Ejueyitsi v Board of Examiners

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
EJUEYITSI v BOARD OF EXAMINERS
[2021] SASC 65
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL
This is an application to reinstate an appeal against a “judgment” of the Board of Examiners (the Board) said to have been made on 31 May 2017. The relevant decision made by the Board on 1 March 2016 was to revoke the determination it had made on 30 August 2011 in relation to a review of the applicant’s overseas qualifications.
On 15 June 2017, the applicant filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Board. However, on 27 March 2018 the applicant was advised by the Supreme Court Registry that his appeal had been discontinued pursuant to r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA).
On 30 November 2020, the applicant filed an interlocutory application in which he sought orders for:
1.      reinstatement of application; and
2.      matter listed for a review.
Held, per Parker J, dismissing the application:
1.   There is no relevant right of appeal against the decision made by the Board on 1 March 2016.
2.   The application made on 30 November 2020 is dismissed. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed on 15 June 2017 continues to be taken to have been discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) as it had not been set down for hearing within six months.
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) ss 14C(2), 14I, 14J, 15(1), 15(2), s 17A(6); Rules of the Legal Practitioners Education and Admission Council 2004 r 4; Supreme Court Act 1936 (SA) s 50; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) Part 9 of Chapter 17, r 296(2), r 366(1)(c), r 375, r 407, r 408; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) Chapter 7, r 257.9, referred to.
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, applied.
Re Evenden (1988) 148 LSJS 138, distinguished.

EJUEYITSI v BOARD OF EXAMINERS
[2021] SASC 65
Civil

PARKER J: In this action the applicant, Vincent Ejueyitsi, seeks to reinstate an appeal against a “judgment” of the Board of Examiners (the Board) that he alleges was made on 31 May 2017. For the reasons that follow, no appealable decision was made by the Board relating to Mr Ejueyitsi, whether on 31 May 2017 or at any other time. His application is therefore dismissed.
Background
On 30 August 2011, the Board resolved as follows:
Academic: That Vincent Babatunde Ejueyitsi be advised that to satisfy the academic requirements for admission he must complete at an Australian University the following subjects Criminal Law and Procedure, Torts, Contracts, Property, Equity (and Trusts), Company Law, Administrative Law, Federal and State Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
Practical: That Vincent Babatunde Ejueyitsi be advised that he would need to complete an approved Practical Legal Training program in Australia.
In reaching this decision the Board relied upon the advice of the Council of Legal Education as assessing body for South Australian applications and as contained in their letter of advice of 16 August 2011.
The Board advises the applicant that he will need to satisfy these requirements within 5 years of the date of this determination and that he will need to satisfactorily complete an IELTS test within 2 years of the date of his application for admission.[1]
(Footnote added)
[1] The acronym IELTS stands for International English Language Testing System.
On 22 May 2015, the Council of Legal Education in Victoria (the Council)[2] advised the Board that it had reviewed the advice that it had provided to the Board on 16 August 2011 concerning its assessment of the qualifications of Mr Ejueyitsi. The assessment it had made in 2011 was based on documents that he had provided indicating that he had completed the degree of Bachelor of Science in Law at Suffield University in the United States. It was noted that Suffield University was not approved by the American Bar Association. For that reason, the Board was advised in 2011 that Mr Ejueyitsi should undertake study in all “Priestley 11” subject areas and also the full practical legal training requirement in accordance with the Uniform Principles for Assessing Qualification of Overseas applicants for Admission to the Australian Legal Profession.[3] The letter further stated:
It has now come light that the Bachelor of Science in Law at Suffield University in USA does not appear to be a qualification leading to practice in an overseas jurisdiction and may in fact be bogus. It appears that Suffield University is not an accredited institution.   It was not possible to verify through an internet search that Suffield University has a physical address. We made an email enquiry to the institution which has gone unanswered. There are numerous online statements alleging Suffield University is a ‘diploma mill’ which grants qualifications in return for payment.
[2]    This body has also been referred to at different points in the documentary evidence as the Legal Admissions Board and the Board of Examiners.
[3]    The “Priestley 11” are the subjects that all Australian law students must have passed in order to meet the minimum academic requirements for admission to legal practice. They comprise the subjects listed in the Council’s letter of 16 August 2011.
