EMU20 v Anderson
[2020] FCA 1585
•4 November 2020
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EMU20 v Anderson [2020] FCA 1585
File number: SAD 153 of 2020 Judgment of: BESANKO J Date of judgment: 4 November 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for interim relief in a proceeding for judicial review of a decision made by an examiner of the Australian Crime and Intelligence Commission pursuant to s 28 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) to summon the applicant — consideration of the mandatory relevant considerations of the decision to summon a person for examination — legal unreasonableness — whether the applicant has a prima facie case — consideration of where the balance of convenience lies — application for interim relief refused Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 4, 25A 28, 29A, 29B
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 251 CLR 196
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 248 CLR 92
Division: General Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings Number of paragraphs: 38 Date of hearing: 21 October 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Abbott QC Solicitor for the Applicant: Jennifer Stefanac Barrister & Solicitor Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission ORDERS
SAD 153 of 2020 BETWEEN: EMU20
Applicant
AND: JEFFREY P ANDERSON
First Respondent
AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE COMMISSION
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BESANKO J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interim injunction made on 21 October 2020 be discharged.
2.The parties be heard as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BESANKO J:
Introduction
The applicant has brought an application for judicial review of a decision made by an examiner on 12 October 2020 to issue a summons pursuant to s 28 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (the Act) summoning the applicant to appear at an examination before the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (the ACIC) on 21 October 2020 at 10 am (the summons). Although the applicant’s Originating application does not, other than in the orders sought, identify the statutory provisions under which it is brought, counsel for the applicant told the Court in the course of his submissions that the applicant relied on ss 5 and 6 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The respondents are Mr Jeffrey P Anderson, who summoned the applicant under s 28 of the Act (the examiner), and the ACIC.
On 20 October 2020, the applicant issued an Interlocutory application in which the applicant sought an urgent interim injunction restraining, until further order, the respondents from removing the applicant from any custodial institution and conducting an examination of the applicant.
On 21 October 2020, the parties made submissions to the Court on the applicant’s Interlocutory application. I reserved my decision and made an interim injunction in terms of the order sought by the applicant pending my decision. These are my reasons on the interlocutory application. I have decided that an injunction pending the determination of the application for judicial review should not be granted.
The Facts
The applicant relies on two affidavits of the applicant’s solicitor, both sworn on 20 October 2020. The respondents rely on an affidavit of an investigator employed by the ACIC sworn on 21 October 2020.
The applicant’s solicitor establishes the following matters. On [REDACTED] 2020, the applicant was arrested and charged with [REDACTED] (the Charge). The applicant has been in custody in a correctional facility in South Australia on remand since his arrest.
On [REDACTED] June 2020, the applicant pleaded guilty in the [REDACTED] Magistrates Court of South Australia to one count of [REDACTED] contrary to [REDACTED]. The applicant was committed for sentence in the District Court of South Australia. At the time the applicant entered a plea of guilty to the Charge, there were [REDACTED] relating to the Charge. The applicant’s solicitor states that the applicant’s agreement to a plea of guilty was conditional upon there being no opposition to that plea being set aside if the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. The applicant will not be sentenced until the [REDACTED (conditions upon which the guilty plea may be set aside)] is received.
The applicant was served with the summons on [REDACTED] October 2020. Later on the same day, the applicant’s solicitor was provided with a copy of the summons at the solicitor’s office.
The summons refers to the special ACIC operation being undertaken by the ACIC under the “Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (High Risk and Emerging Drugs) 2020” (the Determination). The summons summons the applicant to appear before the examiner to:
(a)give evidence in relation to matters of the following general nature, being matters that are relevant to federally relevant criminal activity, and that may include the following:
i)[REDACTED] of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Criminal Code) punishable by imprisonment for a period of three years or more, including [REDACTED] of the Schedule to the Criminal Code; and
ii)[REDACTED] of the Criminal Code, being offences connected directly or indirectly with the course of that activity.
