Egan-Green v McLean
[2017] ACTCA 28
•18 July 2017
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: | Egan-Green v McLean |
Citation: | [2017] ACTCA 28 |
Hearing Date: | 29 May 2017; 31 May 2017 |
DecisionDate: | 18 July 2017 |
Before: | Penfold J |
Decision: | (a) Ms Egan-Green’s application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the primary judge’s decision is refused. (b) Ms Egan-Green’s appeal is incompetent, and is dismissed. (c) Ms Egan-Green is to pay Ms McLean’s costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. |
Catchwords: | APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – whether appeal was incompetent – whether primary judge’s decision was interlocutory or final – failure to file correct documents in timely way attributed to appellant’s reliance upon procedural advice from registry staff – whether appeal futile – whether injustice would be caused to appellant if appeal could not proceed. |
Legislation Cited: | Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 137, 137(1), 137(2)(b) Family Law Act 1974 (Cth) Practice Direction 1 of 2016 |
Cases Cited: | Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 Capital Property Projects(ACT) Pty Ltd and Anor v Planning and Land Authority (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9; 2 ACTLR 44 Technical Team Projects v Noble Dunn (1990) 20 NSWLR 221 |
Parties: | Denise Egan-Green (Appellant) Janice McLean (Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel Unrepresented (Appellant) Mr C Painter (Respondent) |
| Solicitors Unrepresented (Appellant) Snedden Hall & Gallop Lawyers (Respondent) | |
File Number: | ACTCA 11 of 2017 |
Decision under appeal: | Court: ACT Supreme Court Before: Robinson AJ Date of Decision: 7 March 2017 Case Title: Denise Egan-Green v Janice McLean Citation: [2017] ACTSC 48 |
The original proceedings
Denise Egan-Green, who appears to have been unrepresented throughout the relevant proceedings (although she has obtained some legal advice at certain points), brought an action for defamation against her former sister-in-law, Janice McLean. The defamation was said to have been constituted by comments made by Ms McLean in 1997 to a person (the investigator) investigating Ms Egan-Green’s application for an annulment of her marriage.
The defamation proceedings were dismissed summarily on 7 March 2017 on application by Ms McLean. Ms Egan-Green wishes to appeal against that dismissal, and against other orders made by the primary judge.
Background
It is necessary first to set out some of the factual background to this unusual case.
In 1965 Ms Egan-Green married a Mr Walter Green. In 1995 they were divorced under the Family Law Act 1974 (Cth). During the following year Ms Egan-Green applied to a tribunal of the Catholic Church for the annulment of the marriage. More details of the annulment process are set out in the judgment of the primary judge (Egan-Green v McLean [2017] ACTSC 48) at [6] to [10].
The material before me contains numerous references to tribunals, in various contexts. It seems that there may be a number of tribunals within the Catholic Church structure, operating in different regions and possibly in different subject areas, and it may be that more than one tribunal has been involved in this matter over the years. In general, I do not think the exact title of any particular tribunal matters for present purposes, and so I shall generally refer simply to “the Tribunal”.
Part of the Tribunal’s process for dealing with the annulment application included the taking of statements from people who would have had close knowledge of the marriage between Ms Egan-Green and Mr Green. To that end a statement was taken from Ms McLean on 24 March 1997. The contents of the statement were not disclosed to the Ms Egan-Green.
Following the establishment of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (the Royal Commission), the Catholic Church in NSW and the ACT reviewed all Tribunal cases “to ensure the obligations of the Church were met regarding civil mandatory reporting requirements”. Those reviews were conducted by local Tribunal staff, the Judicial Vicar, and sometimes Tribunal staff from elsewhere.
It seems (although whether this was related to the Church’s review is not clear) that Ms Egan-Green read Ms McLean’s statement for the first time on 13 July 2015.
On 12 July 2016, Ms Egan-Green filed her originating claim and statement of claim.
On 14 October 2016, after the statement of claim, defence and reply were filed, Ms McLean’s solicitors filed an application for summary judgment, claiming that Ms Egan-Green’s action was not maintainable because the applicable limitation period had expired some years earlier.
The application was supported by an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2017 by Father Julian Wellspring, a priest in the parish of St Thomas More in Campbell, ACT, and also an Associate Judicial Vicar for the Regional Tribunal of NSW and the ACT, and a Judge of that Tribunal.
Father Wellspring’s affidavit reported that he had read the Tribunal’s file on Ms Egan-Green’s annulment application, and that the evidence given in his affidavit was based on his reading of the material in that file and his understanding of Canon law. Among other things, the affidavit provided the information set out at [6] and [7] above.
Father Wellspring’s affidavit explained some of the processes of the Tribunal, with a focus on who was permitted access to Tribunal material, and the scope for such material to come to the notice of various groups of people as material was gathered, and through the decision-making and appeal or review processes. He also summarised information on Ms Egan-Green’s file about the particular individuals who would have seen the material on that file, and set out information about the current status and whereabouts of people identified in relation to that file. He noted that there was no record indicating that, after the file was closed around mid-1998, it had been accessed by anyone except:
(a) for the purpose of the 2015 case reviews; and
(b) by Ms Egan-Green herself.
Father Wellspring does not say when he read Ms Egan-Green’s file for the purpose of preparing the affidavit, but given what he reports in his affidavit, I must assume that it was after Ms Egan-Green read the file in July 2015 and before he made his affidavit in October 2016.
Application for summary judgment
Ms McLean’s application for summary judgment was made under r 1147 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (the Rules), which is as follows:
1147Summary judgment—for defendant
(1)A defendant may apply to the court for summary judgment against a plaintiff at any time after filing a notice of intention to respond or defence.
NotePt 6.2 (Applications in proceedings) applies to an application under this rule.
(2)The court may give judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s claim for relief (or part of it) if satisfied—
(a)that the claim (or part of it) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(b)that there is a good defence to the claim (or part of it) on the merits; or
(c)that the proceeding should be finally disposed of summarily or without pleadings.
