EUL17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

EUL17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 534   

File number: MLG 2330 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 14 June 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where applicant claimed to fear harm based on his association with individuals who had been kidnapped and/or murdered – where applicant participated in interview with delegate – where applicant alleged that his participation was compromised by communication difficulties and lack of legal representation – where delegate decision referred to photographs appearing on the applicant’s smartphone – where photographs not before the Authority creating an “informational gap” – whether Authority acted unreasonably by failing to exercise or consider the exercise of s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to get the photographs – where the missing information was not of importance to the Authority’s reasoning and statutory task of review – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed with costs
Legislation:  Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 36, 473DC
Cases cited:

 ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34.

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 (2021) 285 FCR 381; [2021] FCAFC 58.

Mundele v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 526.

WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131.

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 60
Date of last submissions: 21 May 2024
Date of hearing: 21 May 2024
Place: Melbourne
The applicant: In person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

MLG 2330 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

EUL17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SYMONS

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JUNE 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The application for judicial review filed on 30 October 2017 be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SYMONS:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By an application filed on 30 October 2017, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) made on 10 April 2017. The Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 534
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EUL17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Tamil-speaking Muslim from Sri Lanka's Central Province, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming the delegate's refusal to grant a visa. The applicant's claims for refugee status were based on his alleged association with individuals who had been kidnapped and murdered, but the Authority found several aspects of his account to be implausible or lacking in credibility. The applicant argued that his communication difficulties and lack of legal representation during his interview with the delegate compromised his participation, and that the Authority acted unreasonably by not exercising its power under s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain photographs from his smartphone. The court examined whether the Authority's failure to obtain these photographs constituted a jurisdictional error.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Authority's decision contained a jurisdictional error by not exercising or considering the exercise of s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act to obtain photographs from the applicant's smartphone. The court considered whether this omission constituted an error in law, particularly in light of the applicant's allegations of communication difficulties and lack of legal representation. The court also assessed whether the absence of these photographs affected the Authority's reasoning and whether their importance was such that it would have changed the outcome of the review. The applicant's argument relied on the premise that these photographs would have substantiated his claims, but the court had to determine if the lack of these photographs led to a failure in the statutory task of review.