The summons which was signed by the examiner at 1.46 pm on [REDACTED] October 2020, provides that the examiner is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to summons the applicant and that the examiner is also satisfied that it is reasonably necessary for the purposes of the special ACIC operation even though the applicant has been charged with a related offence. The summons states that the examiner has recorded in writing the reasons for his states of satisfaction at 1.42 pm on [REDACTED] October 2020. The summons contains a notation pursuant to subsection 29A(1) of the Act as follows:
Disclosure of information about this summons, or any official matter connected with it, is prohibited except in the following circumstances:
1.to the Federal Court of Australia and the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and the States for the purposes of any application challenging the validity of the Summons, in which case an application is to be made to the Court for the applicant’s name to be suppressed and replaced by a letter and/or number pseudonym; and
2. where section 29B of the Act does not prevent such disclosure.
The summons goes on to state by reference to s 29B of the Act that it is an offence to disclose the existence of the summons or any information about it, or the existence of or any information about any official matter connected with the summons, including information in the annexures.
There are three annexures to the summons, being the Determination, a Statement of Rights and Obligations pursuant to subsection 29A(3) of the Act and Explanatory Notes directed to the recipient of the summons.
While dealing with the summons, it is convenient to set out the relevant subsections in the Act:
28 Power to summon witnesses and take evidence
(1)An examiner may summon a person to appear before an examiner at an examination to do either or both of the following:
(a) give evidence;
(b) produce any documents or other things referred to in the summons;
if the examiner is satisfied that issuing the summons is:
(c) in all cases—reasonable in all the circumstances; and
(d)in the case of a post-charge, or post-confiscation application, summons—reasonably necessary for the purposes of the relevant special ACC operation/investigation even though:
(i)the person has been charged or the confiscation proceeding has commenced; or
(ii) that charge or proceeding is imminent.
(1A)The examiner must also record in writing the reasons for the issue of the summons. The record is to be made:
(a) before the issue of the summons; or
(b) at the same time as the issue of the summons.
Section 4 defines a post-charge summons as follows:
…
(d)a summons is a post-charge summons if the summons is issued to a person at a time when:
(i)the person has been charged with a related offence and that charge is still to be resolved; or
(ii)such a charge is imminent.
A charge against a person is “imminent”, pursuant to s 4, if:
…
(iii)a person with authority to commence a process for prosecuting the person for an offence has decided to commence, but not yet commenced, the process;
A “related offence” for a summons is defined in s 4 as follows:
…
(b)for a summons—an offence if the subject matter of the summons relates to the subject matter of the offence.
In July 2020, a solicitor from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (the ODPP) with conduct of the Charge advised the applicant’s solicitor by telephone that further charges may be laid against the applicant in addition to the Charge. The advice was confirmed by an email sent to the chambers of the judge of the District Court who is dealing with the matter on [REDACTED] July 2020. The email is in the following terms:
I advise that the prosecution will be asking for the matter to be adjourned. We have recently been advised by police of material that may give rise to further charges being laid against at least one of the defendants in relation to this matter. However, it is highly unlikely we will be in a position to finalise our position in time for the arraignment on [REDACTED] July 2020.
I have advised [REDACTED] the defendants’ solicitor, of the prosecution position, and she has consented to the prosecution advising the Court.
The information laid in the Magistrates Court involved [REDACTED] defendants and that explains the reference in the email to “at least one of the defendants”.
The applicant’s solicitor understands that the further charges, if laid, may relate to allegations regarding the applicant’s involvement [REDACTED]. The applicant’s solicitor states that there is a probability that the applicant will plead not guilty to any such further charges.
The ODPP is yet to confirm whether or not further charges will be laid.
On [REDACTED] October 2020, the applicant’s solicitor communicated with a member of the ACIC advising that person of the conditional nature of the plea of guilty and the possible new charges. That was four days after the summons had been issued and two days after it had been served on the applicant.
The applicant’s solicitor states that she is currently unable to attend the correctional facility in which the applicant is detained. The applicant’s solicitor is instructed and verily believes that the applicant can and will swear an affidavit deposing to the following matters:
18.1Prisoner movements have been significantly reduced due to COVID 19. The Applicant’s removal from the prison without any listing of his criminal charges in Court could appear highly suspicious to other inmates and, in the absence of any publicly available appearance of his name in a Court cause list, would reasonably lead them to suspect that he was being taken away to an ACIC examination.
18.2On other occasions there has been speculation amongst the inmates that other inmates who have left [REDACTED] for unexplained reasons were being taken to an ACIC examination and those inmates were spoken about in pejorative terms.
18.3[REDACTED] records its prisoner movements on [REDACTED] which is in full view of other prisoners. [REDACTED] records the prisoners name, prisoners’ numbers and their location.
