EP Financial Services Pty Ltd v Arch Underwriting at Lloyd's Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

EP Financial Services Pty Ltd v Arch Underwriting at Lloyd’s Limited & Ors [2021] QSC 347

PARTIES:

EP FINANCIAL SERVICES PTY LTD
ACN 130 772 495

(applicant)

v
ARCH UNDERWRITING AT LLOYD’S LIMITED ON BEHALF OF SYNDICATE 2012

(first respondent)
AND
ARCH MANAGING AGENCY LIMITED ON BEHALF OF SYDNICATE 1955
(second respondent)
AND
LIBERTY MANAGING AGENCY LIMITED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF SYDNICATE 4472
(third respondent)
AND
UNDERWRITING LIMITED ON BEHALF OF SYNDICATE 3624
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO:

BS 8289 of 2021

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 December 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 October 2021

JUDGE:

Bradley J

ORDER:

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.   On its proper construction, clause 7.20(a) of the policy wording in the professional indemnity insurance policy between the respondents, as insurers, and the applicant, as an insured, (the “Policy”) does not exclude the respondents’ liability to indemnify the applicant for the claim by Michiyo Tanabe and Mickks Pty Ltd (the “Clients”) to recover losses suffered from acting on advice given to them by Jonathan Bonnett as an authorised representative of the applicant between 15 January 2013 and 18 September 2013. 

2.   The respondents are liable to indemnify the applicant under the Policy for its claim in respect of the claim made by the Clients.

AND THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3.   The parties are to provide written submissions on costs by 31 January 2022. 

CATCHWORDS:

INSURANCE – PROFESSIONAL INDEMNITY – EXCLUSIONS – where the applicant held professional indemnity insurance (the Policy) with the respondents as underwriters –where the applicant is a company that provides investment and financial planning advice – where an employee and authorised representative of the applicant (adviser) provided negligent investment advice to the applicant’s clients – where the clients suffered financial loss as a result – where the clients commenced proceedings against the applicant and its adviser which was settled by the applicant out of court – where a claim for indemnity by the applicant was refused by the respondents in reliance upon an exclusion clause in the Policy relating to the listing of products in the Insured’s Approved Product List – where the Policy is a composite policy – where an exclusion should be construed to give a congruent operation to the various provisions of the Policy as a whole – where the scope of the exclusion clause is ambiguous – whether the exclusion clause applies to deny the applicant’s claim for indemnity

Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12DA
Corporations Act 2001
(Cth), s 913B, s 917B, s 917F

Birrell v Dryer (1884) 9 App Cas 345, cited
Caine v Lumley General Insurance Limited
[2008] NSWCA 4, followed
Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd
(1986) 161 CLR 500, cited
DMS Maritime Pty Ltd v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance PLC [2018] QSC 303, applied
Eide UK Ltd v Lowndes Lambert Group Ltd [1999] QB 199,…

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Details
Case
[2021] QSC 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of EP Financial Services Pty Ltd v Arch Underwriting at Lloyd's Limited, the applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of an exclusion clause in a professional indemnity insurance policy, which the underwriters had used to deny the applicant's claim for indemnity. The applicant, a company that provides investment and financial planning advice, was insured by the respondents, who acted as underwriters. The applicant had settled a claim out of court for losses suffered by its clients due to negligent investment advice provided by one of its employees and authorised representatives. The respondents refused the applicant's claim for indemnity, citing an exclusion clause in the policy relating to the listing of products in the Insured's Approved Product List. The court was required to determine whether this exclusion clause applied to deny the applicant's claim for indemnity.

The court considered the principles of interpreting insurance policies as commercial contracts, with a focus on the ordinary meaning of the language used, the commercial purpose and object of the contract, and the surrounding circumstances. The court emphasised the importance of giving the policy a businesslike interpretation and preferring a construction that supplies a congruent operation to the various components of the whole. The court also considered the commercial purpose of the insurance policy and the need to assess how a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language. In this case, the court found that the exclusion clause in question was ambiguous and did not exclude the respondents' liability to indemnify the applicant for the claim made by the clients.

