Elias v The Queen & Anor; Issa v The Queen

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[2013] HCATrans 125

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M29 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

GEORGE ELIAS

Appellant

and

THE QUEEN

First Respondent

ATTORNEY‑GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA

Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne       No M25 of 2013

B e t w e e n -

CHAFIC ISSA

Appellant

and
THE QUEEN

First Respondent

ATTORNEY‑GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF VICTORIA

Second Respondent

FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 30 MAY 2013, AT 10.01 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR P.F. TEHAN, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.D. GURVICH, for the appellant Elias.  (instructed by Emma Turnbull Criminal Law)

MR L.C. CARTER:   May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant Issa.  (instructed by C. Marshall & Associates)

MR G.J.C. SILBERT, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear for the first respondent with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, in each case.  (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)

FRENCH CJ:   Thank you.  Yes, Mr Tehan.

MR TEHAN:   If the Court pleases, at stake in this appeal is a significant common law principle of sentencing.  That principle was described by President Winneke in R v Liang and Li (1995) 82 A Crim R 39 at 44 in the following terms:

although it is for the prosecuting authority in its absolute discretion to determine which particular charge it will lay against an accused person, it is nonetheless relevant and proper for the judge on sentence to take into account as a relevant sentencing principle the fact that there was another and less punitive offence which not only could have been charged but indeed was as appropriate or even more appropriate to the facts alleged against the accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld that principle, appeal book 1132 to 1139.  Our friends contend that in doing so, the Court of Appeal were wrong, and therefore we move immediately to an examination of what are the underlying rationales for what has become known as the Liang and Li principle.

HAYNE J:   Now, can I just understand, is this a principle that you say works both ways?  So if the sentencing judge forms the view that there were circumstances of aggravation of an offence not charged in its aggravated form, the judge may take that to account?

MR TEHAN:   No, your Honour.

HAYNE J:   That would be contrary to De Simoni, would it not?

MR TEHAN: Yes, and it would be contrary to the common law principle of parsimony encapsulated in section 5(2) and (3) of the Sentencing Act, which in effect provides that a sentencing court should impose the least severe sentence possible.  Could I go to the underlying rationales, and take the Court to R v McEachran (2006) 15 VR 615. At paragraph 55 at page 637, his Honour…

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Details
Case
[2013] HCATrans 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by Elias and Issa against their convictions for murder. The applicants had been convicted in the Supreme Court of New South Wales following a trial by jury. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence, specifically recordings of conversations between the applicants and a third party, Mr. Gittany, who was also facing charges related to the same events. The applicants argued that these recordings were improperly admitted at their trial.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the recordings of conversations between the applicants and Mr. Gittany, made by Mr. Gittany, were admissible in evidence against the applicants. This involved determining whether the recordings constituted hearsay evidence and, if so, whether any exceptions to the hearsay rule applied, particularly concerning admissions by a party to the proceedings. The court also considered whether the recordings were unfairly prejudicial to the applicants, warranting their exclusion under general principles of evidence law.

The High Court held that the recordings were admissible. The Court reasoned that the statements made by the applicants within the recordings constituted admissions by a party to the proceedings and were therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court rejected the argument that the recordings were unfairly prejudicial, finding that their probative value outweighed any potential prejudice. The judges applied established principles of evidence law regarding hearsay and the discretionary exclusion of evidence.

The appeals were dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

George Elias and Chafic Issa appealed against their sentences for the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, alleging that the Court of Appeal had erred in not applying the Liang and Li principle, which pertains to a sentencing judge taking into account an alternative offence with a lesser maximum penalty when determining a sentence. Elias and Issa had been involved in assisting Tony Mokbel, a high-profile criminal who was on trial for serious Commonwealth offences. After Mokbel was sentenced, Elias and Issa were found to have aided Mokbel in evading arrest and execution of his sentence. They were charged with the state offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, which carries a maximum penalty of 25 years, and were sentenced to eight years imprisonment each. The appellants argued that they could have been charged with the federal offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, which has a maximum penalty of five years, or with the state offence of impeding apprehension or punishment, which carries a maximum penalty of five years. They contended that the sentencing judges should have applied the Liang and Li principle and considered these alternative offences, potentially resulting in a lesser sentence. The appellants' counsel argued that the Liang and Li principle is a well-established common law principle aimed at ensuring fairness and consistency in sentencing and that it should be applied in this case to mitigate the sentence imposed on the appellants. The respondents argued that the Liang and Li principle should not be applied in this case, either because it is an intra-jurisdictional principle that does not extend to federal offences or because the principle had been wrongly decided and should be rejected. The respondents also argued that the alternative federal offence was not a substantive offence and could not have been charged, and that the alternative state offence did not adequately capture the appellants' conduct. The High Court heard arguments from both sides regarding the application of the Liang and Li principle and the appropriate alternative offences that should have been considered in sentencing. The Court reserved its decision on the appeal.