18.4On some occasions an otherwise unexplained prisoner movement has been endorsed with [REDACTED], which initials are taken by inmates to refer to the Australian Federal Police and leads to a belief among inmates that the prisoner is being taken [REDACTED] to an ACIC examination.
18.5Some inmates have also become suspicious that a prisoner has attended at an examination by virtue of the “story” that they provide to other inmates as an explanation for their removal from the prison. In the past suspicion has arisen when prisoners’ “stories” have been discovered to be inconsistent with the record of prisoner movements [REDACTED] and the prisoner is viewed as having lied as to where he has been.
18.6He does not want to be removed from [REDACTED] under the Summons.
18.7He does not want to be forced to answer questions about [REDACTED] when:
18.7.1his sentence and the final nature of the charge he is to be sentenced on is yet to be determined; and
18.7.2he is potentially facing other charges.
The following matters should be noted about this evidence. First, I accept that the content of paragraph 18 of the solicitor’s affidavit reflects the applicant’s instructions to the solicitor and I note that the solicitor has undertaken to use reasonable endeavours to obtain and file an affidavit of the applicant “in the same or substantially similar terms to those matters contained in paragraph 18 above”. Secondly, there is nothing in paragraph 18 which is expressly to the effect that the applicant fears physical harm from other prisoners if he is taken to an examination. This is in a context in which in paragraph 18.7 the applicant describes what “he does not want” and that relates to questions at the examination. Finally, the nearest one gets to a statement of a fear of physical harm if the applicant is taken to an examination is a statement by the solicitor in the first affidavit that “[i]n the above circumstances, there is a real risk that an inmate thought to have attended at an ACIC examination could be the subject of violence or recrimination” and a statement by the solicitor in the second affidavit that the applicant “has fears for his safety if he is removed for the purpose of an ACIC examination”.
The applicant’s solicitor states that given s 29B of the Act which makes it an offence for any person, including the applicant, to disclose information about the summons or any matters connected with the summons, the applicant will not be able to disclose where he has been even if a suspicion is raised by other inmates.
In the second affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor, the deponent states that the applicant has an arguable case that the respondents failed to take into account relevant matters pertaining to the applicant and the applicant’s safety and that the applicant was subject to a pending decision concerning further charges that will likely be the subject of the examination. The deponent states that the case on the invalidity of the summons is arguable given the situation concerning the ODPP’s decision about further charges does not appear to have been considered by the examiner when issuing the summons.
The investigator deposes to the service of the summons on the applicant and on the applicant’s solicitor. The investigator also deposes to the advice given to the applicant at the time the applicant was served with the summons which was to the effect that arrangements would be made to facilitate the applicant’s attendance at the examination and, in particular, that arrangements had been made to remove the applicant from the correctional facility, that those arrangements did not identify that the applicant will be attending an ACIC examination and that no person in the correctional facility has been or will be advised that the applicant will be attending an ACIC examination.
The investigator states that he is able to provide further details of such arrangements within a confidential affidavit if required by the Court. He states that for reasons that will be dealt with in any such confidential affidavit, the details of those arrangements cannot be disclosed in an open affidavit. The investigator states that if details of the arrangements were disclosed openly in the proceedings, it would, in his opinion, jeopardise the effectiveness of the steps taken by the ACIC to protect prisoners being removed for ACIC examinations from correctional facilities, both in South Australia and, he apprehends, nationwide. The investigator sets out the steps taken to provide an explanation in respect of the applicant’s absence from the correctional facility whilst attending the ACIC examination. A “cover story” is provided to explain the examinee’s absence from the correctional facility and the investigator provides details of what that involves in his affidavit.
The investigator states that he has been personally involved in the successful removal of prisoners from correctional facilities for the purposes of ACIC examinations since the beginning of the COVID‑19 pandemic. He states that to date this has occurred safely and without any incident to any examinee and that the measures adopted have meant that the examinee has been able to leave “the facility with impunity from other prisoners and prison staff and any enquiries of them as to their absence from prison during the examination”. The investigator expresses the view that the ACIC’s procedures are “well-practised, but they remain flexible and responsive to the circumstances” and there is nothing to suggest in his opinion and on the information to which he has access due to his duties, that the ACIC’s operational practices would expose the applicant’s involvement in an ACIC examination to the prison community.