(3)The court may make any other order it considers appropriate.
Example
stay the proceeding
NoteAn example is part of these rules, is not exhaustive and may extend, but does not limit, the meaning of the provision in which it appears (see Legislation Act, s 126 and s 132).
The application asserted that the claim was frivolous or vexatious (r 1147(2)(a)) and that there was a good defence (r 1147(2)(b)).
The application was heard on 6 March 2017. On 7 March, Robinson AJ (the primary judge) concluded that Ms Egan-Green had not commenced her action within the appropriate period, that there was no basis on which the time could be extended, that any trial would be resolved in favour of Ms McLean, and that there was no reason not to give judgment at that point. Accordingly, he dismissed the proceedings and ordered Ms Egan-Green to pay Ms McLean’s costs.
Unfortunately, the primary judge did not specify the particular provision of r 1147 (or otherwise) under which he acted. Nor is that clear from his Honour’s reasons.
His Honour did not explicitly find, or even consider, whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious (1147(2)(a)). To the contrary, his Honour expressed the view that Ms McLean’s concession that the material was defamatory was soundly based (at [11]).
The primary judge did conclude that there was a good defence to the claim based on the applicable limitation periods (at [23] to [32]); however his Honour did not canvass whether a limitation defence was “a good defence ... on the merits” as mentioned in r 1147(2)(b).
It may even be that, although not relied on by Ms McLean, his Honour had simply concluded under r 1147(2)(c) that the proceedings should be finally disposed of summarily; however, no basis for such a conclusion, other than the limitation defence, was mentioned. Rather, having noted the limitation defence, his Honour simply dismissed the proceedings.
The hearing before the primary judge
The subpoenas
It seems that in February and early March 2017, Ms Egan-Green had issued five subpoenas, respectively to:
(a) Father Wellspring;
(b) Bishop Philip Wilson;
(c) the Catholic Church Tribunal Newcastle;
(d) Father Dominic Carrigan; and
(e) her former husband, Mr Green.
Early in the hearing before the primary judge, Ms Egan-Green suggested that “it’s on the cards” that material sought under the subpoenas would materially assist her in the current proceedings. The primary judge was disinclined to spend time on the subpoena issue when the matter listed before him was Ms McLean’s application to strike out the statement of claim, and it was agreed, including by Ms Egan-Green, that dealing with the return of the subpoenas would be adjourned to another day to be fixed.
Evidence
Counsel for Ms McLean initially read Father Wellspring’s affidavit without objection from Ms Egan-Green, although it was agreed that the reference at [21] of the affidavit should have been to Ms Egan-Green’s marriage lasting for 30 rather than 22 years. Later in the hearing, the primary judge asked Ms Egan-Green if she objected to any part of the affidavit, and she said that she did not object to the affidavit going into evidence, but that she had been under the impression that she would “have the opportunity to speak with” Father Wellspring about it at the hearing.
After indicating that he reserved his judgment, the primary judge asked if there were any questions for Father Wellspring, and Ms Egan-Green said that she wanted to ask him a couple of questions about him reviewing the file. In discussion between his Honour and Ms Egan-Green, it emerged that she was concerned to ensure that it was accepted that Father Wellspring had looked at her file and read what was on it. His Honour noted that this was accepted.
Other matters
After some discussion, and an examination of the court file, it was accepted between the parties that Ms Egan-Green’s action had been initiated on 12 July 2016, the last day of the period of one year beginning when Ms Egan-Green first read Ms McLean’s statement.
Ms Egan-Green’s submissions before the primary judge about why her action was not out of time included a reference to the “publication” of the relevant material to the people who had reviewed her file for the purposes of the Royal Commission; his Honour pointed out to her that any such publication was made by the Catholic Church, not by Ms McLean.
Application to amend statement of claim
At the hearing before the primary judge on 6 March 2017, Ms Egan-Green pointed to the examination of her file in the context of the Royal Commission in 2015, and by Father Wellspring in 2016. At 11.30 am his Honour adjourned the subpoena issues to a date to be fixed, and reserved his decision on the other applications until the following morning.
Later that day, Ms Egan-Green filed an application for leave to amend her statement of claim to refer to the re-publication of the relevant material to Father Wellspring. His Honour re-convened the court at 2.35 pm that day; the proceedings are described in the bench sheet as “brief”, but no transcript is available to me. Nor did his Honour refer in his judgment to events at that re-convened hearing.
Orders of primary judge
On the following day, 7 March 2017, the primary judge dismissed Ms Egan-Green’s proceedings, made costs orders in Ms McLean’s favour, and published reasons. In those reasons, he also dismissed the application to amend the statement of claim, saying that there would be no utility in such an amendment. His Honour did note that the material complained of (that is, Ms McLean’s statement to the investigator) had already been attached to the original statement of claim.
After this, Ms Egan-Green asked for access to the material that had been produced on subpoena. His Honour said that the proceedings were no longer on foot, and that she had no right to look at the material that had been produced. Counsel for Ms McLean invited his Honour to dismiss the subpoenas, but the files do not record the making of any such orders.
The appeal
On 4 April 2017 Ms Egan-Green filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal from the orders of the primary judge dismissing her application to amend her statement of claim, dismissing the proceedings, and ordering Ms Egan-Green to pay Ms McLean’s costs. The appeal grounds were as follows:
1.His Honour erred in not permitting the Appellant to have an opportunity to access the materials produced on Subpoena prior to the commencement of the hearing of the Respondent's Strike-Out Application.
2.His Honour erred in not hearing and dismissing the Application brought to set aside certain Subpoenas issued by the Appellant against Father Julian Wellspring and the Office of the Tribunal of the Catholic Church prior to the commencement of the Respondent's Strike-Out Application.
