordingly to the principles of equity, vexatious or oppressive. Thus, it was said in Carron Iron Co v Maclaren that “[w]here [there is] … pending a litigation here, in which complete relief may be had, [and] a party to the suit institutes proceedings abroad, the Court of Chancery in general considers that act as a vexatious, harassing of the opposite party, and restrains the foreign proceedings”.

    22.In considering the further circumstances in which such an injunction might be granted, the High Court also commented that (at 394):

    Because the power to grant injunctions in respect of foreign proceedings which are vexatious or oppressive, in the sense described, derives from equity, it is not to be confined to the examples found in the decided cases. Rather, it is a power the limits of which are determined by the dictates of equity and good conscience. Thus, for example, it may be that the bringing of proceedings with respect to one claim is properly to be seen, in the circumstances of the case, as an election either not to proceed on another claim or not to proceed in another jurisdiction, thus giving rise to an estoppel by conduct such that it would be unconscionable for that other claim to be pursued or for proceedings to be commenced in another jurisdiction. In cases of that kind an injunction may issue in restraint of the subsequent proceedings.

    23.As the High Court noted in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (above, at 394):

    It is not a power which involves a determination that proceedings instituted in a foreign court are vexatious or oppressive in the sense that they are an abuse of that court's processes or, even, in the sense that they should be stayed by the foreign court on forum non conveniens grounds. (emphasis added)

    24.In Henry the majority extract a passage from Dixon J in Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277 at 281 (extracted at 83,123) before relevantly commenting that:

    [T]here is … inconvenience and embarrassment if the same issue is to be fought in the courts of different countries according to different regimes, very likely permitting of entirely different outcomes.

    25.There are two possible bases relied upon here for the entry of the injunction sought and some different principles apply to each.  In respect of the first basis of ‘vexation and oppression’ it may be appropriate for the Court to consider whether the proceedings before it should be stayed before turning to a consideration of the foreign proceedings.  In relation to the second basis, however, the High Court in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (above, at 398) commented that:

    In cases where anti-suit injunctions are sought to protect the proceedings or processes of a court, no question arises whether that court is an appropriate forum for the resolution of that issue: it is the only court with any interest in the matter.”

    26.The first basis advanced in support of the injunction, of ‘vexation and oppression’ falls to be determined in accordance with the principles established in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 (subsequently affirmed in each of Henry v Henry (above) and CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (above)).

    27.The test established in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 and as enunciated by the High Court in Henry v Henry (at 83,121), is that a stay should be granted if the continuation of the proceedings would be oppressive in the sense of seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging or vexatious in the sense of productive of serious and unjustifiable trouble and harassment. In Henry v Henry (above, at 83,123) the High Court considered that:

    It is prima facie vexatious and oppressive, in the strict sense of those terms, to commence a second or subsequent action in the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the matter in issue And although there are cases in which it has been held that it is not prima facie vexatious, in the strict sense of that word, to bring proceedings in different countries, the problems which arise if the identical issue or the same controversy is to be litigated in different countries which have jurisdiction with respect to the matter are such, in our view, that, prima facie, the continuation of one or the other should be seen as vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words.

    It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed. However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", or, vexatious, in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment". And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation.

    28.The High Court in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (above, at 392) recognised that the categories of cases in which an ‘anti-suit’ injunction might be entered are not closed.

    Argument – injunction

    29.There can be no issue that the proceedings before this Court and those in Singapore form but part of the one controversy between the Husband and Wife.  Such an approach is consistent with that of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Dobson v Van Londen (2005) FLC 93-225 where the Full Court considered that the trial Judge should have proceeded from a starting point of “unity” consistent with the decision of the High Court in Henry v Henry (1996) FLC 92-685 at 83-124, where it was relevantly said that:

    The marital relationship lies at the heart of all proceedings between husband and wife with respect to their marital status especially proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. In such cases, it is the marital relationship itself which is the subject of controversy. And if the marriage is still subsisting, disputes with respect to property, maintenance and the custody of children will ordinarily be but aspects of an underlying controversy with respect to the marital relationship.

    30.Further, there can be no issue that a position which results in the continuation of both sets of proceedings ought be avoided if possible – the competing applications of each of the husband and wife being determined here are common in seeking such an outcome and reflect the commonality of issues between the two proceedings.

    31.Consistent with the principles outlined above, no submission is advanced as to whether Singapore is an appropriate forum to determine the issues and the Court need not so find – rather, the wife contends that it is appropriate to grant the injunction sought by her in circumstances where, in addition to the matters outlined at paragraph 17 above:

    1.there is no dispute that the Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction to determine the entirety of the marital issues between the parties;

    2.this Court has power to grant all of the relief sought by the parties, and in particular the wife in respect of superannuation splitting – that is, and unlike in Singapore, complete relief is available to the Wife in the proceedings now pending before this Court;

    3.this Court has already entered injunctive orders and orders for financial disclosure;

    4.the vast majority of the parties’ illiquid interests are physically located in Australia, the balance having no necessary ties to any jurisdiction;

    5.the husband, an Australian citizen, has the unfettered ability to participate in the proceedings;

    6.the wife’s continued presence in Singapore is uncertain and subject, at least presently, to the continuing indulgence of the husband; and,

    7.in circumstances where the husband controls the vast majority of the parties’ liquid interests, the wife has the ability to obtain orders for interim financial relief to ensure that she is properly represented in the Australian proceedings, a prospect that is remote in Singapore.

