[2025] QCA 53
COURT OF APPEAL
FLANAGAN JA
Appeal No 16656 of 2024
DC No 1202 of 2017
EMMA THOMPSON Appellant/Respondent
v
JULENE FRANCES CYATI Respondent/Applicant
BRISBANE
WEDNESDAY, 26 APRIL 2025
JUDGMENT
FLANAGAN JA: The respondent to this appeal applies pursuant to rule 722 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules Queensland for security for costs in the amount of $22,000. Now, this Court has a wide and unfettered discretion to order security for costs on an appeal. An order of this nature is more likely to be given at an appellate level. Rule 772 is only enlivened when there is an appeal on foot. Here, a notice of appeal was filed on 24 December 2024. The appeal is in relation to a judgment of his Honour, Judge Byrne KC in the District Court.
The appellant, Ms Thompson, and the respondent, Ms Cyati, are the children of the male deceased. The respondent was appointed as the executor of the deceased’s estate. The appellant, on the other hand, was expressly excluded from benefiting under the deceased’s will. On 5 April 2017, Ms Thompson applied to the District Court pursuant to section 41 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) – the Act – for provision from the deceased’s estate for proper maintenance and support. That application was heard from 28th to 30th of May 2024, and 3 June 2024 before his Honour. The reasons were published on 29 November 2024.
In determining the application, his Honour applied the two-stage test derived from section 41 of the Act as set out in Singer v Berghouse (1984) 181 CLR 201. His Honour was not satisfied that the first stage had been made out. In other words, the lack of any provision to Ms Thompson from the deceased’s estate did not result in an inadequate provision in all of the circumstances. This was so having regard to Ms Thompson’s financial position at the time of her father’s death, which comprised, according to his Honour, more than $2 million worth of assets, such figure being more than double the value of the estate.
It may be accepted that Ms Thompson’s financial position has considerably changed by the time the trial took place some eight years later. His Honour recognised the shift in Ms Thompson’s financial position. Ultimately, however, this could have no bearing on the application of section 41 of the Act, as her financial position was to be assessed as at the date of the death of her father. Also relevant to his Honour’s determination was Ms Thompson’s strained relationship with the deceased, her overall capacity to work, the fact the deceased had loaned her a little under $200,000 of which no principal or interest was repaid, and her use of, “the proceeding to avenge some perceived wrongs against,” Ms Cyati. It was therefore unnecessary to consider the second stage of the test. The application was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Following this, the respondent sought costs, including reserve costs, from the appellant on…
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- Case
- [2025] QCA 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the Court was whether the appellant should be ordered to provide security for the respondent’s costs in relation to the appeal. The Court was required to consider a number of factors in exercising its discretion to order security for costs. These included the appellant’s prospects of success on appeal, her financial position, the fact that she had already had her day in court and lost, whether an order for security for costs would stifle the appeal, any delay in bringing the application, and whether the appeal involved questions of public importance. The Court also considered the prerequisites of discretionary factors which apply to an application for security for costs at first instance as set out in rule 671 and 672 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.
In assessing the appellant’s prospects of success, the Court noted that the appeal raised no jurisdictional challenge to the primary Judge’s findings. It was difficult to identify an error in the exercise of judicial discretion, and there was no evidence of denial of procedural fairness, bias or mistaken conclusions. The appellant’s grounds for appeal did not raise a jurisdictional challenge, and her prospects of success may be described as poor.
In relation to the appellant’s financial position, the Court found there were considerable doubts that she had the financial means to satisfy any cost order. The appellant had been unsuccessful at first instance and had had her day in court, a factor which enabled the Court to more readily come to the view that security should be ordered than not. There was no evidence that the estate caused the appellant’s impecuniosity.
The Court also considered whether an order for security for costs would stifle the appeal. While the appellant had at least a fair, arguable case, the prospect that the order would stifle the appeal should not weigh heavily in the balance, but it was a matter that the Court took into account in exercising the discretion.
The Court found that there had been some delay in bringing the present application, but this was alleviated by the fact that the appeal had not substantially progressed. There was no suggestion that the present appeal concerned any questions of public importance which ought to be addressed.
The Court found that the interests of justice required an order for security for costs. The estate had already incurred significant cost in defending the proceeding before the primary Judge and the two Supreme Court proceedings, and despite cost orders in its favour had not received any payment from the appellant. There was considerable doubt that the appellant had the financial means to meet any cost order, and it was in the interests of justice that an order for security for costs be made.
In relation to the quantum of such security, the Court ordered that the appellant must provide security for the respondent’s cost of the proceeding in the amount of $15,000. The appeal is stayed pending provision of such security. Failing the furnishing of such security by the specified date and time, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs without further order.
The orders made are as follows: 1. The hearing date for the appeal, 6 May 2025, is vacated. 2. Pursuant to rule 772 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), the appellant must provide security for the respondent’s cost of the proceeding in the amount of $15,000 in a form acceptable to the registrar of the court by 4 pm, 12 May 2025. 3. The appeal is stayed pending provision of such security. 4. Failing the furnishing of such security by that date and time, the appeal will stand dismissed with costs without further order. 5. The cost of this application will be costs in the appeal.
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