3.His Honour erred in not permitting the Appellant to have an opportunity to access the materials produced on Subpoena by Father Julian Wellspring and the Office of the Tribunal of the Catholic Church prior to the commencement of the hearing of the Respondent's Strike-Out Application.
4.His Honour erred in not permitting Father Julian Wellspring to be cross-examined on his Affidavit sworn 11th October 2016. [J. 4]
5.His Honour erred in not finding that the Appellant did not plead republication of the statement against the Defendant as she knew nothing about the republication until she received Father Julian Wellspring's Affidavit sworn 11th October 2016 that was filed in support of the Respondent's Strike-Out Application. [J. 14]
6. His Honour erred in finding that the cause of action must have arisen in 1997. [J. 15]
7. His Honour erred in pre-judging and finding that the likely limits of the publication were quite limited. [ J. 16]
8.His Honour erred in not finding that in the ACT as at the material date; namely, 24 March 1997; that as this was a cause of action in slander that it only commenced to run when the Plaintiff become aware of the slander; that is, on 13th July 2015. [J. ]
9.His Honour erred in finding that the abolition of the need for the suffering of special damage in slander also abolished the rule that time would not run in slander until the discovery of that slander and that this cause of action runs from the date of publication. [J. 25, 26, 29 - 31]
10.His Honour erred in finding that on a true construction of the amendment to the Limitation Act, 1985 contained in section 21B that that amendment applied to the Appellant's claim for a slander on 24 March 1997; when this was only became known to the Plaintiff on 13th July 2015.
11.His Honour erred in not finding that the amendment to the Limitation Act, 1985 contained in section 21B had no retrospective operation and did not apply to this cause of action in slander. [J. 25 & 31]
12.His Honour erred in dismissing the Appellant's Application to extend time and to allow the Appellant to amend her statement of claim to add a claim of “republication" of the defamation to Father Wellspring. [J. 34 - 36]
13.His Honour erred in finding that any publication to Father Wellspring attracted privilege being a matter necessary for the administration of justice. [J. 34]
14.His Honour erred in finding that any reading of the defamatory material to Father Wellspring arose out of or was in any way connected to these proceedings. [J. 34]
15.His Honour erred in finding that the time of "re-publication" to Father Wellspring that the proceedings were not only contemplated but on foot. [J. 34]
16.Such further or other grounds of appeal as the Appellant may be advised.
Claim that appeal is incompetent
On 19 April 2017 Ms McLean filed a notice of intention to respond, and on 5 May 2017 she filed an application in proceeding for an order dismissing the appeal as incompetent on the ground that “[n]o appeal as of right is available pursuant to Section 37E(4) of the Supreme Court Act ACT [sic] 1933”.
The power to strike out an appeal to the Court of Appeal as incompetent (r 5472 of the Rules) may be exercised by a single judge exercising the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal under s 37J(1)(h) of the Supreme Court Act and r 5604 of the Rules.
Ms McLean’s claim that the appeal is incompetent rests on the propositions:
(a) that the orders of the primary judge were interlocutory;
(b) that the appeal therefore required leave (s 37E(4) of the Supreme Court Act); and
(c) that leave had been neither sought nor granted.
An appeal filed without the necessary leave is incompetent (In the matter of an appeal by Gaye Alexandra Mary Luck [2003] HCA 70; 203 ALR 1).
Appeal against interlocutory orders
The process for appealing against an interlocutory order is a two-stage process and accordingly more complex than the process for filing an appeal as of right. The process is laid down in the following rules:
(a) r 5310: a person who wants to appeal to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory order of the Supreme Court constituted by a single judge must make an application for leave to appeal under division 5.4.2 of the Rules.
(b) r 5312: the application for leave to appeal, and supporting material for the application (which, under Practice Direction 1 of 2016 includes a draft notice of appeal), must be filed in the court not later than 7 days after the day the interlocutory order is made, or not later than any further time allowed by the Court of Appeal or the judge who made the interlocutory order.
(c) r 5405: if leave to appeal is given, the notice of appeal must be filed not later than 7 days after that leave is given, or not later than another time set or allowed by the Court of Appeal when giving leave or otherwise.
A failure to seek leave to appeal an interlocutory decision may, in appropriate circumstances, be initially cured by a grant of leave to apply, out of time, for leave to appeal, often referred to as an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal.
Appeal against final orders
If leave to appeal is not required, the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal must be filed not later than 28 days after the day of the order appealed from (r 5405(1)(b) of the Rules). Ms Egan-Green’s notice of appeal appears to have been filed on the 28th day after the primary judge’s decision, so if the primary judge’s orders were final orders, then Ms Egan-Green’s appeal was by right and was filed within time.
Response to claim of incompetence
After the appeal was first mentioned before another judge (but before Ms McLean’s application was heard), Ms Egan-Green filed an application that, while not expressed in absolutely conventional terms, could in my view, by dispensing with the Rules as necessary, have been appropriately accepted as an application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal.
In due course the matter came before me as duty judge, having been adjourned by another judge apparently, but unproductively as it turned out, to permit Ms Egan-Green to obtain legal representation. Counsel for Ms McLean accepted my proposition that finding that Ms Egan-Green’s attempt to appeal was incompetent because she had not sought leave to appeal would not necessarily resolve the issue between the parties, but would instead open the way to the filing of a separate application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal; in the circumstances, such an application seemed to have some prospects of success, at least in relation to her explanation for a failure to seek the necessary leave in time, or at all.
Accordingly, I agreed to hear argument on:
(a) whether the orders of the primary judge were interlocutory; and
(b) if so, whether Ms Egan-Green should be allowed to pursue her appeal, specifically whether:
(i)whether she should be given an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal; and
(ii)if so, whether she should be given leave to appeal.
It seemed to me that under s 37J of the Supreme Court Act it was within my power as a single judge exercising the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to determine each of those questions, and that this would be a more efficient use of court resources than permitting the various questions to be the subject of further separate applications.
Was the decision final or interlocutory?