In that light, the Council recommended that the assessment of Mr Ejueyitsi’s qualifications should be revoked unless he could provide evidence that his qualification does lead to legal practice in an overseas jurisdiction as required by item 1(a) of the Uniform Principles. The author went on to apologise for what appears to have been an error in the assessment provided in 2011. Steps were to be taken to ensure that it does not reoccur.
On 26 May 2015, the Board informed Mr Ejueyitsi by letter of the further advice it had received from the Council and invited him to make submissions about the matter by 5 June 2015. The Board specifically asked Mr Ejueyitsi to provide evidence that his qualifications did lead to legal practice in overseas jurisdiction as required by Item 1(a) of the Uniform Principles.
The information provided to the Court by the parties does not disclose what response, if any, Mr Ejueyitsi made to the Board’s letter of 26 May 2015. However, the fact that the Board did not decide the issue until 1 March 2016, suggests that there was some communication.
In a letter dated 2 March 2016 the Board advised Mr Ejueyitsi that it had been informed that the accreditation provided by the Council that formed the basis for the resolution had been withdrawn. On that basis, on 1 March 2016 the Board had resolved as follows:
That the determination made by the Board of Examiners on 30 August 2011 be revoked in accordance with the advice provided by the Victorian Legal Admission Board.
On 31 May 2017 Ms Rosalind Burke, the Director (Ethics and Practice) with the Law Society wrote to Mr Francis Elekwachi, the solicitor then acting for Mr Ejueyitsi, in her capacity as the secretary to the Board.[4] She referred to a letter sent to the Board by Mr Elekwachi dated 8 May 2017. She advised that the Board had noted the decision it had made on 1 March 2016, based on advice from the Council,[5] to revoke the determination it had made on 30 August 2011. Ms Burke advised that “it is for your client to determine his possible course of action with respect to that decision”. She went on to say:
I have been directed by the Board of Examiners to refer you to Part 9 of Chapter 17 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 which deals with appeals against decisions made by the Board of Examiners.
[4] The Law Society provides administrative support to the Board pursuant to a memorandum of understanding.
[5] Here referred to as the Victorian Legal Admissions Board.
The appeal
On 15 June 2017 Mr Ejueyitsi filed an amended notice of appeal against the decision of the Board that he said had been made on 31 May 2017.[6] He stated that it was not clear if he needed an extension of time and indicated that he had first heard about the revocation of the original Board decision in December 2016 while undertaking practical legal training. He then made enquiries with the Board but did not receive what he described as “the revocation letter” (apparently the letter dated 1 March 2016) until 24 April 2017. He stated that he was unaware of his right to appeal against the decision until he was advised by the Board in its letter dated 31 May 2017. He stated that he had lodged his appeal within 21 days of being informed of his right of appeal.
[6] An earlier and materially different version of the notice of appeal dated 7 June 2016 was received in the Registry by facsimile message on that date.
Mr Ejueyitsi raised three grounds in the amended notice of appeal filed on 15 June 2017.
The grounds of appeal were as follows:
·Whether the revocation of the accreditation granted to the Appellant in 2011 was retrospective, and whether the respondent erred on this ground?
·Whether the Uniform Principles for Assessing Overseas Applications was in existence in 2011? Whether the appellant made application in 2015 that required the application of the Uniform Principles policy introduced in 2015. Whether the respondent erred on this ground?
·Whether the accreditation granted to the Appellant by the respondent in 2011 limit the Appellant to a jurisdiction in terms of Undergoing Practical Legal Training in an Approved institution in Australia? Whether the respondent erred in the contrary?
On 27 March 2018 Mr Ejueyitsi was advised by the Supreme Court Registry that his appeal had been discontinued pursuant to r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006. If he wished the appeal to be reinstated, it would be necessary to file an interlocutory application and affidavit. Nothing appears to have happened, as far as the Court is concerned, until 23 November 2020 when Mr Ejueyitsi contacted the Registry by email.
The interlocutory application
On 30 November 2020 Mr Ejueyitsi filed an interlocutory application in which he sought orders for:
1.Reinstatement of application;
2.Matter listed for a review.