The investigator states that he has facilitated the making of arrangements to have the applicant removed from the correctional facility and with particular reference to [REDACTED], he states that any record [REDACTED], should prison staff record any movement, will not therefore be made on the basis of any information that would disclose that a prisoner attended the ACIC or at an examination. The investigator states that he has made inquiries with the Department of Correctional Services and has been advised and verily believes that there is no recording [REDACTED] which would disclose any prisoner attendance at the ACIC. The investigator states any speculation about categories of movement recorded [REDACTED] would, in his opinion, amount to just that, namely, speculation.
Prima Facie Case
In order to qualify for an interlocutory injunction, an applicant must establish a prima facie case in the sense described by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57. Their Honours said (at [65]):
The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd. This court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries, and continued:
The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief … The second inquiry is … whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.
By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument. With reference to the first inquiry, the court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal:
How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks.
(Citations omitted.)
The grounds of the application for judicial review as set out in the Originating application are as follows:
1.In making the Decision, the First Respondent failed to take into account relevant considerations, namely that:
1.1 the Applicant’s guilty plea to the Charge was conditional upon [REDACTED].
1.2 the ODPP has indicated that there may be further charges laid against the Applicant and has not yet made that decision;
1.3 there is a real and substantial risk of serious harm to the Applicant if he be removed from [REDACTED] in the current circumstances pertaining to him.
2.The Decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have made it.
3.The Commonwealth of Australia does not have the power to legislate to require the attendance of a person at the ACIC when that person is the subject of a yet to be determined decision of the DPP as to whether to lay charges against him and so the Decision and the Summons are not validly made and issued under a law of the Commonwealth.
As developed before this Court, a summary of the applicant’s arguments is as follows. First, the applicant submits that in making the decision to issue the summons, the examiner failed to take into account the security and safety issues affecting the applicant and the risk of harm to the applicant from other prisoners in the correctional facility in which the applicant is held. That was a mandatory relevant consideration which the examiner did not take into account. Secondly, the applicant submits that in making the decision to issue the summons, the examiner failed to take into account “the pending charges” and the conditional nature of the guilty plea to the Charge. That was also a mandatory relevant consideration which the examiner did not take into account. Thirdly, the examiner’s decision to issue the summons, irrespective of his motives or the matters he took into account, was not authorised by the Act. The Act did not expressly authorise the issue of a summons in the circumstances of this case and, absent express authorisation, the Act is not to be interpreted so as to authorise the issue of the summons. As I understood the submission, the circumstance which took this case outside the express words of the Act is, to use counsel’s words, “this unique situation where he is both post-charge and pre-charge”. The submission is that the common law insists on express authorisation of an abrogation or curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity and such authorisation is not given in the Act (X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 248 CLR 92 at [86]–[87], [142], [147] per Hayne and Bell JJ; at [158]–[162] per Kiefel J (as her Honour then was); Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 251 CLR 196 at [313]–[314] per Gageler and Keane JJ). Although Ground 3 in the Originating application is expressed in terms of an absence of the power to legislate, the argument as developed was not one asserting an absence of power, but rather that the power had not been exercised. I turn now to deal with the arguments in detail.
With respect to the first argument, it is relevant at the outset to note the following provisions of the Act. An examination before an examiner must be held in private (s 25A(3)) and the examiner may direct that examination material must not be used or disclosed (s 25A(9)) and must give such a direction if the failure to do so might prejudice a person’s safety (s 25A(9A) and (11)). Section 29A(1) provides that an examiner issuing a summons under s 28 must, or may, as provided in subsection (2), include in it a notation to the effect that disclosure about the summons, or any official matter connection with it, is prohibited (emphasis added). Subsection (2) provides:
(2) A notation must not be included in the summons except as follows:
(a)the examiner must include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so would reasonably be expected to prejudice:
(i) the safety or reputation of a person; or
(ii)a person’s fair trial, if the person has been charged with an offence or such a charge is imminent; or
(iii) the effectiveness of an operation or investigation;
(b)the examiner may include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so might prejudice:
(i) the safety or reputation of a person; or
(ii)a person’s fair trial, if the person has been charged with an offence or such a charge is imminent; or
(iii) the effectiveness of an operation or investigation;
(c)the examiner may include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so might otherwise be contrary to the public interest.