As already noted:
(a) if the decision of the primary judge was a final decision, then the notice of appeal was filed within time, and no leave was required for the appeal;
(b) if that decision was an interlocutory decision, then Ms Egan-Green required leave to appeal, and she needed to seek that leave within seven days after that decision; and
(c) distinguishing between final and interlocutory orders can in some cases be difficult.
The orders made by the primary judge were:
(a) that the application to amend the statement of claim was dismissed;
(b) that the proceedings were dismissed; and
(c) that Ms Egan-Green was to pay Ms McLean’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings.
I do not understand there to be any doubt that the refusal to allow amendment of the statement of claim is an interlocutory order, or that a costs order made in relation to an interlocutory order is also interlocutory. The only outstanding question is whether his Honour’s dismissal of Ms Egan-Green’s proceedings was an interlocutory order.
The particular difficulty raised by the primary judge’s approach is that whether the order dismissing the proceedings was final or interlocutory may depend on the basis on which his Honour made that order. As noted at [17] above, the basis on which the order was made was not clear.
Tests for final and interlocutory decisions
In Tampion v Anderson (1973) 3 ALR 414 at 416, the Privy Council noted the difficulties in framing definitions of “final” and “interlocutory” that are universally applicable, and said:
... in Salter Rex & Co v Ghosh [1971] 2 QB 597 at 601; [1971] 2 All ER 865 at 866, Lord Denning MR said: “This question of ‘final’ or ‘interlocutory’ is so uncertain that the only thing for practitioners to do is to look up the practice books and see what has been decided on the point. Most orders have now been the subject of decision.” This advice, even if it be distressing to the scientific lawyer, may nevertheless be the most helpful in any actual case.
Furthermore, the authorities suggest that striking out a proceeding and dismissing the proceeding may be relevantly different in the current context. In Piscioneri v Reardon [2016] ACTCA 33 (Piscioneri), the ACT Court of Appeal said:
34. Whether a judgment is an interlocutory judgment or a final judgment depends upon the legal rather than the practical effect of the judgment: Carr v FinanceCorporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246 (Carr) at 248 per Gibbs CJ. The question is whether the consequence of the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause of action: Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 443 per Windeyer J, Carr at 248, Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 (Bienstein). A strike out order is an interlocutory order although the practical effect of the order may be to finally determine the proceedings: McColley v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] ACTCA 21. The position is otherwise if the order also provides that the proceedings are dismissed: Florida Investments Pty Ltd v Milstern (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1972] WAR 148.
In Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; 178 FCR 401, the Full Federal Court (Spender, Graham and Gilmour JJ) said at [40]:
In our opinion, a case where summary judgment is given for a respondent in the absence of the full and complete factual matrix and full argument thereon, the Court being satisfied that the moving party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding is no different from a case where an order is made dismissing an action because it is frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of the process of the Court or does not disclose a reasonable cause of action (see Re Luck) or one dismissing an appeal from an order of a Master refusing to set aside a default judgment (see Carr v FCA) (see Zoia v Commonwealth Ombudsmen Department (2007) 240 ALR 624 (‘Zoia’) per Spender J, Gilmour J concurring, at [14] and [19] and per French J as his Honour then was at [26]).
We respectfully disagree with the views expressed by Finkelstein J in Jefferson Ford at [12] that ‘[i]n an application for summary judgment, the judge resolves the dispute on the merits’, and by Gordon J, by way of obiter dicta, at [164] that ‘an order granting summary judgment on all claims … is a final order because there are no further substantive rights in issue’.
What the judge does, when considering a summary judgment application, is make a determination, on the material then before the Court, as to the prospects of the moving party successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The legal effect of such a judgment is not final.
(emphasis in original)
Their Honours were considering s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which is relevantly as follows:
31ASummary judgment
(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:
(a) the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and
(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.
(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:
(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and
(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.
(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:
(a) hopeless; or
(b) bound to fail;
for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.
(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.
This section is not directly equivalent to r 1147, but their Honour’s reference to summary judgment being given “in the absence of the full and complete factual matrix and full argument thereon” describes the primary judge’s approach in this case, and the basis on which his Honour dismissed Ms Egan-Green’s claim.
Ms Egan-Green provided written submissions in support of her assertion that the primary judge’s decision was final rather than interlocutory, concluding:
Clearly in this case it is not theoretically open for the Plaintiff to do anything other than to Appeal the various decisions of the Associate [sic] Justice. Accordingly, the orders must be final orders and not interlocutory. Further all of the orders made are so coloured by the Order for dismissal that they must also be treated as final orders.
However, Ms Egan-Green’s problem is that theoretically it is open for her to begin again, with a new originating claim. If that claim is to the same effect as the one that has been struck out, then practically it is unlikely to advance her cause, and would likely lead to further costs orders against her. If the claim were re-pleaded so as to avoid the problems afflicting the current claim (for instance by claiming, in respect of a publication of the material in the last 12 months, against someone who might be responsible for such a publication) then she might have more success.
Having regard to the authorities I have mentioned, and despite Ms Egan-Green’s submissions and the primary judge’s failure to identify the basis on which he dismissed Ms Egan-Green’s proceeding, I am satisfied that the order his Honour made in dismissing that proceeding was an interlocutory rather than a final order.
My conclusion that all the primary judge’s orders were interlocutory has implications for the competence of Ms Egan-Green’s appeal, but it also has implications for her substantive action.
In particular, I have concluded that, despite dismissing her action in defamation, the primary judge did not determine her claim substantively or on the merits, but decided only that in the context of his understanding of the currently applicable limitation periods, the action could not be successfully prosecuted.
Leave to appeal – considerations
There are differing views in the authorities about the relative importance, in an application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal, of:
(a) the applicant’s explanation for the failure to pursue the appeal in a timely way; and
(b) the strength of the proposed appeal.
In relation to a grant of leave, the strength of the proposed appeal is one of the considerations, the other being whether substantial injustice would result if the appeal could not be pursued.
