IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S522 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
PETER JAMES ELLIS
First Applicant
VIVIENNE JOAN ELLIS
Second Applicant
PHILIP WALLACE JONES
Third Applicant
and
JEANETTE ANN FOLEY
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 19 JUNE 2009, AT 11.54 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR L.J. ELLISON, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicants. (instructed by Bartier Perry Solicitors)
MR P.J. MENADUE: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Kydon Segal Lawyers)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Ellison.
MR ELLISON: Your Honours, this special leave application is different from others. This is by an executor. In Singer v Berghouse and Vigolo ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Just slow down for a minute. Is there some error in fact‑finding by the primary judicial officer?
MR ELLISON: The Court of Appeal found there was an error of fact‑finding with regard to ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Do you challenge that?
MR ELLISON: No, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: So therefore the matter was, as it were, in play before the Court of Appeal.
MR ELLISON: Yes.
GUMMOW J: They had found a factual error below. What then was the error that they committed?
MR ELLISON: To use that single finding of fact to overturn a very thorough discretionary judgment and in that context to bring into play the competing circumstances of the beneficiaries, the other beneficiaries of the first stage of Singer v Berghouse, instead of the second stage and to give no proper regard to the principle of testamentary freedom in the context of an estrangement or character and conduct over many years.
BELL J: When you say that to seize, as it were, on a factual finding to then overturn a careful decision by the primary judge, that might be thought to somewhat overlook the significance of the factual finding, may it not? As I understand it, the unchallenged evidence was that the plaintiff before the primary judge had suffered two accidents around the time in fact of the testator’s death, in consequence of which:
she has had limited capacity to work or to be on her feet, and that she suffers considerable pain and debilitating exhaustion.
That is his Honour at paragraph 34. Then when one goes over to application book 28 at 93, there is the observation that:
There appears to be not reason why the Plaintiff should no increase her earnings, by, for example, working in a full‑time capacity –
Now ‑ ‑ ‑
MR ELLISON: It is the second half of that sentence, the “full‑time capacity” that was not put to the claimant as plaintiff. There is reference to a medical report. She had increased her hours I think from two days a week to four days a week still part‑time three or four hours a…
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- AGLC
- Ellis & Ors v Foley [2009] HCATrans 143
- Case
- [2009] HCATrans 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the notices of intention to present a winding-up petition were validly served on the respondent, and consequently, whether the winding-up proceedings could validly commence. This involved an examination of the requirements for service of such notices under the *Corporations Act* and relevant rules of court, particularly in circumstances where the respondent's registered office was no longer operative.
The Court analysed the statutory framework governing the service of notices in winding-up proceedings, focusing on the principles of statutory interpretation and the purpose of such provisions. It considered the implications of the respondent's failure to maintain a registered office and the steps taken by the applicants to effect service. The Court applied established principles regarding the efficacy of service when a party deliberately evades or obstructs formal communication, ultimately determining that the service of the notices was not effective in accordance with the *Corporations Act*.
Consequently, the Full Federal Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the primary judge, holding that the winding-up proceedings were not validly commenced due to the defective service of the notices.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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