In a supporting affidavit Mr Ejueyitsi stated that he had complied with the recommendation made by the Board in 2011 by studying the nominated subjects and completing practical legal training. He deposed that he had “made several reconciliatory attempts to resolve the matter, but failed”. He further deposed that when he sought review by this Court, Ms Burke had advised him that the decision to revoke his accreditation had been made by the Victorian Board. He added that “efforts were now directed towards Victoria Legal Board”. He stated that he had engaged a solicitor to pursue the matter with the Victorian Board but when he “filed action against the Victoria legal board that they now argued that they were not the maker of the decision”. This had the effect of delaying the proceedings in this Court. He submitted that his application for review had merit as the Board had wrongly acted on hearsay information from the Victorian Board.
Thereafter, several directions hearings were conducted before different judges. On some occasions Mr Ejueyitsi was represented by different legal practitioners and on others he was unrepresented.
The matter finally came before me. On 16 April 2021, I heard oral submissions and invited the parties to make further written submissions. After receiving those submissions, I would decide whether I needed to call the matter back on for further oral submissions. The parties did not object to that approach. Upon receiving the written submissions, I did not consider it necessary to hear further oral submissions.
Statutory requirements
The admission of legal practitioners is governed by the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the Act) and Rules made under the Act.
The LPEAC Rules 2004
When the Board made its original decision on 30 August 2011, and also when it made its further decision on 1 March 2016, the recognition of overseas qualifications by persons intending to seek admission as a legal practitioner was governed by r 4 of the Rules of the Legal Practitioners Education and Admission Council 2004 (the LPEAC Rules 2004). The provisions of r 4 relevant to the present matter were as follows:
4.1A person who holds qualifications obtained outside Australia which are recognised as qualifying him or her to be admitted to practice in an overseas jurisdiction, including New Zealand, but who was not admitted to practice in that jurisdiction, may apply to the Board for a direction as to what further, if any, academic or practical requirements must be complied with in order to satisfy the requirements for admission in this State.
4.2An applicant for such a direction must lodge with the Board a statutory declaration—
(a)     stating the nature and details of the applicant’s academic qualifications and practical qualifications and experience;
(b)     providing evidence that the applicant has the academic and practical qualifications relied upon, annexing to the declaration any original or authenticated documentary evidence that the applicant has the academic and practical qualifications relied upon; and
(c)     stating whether the applicant has applied for admission in any other Australian jurisdiction and the result of any such application.
4.3In dealing with any application under rule 4.1, the Board may decline to give a direction or direct that the applicant:
(a)     comply with any further academic requirement as may be specified by the Board;
(b)     obtain further specified practical training or experience or both;
(c)     is not required to undertake any further academic or practical training.
…
4.9A person who seeks a direction pursuant to this rule, must, when applying to the Board for directions, in addition to the matters referred to in rule 4.2 and 4.5, provide to the Board:
…
(e)      documentation relating to any academic or practical qualification relied on by the applicant (including a syllabus or other document describing course details and coverage) issued by the body which has awarded that qualification;
(f)     The original or duly authenticated copy of the applicant’s student record relating to the academic subjects and practical courses undertaken, the year in which each subject or course was undertaken and the grade achieved by the applicant in respect of each such subject or course.
I also note that r 4.10 provided that if the first language of an applicant for admission is not English, they must satisfy the Board that they have a sufficient knowledge of written and spoken English to practice in Australia.
Rule 4.11 also provided that the Board may, amongst other matters, make further enquiries as it thinks fit concerning the nature and adequacy of the applicant’s training and may act in respect of such matters on the written advice of, amongst others, the Council. I pause to note my understanding that for many years the Council has acted as the primary source of advice to the Board on recognition of overseas qualifications.
The Legal Practitioners Act
Section 15(1) of the Act provides that a person who satisfies the Supreme Court that, amongst other matters, he or she has complied with the LPEAC Rules prescribing the qualifications for admission as a barrister and solicitor is entitled to be admitted and enrolled as such. Section 15(2) requires that the Court must refer each application for admission to the Board for its report and recommendation.
The Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006
Part 9 of Chapter 17 of the former Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (the 2006 Rules) provided as follows:
407—Application of this Part
This Part applies to appeals against decisions of—
(a)the Board under the Act or this Chapter;
(b)LPEAC under the Act or this Chapter;
(c)the Law Society under the Act or this Chapter; and
(d)the Tribunal under the Act or this Chapter.