In Piscioneri, the Court of Appeal said:
37.Although rules of court that prescribe time limits should ordinarily be observed, they should not be allowed to become instruments of injustice: Capital Property Projects(ACT) Pty Ltd and Anor v Planning and Land Authority (ACT) [2008] 2 ACTLR 44 (Capital Property Projects) at [17]–[18]. The determination of whether to extend time because the rules might otherwise work an injustice involves a consideration of the history of the proceedings, the conduct of parties, the nature of the litigation, the consequences of granting or refusing leave, the prospects of success on appeal and the explanation for the delay: Capital Property Projects at [18]–[20] applying Gallo v Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR 458 at 459 per McHugh J.
In Technical Team Projects v Noble Dunn (1990) 20 NSWLR 221, Cole J said at 226-227:
However, in my view it is a misconception to contend that on an application for leave to extend time within which to file a notice seeking leave to appeal pursuant to s 38(4)(b) a court is required to consider either whether the applicant for extension of time has such a "good case", or whether in truth significant or serious questions of law of general application are involved. Each of those matters is material upon the consideration whether to grant leave to appeal pursuant to s 38(4)(b). In my view, however, such matters are immaterial in relation to consideration of the application for extension of time. That is so both as a matter of principle and of logic. It cannot be that because a party has a "good case" or wishes to raise questions of significance, that it has a greater indulgence to disregard the Supreme Court Rules concerning procedural steps, than a party who has a less arguable case or who wishes to raise matters of less significance. However, a court considering an application for extension of time will wish to consider the substance of matters desired to be argued to satisfy itself that granting an extension is not a futile exercise because the points sought to be raised are of no substance. It is wrong, in my view, to merge an application to extend time within which to lodge a notice of appeal, with the application for leave to appeal itself.
The Court of Appeal in Piscioneri at [38] quoted Refshauge J’s summary of principles relating to the granting of leave to appeal as set out in Capital Property Projects(ACT) Pty Ltd and Anor v Planning and Land Authority (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9; 2 ACTLR 44; the relevant ones for present purposes are:
c) decisions which, though interlocutory, determine substantive rights will more readily be the subject of the grant of leave;
d) the party seeking leave bears the onus of satisfying the court of the necessary criteria to justify the grant of leave;
e) the court will ordinarily grant leave where the decision is wrong and prejudice will be suffered by the appellant;
f) leave may also be granted where the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration or, to put it another way, where the decision is ‘attended with difficulty and [its] correctness is open to dispute’ (Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 400) and, if it is wrong, significant consequences will be suffered by the applicants;
In Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225, the High Court (McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ) said at [29]:
The principles that govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. An applicant for leave must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal.
[citations omitted]
Although the issues in relation to the strength of a proposed appeal are not described in identical terms in relation to an application for an extension of time with which to seek leave to appeal and an application for leave to appeal, and notwithstanding Cole J’s comments quoted at [61] above, I propose to consider all the relevant issues together, with a view to ensuring that Ms Egan-Green, as an unrepresented litigant, is not disadvantaged by her capacity to deal with the subtleties of the different tests described in different authorities.
Explanation for failure to take timely or appropriate steps
In this case Ms Egan-Green, having regard to her position as an unrepresented litigant, seems to have a relatively adequate explanation for her failure to seek leave to appeal within the first 7 days after the primary judge’s decision. In short, she claims to have been acting in accordance with advice given to her by a member of the Supreme Court registry.
Ms Egan-Green’s claim, supported by a record of an email exchange between her and an appeals clerk in the Supreme Court Registry, is that her notice of appeal was filed outside the 7‑day time limit because of advice from the appeals clerk, who told her that the deadline for filing her appeal documents was a date 28 days after the primary judge’s decision was handed down.
As well as providing to the Court the email from the clerk, Ms Egan-Green also gave oral evidence about earlier dealings with the clerk, including that when she had first spoken to him “probably about the first five or six days” after the decision was made, she had told him that she was enquiring about a final decision.
Ms Egan-Green’s evidence was notably vague about dates apart from the date shown in the email exchange; she explained some of that vagueness by evidence (not further explained) that she routinely deleted records of phone calls from her mobile phone. However, her oral evidence, if accepted, would have supported a finding that the clerk had advised her, within the 7-day deadline, and after inspecting her file himself, about the appeal period for a final decision made by the primary judge.
It is true that the only advice established by the documentary evidence was given nearly two weeks after the end of the 7-day limit applicable to the initiation of an appeal against an interlocutory decision, and it consisted of providing an electronic copy of the form prescribed for appeals against final decisions. At that point, Ms Egan-Green was not misled into ignoring a 7-day limit that she could, given proper advice, have complied with; rather, after that limit had passed, she was led to believe that she still had time to comply with the applicable deadline, which she then did – in the sense that she filed a notice of appeal against what she regarded as non-interlocutory orders within the 28-day period mentioned by the appeals clerk.
Furthermore, she was given incorrect information by the appeals clerk not only because she had told him that she was enquiring about a final decision (at [67] above) but also because, presumably, when he inspected Ms Egan-Green’s file, he did not recognise that the decision of the primary judge about which Ms Egan-Green had asked involved only orders that were technically interlocutory. It is notable that the subject line in the email in evidence before me, which was presumably included by the appeals clerk who prepared the email (rather than by Ms Egan-Green who had communicated with him by telephone, not by email), referred to “Appeal from final decision on matter SC 308 of 2016 ...”).
This is not a ground on which to criticise the appeals clerk, and this discussion is not intended as any criticism of him. As already noted at [48] above, the question whether an order is interlocutory or final is one that has repeatedly exercised the courts, and has over time generated a long list of examples of interlocutory orders rather than any clearly applicable legal principle. It is not an appeals clerk’s responsibility to read a particular judgment asked about by a potential litigant, engage in detailed legal research, and give that potential litigant legal advice, or a conclusion, about a question that in due course may require quite some consideration even from an experienced judge.