The court concluded that the Authority did not commit a jurisdictional error by not obtaining the photographs from the applicant's smartphone. The court reasoned that the Authority's decision was not influenced by the absence of these photographs as they were not pivotal to the Authority's reasoning. The Authority had adequately considered the applicant's claims and evidence, and rejected them on the basis of credibility and the improved conditions in Sri Lanka. The applicant's complaints centred on the Authority's rejection of his claims, rather than any procedural shortcomings in the review process. The court further noted that the applicant had been represented by a migration agent during the review, and had not provided specific details of the alleged communication difficulties or how they impacted the findings. The court found that the applicant had not established that these issues led to a miscarriage of justice.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered the applicant to pay costs. The decision underscored the importance of particularised and substantiated arguments in judicial review proceedings, and emphasised that the absence of legal representation alone does not necessarily render a review process flawed. The court held that the applicant's grievances, while understandable, did not meet the threshold for setting aside the Authority's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In this regard, the delegate was not satisfied that there was a real risk of the applicant suffering significant harm as a result of his relationship with these individuals because the delegate did not accept the applicant’s account regarding his becoming a person of interest to the attackers, because the applicant had not presented evidence that anybody else associated with the master had come to harm since 21 January 2015 and because the passage of time since the applicant left Sri Lanka would further reduce any chance that the attackers would maintain an interest in the applicant (CB 143). REFERRAL TO AND DECISION OF THE AUTHORITY On 13 April 2017, the decision of the delegate was referred to the Authority for a review (CB 150-163). On 20 October 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision and produced a set of written reasons (Reasons) (CB 173-189). The Authority noted that it had had regard to the material given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act and that no further information had been obtained or received (Reasons [4]-[5]). The Authority summarised the applicant’s claims as they appeared in the applicant’s statutory declaration. The Authority accepted that the applicant was a Tamil-speaking Muslim who came from Sri Lanka’s Central Province (Reasons, [9]). The Authority acknowledged that the applicant had attended an interview with the delegate on 21 March 2017 (Reasons, [10]). The Authority identified the applicant’s “key claim to fear harm” as one based on his close relationship with P and S, both of whom had (according to the applicant) been kidnapped in 2012 and, in the case of P, murdered in 2015 (Reasons, [11]). However, the Authority was concerned with what it described as “a number of aspects of the applicant’s evidence that appear to be implausible or to lack credibility”. The Authority noted that even if the applicant’s claims of a close association with persons who had been kidnapped (and in the case of P, murdered) were true, the applicant had not explained or provided any evidence to indicate why he would be at risk from the same unknown persons (Reasons, [12]). The Authority continued (also at Reasons, [12]):…Although he has speculated that the men may think he knew ‘secrets’ about P or P’s business, he does not know what these ‘secrets’ might be. In any event, he does not know the reason behind the kidnappings and is only speculating that it relates to P’s business. If this reason is true, I note that the applicant was not involved in the business at all and was associating with P in a master/student role and some social contact. There is no evidence before me that he had any other type of association or involvement in P’s business that might impute him with having ‘secret’ knowledge of business or other dealings. The Authority also recorded the following findings about aspects of the applicant’s account that he was a person of interest to kidnappers: First, the Authority found it was implausible that, if the kidnappers wanted to kidnap the applicant, they would warn him by telling his aunt. The Authority also found it implausible that if this threat was made, neither the applicant nor any member of his aunt’s household had reported the incident to the police (Reasons, [13]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister noted that the applicant had been represented by a registered migration agent for the purposes of the review to the Authority (CB 164) but no submission had been made to the Authority to the effect that the applicant had difficulties with communication during the SHEV interview. It was also the case that in the context of this judicial review proceeding, the applicant had not provided particulars of the alleged miscommunications or how such instances of miscommunication had affected the findings recorded by the Authority.CONSIDERATION I am not persuaded that the Authority decision is liable to be set aside for jurisdictional error. As far as the applicant’s generally expressed grounds of review are concerned, I am not able to discern any procedural error in the approach adopted by the Authority in circumstances where the applicant did not make any effort to put submissions or information before the Authority and where the Authority’s review was otherwise circumscribed by the limited nature of the statutory review conducted under Part 7AA of the Act. I am likewise unable to identify any error in the nature of an application of the wrong legal test in the decision of the Authority. The Reasons contain correct statements of the statutory provisions directed at an assessment of whether the applicant was able to satisfy either s 36(2)(a) (refugee assessment) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (complementary protection assessment). The Authority rejected the applicant’s claims under both provisions because it rejected important aspects of the applicant’s claims and evidence and because contemporary country information was to the effect that conditions in Sri Lanka (especially for Tamil-speaking Muslims) had significantly improved. I accept that the applicant genuinely considers that his participation in the SHEV interview was compromised, including because he no longer had the benefit of legal assistance; it would appear that he received assistance for the purpose of making his application for the visa but not on an ongoing basis (CB 85). However, despite being given the opportunity to explain the nature and/or identity of the communication difficulties and to explain how these difficulties impacted on findings recorded by the delegate and, in turn, the Authority, the applicant was unable to advance this argument in any meaningful way. The applicant is understandably aggrieved by the decision of the Authority but having heard from him in person, it would appear that in substance, his complaints are that the Authority did not accept his claims. While I appreciate the difficulties encountered by a self-represented litigant in this jurisdiction, the Court cannot provide redress for arguments that are wholly unparticularised or unsubstantiated. The onus is on an applicant to establish that through communication difficulties (whether misinterpretation or otherwise) he has been prevented from giving evidence: WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131 at [29]. Neither can the Court countenance an approach that would suggest that a lack of representation, without more, infects the review process. Such an approach would be contrary to authority: see, for example, Mundele v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 526 at [5]. It is also the case that the applicant did appoint a representative when his matter was before the Authority although it is not clear what assistance this individual provided to the applicant (CB 170).