ELR18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ELR18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1583

Appeal from: ELR18 & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 251
File number: NSD 267 of 2019
Judge: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 1 October 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) – judgment of the FCCA delivered ex tempore – ex tempore reasons were not interpreted – written reasons of FCCA not published until after expiration of appeal period to this court – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – decision by the first respondent refusing applications for protection visas – whether the Tribunal decision was a product of jurisdictional error – whether the FCCA failed to afford the appellants procedural fairness – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 412

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

CQX18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 142

DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499

Maere v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1694

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6

Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625

SZQRU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234

Date of hearing: 23 August 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Keevers of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 267 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ELR18

First Appellant

ELS18

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 OCTOBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants are to pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

BACKGROUND

  1. The appellants—a married couple—are citizens of Nepal.  On 30 March 2015 and 4 May 2015, the husband and wife, respectively, travelled to Australia, each holding a valid tourist visa.  On 15 May 2015, they each made an application under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (hereafter, the “Act”) for a protection visa (within the meaning attributed to that phrase by the Act).  I shall refer to those applications collectively as, the “Visa Application”.

  2. By a decision dated 21 January 2016, a delegate of the first respondent (hereafter, the “Minister”) rejected the appellants’ Visa Application.  They applied to the second respondent (hereafter, the “Tribunal”) for a…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1583
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of ELR18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicants, a married couple, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed their applications for protection visas. The applicants, hailing from Nepal, claimed that they faced a real chance of persecution if they were to return to their home country due to various circumstances, including the husband’s financial dealings, his marriage to a woman of a different caste, and the wife's treatment by her husband's and ex-husband's families. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCFCA) dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the AAT's decision. The key legal issues for the court were whether the AAT's decision was flawed by jurisdictional error and whether the FCFCA had failed to afford the applicants procedural fairness.

