Electro Industry Group Queensland Ltd v O'Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Electro Industry Group Queensland Ltd v O’Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd [2017] QCA 24

PARTIES:

ELECTRO INDUSTRY GROUP QUEENSLAND LIMITED
ABN 98 084 199 333
(appellant)
v

O’DONNELL GRIFFIN PTY LTD T/A DIVERSE DATA COMMUNICATIONS also T/A DDC COMMUNICATIONS
ABN 78 003 905 093
(respondent)
STEVE JULIAN CLAUDE MEDINA
(not a party to the appeal)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8212 of 2016
SC No 4825 of 2009

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2016] QSC 143

DELIVERED ON:

3 March 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 February 2017

JUDGES:

Holmes CJ and Gotterson JA and Bond J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Set aside the orders made on 18 July 2016.

3.   Order that the originating application filed on 6 May 2016 be dismissed.

4.    Order that the defendant have leave pursuant to r 389(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules to take a new step in the third party proceeding on the condition that the third party claim is to be litigated on the basis of the statement of claim of the defendant against the third party filed on 11 November 2009.

5.   There be no order as to costs in respect of each of the appeal and of the originating application at first instance.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COURT SUPERVISION – WANT OF PROSECUTION OR LACK OF PROGRESS – where a claim was brought against the appellant in May 2009 by an employee for personal injury arising from the appellant’s negligence – where the appellant commenced third party proceedings against the respondent in November 2009 – where between 2010 and 2016, there were significant delays between steps taken in the third party proceeding – where the appellant took steps without first delivering a Notice of Intention to Proceed or obtaining an order of the Court in accordance with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (“UCPR”) r 389 – where the appellant sought leave nunc pro tunc pursuant to UCPR r 389 to take the irregular steps and proceed with the claim – where the primary judge refused leave and struck out the third party proceeding for want of prosecution – where the primary judge misapprehended the true facts due to unsatisfactory evidence – whether the misapprehension of fact infected the exercise of the discretion in a material way – whether it is appropriate to grant leave pursuant to UCPR r 389(2) to take a new step in the third party proceeding

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – IN GENERAL – JUDGE MISTAKEN OR MISLED – GENERALLY – where the primary judge struck out the third party proceeding for want of prosecution – where, in exercising his discretion, the primary judge attached “heavy” weight to the inability of the respondent to locate…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Electro Industry Group Queensland Ltd v O'Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd, the dispute arose from a claim for personal injury brought against the appellant in May 2009 by an employee, with the appellant subsequently commencing third-party proceedings against the respondent in November 2009. The primary judge struck out the third-party proceeding for want of prosecution due to delays and the inability to locate a key witness, Mr Kirk. The appellant sought leave to proceed with the claim, which was refused, leading to an appeal.

The court had to determine whether the primary judge's misapprehension about the facts materially affected the exercise of discretion in dismissing the third-party claim. Specifically, the issue was whether the primary judge's reliance on the unavailability of Mr Kirk as an essential witness led to an incorrect decision. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the respondent was prejudiced by the delay and whether it was appropriate to grant leave under UCPR r 389(2) for the appellant to take a new step in the third-party proceeding.

The court found that the primary judge's decision was influenced by a misapprehension of fact, as evidence on appeal demonstrated that Mr Kirk was available to testify. The court concluded that the misapprehension materially affected the exercise of the primary judge's discretion. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made on 18 July 2016 were set aside. The court granted leave for the appellant to take a new step in the third-party proceeding on the condition that the claim is litigated based on the statement of claim filed on 11 November 2009. No order was made as to costs for the appeal and the originating application at first instance.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders made on 18 July 2016.

3. Order that the originating application filed on 6 May 2016 be dismissed.

4. Order that the defendant have leave pursuant to r 389(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules to take a new step in the third party proceeding on the condition that the third party claim is to be litigated on the basis of the statement of claim of the defendant against the third party filed on 11 November 2009.

5. There be no order as to costs in respect of each of the appeal and of the originating application at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The learned primary judge concluded that the third party proceeding ought to be struck out for the following reasons:[25][25]Reasons [32]-[35].“[32] The factors which weigh heavily in this case are:(a)The unsatisfactory explanation for the delay.(b)The current inability of the third party to locate witnesses, especially Kirk.(c)The inevitable deterioration in the memories of any witnesses who might be found.[33]In the absence of Mr Kirk, ODG has no witnesses upon which it can rely. Although the site diaries may be admissible under the provisions of the Evidence Act, the importance and meaning of the entries and, in particular, the absence of particular entries, cannot be conveyed to the court without Mr Kirk being available to give that evidence. Even if he were available, whatever recollection he might otherwise have had about general issues about the work system, the way scaffolding was used and the manner in which cables were laid in 2003 would have deteriorated substantially after the passage of 13 years.[34]This is a case in which the defendant has sat on its hands. That might have been due to a forensic choice or to mere unexplained inactivity. The third party should not be compelled to face a case in which, through no fault of its own, it would not be able to call an essential witness. Further, it should not be required to face a case which EIG seeks to enlarge by its most recent pleading. The effluxion of time does lead to the deterioration of memory and, in this case, the unavailability of witnesses. That leads to a prejudice to the third party and will prevent it receiving a fair trial. In those circumstances it is appropriate to make the order sought.”The appeal and evidence on appeal On 12 August 2016, EIG filed a notice of appeal to this Court against the decision at first instance.[26] At the hearing of the appeal, leave was granted, without objection, to the filing of three affidavits. They all concern the availability of ODG’s site foreman, Mr Kirk, to testify. As a prelude to detailing these affidavits, I note that Mr S A Sullivan, solicitor, who acts for ODG, had filed an affidavit in support of the application at first instance in which he had deposed that an employee of his firm had spoken to Mr Kirk on 11 October 2007 and was told the following by him:[27]“10.1he signed off on the site diary every day;10.2the site diary was extremely accurate;10.3he could not recall the plaintiff at all and was unaware of any incident involving the plaintiff on site;10.4he would have recorded the number of hours actually worked by each of the workers, including the plaintiff, in the site diary. If a worker, including the plaintiff, had not undertaken the work, Matthew Kirk would not have recorded the time in the diary; and10.5he would have made a note in the site diary if there was any report of an incident, injury or treatment of first aid on a particular day. The absence of an entry meant that there was no report of an incident, injury or treatment of first aid on that day.”but that in April and May 2016, he had been unable to locate Mr Kirk.[28][26]AB362-365.[27]Affidavit S A Sullivan sworn 6 May 2016, paragraphs 10.1-10.5: AB18.[28]Ibid paragraphs 10, 15: AB19.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established