Given that fact, it may be wise for an appeals clerk in such a situation to adopt a practice of always including, in an answer to such a question asked by a member of the public, the comment that the appropriate appeal deadline depends on whether the decision concerned is final or interlocutory, together with an indication that he or she cannot give advice about the different between the two kinds of orders.
On the other hand, registry staff may be one of the only sources of procedural advice available to an unrepresented litigant, and one would hesitate to disadvantage an unrepresented potential appellant who has relied, apparently in good faith, on advice given to her, also in good faith, by a member of the staff of the court registry.
In fact, at least in cases involving unrepresented litigants, it may be more useful for courts themselves to point out, where relevant, that a decision is or may be interlocutory and therefore subject to a shorter deadline, and a different process, for the initiation of an appeal.
To the extent that Ms Egan-Green’s scope for pursuing her appeal depends on her providing an adequate explanation for her failure to take the necessary steps to initiate her appeal in a timely way, I am inclined to the view that she has provided such an explanation.
Assessment of proposed appeal for present purposes
As noted at [58] to [64] above, accepting that there is a reasonable explanation for Ms Egan-Green’s failure to pursue her appeal properly, the next issue is, in general terms, the nature and significance of the appeal. The questions raised are whether the proposed appeal would be futile because there is no substance to the proposed grounds of appeal, whether the primary judge’s decision is attended with significant doubt, and whether substantial injustice would be done if the appeal cannot proceed.
These are not identical questions, but clearly they raise similar and largely overlapping issues, and for present purposes I consider that it is adequate to consider the three questions together.
When this matter came before me on 29 May 2017, I indicated that I would hear Ms Egan-Green’s arguments in favour of a grant of leave to appeal at the same time as I dealt with the respondent’s incompetence application and Ms Egan-Green’s application for an extension of the time within which to seek leave to appeal, and that she should appear at that hearing ready to make submissions about all relevant issues.
In effect, when the hearing resumed before me on 31 May 2017, Ms Egan-Green needed to address two matters relating to the content of her appeal, being in general terms, first, the appeal’s prospects of success and, secondly, whether letting the primary judge’s decision stand would effect a substantial injustice.
Appeal’s prospects of success
The primary judge’s decision had two elements. His Honour:
(a) rejected Ms Egan-Green’s argument that her originating claim had been filed before the expiry of the applicable limitation period; and
(b) rejected her application to amend her statement of claim in an attempt to overcome the limitation defence accepted by his Honour.
Some of the appeal grounds relate to one or other of those decisions, but many others do not.
Limitation defence (appeal grounds 6, 8, 9, 10, 11)
Ms Egan-Green’s argument about the applicable limitation period was as follows:
(a) the original defamation was published orally on or about 24 March 1997 by Ms McLean to the investigator;
(b) as oral defamation (“slander”), the defamation did not become actionable until Ms Egan-Green became aware of it;
(c) this legal framework was applicable in 1997 and had survived several changes to the relevant law of defamation in the ACT; and
(d) therefore, Ms Egan-Green’s cause of action arose on 13 July 2015 and her originating claim, filed on 12 July 2016, was filed within the applicable limitation period.
Rather, his Honour concluded (at [31]), after reviewing changes in defamation law in the ACT and NSW since before 1997, that the relevant cause of action arose on the date of publication, in 1997, and therefore (at [37]) that the action was begun well outside the limitation period.
The appeal grounds as framed simply assert that his Honour’s conclusions about the legal aspects of the limitation issue were wrong, and repeat Ms Egan-Green’s arguments as set out by the primary judge at [28] of his judgment. Neither the draft notice of appeal nor Ms Egan-Green’s submissions contains any useful explanation of where his Honour went wrong in rejecting her argument.
Nor, in the absence of relevant submissions, have I identified any error in his Honour’s reasoning or conclusion.
Application to amend statement of claim (appeal grounds 5, 12)
His Honour dismissed Ms Egan-Green’s application to amend her statement of claim (at [28] to [30] above).
The application to amend the statement of claim was expressed to be made on the grounds of the affidavit evidence of Father Wellspring that the Court had received on the day the application was filed, and identified “the question of law to be raised” as follows:
Whether or not the Court should allow the Plaintiff an extension of time to amend her Statement of Claim to bring a claim based on the republication of the matters complained of in her Statement of Claim to Father Wellspring – which have only today been confirmed (or at least the possibility of such a republication only became known to the Plaintiff when she first read Father Wellspring’s affidavit sworn 11th October 2016).
The evidence was clear, as the primary judge noted, that Father Wellspring had looked at the annulment file for the purpose of providing an affidavit to the court about the annulment processes (whether he must also have looked at the file sometime earlier is raised by appeal grounds 14 and 15). Father Wellspring’s review of the file for that purpose must have taken place after (possibly some weeks after) Ms Egan-Green’s claim was filed on 12 July 2016, and sometime before the time of the hearing before the primary judge. If that “publication” to Father Wellspring was in fact a new publication on behalf of Ms McLean, then presumably action based on it was, certainly at the time of the hearing before the primary judge and possibly even now, still able to be instituted within the applicable one-year limitation period; if not, then it is hard to see how the publication to Father Wellspring could have cured any defect in the original statement of claim.
Significantly, at no point did Ms Egan-Green frame the actual amendments proposed to the statement of claim. There is nothing in her application that allowed even an educated guess at the intended amendments. In particular, there is nothing that could have been read as adding, or substituting, a pleading that could have cured, at least as far as the new pleading went, the limitation problem inherent in the original statement of claim.
I cannot see how his Honour could have given leave to amend the existing statement of claim on the basis of the material that was before him. Nothing in the relevant appeal grounds identifies any error in his Honour’s refusal to allow amendment of the statement of claim.
Other matters
As noted, Ms Egan-Green’s grounds of appeal also canvass various other matters not clearly relevant to the proceedings before the primary judge.