The court considered the AAT's findings and determined that they were based on a comprehensive assessment of the evidence presented by the applicants. The AAT had carefully evaluated the credibility and plausibility of the applicants' claims, taking into account inconsistencies and contradictions in their evidence. The court found no basis to conclude that the AAT had erred in its jurisdictional capacity or failed to observe procedural fairness. The applicants' arguments centred on the AAT's alleged misinterpretation of their evidence and its failure to give proper weight to certain aspects of their claims. However, the court found that the AAT had appropriately exercised its discretion in weighing the evidence and making its findings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants are to pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Ignoring, for the time being, the Tribunal’s own commentary (including for example, the opening words of [30]), the above is a fair summary of what the second appellant claimed in support of his Visa Application. Additionally, he claimed that he was at risk of relevant harm because of his marriage to the first appellant, who is his second wife and who is, by background, of a different caste.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal did not accept that the circumstances that the appellants advanced—or such of them as it was minded to believe—were sufficient to warrant that they be granted protection visas. With the exception of her claims based on her husband’s borrowings (about which more is said below), and about her treatment at the hands of her husband’s and ex-husband’s families and associates, the Tribunal accepted as true—which is to say that it believed that there existed—the circumstances that the first appellant advanced in support of her Visa Application (above, [4]). It did not, however, accept that any of those circumstances individually, or any combination of them collectively, gave rise to a genuine prospect that the first appellant would face a real chance of physical or mental harm, or any other form of harm sufficient to qualify her for a grant of a protection visa. Insofar as concerned the second appellant, the Tribunal made the following findings:41.I accept that [the second appellant] was previously legally married and divorced before he married [the first appellant] in 2009. I accept that they are of different castes. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that [the second appellant] faces a real chance of being persecuted in Nepal, either directly or indirectly, for reasons of marrying [the first appellant], or for reasons of entering into a second marriage, or for reasons of marrying a woman of a different caste, or for any other reason involving inferences about their relationship.42.I accept that [the second appellant] is owed money from people to whom he previously lent and in whom he invested. I accept that the courts intervened, and I accept that they found for [the second appellant] in what was a moot victory for him because his debtors have disappeared (conceivably, for example, to India). I am not satisfied that [the second appellant] faces a real chance of being persecuted for a reason cited in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act due, either separately or cumulatively, to his predicament as a disaffected lender/investor.43.[The second appellant] claims, as noted[,] that his inability to be repaid affects his ability to pay. Relevant to this, it seems reasonable to observe, his claims about borrowing money from people he did not know or meet, with only verbally-agreed terms through an intermediary, strikes me as implausible, not least since he provided evidence of the way he does business in matters financial: knowing his clients and contracting in writing to record amounts to be transferred and repaid. On the evidence before me, it seems out of character for [the second appellant] to be distracted by the amount offered into borrowing on the terms and in the circumstances claimed. It may conceivably be that he has different ways of operating, depending on whether he is parting with his money to help others and others are parting with their money to help him, but it still strikes me as incongruous that [the second appellant] did not engage in a more secure and accountable arrangement when he purportedly borrowed money to grow his vehicle and real estate businesses.44.In any event, I accept that [the second appellant] borrowed money through the man identified as [R] and I am prepared to proceed on the basis of accepting that the loan was from a “loan shark” individual or syndicate. However, as to [R] being a middle-man between Maoist lenders/investors and [the second appellant], I have difficulty accepting that Maoists have anything to do with this case at all.45.Whereas [the second appellant] gave a quite plausible account of how Maoists, after co-option into the democratic process, continued to launder money through investments and loans, he has been inconsistent in his evidence as to whether he ever had any direct contact with any Maoists themselves. Initially he claimed that he had no direct contact whatsoever. He told me he made no deals with them. As noted, he said he made all his agreements with [R], and none of them on paper. He argued that [R] was somewhat of a buffer between himself and the Maoists who he did not ever meet. However, when I questioned how [R] had survived so long, considering he was purportedly the only person in this matter with whom the Maoists ever dealt, [the second appellant] said that [R] too was a Maoist, which assertion directly contradicted all of his foregoing evidence about his indirect relationship with the Maoists.46.[The second appellant]’s claim about never having had any direct contact with the Maoists appears somewhat contradicted by the direct contact he claims to have had during his claimed abduction and interrogation in 2012, as he claims his abductors were solely concerned with the money lent to him.47.Meanwhile, [the second appellant] gave inconsistent evidence, over time, about the presence and actions of Maoists in Jogmani. He gave self-contradicted evidence about having seen Maoists, including a known Maoists youth leader, following and monitoring him in Jogmani. He did not resolve whether he saw them, and saw them following him, or just feared (using the “paranoid” expression) that they could come after him in India.48.I can accept that [the second appellant] left for India, and took [the first appellant] with him, in order to avoid the problem of not being able to repay debts in Nepal. I can also accept, having regard to the documents tendered at the Tribunal hearing, that [the second appellant] has tried unsuccessfully to recoup loans and investments [h]e made in respect of others. I can thus accept that being a disaffected creditor of sorts has exacerbated [the second appellant]’s predicament with his own lenders. However, on the contradictory evidence before me, I do not accept that [the second appellant]’s creditors/investors were Maoists or Maoist-backed. Also, in view of the inconsistencies in [the second appellant]’s evidence, I am not satisfied that he was abducted in December 2012 and given five weeks, under threat of serious harm, to repay monies either lent to or invested in him.49.Whether or not the lenders/investors in this case were Maoists is a significant factor in the harm [the second appellant] claims to fear. This is because [the second appellant]’s claims about the real chance of suffering harm relies significantly on the Maoists having wide-ranging social and political networks as well as unscrupulous methods of expressing and maintaining power.50.On the evidence overall, I am not satisfied that [the second appellant] borrowed from Maoists. However, as noted, I am prepared to accept that he entered into an arrangement with a loan shark or loan shark syndicate.51.That said, I am not satisfied that [the second appellant]’s claimed fears involve any of the five factors cited in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act. His claims relate purely to individual criminal and mercenary circumstances.52.I find on evidence provided by [the second appellant] that the Nepalese authorities are willing and able to arbitrate in matters of bad debts. I also find on the evidence before me that the authorities are also willing and able to protect Nepalese society from the unscrupulous actions, demands and terms of loan sharks in Nepal...53.On the evidence overall, I am not satisfied that [the second appellant] faces a real chance of being persecuted in Nepal in the reasonably foreseeable future, let alone for any of the five reasons cited in s.5J(1)(a) of the Act.54.I am also not satisfied that [the second appellant] faces a real chance of being persecuted in Nepal for reasons involving [the first appellant]’s claimed concerns about caste, remarriage and imputed moral standing in Nepalese society.55.For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that [the second appellant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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