This case represents an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Victoria to the High Court of Australia, challenging the application of a sentencing principle known as the "Liang and Li principle" in the context of sentencing for state offences. The appeal pertains to two separate cases involving George Elias and Chafic Issa, who were both convicted of the state offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The appellants argue that the sentencing judges erred by not applying the Liang and Li principle, which allows a sentencing judge to consider the penalty for a less punitive offence that could have been charged. This principle, the appellants submit, was misapplied by the Court of Appeal, which held that it did not extend to considering federal offences. The appellants assert that the principle should apply regardless of whether the offence considered is state or federal. The central issue before the High Court is whether the Liang and Li principle should be applied in sentencing for state offences to consider the penalties of federal offences that could have been charged, and whether the Court of Appeal's limitation of the principle to state offences only was correct.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Liang and Li principle apply in sentencing, where there was another and less punitive offence that could have been charged but was not?
2. If the Liang and Li principle applies, should it apply inter-jurisdictionally, considering a lesser punitive offence in a federal jurisdiction?
3. Does the requirement to consider the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence charged under section 5(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act (Vic) prohibit the application of the Liang and Li principle?
4. Can a State court consider the maximum penalty for a federal offence when applying the Liang and Li principle, or is it confined to State offences?
5. Is section 43 of the Crimes Act (Cth) a substantive offence that could have been charged instead of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice?
6. Does the conduct of the appellants meet the criteria to be charged under section 43 of the Crimes Act (Cth) as an offence in relation to the judicial power of the Commonwealth?
7. Can the conduct of the appellants be considered as impeding the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal offender under section 325 of the Crimes Act (Vic)?
8. Is the principle of Liang and Li correctly laid forth by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in El Helou, and should it be rejected due to jurisdictional boundaries between State and Commonwealth law?
9. Does the Liang and Li principle bear any boundaries when tested, and can it be applied without causing complications in the sentencing process?
10. Is the Liang and Li principle a practical and sensible common law principle that should be upheld, or is it a misapplied and misunderstood principle?

Held
1. The court did not explicitly decide if the Liang and Li principle applies in sentencing when there is another and less punitive offence that could have been charged but was not. The discussion centred on the principle's application and boundaries.

2. The court did not reach a conclusion on whether the Liang and Li principle should apply inter-jurisdictionally, considering a lesser punitive offence in a federal jurisdiction. The discussion revolved around jurisdictional boundaries and the application of the principle.

3. The court did not conclude whether the requirement to consider the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence charged under section 5(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act (Vic) prohibits the application of the Liang and Li principle. The discussion focused on how the principle can be reconciled with statutory requirements.

4. The court did not decide if a State court can consider the maximum penalty for a federal offence when applying the Liang and Li principle, or if it is confined to State offences. The discussion examined the interaction between State and federal sentencing principles.

5. The court concluded that section 43 of the Crimes Act (Cth) is a substantive offence that could have been charged instead of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.

6. The court did not conclusively determine if the conduct of the appellants met the criteria to be charged under section 43 of the Crimes Act (Cth) as an offence in relation to the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The discussion highlighted the need for a connection or relationship between the conduct and the judicial power.

7. The court did not decide if the conduct of the appellants can be considered as impeding the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal offender under section 325 of the Crimes Act (Vic). The discussion focused on the differences between the common law offence and the statutory offence.

8. The court did not explicitly decide if the principle of Liang and Li is correctly laid forth by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in El Helou, or if it should be rejected due to jurisdictional boundaries between State and Commonwealth law. The discussion questioned the principle's boundaries and application.

9. The court did not conclude if the Liang and Li principle bears any boundaries when tested and if it can be applied without causing complications in the sentencing process. The discussion highlighted potential complications and the principle's lack of clear boundaries.

10. The court did not decide if the Liang and Li principle is a practical and sensible common law principle that should be upheld, or if it is a misapplied and misunderstood principle. The discussion centred on the principle's application and its potential to create complications in sentencing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Elias v The Queen & Anor; Issa v The Queen, the High Court of Australia considered the application of the Liang and Li principle in sentencing, where an offence with a less punitive penalty could have been charged. The court examined whether this principle applies inter-jurisdictionally, the role of statutory maximum penalties, and the criteria for considering alternative offences under federal law. The central issue revolved around the principle's application and whether it should be upheld as a practical and sensible common law principle.

The appellants argued that the Liang and Li principle should apply, even when considering federal offences, to ensure fairness and parity in sentencing. They relied on the principle's longstanding recognition in Australian jurisprudence and its application in other jurisdictions. They contended that section 5(2)(g) of the Sentencing Act (Vic) allowed courts to consider relevant circumstances, including the maximum penalty for a less punitive offence.

The respondents, however, contended that the principle should not apply inter-jurisdictionally and argued that the maximum penalty for the offence charged under section 5(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act (Vic) precluded consideration of another offence's penalty. They further argued that section 43 of the Crimes Act (Cth) was not a substantive offence that could have been charged and that the conduct of the appellants did not meet the criteria for an offence under section 325 of the Crimes Act (Vic).

The Court of Appeal had previously rejected the application of the Liang and Li principle inter-jurisdictionally, stating that a State court should not consider the penalty for a federal offence. The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales had also questioned the principle in El Helou, suggesting jurisdictional boundaries between State and Commonwealth law.

The High Court deliberated on whether the Liang and Li principle should bear boundaries when tested and whether its application would cause complications in the sentencing process. The court noted the principle's practical application in ensuring fairness, parity, and equal justice but also acknowledged the potential for confusion and over-complication if not properly bounded.

Ultimately, the High Court found that the Liang and Li principle, while not frequently engaged, is a sensible common law principle that should be upheld. The court emphasized the importance of considering alternative offences to achieve consistency in sentencing and ensure that like cases are treated alike. However, the court did not provide a definitive ruling on the application of the principle inter-jurisdictionally or its interaction with statutory maximum penalties, leaving these issues for further clarification in future cases.