408—Appeals
(1)     An appeal against a decision of the Law Society, the Board, LPEAC or the Tribunal under the Act or this Chapter is to be instituted by notice of appeal in an approved form.
(2)     Subject to the Act, an appeal is to be instituted within 21 calendar days after the date of the decision the subject of the appeal.
(3)     Unless the Court otherwise directs, the appeal is to be governed by Chapter 13.
The former Chapter 13 dealt generally with the conduct of all appellate proceedings.
The applicant’s submissions
Unfortunately, Mr Ejueyitsi has devoted considerable attention in both written and oral submissions to a complaint that the respondent had failed to comply with an order made by Stanley J on 5 February 2021. I only refer to this issue because of the level of concern apparently held by the applicant and the amount of effort he has put into addressing the matter.
On 5 February 2021, Stanley J ordered the applicant to file and serve a further affidavit in support of the reinstatement application by 26 February 2021 and also order that the respondent “is to file and serve a response to the Applicant (if so instructed) by close of business 12 March 2021”.
The clear effect of the latter order is that the respondent was not required to file and serve a response but may do so, if it chose, by 12 March 2021. The respondent was permitted, but not required, to file a response. Clearly, the contention by the applicant that the respondent was guilty of contempt because it had not filed a reply is baseless.
In his written submissions dated 20 May 2021, Mr Ejueyitsi observed that s 14C(2) of the Legal Practitioner Act provides that “a rule made under this section may leave a matter to be determined according to the discretion of LPEAC or the Supreme Court”. On that basis, he submits that the Court has a discretion to hear appeals on decisions made by the Board under the LPEAC Rules 2004. He further submits that it does not matter that a decision made by the Board under r 4 relating to overseas qualifications was not expressly identified as attracting a right of appeal to the Court. In this respect, he observes that neither the LPEAC Rules nor the Act specifically listed the decisions of the Board made under the LPEAC Rules that are subject to appeal to the Court.
Mr Ejueyitsi further submits that the Board is established by s 14I of the Legal Practitioners Act pursuant to s 14J as the functions conferred on it under the Act or by LPEAC. He submits that a determination made by the Board under the LPEAC Rules, including under r 4, is a function conferred upon the Board by LPEAC pursuant to s 14J.
Mr Ejueyitsi also submits that rr 407 and 408 of the 2006 Rules provide for appeals to the Court from decisions of the Board. The decisions made by the Board include those made under r 4.
Mr Ejueyitsi also contends that, in so far as the determination by the Board asserts that he has not complied with the LPEAC Rules, s 15 of the Act applies to the appeal so that the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether it is satisfied that he has complied with the qualifications for admission as a practitioner under the LPEAC Rules.
Mr Ejueyitsi has also referred to the decision in Re Evenden where King CJ (with White and Bollen JJ agreeing), exercised jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the Board concerning directions that a person with overseas qualifications needed to undertake additional studies in Australia in order to qualify for admission as a practitioner.[7]
[7] (1988) 148 LSJS 138.
The Board’s submissions

The submissions on behalf of the Board are contained in an affidavit affirmed by Ms Burke on 15 April 2021. She observes that Mr Ejueyitsi failed to specify in his supporting affidavit filed on 30 November 2020 what “application” he is seeking to be reinstated, what “matter” he wanted to be “reviewed” and the jurisdictional basis for the interlocutory application and the orders that he sought.
The substance of the submissions made on behalf of the Board is that the LPEAC Rules 2004 did not provide for appeals against decisions of the Board made under r 4. The right of appeal against decisions of the Board was limited by rr 407 and 408 of the 2006 Rules to decisions made by the Board under the Act and Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules. There is nothing in the Act or in Chapter 17 relating to overseas applicants for admission under r 4 of the LPEAC Rules.
Consideration
Before considering the substance of this matter, I need to comment on two issues.
The letter sent on behalf of the Board on 31 May 2017 indicated to Mr Elekwachi that it was for his client to determine his possible course of action. However, the letter also stated that the Board had directed that he be referred to Part 9 of Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules “which deals with appeals against decisions made by the Board of Examiners”. Unfortunately, whether it was intended or not, the clear effect of the letter was to suggest that the 2006 Rules conferred a right of appeal against the decision made by the Board. If in fact the Board then held the view that it has now advanced in submissions, it should have stated that it did not consider that there was any right of appeal or remained silent on the point.
