DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Eugene v Commissioner of Police [2019] QDC 146
PARTIES:
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM EUGENE
(appellant)
v
THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(respondent)FILE NO:
D1/19
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Magistrates Court at Caloundra
(Baldwin M)DELIVERED ON:
16 August 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Maroochydore
HEARING DATE:
7 August 2019
JUDGE:
Cash QC DCJ
ORDERS:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE – CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – s 222 Justices Act – where the appellant was convicted of one charge of breaking and entering premises and stealing – where the appellant’s fingerprint was found on an item inside the store – where the case was entirely circumstantial – whether reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence was excluded by the evidence.
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 7, 8
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 18, 101
Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 [22]-[23]
Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50, [67]-[68]
Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, 5
McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255; [2018] 2 Qd R 612
R v McEwan [2019] QCA 16, [24]-[29], [62]
Robinson Helicopter Company Inc. v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679, 686-687; [2016] HCA 22 [43]
Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 , 969
Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84, [4]
Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co. Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, 107
Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, 223-224, 228COUNSEL:
J Cook for the appellant
A Stark for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Bell Dore Lawyers for the appellant
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondentIntroduction
In October 2018 the appellant appeared before a Magistrate at Caloundra in relation to an allegation that around Anzac day that year he broke into a café at Montville and stole items in the premises. He pleaded not guilty but on 23 November 2018 was convicted by the Magistrate. The case against the appellant was circumstantial. The only evidence implicating the appellant was that his fingerprints were found on a box in the premises. Having secured an extension of time within which to appeal, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in January 2019. In essence, the appellant’s complaint is that, “the evidence, rationally and properly considered as a whole, did not … exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.”
For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant and that there were no errors in the decision of the Magistrate. The appeal will be dismissed.
Applicable legal principles
An appeal to this court pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) is to be determined in accordance with section 223 of that Act. That is, the appeal is by way of rehearing on the evidence before the Magistrate…
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- Case
- [2019] QDC 146
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the evidence excluded, beyond reasonable doubt, all innocent hypotheses. The appellant argued that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that his fingerprints were placed on the item innocently, either before the box was delivered to the store or after the break-in. The court considered these arguments and found that once it was accepted that the box was in a private part of the café and was moved during the break-in, theories about how the appellant's fingerprints came innocently to be on the box ceased to be reasonable.
The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the evidence proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The court found that there existed no reasonable possibility that the appellant's fingerprints came to be on the box other than in the process of breaking into and stealing from the café. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction stood.
This case underscores the importance of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases and the necessity for such evidence to exclude, beyond reasonable doubt, all innocent hypotheses. The court's decision reinforces that even if there are multiple theories that could explain the presence of evidence, if one of those theories aligns with the commission of the crime, it can be sufficient to uphold a conviction.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
While the appellant pursued three grounds of appeal they may conveniently be condensed into the single complaint set out above: that the evidence, rationally and properly considered as a whole, did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. The appellant maintained the submission that there was conflicting evidence as to the location of the box before the break-in. On appeal the appellant seemed to add a fourth hypothesis for consideration. This submission was to the effect that even if the appellant had left his fingerprint on the box during the break-in it may have been another person who stole in the premises. It was argued that as the prosecution did not expressly rely upon the provisions for derivative liability found in sections 7 and 8 of the Criminal Code the prosecution also had to exclude this scenario as a reasonable possibility.Consideration It is convenient to commence with the appellant’s proposition that there was competing evidence as to the location of the box before the break-in. The only direct evidence as to the location of the box was that of Ms Walters. Her evidence was unequivocally to the effect that the box had been stored in the office area rather than in the part of the café that was generally publically accessible. There was no challenge to her evidence in cross-examination. The evidence of Senior Constable Troy could not be relied upon to prove the location of the box: the rule against hearsay prohibited such a use.[15] There could be no suggestion the evidence was admitted to prove a prior inconsistent statement that had not been “distinctly admitted” by Ms Walters. The provisions of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) were not engaged.[16] At best for the appellant the testimony of Senior Constable Troy was relevant to the assessment of the truthfulness and reliability of Ms Walters’ own evidence. If she had told the police officer the box was in a drawer or cupboard under the window that may cause doubt about the reliability of her testimony that it was on a shelf in the back office.[15] Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965, 969.[16] Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 18, 101. Assessing the evidence for myself, I do not doubt the reliability of Mr Walters’ evidence. The conversation recalled by Senior Constable Troy was not put to Ms Walters. Nor was she challenged on her evidence that the box was stored in the office. In my view the tendency of Senior Constable Troy’s evidence to undermine that of Ms Walters was slight. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, as was the Magistrate[17], that the box was in the office before the break-in.[17] Transcript of decision, 23 November 2018, T.7.13-15. This finding presents the appellant with considerable difficulty. Theories about how his fingerprints came innocently to be on the box cease to be reasonable once it is accepted that the box was in a private part of the café and was moved during the break-in. This finding deals with the possibility that the appellant deposited his fingerprints while innocently browsing the store. It leaves open the possibility that he deposited his fingerprints at some time before the box was delivered to the store and the possibility that he touched the box through the broken window after someone else had already committed the offence.