The first question is what is the mandatory relevant consideration in the Peko-Wallsend sense (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24). This is not a case where a potential examinee is given the right to make submissions before a decision to issue the summons is made and the question might be whether the matters advanced in the submissions are mandatory relevant considerations. That being the case, the identification of the relevant considerations is carried out “primarily, perhaps even entirely, by reference to the Act rather than the particular facts of the case that the tribunal is called on to consider” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [73] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). If a matter is not expressly identified in the Act as a relevant consideration, then the Court looks to the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act in order to determine whether it can be implied that a consideration is a mandatory relevant consideration (Peko-Wallsend at 39–40). I make these points to emphasise that, assuming an examiner in deciding whether to issue a summons is bound to take the risk of harm to an examinee in being brought to an examination into account, they mean that that consideration must be expressed at a fairly high level of generality.
The very practice adopted by the ACIC as identified by the investigator suggests that the ACIC is aware of the risk and takes measures to eliminate it. This evidence of the practice is significant in another respect. I infer that the examiner is aware of the practice and it is something that he would have been aware of when he decided to issue the summons. On the arguments advanced to this point, it is difficult to see that he was required to do anything more. As far as legal unreasonableness is concerned, the reasons of the examiner are not before the Court so it is difficult to draw any conclusion about the decision-making process. Further, it is difficult to characterise the decision itself as a decision to which no reasonable person could come (ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34 (ABT17) at [19]–[20] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
With respect to the second argument, the difficulty with the argument is that there is no evidence that the examiner was aware of the so-called conditional nature of the guilty plea to the Charge or of the fact that the ODPP had foreshadowed the possibility of further charges. I am unable to see anything in the Act and, in particular, its subject-matter, scope and purpose, which leads to the conclusion that these matters are mandatory relevant considerations under the Act such that, absent information being provided to the examiner, he had a duty to inquire about such matters and then to take the information he received into account. The possible further charges do not fall within s 28(1)(d) of the Act because they are not imminent, as that word is relevantly defined. There is no evidence that, as to such possible further charges, a person with authority to commence a process for prosecuting the applicant for the offences has decided to commence the process. The applicant’s argument insofar as it relies on a failure to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration seems to encounter great difficulty at the first hurdle. Nor is the decision to issue the summons legally unreasonable in light of the “conditional” nature of the plea to the Charge or in light of the possibility of further charges. Further, even if the examiner did not take those matters into account, it is by no means plain that that means that the decision-making process is unintelligible (ABT17 at [19] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
With respect to the third argument, the existence of the Charge did not prevent the exercise of the power to issue the summons. There is an express power for the examiner to proceed in those circumstances in s 28 of the Act subject to the additional “satisfaction requirement” in s 28(1)(d) of the Act. I am unable to see how the possibility of further charges takes the case outside the terms of s 28. At this point, the laying of further charges is no more than a possibility.
On the arguments presented, if the applicant has a prima facie case, it is a weak one.
Balance of Convenience
The balance of convenience is not considered without regard to the strength of the applicant’s prima facie case. A weak prima facie case may tip the balance of convenience against the grant of an injunction just as a strong prima facie case may have the opposite effect (Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 at [87]).
The applicant advances three arguments in support of the contention that the balance of convenience is in the applicant’s favour. Those arguments are as follows. First, the applicant submits that if the interlocutory injunction is not granted, the application for judicial review will be rendered nugatory. I accept that this is so to the point that, absent an injunction, the applicant will not avoid attending the examination and whatever risks are associated with that attendance. Secondly, the applicant submits that if the interlocutory injunction is not granted, the applicant will face a real risk of violence or recrimination. I refer to what I have said above (at [20]). This is not actually what the applicant has conveyed to his solicitor. Finally, the applicant submits that the respondents have not adduced any evidence of urgency associated with the proposed examination of the applicant. Although that is true, that circumstance does not prevent me from refusing an injunction if I have reached the conclusion that there is no real argument on the merits to be advanced. There is a public interest in proceedings under the Act not being unnecessarily delayed. I have reached the conclusion that that is the case here and an injunction should not be granted.
Conclusions
The interim injunction made on 21 October 2020 should be discharged. I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Besanko. Associate:
Dated: 4 November 2020
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