Eveready Australia Pty Ltd v Gillette Australia Pty Ltd (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Eveready Australia Pty Ltd v Gillette Australia Pty Ltd (No 5) [2000] FCA 167

COSTS – indemnity costs – respondent succeeded in opposing applicant’s application for interlocutory injunction – certain remarks of judge capable of being regarded as generally favourable to respondent as to ultimate outcome of proceeding – offer by applicant to settle for injunction in its favour less extensive than those it obtained when it succeeded on final hearing – whether applicant should have its costs of the proceeding generally on indemnity basis – whether there should be special costs order in relation to interlocutory hearing in favour of respondent – survey evidence – applicant notified respondent under Practice Note 11 of its intention to conduct market survey and supplied to respondent copy of proposed questionnaire – respondent’s non-compliance with Practice Note 11 – implications for costs – generally costs order in favour of applicant not qualified to exclude costs associated with survey, even if respondent’s criticisms of survey had substance because respondent had not attempted to overcome disagreement with applicant as required by Practice Note 11.

EVEREADY AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED v GILLETTE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED

NG 1205 of 1998

LINDGREN J
17 FEBRUARY 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 1205 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

EVEREADY AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 003 539 026)
Applicant

AND:

GILLETTE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 011 914)
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE:

17 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT DECLARES:

1.That in causing the three advertisements being annexures A1, A2 and A3 to this document (“the Advertisements”) to be broadcast, the respondent in trade or commerce engaged in conduct that was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and made false representations in contravention of s 53(a) and (c) of that Act.

2.That in causing the billboard advertisement in the form of annexure “B” to this document (“the Billboard Advertisement”), to be exhibited, the respondent in trade or commerce engaged in conduct that was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and made false representations in contravention of s 53(a) and (c) of that Act.

3.That in causing each of the three stickers in the form of annexures C1, C2 and C3 to this document (“the Stickers”) to be exhibited, the respondent, in trade or commerce, engaged in conduct that was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and made false representations in contravention of s 53(a) and (c) of that Act.

THE COURT ORDERS:

1.That the respondent, whether by its servants or agents or otherwise be permanently restrained from, in trade or commerce, broadcasting, or causing to be broadcast, each of the Advertisements or any material which is substantially identical to, or only colourably different from, any of the Advertisements.

2.That the respondent, whether by its servants or agents or otherwise be permanently restrained from, in trade or commerce,…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Eveready Australia Pty Ltd v Gillette Australia Pty Ltd (No 5), the primary dispute between the parties centred around the costs incurred in relation to the proceedings. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue the court was required to decide pertained to the allocation of costs between the parties, specifically regarding the costs associated with the survey evidence presented by Eveready. Duracell, the respondent, argued that the survey evidence was fundamentally flawed and should not have been admitted or given any weight. They further contended that Eveready should not be entitled to recover the costs associated with the survey evidence because of their non-compliance with Practice Note 11.