Regardless of the content of the letter, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction that is validly conferred upon it. The letter could not confer an appeal right that did not exist.
As I have previously noted, Mr Ejueyitsi has also deposed that it was suggested to him, allegedly by Ms Burke, that the relevant decision had been made by the Council rather than the Board. He claims that led him to institute proceedings in Victoria. It appears that he has raised this issue in an attempt to explain the delay in setting down the appeal.
It is clear from r 4.11 of the LPEAC Rules that the Board was entitled to seek advice from the Council but was not bound by that advice. The decision was clearly made by the Board in South Australia and any challenge could only be commenced in this Court, albeit that that there was no appeal right. All written communications from, or on behalf of, the Board that have been provided to the Court were consistent with that position.
When the Board wrote to Mr Ejueyitsi on 26 May 2016 and invited him to make submissions before it made a decision in response to the further advice received from the Council, it was made abundantly clear that the Board did not regard itself as bound by that advice. The obvious purpose of the Board in writing to him was to accord procedural fairness before it made a decision. Moreover, Ms Burke specifically stated in her letters of 2 March 2016 and 31 May 2017 that the decision had been made by the Board on the advice of the Victorian body. I also note that Mr Ejueyitsi has stated that the matter was pursued in Victoria by a solicitor acting on his behalf. In these circumstances, any incorrect oral advice that may have been given is likely to be of little help in explaining such a long delay. Of course, that is only an academic point as I do not consider that there is any right of appeal.
I turn to the substance of the application. While I accept that Mr Ejueyitsi’s affidavit of 30 November 2020 was far from clear, there is no doubt that he is seeking to reinstate the appeal that he filed in 2017 against the decision of the Board made in 2016 to revoke the direction that it had given to him in 2011 concerning the further studies that he needed to undertake in order to qualify for admission as a practitioner. I proceed on that basis.
It is of fundamental importance to recognise that a right of appeal must be conferred by an enactment. The right to appeal is not a right conferred by the common law.[8]
[8] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ at [20], McHugh J at [70] and Callinan J at [145].
The appellant in Re Evenden had appealed to the Full Court under r 45 of the Admission Rules as they then stood. As in the present case, the subject matter of the appeal was a direction by the Board that a person who had completed their studies outside Australia should undertake further studies in Australia before applying for admission in this State. It appears from the judgment of King CJ that in such a case r 45 of the Admission Rules expressly conferred a right of appeal against a determination of the Board. That is very different to the position under the LPEAC Rules 2004 where there is no express appeal right. Thus, Re Evenden provides no assistance to Mr Ejueyitsi.
I turn to the submission by Mr Ejueyitsi that “the appeal is one to which s 15 of the Act applies, such that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to enquire into the matter”. Section 15 is concerned with the admission of persons as legal practitioners by the Court. Part 4 of Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules (and now Part 7 of Chapter 7 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the UCR)) governs the procedure for admission of persons as practitioners.
Rule 375 of the 2006 Rules and r 257.9 of the UCR provide for the Full Court to hear and determine applications for admission and, if the Court so determines, to act on the report of the Board without further enquiry. In practice, that occurs in the overwhelming majority of cases so that groups of applicants are admitted by the Full Court at the one sitting based upon reports from the Board.
The only exception is where a particular issue arises in respect of an individual applicant. In the rare case where the Board has raised a doubt about the suitability or qualifications of an individual applicant, that matter would be heard separately by the Full Court. However, that is a very different process to what is involved in the present case.
Mr Ejueyitsi has not applied for admission in this State. Instead, he proposes to seek admission in New South Wales but he has apparently been informed by the authorities in that State that they will not decide his application until the present matter is resolved. Mr Ejueyitsi is seeking to challenge an earlier step in the process leading to admission than that described above. His concern lies with the withdrawal of the recognition previously given to the degree ostensibly conferred by Suffield University as satisfying some of the academic requirements for admission in South Australia. Thus, I consider that the reliance placed by Mr Ejueyitsi on s 15 is premature.
The decisive issue in this matter is the meaning of the words in r 407(a) “this part applies to appeals against decisions of – the Board under the Act or this Chapter”. The important point to note is that r 407 is not the source of a right to appeal. Rather than conferring a right to appeal, r 407 governs the procedure to be applied to appeals against decisions falling within the classes of decision listed in the four paragraphs enumerated at (a) to (d) in that rule.