    32.As already noted, the circumstances in which the Singaporean proceedings were commenced shortly prior to the Australian proceedings deprives that fact of any significance in the enquiry.

    Conclusion

    33.For the reasons set out, the wife contends that:

    34.Australia ought not be found to be a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ for the determination of the issues arising out of the parties’ marriage; and,

    35.in all of the circumstances, such issues ought be determined in Australia, being the only jurisdiction in which complete relief can be afforded to the parties, and an injunction issue in respect of the Singaporean proceedings.

  3. It was submitted on behalf of the husband:

    8.THE WIFE’S CLAIMED ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

    8.1There is no need to consider this relief if the stay sought by the Husband is granted.  The following submissions are made if the stay is refused.

    8.2An anti-suit injunction against proceedings in the foreign forum is not the automatic corollary of refusal to order a stay of proceedings in the local forum and must rest to be determined on discrete factors.  Indeed, considerable caution must be exercised as is amply explained by Murphy J in Skinner & Alfonso-Skinner [2010] FamCA 329 @ #39-40:

    “39.     There is, then, to my mind, a reasonable foundation for arguments in support of a contention that, in the usual course of events, this court would be reluctant to grant an anti-suit injunction in circumstances where a live issue about the jurisdiction of a foreign court has not been determined by that foreign court.  As submitted by the wife, issues of international comity and propriety can be seen as an important component of that proposition.

    40.The importance of the former has been specifically recognised by the High Court. In CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 (“Cigna”) at 396, the plurality cited with approval the comments by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v Guyot [1895] USSC 185; (1895) 159 US 113 in the following terms:

    ‘Comity’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”

    (emphasis added)

    There is of course a “live issue” before the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore about its jurisdiction and the Wife’s Application for a stay of those proceedings is to be heard in November 2019.  In addition, the Wife’s “stay” Application was filed out of time, so she needs the Court to exercise its discretion to extend time which “is not automatic” ([Ms A] Aff).

    8.3Apart from that, there are two bases for the grant of an anti-suit injunction, as explained in CSR per the majority, at 390-393.

    The first is sourced in the Court’s inherent power to prevent its processes being abused, and its power to protect the integrity of those processes: CSR at 391.

    The second is the power deriving from the Chancery Court to make orders in restraint of unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of legal rights: CSR at 392-393; or, where, upon equitable principles, the institution or continuance of proceedings in the foreign court would be “according to the principles of equity”, vexatious or oppressive: CSR at 393-394:

    “… Thus, it was said in Carron Iron Co v Maclaren [(1855) 5 HLC 416 at 437] that “[w]here [there is]…pending a litigation here, in which complete relief may be had, [and] a party to the suit institutes proceedings abroad, the Court of Chancery in general considers that act as a vexatious harassing of the opposite party, and restrains the foreign proceedings”.

    …

    [I]n Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [[1987] AC 45 at 60] Robert Goff LJ pointed out, correctly, in our view, although without specific reference to underlying equitable principle, that foreign proceedings are to be viewed as vexatious or oppressive only if there is nothing which can be gained by them over and above what may be gained in local proceedings. On the other hand, they are vexatious or oppressive if there is a complete correspondence between the proceedings or, in terms used in Carron Iron Co, if “complete relief” is available in the local proceedings.”

    (emphasis added)

    8.4In the circumstances of this case, it is the commencement and continuation of the Australian proceedings that has created and continues to cause, oppression and vexation in the Voth and CSR sense.  Nothing the Husband has done can justify an order that the Singapore proceedings ought be stayed.  Nothing the Husband has done could constitute an abuse of the processes of the Family Court, nor can his commencement of the Singapore proceedings be characterised as unconscionable in any respect.  Indeed, if both Australia and Singapore used the “more appropriate forum” test, the answer would be simple.

    8.5We submit Your Honour ought refuse the anti-suit injunction and allow the Singaporean Court to determine whether it ought exercise the jurisdiction it clearly has, in November 2019.

Discussion

  1. Subject to time being extended, the wife’s application for a stay of the Singapore proceedings will come before the Family Justice Courts in Singapore in November 2019.  On the face of it, the injunction sought by the wife would prevent the husband from contesting that application.  In my view that would be highly disrespectful to the Singapore court and inimical to the principles of comity between Courts.

  2. I accept that in some instances the corollary of a refusal to stay local proceedings on forum grounds would be to restrain the moving party in similar proceedings before another Court.  However, in my view that would not be appropriate here.

  3. As a result of the dismissal of the husband’s application for a stay of the proceedings before this Court, there remains a controversy about the appropriate forum for the proceedings associated with the breakdown of the parties’ marriage.  In my view, this Court should not purport to interfere in the proceedings before the Family Justice Courts of Singapore.  It certainly should not do so before that Court has had the opportunity to address the forum controversy. 

  4. As to the mischief to which an anti-suit injunction would be aimed, there is no real risk here of parallel proceedings, as the parties are agreed that they should be avoided.  It may be that the more nuanced forum test that will be applied in Singapore will make it easier for that Court to resolve the conundrum caused by the parties initiating similar proceedings in different jurisdictions. 

  5. In any event I will dismiss the wife’s application for an anti-suit injunction.

Conclusion

  1. The husband sought that the proceedings between the parties before this Court be stayed.  The wife sought that the husband be restrained from continuing to prosecute proceedings between the parties that he instituted in Singapore.  Both applications will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-five (85) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Loughnan delivered on 4 November 2019.

Associate: 

Date:  4 November 2019


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Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis [1974] HCA 17
Henry v Henry [1996] HCA 51
Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] HCA 10