The court declared that the exclusion clause in question did not exclude the respondents' liability to indemnify the applicant for the claim made by the clients. The court also directed that the parties were to provide written submissions on costs by a specified date. This decision highlights the importance of carefully considering the language used in insurance policies and the need to interpret them in a manner that is consistent with their commercial purpose and object.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1. On its proper construction, clause 7.20(a) of the policy wording in the professional indemnity insurance policy between the respondents, as insurers, and the applicant, as an insured, (the “Policy”) does not exclude the respondents’ liability to indemnify the applicant for the claim by Michiyo Tanabe and Mickks Pty Ltd (the “Clients”) to recover losses suffered from acting on advice given to them by Jonathan Bonnett as an authorised representative of the applicant between 15 January 2013 and 18 September 2013.

2. The respondents are liable to indemnify the applicant under the Policy for its claim in respect of the claim made by the Clients.

AND THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3. The parties are to provide written submissions on costs by 31 January 2022.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the respondents, Mr Couper QC, emphasised that the policy ought to be “given a businesslike interpretation, paying attention to the language used by the parties in its ordinary meaning, and to the commercial, and where relevant, the social purpose and object of the contract, in the context of the surrounding circumstances”, citing part of the reasons of Allsop CJ and Gleeson J in Todd v Alterra at Lloyds Ltd.[9] These are found in the following parts of those reasons: [9](2016) 239 FCR 12 at [42]. “[35]The nature or character of a contract of insurance is “elusive” to define: Parkington M et al, MacGillivray and Parkington on Insurance Law (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) [1] at 1. The working definition given over 100 years ago by Channell J in Prudential Insurance Company v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1904] 2 KB 658 at 663-664 remains the foundation of analysis: for a monetary consideration (the premium) the person (the underwriter) agrees to pay to the other (the insured) a sum of money or some benefit upon the occurrence of one or more specified events. Other relationships could well fit such a simple mould. One needs, however, before identifying or characterising the contract as one of insurance, to elaborate upon each element — premium, promise to pay, sum of money or other benefit, upon a specified event — not by way of further definition, but by reference to the purpose and character of the arrangement to share the risk of, or spread the loss from, unhoped-for, but possible, contingencies that may or may not happen (in life insurance, as to timing of an ultimately certain contingency). …[38]A contract of insurance has the object or purpose of sharing the risk of, or spreading loss from, a contingency. Relevant to its character as insurance will be how the contract came to be effected, its nature and purpose and how it is to be performed: see generally Seaton v Heath [1899] 1 QB 782 at 792-793 (Romer LJ).…[40]Ultimately, of course, such tasks of categorisation or characterisation depend on the context, in particular, the purpose of the enquiry. From the nature, character and purpose of insurance there is no reason, and no precedent, for according an insurer the tenderness accorded to guarantors and indemnifiers as reflected in the general principle recently restated in Bofinger at [53].…[42]The principles, otherwise, to apply in relation to the interpretation and construction of insurance policies as commercial contracts were not in dispute. Such principles can be found in authorities dealing with the construction of commercial contracts, to some of which reference was made in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 at [19]-[23]; and also in authorities dealing specifically with contracts of insurance: McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579 at [22] (Gleeson CJ), [73]-[74] (Kirby J); Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522 at [15] and [16] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Australian Casualty Company Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 at 520-521 (Gibbs CJ), and see also the valuable discussion of principle by Kirby J (though in dissent) in Johnson v American Home Assurance Company (1998) 192 CLR 266 at [19]. The principles need not be restated here beyond some essential considerations, which for present purposes can be taken to be that the policy is to be given a businesslike interpretation, paying attention to the language used by the parties in its ordinary meaning, and to the commercial, and where relevant, the social purpose and object of the contract, in the context of the surrounding circumstances, including the market or commercial context in which the parties are operating, by assessing how a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language. Preference is to be given to a construction supplying a congruent operation to the various components of the whole. [43]The importance of the commercial purpose in the interpretation and construction of a policy can be seen in the cases referred to by McHugh JA (as his Honour then was) in Legal & General Insurance Australia Ltd v Eather (1986) 6 NSWLR 390 at 405. [44]To refer to “social” purpose (where relevant) is not to detach the process of interpretation and construction from the objective enquiry as to the meaning of a document regulating the private rights of the parties. It is to identify the reality that in some circumstances a policy of insurance as a commercial document will find its place in some aspect of the organisation of society through the rights and obligations thereby created by it. That place or purpose will have its weight in the description of meaning to the words in question.”Consideration of the submissions