El Safty v Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

El Safty v Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd [2017] QCA 224

PARTIES:

AHMED EL SAFTY
(applicant)
v
KAYE CHAPMAN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
ACN 145 505 951
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4264 of 2017
DC No 248 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Southport – Unreported, 3 April 2017 (Muir DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

6 October 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 September 2017

JUDGES:

Gotterson and McMurdo JJA and Mullins J

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to adduce further evidence refused.

2.   Application for leave to appeal refused.

3.   The applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the applications to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE – IN GENERAL – where applicant applied for leave to appeal against summary judgment in favour of the respondent – where summary judgment application had been adjourned to allow the applicant to adduce further evidence on issues in dispute, including the ownership of certain furniture – where the applicant failed to adduce further evidence at the adjourned summary judgment application on the ownership of the furniture – where counsel for the applicant conceded that summary judgment could be given in favour of the respondent for the undisputed part of the respondent’s claim – whether the applicant should be granted leave to adduce further evidence on the issues alleged to be in dispute – whether the application for leave to appeal against summary judgment should be granted

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 766

R v Katsidis; ex parte A-G (Qld)[2005] QCA 229, cited

COUNSEL:

C C Upton for the applicant
G R Coveney for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

PPCS Lawyers for the applicant
Case Legal Pty Ltd for the respondent

  1. GOTTERSON JA:  I agree with the orders proposed by Mullins J and with the reasons given by her Honour.

  2. McMURDO JA:  I agree with Mullins J.

  3. MULLINS J:  Mr El Safty applies for leave to appeal against summary judgment given against him in the District Court on 3 April 2017 for part of the respondent’s claim, namely the sum of $105,544, together with an order for costs of the summary judgment application in favour of the respondent.

  4. Unless Mr El Safty is successful in his application for leave to adduce further evidence on the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, there is no basis to challenge the learned primary judge’s decision to give summary judgment against Mr El Safty, as the then counsel for Mr El Safty conceded that such judgment could be entered against his client.

    The District Court proceeding

  5. The respondent’s claim against Mr El Safty was for the sum of $248,572.70 for debt together with indemnity costs pursuant to an agreement between the parties.  The statement of claim pleaded a number of agreements between the respondent, Mr El Safty and El Safty Enterprises…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

El Safty brought proceedings against Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd for the return of furniture and other relief. Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd applied for summary judgment. The application was adjourned to enable El Safty to adduce evidence on the ownership of the furniture. When the matter returned, El Safty’s counsel conceded that judgment could be entered for the undisputed part of Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd’s claim. El Safty subsequently applied for leave to appeal against the summary judgment and to adduce further evidence. El Safty argued that he had been unable to communicate his position to the primary judge and that he would have paid Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd if the furniture had been returned. Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd opposed the application on the basis that the application was an abuse of process and that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. The court considered whether El Safty should be granted leave to adduce further evidence on the issues alleged to be in dispute and whether the application for leave to appeal against summary judgment should be granted. The court held that El Safty had not discharged the onus of showing that the primary judge had erred in refusing to admit the further evidence and that the application was an abuse of process. The court held that the evidence was irrelevant because it did not address the issues that were before the court and inadmissible because it was hearsay. The court refused the application for leave to adduce further evidence and the application for leave to appeal. The court ordered that El Safty pay Kaye Chapman Investments Pty Ltd’s costs of the applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to adduce further evidence refused.

2. Application for leave to appeal refused.

3. The applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the applications to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In giving reasons for ordering judgment on part of the respondent’s claim, the primary judge noted that, on Mr El Safty’s own case, he was indebted to the respondent in the sum of $202,000 and, deducting from that sum the amounts in respect of which Mr El Safty had produced evidence of making payments to the respondent between 9 June and 22 December 2015, left the balance of $105,544. The primary judge noted expressly that judgment was given for the amount conceded by Mr El Safty. The summary judgment disposed of only part of the respondent’s claim and it was common ground that the balance of the plaintiff’s claim would have to proceed to trial.The further evidence The further evidence was received by the court for the purpose of determining the question of leave pursuant to r 766(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). It relevantly comprises two affidavits of Mr El Safty and an affidavit of a law clerk from Mr El Safty’s former solicitors. The law clerk was present during the hearing on 3 April 2017, but was not present for all the conversation that took place between Mr El Safty and his then counsel, when the matter had been stood down by the primary judge to enable counsel to obtain instructions from Mr El Safty. The law clerk heard counsel’s advice to Mr El Safty that “the judge was heading down the path of giving summary judgment”. One affidavit of Mr El Safty records that he was “not happy” when his counsel told the court that judgment could be entered and that his solicitor would not allow him to talk directly to the judge. Mr El Safty deposed that, if he had been allowed to speak to the judge, he would have informed the court that he would pay the respondent, if the furniture was returned to him. The other affidavit of Mr El Safty sets out his recollection of the conversation that he had with counsel on 3 April 2007 prior to the concession being made to the judge about the entry of judgment and exhibits the application Mr El Safty filed in the District Court on 4 September 2017 to seek leave to withdraw the deemed admissions made in the amended defence and counterclaim filed on 6 March 2017 and for leave to file the further amended defence and amended counterclaim (the proposed defence and counterclaim) exhibited to that affidavit. Mr El Safty has recited the effect of the conversation he had with counsel as follows:“(i)Counsel said to me that the judge had made up her mind that the Plaintiff was the owner of the furniture and she would make an adverse order if I do not admit that the Plaintiff is the owner of the furniture;(ii)in response, I informed Counsel that I was the owner of the furniture, and that I had stated this in my affidavits filed in the Application;(iii)I informed Counsel that I am entitled to an account for the value of the furniture and I am entitled to set-off that value against the money I owed the Plaintiff pursuant to our 2015 agreement;(iv)I told Counsel if the Plaintiff returned the furniture to me, which is rightfully mine, I owed the Plaintiff money. If she doesn’t, I do not owe the Plaintiff any money;(v)that was the end of our conversation and Counsel returned to Court.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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