The court considered the implications of non-compliance with Practice Note 11 and its impact on the admissibility and weight of the survey evidence. The court reasoned that although it was assumed that the survey evidence was fundamentally flawed and should not have been given weight, the non-compliance with Practice Note 11 meant that Duracell was still liable for the costs associated with the survey evidence. The court held that if a party was permitted to not comply with the Practice Note and succeed in their submissions regarding the evidence, it would undermine the purpose of enforcing the Practice Note. Consequently, the court ruled that Duracell should bear the costs associated with the survey evidence despite the assumption that the evidence was flawed. Additionally, the court declined to except from the order for costs in favour of Eveready the costs of the hearing held on 9 February. The court treated the two-day hearing as one substantive hearing, and thus, both days were included in the order for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view, although Duracell succeeded on the motion before Tamberlin J it should not have its costs of that motion which was brought about by its failure to comply with Practice Note 11. I was inclined at one stage to think that Eveready should have an order for its costs of the motion, since what prompted the motion was that non-compliance. But I think the better view is again that the parties bear their own respective costs of the motion.The costs of the survey evidence and the part of the hearing related to it The third special costs order sought by Duracell is that Eveready should not recover its costs associated with the obtaining and presentation of the survey evidence, or of that part of the hearing which related to the survey evidence. Duracell refers to the well known case, Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313, and to the requirements with which surveys should comply recognised in that case. It submits that the survey evidence led by Eveready fell far short of complying with those requirements, that those requirements were well known, and that if I had had to resolve the matter I would have given no weight to the survey evidence. Duracell submits that if I should be unable to determine the present issue without making a finding in relation to the weight to be given to the survey evidence, I should proceed to make such a finding. I do not find the submission that I should review all of the evidence and submissions made as to the admissibility of the survey evidence and the weight to be given to it, a particularly attractive one at this stage. Rather, I would take quite a simple approach: making the assumption in favour of Duracell that Eveready’s survey evidence was fundamentally flawed and would have been given no weight, nonetheless Duracell should have to pay Eveready’s costs relating to it which Duracell seeks to have excluded. The reason is simply that Duracell did not comply with Practice Note 11. If it should be open to a party not to comply with the Practice Note, then to succeed on its submissions in relation to the survey evidence, yet not have to pay the costs associated with the survey-evidence, there seems to be no reason why an objecting party should ever comply with Practice Note 11. It is no answer to say that the Practice Note should be enforced by admitting inadmissible survey evidence, or giving weight to survey evidence that it does not deserve. Let it be assumed in the present case that Dr Gordon’s evidence demonstrated that Eveready’s survey evidence was inadmissible or should be accorded no weight. I do not think that in such circumstances the evidence ought to be admitted or given weight as some kind of sanction against Duracell. Generally, evidence either is or is not admissible, and either is or is not to be given weight in accordance with legal principle. Costs, on the other hand, are of a different order and invoke a wide discretion. That is why I can determine the present issue by making all assumptions in favour of Duracell. Assuming in its favour that Dr Gordon’s evidence, which was, as I indicated earlier, detailed and comprehensive in nature, demonstrated that Eveready’s survey evidence was fundamentally flawed and should properly carry no weight, nonetheless Duracell should have to pay Eveready’s costs because the Practice Note required Duracell to attempt jointly with Eveready to overcome any problems which it, Duracell, saw in the survey methodology. Of course one cannot be sure what would have happened if Duracell had made that attempt. Eveready may have proved intransigent. But the evidence does not satisfy me that it would have and suggests that it would not have. Duracell should not be allowed to benefit from any uncertainty in this respect.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
Mr Sharpley of counsel for Duracell asks for a special order as to costs. The special order is, in effect, that Eveready should not recover its costs of the hearing last Wednesday 9 February. He points out, correctly, that on the hearing of the question of the declarations and orders to be made, both parties have had some success. However, I regard the two days, last Wednesday and today, as being, in effect, one hearing on these issues. Therefore, I treat it as a necessary outcome of the substantive hearing that this two-day hearing has occurred. I do not distinguish between the two days or between parts of them. Accordingly, I decline to except from the order for costs in favour of Eveready the costs of last Wednesday, 9 February.CONCLUSION For the above reasons and those delivered on 23 December 1999 there will be declarations and orders as annexed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

This proceeding is listed this morning for the making of orders, including orders as to costs. These issues have been the subject of detailed written and oral submissions. I published reasons for judgment on 23 December last. Those reasons form part of the reasons for the making of the declarations and orders to which I will shortly refer and I will use the abbreviated forms of reference that were used in those reasons. Form of declarations and orders The first area of dispute relates to the content of the declarations and orders to be made. Eveready submits forms of declaration of contravention of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“the TP Act”) that relate to parts only of the television advertisements being those parts which, it submits, express the gravamen of the misrepresentations which I found to have been made. Duracell submits that the declarations should be limited by the use of the words “to the extent that” so that it is made clear that it is only “to the extent that” the advertisements contained specific representations identified by me in the earlier reasons that they contravened the TP Act. Eveready submits a form of injunction that relates to the same parts only of the three television advertisements. It also submits that there should in addition be a general injunction restraining Duracell from making misrepresentations to the effect of those which I found to be contained in the advertising material. For its part, Duracell submits that the injunction should be expressed to relate to the entirety of the three advertisements and that an additional injunction of the general kind sought by Eveready should not be made at all. I have decided that the declarations are best formulated to relate to the full forms of the three television advertisements (and billboard and product stickers) as submitted by Duracell but that the “to the extent that” limitation should not be adopted. I also think that there should be a general order referring to representations to the effect of those that I found to have been made, as submitted by Eveready. Duracell submits that there should be a proviso excluding from the scope of the injunctive order the “Duracell Ultra” battery which was not the subject of the proceeding, any Duracell lithium battery, or any other Duracell battery introduced after, and not manufactured by, the date of the order. Eveready agrees. So do I. I give effect to these views in the orders annexed. The word “version” is included in addition to the word “kind” to embrace a battery of an existing kind, a new improved version of which, not yet in production, may indeed “last four times longer”. In relation to removal of product stickers, Duracell has read affidavit evidence to the effect that it cannot comply by dates suggested by Eveready. Eveready does not oppose the fixing of later dates. Accordingly, order 4 will incorporate the later dates suggested by Duracell. I turn next to the question of costs. Indemnity costs