Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA [2008] FCA 1135

ADMIRALTY – ship under tow – liability of ship under tow for loss and damage caused by tug – imputation of liability under contract – cannot be relied upon by third party

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary judgment and judgment on admissions – entering such a judgment for the plaintiff without appropriate orders 

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 190
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 6, 15
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)

Quinlan v Safe International Forsakrings AB [2006] FCA 1718 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 discussed
One.Tel Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548 discussed
Baxter v Obacelo Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 635 applied
Jameson v Central Electricity Generating Board [1998] QB 323 applied
Bankers Trust International Ltd v Todd Shipyards Corporation; “The Halcyon Isle” [1981] AC 221 cited
Currie v M’Knight [1896] AC 97 considered
“The Eschersheim” [1976] 1 WLR 430 considered
Opal Maritime Agencies Pty Ltd v Proceeds of Sale of Vessel MV “Skulptor Konenkov” (2000) 172 ALR 481 cited
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107 distinguished
The Niobe (1888) 13 PD 55 discussed
The Quickstep (1890) 15 PD 196 considered
Owners of the “SS Devonshire” v Owners of the Barge “Leslie” [1912] AC 634 considered
The MSC Panther and the Ericbank [1957] 1 Lloyds Rep 57 cited

United Kingdom Standard Conditions for Towage and Other Services (Revised 1974)

ELBE SHIPPING SA v GIANT MARINE SHIPPING SA, BEING THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP "GLOBAL PEACE" and ADSTEAM HARBOUR PTY LIMITED

NSD 124 OF 2006

SQ MARINE SA v GIANT MARINE SHIPPING SA, BEING THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP “GLOBAL PEACE” and ADSTEAM HARBOUR PTY LIMITED
NSD 125 OF 2006

DOWSETT J
5 AUGUST 2008
BRISBANE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 124 OF 2006

IN ADMIRALTY

BETWEEN:

ELBE SHIPPING SA
Plaintiff

AND:

GIANT MARINE SHIPPING SA, BEING THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP "GLOBAL PEACE"
First Defendant

ADSTEAM HARBOUR PTY LIMITED
Second Defendant

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 AUGUST 2008

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparation for trial, incurred after 7 February 2008 and prior to 11 March 2008, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

2.the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, the motion for judgment, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

3.the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparing for and appearing at the hearing on 17 and 18 March 2008 for the purpose of arguing all questions of costs (not including any costs incurred solely in appearing to consent to dismissal of the action) to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

4.liberty to the plaintiff…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Elbe Shipping SA v Giant Marine Shipping SA, the primary dispute centred around the interpretation of contractual terms, specifically those related to a towage contract. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff, Elbe Shipping SA, sought judgment based on the defendant's admissions and the interpretation of the Standard Conditions for Towage and Other Services. The defendant, Giant Marine Shipping SA, contested the plaintiff's claims, leading to a detailed examination of the contractual obligations and the consequences of their breach.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Elbe Shipping SA was entitled to summary judgment or judgment based on the admissions made by Giant Marine Shipping SA and the interpretation of the contractual terms. The court needed to determine whether the plaintiff's claims were sufficiently established to warrant judgment and whether such a judgment could be entered without specifying the relief to be granted. Additionally, the court had to consider the implications of the plaintiff's failure to promptly apply for summary judgment and the appropriateness of awarding costs under the circumstances.

The court found that while Elbe Shipping SA had made a prima facie case for summary judgment, the failure to promptly apply for such judgment and the absence of a clear basis for specific relief rendered the proposed judgment problematic. The court also determined that Elbe Shipping SA was not entitled to costs under the circumstances presented. The judge highlighted that while there were elements of negligence on both sides, the primary responsibility for the failure to promptly seek summary judgment lay with the plaintiff. Consequently, the court awarded costs to Giant Marine Shipping SA for specific periods related to the preparation for trial, the motion for judgment, and the hearing on costs.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for summary judgment and struck out the action. The final orders mandated that the plaintiff pay certain costs incurred by the defendant, with provisions for potential adjustments to those costs. The notice of motion filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed, and the action was ultimately dismissed without further proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparation for trial, incurred after 7 February 2008 and prior to 11 March 2008, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

2. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, the motion for judgment, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

3. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparing for and appearing at the hearing on 17 and 18 March 2008 for the purpose of arguing all questions of costs (not including any costs incurred solely in appearing to consent to dismissal of the action) to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

4. liberty to the plaintiff and first defendant to apply, at any time prior to the final taxation of costs, to vary the above orders as they apply to the first respondent’s counsels’ fees;

5. the notice of motion filed 22 March 2006 be dismissed; and

6. the action be dismissed.

1. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparation for trial incurred after 21 February 2008 and prior to 11 March 2008, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

2. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, the motion for judgment, to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

3. the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of, and incidental to, preparing for and appearing at the hearing on 17 and 18 March 2008 for the purpose of arguing all questions of costs (not including any costs incurred solely in appearing to consent to dismissal of the action) to be taxed and paid on an indemnity basis;

4. liberty to the plaintiff and first defendant to apply, at any time prior to the final taxation of costs, to vary the above orders as they apply to the first respondent’s counsels’ fees;

5. the notice of motion filed 22 March 2006 be dismissed; and

6. the action be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Elbe Shipping SA (the plaintiff) filed an action against Giant Marine Shipping SA (the first defendant) and Adsteam Marine (the second defendant) over a maritime collision and subsequent damage to the plaintiff's vessel. The plaintiff sought damages based on alleged breaches of contract and negligence by the first defendant. The second defendant was later joined to the proceedings. The Standard Conditions for Towage and Other Services (Revised 1974) were incorporated into the contract between the first defendant and Adsteam Marine. The plaintiff applied for summary judgment based on admissions made by the first defendant and the interpretation of the Standard Conditions. The plaintiff argued that the admissions and the contract terms established their entitlement to judgment without further proceedings. The first defendant opposed the summary judgment application, arguing that the plaintiff's claims were not as straightforward as the plaintiff suggested and that further evidence and argument were necessary to determine liability and damages.