The other matters raised by the appeal grounds can be grouped by topic as follows:
(a) errors in relation to subpoenas, material produced in response to subpoenas and affidavit evidence (1, 2, 3, 4);
(b) errors in his Honour’s conclusions about the circumstances of Father Wellspring’s examination of the 1997 documents (13, 14, 15);
(c) error in factual conclusions (7).
Subpoenas, subpoenaed material, and affidavit evidence (appeal grounds 1, 2, 3, 4)
I am not aware of the contents of any material produced under subpoena, but the material sought under the several subpoenas to the Tribunal and three priests (at [22] above) was along the following lines (this material is set out in the subpoena to Bishop Wilson and is framed slightly differently in subpoenas addressed to other recipients):
1. All tape recordings that you possess concerning Denise Egan-Green, (the Plaintiff herein); and without limiting the generality of the above, the tape recording referred to in Janice McLean's statement dated 24th March 1997;
2. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning any contact or meeting that you may have had with Father Joseph Carroll, a Catholic Priest concerning Denise Egan-Green, during the period 1st January 1988 to 31st December 1998;
3. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning any contact or meeting that you may have had with Father Dominic Carrigan, a Catholic Priest concerning Denise Egan-Green, during the period 1st January 1988 to 31st December 1998;
4. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning any contact or meeting that you may have had with Walter John Green concerning Denise Egan-Green, during the period 1st January 1988 to 31st December 1998;
5. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning Denise Egan-Green and the Redemptorist Order of the Catholic Church;
6. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning Denise Egan-Green;
7. All documents, papers, letters, memoranda and files in your possession concerning the Application for Annulment of Marriage made to the Tribunal of the Catholic Church for NSW and ACT in the matter of Denise Egan-Green and Walter Joseph Green (ref No. 205 96 02 003); and
8. This Subpoena.
At the hearing before the primary judge, it was agreed, including by Ms Egan-Green, that the subpoena issues did not need to be resolved for the hearing of the strike-out application (at [23] above). Nor were the subpoenas raised by Ms Egan-Green in discussion of the application to amend the statement of claim.
As noted at [31] above, on the day after the hearing and after the primary judge had given judgment, Ms Egan-Green sought access to the material produced under subpoena, and was refused on the ground that her proceedings were no longer on foot.
At the hearing before me, I put to Ms Egan-Green that the contents of the subpoenas could not have affected the limitation issues that had been the basis of the primary judge’s conclusions, and she indicated that she would abandon the appeal grounds concerned.
Nor do the appeal grounds concerned suggest how access to the material produced under subpoena could have made a difference to Ms Egan-Green’s application to amend her statement of claim. The material sought is entirely material relating to Ms Egan-Green, not to the timing of Ms McLean’s comments or to any possibly relevant re-publication.
As to the alleged refusal of the primary judge to allow cross-examination of Father Wellspring, Ms Egan-Green initially said that she had expected to have the opportunity to speak to Father Wellspring (at [24] above) and later indicated that she wanted to ask him a couple of questions. However, she did not pursue this request after she was assured that his evidence that he had looked at her file and read the material on it was accepted (at [25] above).
I cannot see how, in the circumstances I have described, his Honour erred in failing to invite Ms Egan-Green to cross-examine Father Wellspring after his Honour’s discussion with Ms Egan-Green about the questions she wanted to ask him. Nor can I see how that failure could have affected the primary judge’s conclusions of law about the limitation issue or the proposed amendment of the statement of claim.
Conclusions about Father Wellspring (appeal grounds 13, 14, 15)
Appeal ground 13 challenges his Honour’s conclusion about the legal significance of the circumstances in which Father Wellspring looked at Ms Egan-Green’s file. Grounds 14 and 15 challenge his Honour’s factual findings about those circumstances.
Conclusions about legal significance
In his reasons, the primary judge said:
34. It will be remembered that Father Wellspring gave evidence as to the process followed for an Annulment. For this purpose, he read the file kept by the Church and hence considered the defamatory material. Such a publication to Father Wellspring will attract privilege being a matter necessary for the administration of justice. The proceedings were not only contemplated but on foot. His affidavit was read without objection.
35. I add that the document in question was annexed by the Plaintiff to the statement of claim in any event.
Section 137 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) is relevantly as follows:
137Defence of absolute privilege
(1)It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that it was published on an occasion of absolute privilege.
(2)Without limiting subsection (1), matter is published on an occasion of absolute privilege if—
...
(b)the matter is published in the course of the proceedings of an Australian court or Australian tribunal, including (but not limited to)—
(i) the publication of matter in any document filed or lodged with, or otherwise submitted to, the court or tribunal (including any originating process); and
(ii) the publication of matter while giving evidence before the court or tribunal; and
(iii)the publication of matter in any judgment, order or other determination of the court or tribunal; or
It is not clear to me that the publication to Father Wellspring would fall within the terms of s 137(2)(b) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act, but that provision does not confine the effect of s 137(1), and nor does s 137(2)(b) exclude the possibility, or perhaps even the probability, that the publication to Father Wellspring was protected by some form of qualified privilege. There is nothing in Ms Egan-Green’s submissions that identified any error in his Honour’s approach to the significance of any re-publication to Father Wellspring.
Conclusions about facts
Ms Egan-Green said that the primary judge had erred in concluding (at [34]) that Father Wellspring’s examination of the claimed defamatory material had taken place in connection with, and for the purpose of, the proceedings before his Honour. That finding was clearly available by reference to Father Wellspring’s affidavit evidence. It did not seem to be disputed by Ms Egan-Green in the context of her request to “cross-examine” Father Wellspring (at [25] above).
However, Ms Egan-Green said, his Honour should not have accepted Father Wellspring’s evidence because she knew that Father Wellspring was currently (and had been at least from a point since the hearing before the primary judge) the head of “the Tribunal” and therefore he must have looked at the relevant material for other purposes.