In other words, the right of appeal to which r 407(a) applies must be found under the Act or in Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules. Upon such an appeal right being identified, the effect of r 407(a) is that the procedural aspects of the appeal will be governed by Part 9. The only operative provision in Part 9 is r 408. This simply requires that an appeal is to be instituted by notice in an approved form, must be instituted within 21 calendar days after the date of the decision being challenged and, unless the Court otherwise directs, is to be governed by Chapter 13 of the 2006 Rules. Neither Chapter 13 nor r 408 confers a right to appeal.
For completeness, I also note that r 366(1)(c) of the 2006 Rules provided that any appeal against “a decision, report or determination of the Board under the Act, or this Chapter [ie Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules] or the LPEAC Rules 2004 under Part 9 [of Chapter 17]” was to be heard by the Full Court. That provision was concerned with the allocation of Court business and the not the conferral of an appeal right. Any appeal right must be conferred by the provisions referred to.
There is also nothing in the Act that confers a right of appeal against decisions of the type currently under consideration. Section 17A(6) of the Act does confer a right to appeal to the Court from a decision of LPEAC or the Board in relation to a decision that the issue or renewal of a practicing certificate will be subject to a condition requiring the practitioner to undertake further education. The conferral of that specific right of appeal (albeit by later amendment) against a narrow class of decisions made by LPEAC or the Board supports my conclusion that there is not otherwise any right of appeal under the Act against the decisions of those bodies. The inclusion of s 17A(6) in the Act was necessary because there would not otherwise have been a right of appeal.
For completeness, I note that my view is that the use of the words in r 407(a) “of the Board under the Act” does not, when viewed in isolation, operate to exclude decisions by the Board under the LPEAC Rules concerning the recognition of overseas qualifications. I base that view upon the decision of the High Court in Griffith University v Tang.[9] However, as I do not consider that r 407 confers a right of appeal, and no relevant right is conferred by the Act or by Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules, it is not necessary to consider that issue any further. The application of these words would be confined to appeals under s 17A(6) of the Act. The important point is that the words in question do not operate to confer a right of appeal that is not conferred specifically by the Act but deal with procedural matters.
[9] (2005) 221 CLR 99.
I conclude that there is nothing in either the Act, Chapter 17 of the 2006 Rules or, for that matter, the LPEAC Rules 2004, that conferred a right of appeal against a decision of the Board under r 4 of the LPEAC Rules 2004 concerning recognition of foreign qualifications.
For completeness, I also note that s 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1936 (SA) confers a right to appeal against judgments of the court constituted by a judge, a master or a judicial registrar while also excluding certain classes of order from being the subject of an appeal. The provision also specifies the circumstances in which permission to appeal is required. There is nothing in s 50 which confers a right to appeal against a decision of the Board.
Because there is no relevant right of appeal, the only remedy potentially available to Mr Ejueyitsi may be by way of judicial review challenging the decision made by the Board on 1 March 2016 (not 31 May 2017, as he has suggested). However, I stress very heavily that I express no view as to the amenability of the decision to judicial review or the likelihood of relief being granted. Furthermore, while I also cannot express any view on the merits of an application for an extension of time, I simply note that any application will have very greatly exceeded the six-month time limit applicable to judicial review applications.
I also note that a serious question will almost inevitably arise in any judicial review proceedings as to the bona fides of the degree ostensibly issued to Mr Ejueyitsi by Suffield University and potentially also the veracity of the information he supplied in support of his original application to the Board. While I cannot and do not express any view on the allegations contained in the letter from the Council dated 22 May 2015, it would be prudent for Mr Ejueyitsi to reflect very carefully on this issue before pursuing further legal proceedings. Having said that, I also note his statement that he has since completed the “Priestley 11” subjects and a course of practical legal training.
Conclusion
As there is no appeal right, I dismiss the interlocutory application made by Mr Ejueyitsi on 30 November 2020 in which he seeks to have reinstated the notice of appeal filed on 15 June 2017.
The result is that the notice of appeal filed on 15 June 2017 continues to be taken to have been discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2) of the 2006 Rules as it had not been set down for hearing within six months.

[2021] SASC 65

03/06/2021