The matter first came before the court when the plaintiff filed an action against the first defendant. The second defendant was later joined to the action. The plaintiff subsequently applied for summary judgment based on admissions and contract interpretation. The first defendant opposed the summary judgment application. The court heard arguments on the summary judgment application and subsequently dismissed the action. The court also considered and made orders regarding costs between the parties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J
Counsel continued:The second way we’d put it is this: applying Order 62 rule 3 which is a very broad rule, extremely broad, and addresses, without descending into the content, but addresses the type of problem that could emerge, such as in this case, that the Court may in the proceedings exercise its powers and its discretions as to costs at any stage of the proceedings or after conclusion of the proceedings, and its an extremely broad power that’s been given.It’s been the subject of some observation by McHugh J, which your Honour would have seen in our written submissions, which means if your Honour is satisfied in essence that there was a strong prospect we would have succeeded, we should get costs under that. In essence, we say that for the same reasons in essence as we moved for summary judgment, we would plainly fall within Order 62 rule 3 which is a lower threshold than a General Steel-type test, but just so that your Honour understands the clarity with which we say one can be satisfied that we will have succeeded, we would meet a General Steel test when we come to look at it. We don’t have to for the purposes of Order 62 rule 3. That’s the second issue that we develop briefly and again, it turns on the same very brief and simple argument about the significance of the terms.The third issue that we seek to develop is, well, if we’re not entitled, if we can’t persuade your Honour that we should have won, then absent my learned friend persuading your Honour likewise that he should have won, the appropriate position is walk away but for issue costs in respect of some relevant delinquency. We say there has been some relevant delinquency in three respects arising from the pleadings and that will be a short argument that I’ll take your Honour to, but in essence we would want issues costs, if I can describe it as that, issues costs in respect of negligence, seaworthiness and loss and damage from the commencement of the proceedings up until the joinder of the second defendant. So that’s the third category, if I can put it in that way, your Honour.SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON ADMISSIONS It is commonly understood that applications for summary judgment should be brought promptly so as to avoid the incurrence of costs in preparing for trial. See Quinlan v Safe International Forsakrings AB [2006] FCA 1718 at [47]. This decision reflects a long line of cases in various jurisdictions. However it is not necessary to consider that proposition for present purposes. The plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to summary judgment or judgment upon the basis of admissions made by Giant Marine and upon the proper construction of the United Kingdom Standard Conditions for Towage and Other Services (Revised 1974) (the “Standard Conditions”) which were incorporated into the contract between Giant Marine and Adsteam. Counsel for the plaintiffs submit that notwithstanding payment in each action, I should simply “enter judgment” for each plaintiff. It is said that not infrequently, courts pronounce orders in that form. In my own experience, when a claim has failed completely, it is not uncommon for a court to order that there be judgment for the defendant. In those circumstances there is no need to say more, save as to costs. However, where judgment is entered for a plaintiff, it is almost axiomatic that some relief must be identified. It may be declaratory relief. It may be an award of damages. It may be the making of an injunction or an order for specific performance. To give judgment for a plaintiff without identifying the appropriate relief could be nothing more than a shorthand way of indicating that the plaintiff had been successful and that appropriate orders would be made accordingly. Where there are to be no such orders, such a “judgment” is pointless. Counsel sought to justify the proposed orders upon the basis that they would avoid further disputes between the parties, or between parties and third parties, as to liability for the collision and/or for the relevant damage. In some circumstances, fear of such a future dispute might justify declaratory relief. However, for present purposes, there is no evidence to suggest any reasonable basis for such a fear.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

The court considered the application for summary judgment and judgment on admissions by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the admissions by the first defendant and the proper construction of the Standard Conditions. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had not identified any specific relief they sought, other than a "judgment" for the plaintiff. The court held that a judgment for a plaintiff without identifying the appropriate relief could be nothing more than a shorthand way of indicating that the plaintiff had been successful and that appropriate orders would be made accordingly. The court held that where there were no such orders, such a "judgment" was pointless.

The court then turned to the issue of costs. The plaintiff argued that they should be awarded costs on an indemnity basis for the preparation and appearance at the hearing on costs. However, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to such costs. The court held that the plaintiff had not met the threshold for such an award and that the first defendant should not be penalised for the plaintiff's failure to secure summary judgment.

Finally, the court considered the issue of issue costs. The plaintiff argued that the first defendant's negligence, seaworthiness, and loss and damage claims from the commencement of the proceedings until the joinder of the second defendant warranted issue costs. However, the court held that there had been no relevant delinquency on the part of the first defendant that warranted such an award. The court held that the first defendant's claims were not frivolous or vexatious and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the first defendant's conduct warranted issue costs. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that a court may not enter judgment for a plaintiff without identifying the appropriate relief and that a plaintiff is not entitled to costs on an indemnity basis for the preparation and appearance at the hearing on costs where they have not secured summary judgment. Additionally, a court may not award issue costs where there has been no relevant delinquency on the part of the defendant.