Pressed about the basis for this claim, Ms Egan-Green said that Father Wellspring must have read the file in connection with the Royal Commission, and that fact must have been recorded on the file note of who had looked at the file.
There was then the following exchange:
HER HONOUR: ... on the basis that at some stage in the last couple of months, you believe he’s become the head of the Tribunal, or he now is the head of the Tribunal? You believe that when he wrote this affidavit in October, he had looked ... at the documents for some other reason?
MS EGAN-GREEN: I do.
HER HONOUR: What is that other reason?
MS EGAN-GREEN: The other reason would be, because as stated in his affidavit ...
MS EGAN-GREEN: Coming back to 28, 29 and 30, and 31 of his affidavit, he says I have reviewed the file, and aside from the access, so he said quite clearly, he has reviewed the file. It’d have to be determined as to where he reviewed the file, but I believe he read it. He must have read it, when it was to do with the Royal Commission situation. Not in 2016 when the - - -
HER HONOUR: Sorry, where do you get that from?
...
MS EGAN-GREEN: At the bottom on 31, he says I have reviewed the file.
HER HONOUR: Yes, and he’s looked at the record of who’s seen it.
MS EGAN-GREEN: Correct. So, there is a ledger kept of anyone that has viewed it.
HER HONOUR: Right. Are you asking me to understand from that, that on that file he must have found the thing that said, Father Wellspring looked at this earlier?
MS EGAN-GREEN: On the ledger there’s a possibility that he did.
HER HONOUR: There’s a possibility any of us did, but that’s not evidence that he did.
MS EGAN-GREEN: Either way, the Tribunal staff and other officers.
HER HONOUR: Indeed. He certainly gives evidence that someone - - -
MS EGAN-GREEN: He doesn’t know. He knows not how many people have viewed the material.
HER HONOUR: He doesn’t know.
MS EGAN-GREEN: He doesn’t know.
Even assuming that Father Wellspring is (or was the relevant time) the head of the relevant Tribunal, this does not establish that he must have looked at the 1997 material for any other purpose than in connection with the current matter. The implication of Ms Egan-Green’s submission, being that, since there was a record of who had looked at her file, that record might have shown that Father Wellspring had looked at the file before he looked at it for the purpose of the current proceedings, is not incorrect as such but, in the context of identifying an error by the primary judge, is verging on incoherent.
Nor does Ms Egan-Green identify a reason why his Honour should have rejected Father Wellspring’s sworn evidence about when he looked at the file and who had looked at it before him.
Ms Egan-Green has not identified any basis on which it could be found that the primary judge’s findings as mentioned in appeal grounds 14 and 15 were erroneous.
Other errors of fact (appeal ground 7)
In finding that “the likely limits of the publication were quite limited”, the primary judge did not attempt to quantify the precise limits of the publication, but merely reflected Father Wellspring’s evidence about the confidentiality obligations attached to the annulment documents under Canon law and the defined and relatively small group of people within the Church’s administrative structures who would have been given access to the relevant material.
His Honour’s conclusion might have been significant, and the details of access to the material might have been teased out more carefully, had Ms Egan-Green’s claim ever reached the stage of an assessment of damages. As things stand, however, Ms Egan‑Green has not suggested any basis for a finding that his Honour’s conclusion was erroneous, or any basis on which that conclusion, such as it was, could have been relevant to the decisions of the primary judge against which she seeks to appeal.
Appeal’s prospects of success
I cannot identify any appeal ground that seems to have any prospect of success.
Whether injustice would be caused by refusal of leave
As to whether refusing leave to appeal would cause injustice to her, Ms Egan-Green said that she would suffer injustice, and explained:
I’ll be left without remedy for the hurt that I’ve suffered and damage I have at the hands of the defendant, and I will be a failed litigant ... and subject to serious cost order. So I believe I’m deserving of my day in court so I can expose the practices and connivances that have troubled me with my dealings with the Catholic Church for over 20 years.
What will leave Ms Egan-Green without a remedy for any hurt and damage suffered as a result of the alleged defamation by Ms McLean is the limitation period applicable to her claim, not her inability to appeal from the primary judge’s decision. Since I have found that the appeal grounds relating to the limitation issue have no substance, and her proposed appeal would not change the limitation position, no injustice would be caused by refusing leave to pursue an appeal from the limitation decision, or to pursue her application to amend the statement of claim.
Furthermore, Ms Egan-Green is correct that as a failed litigant she might be subject to serious costs orders. However, if, as I have found, her appeal has no prospect of success, then enabling her to appeal would only expose her to further and more serious costs orders.
Finally and more significantly, Ms Egan-Green’s submissions reveal that the primary purpose of her action is not, or is not only, the pursuit of Ms McLean over alleged defamatory comments made in confidence some 20 years ago, perhaps predictably, in the course of a process initiated by Ms Egan-Green herself.
Rather, her primary purpose is, or at least includes, using this Court as a forum in which to pursue a body that is not a party to this action, namely the Catholic Church, and to pursue that body in relation to matters that have, if at all, only the most tenuous connection with the subject of Ms Egan-Green’s defamation claim. Her explanation of her wish to expose aspects of her dealings with the Catholic Church by pursuing her former sister-in-law in my view comes dangerously close to exposing Ms Egan-Green’s action as an abuse of the processes of the Court.
Orders
I have concluded:
(a) that Ms Egan-Green has an adequate explanation for her failure to seek leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge within the 7-day deadline that was applicable to his Honour’s orders;
(b) that her appeal would, however, be futile, and that none of her appeal grounds has any prospect of success in overturning the primary judge’s decisions; and
(c) that no injustice would be caused by refusing Ms Egan-Green leave to appeal.
No extension of time to seek leave to appeal
As required by the conclusions set out at [119] above, I refuse Ms Egan-Green’s application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the primary judge’s decision.
Having refused that extension, there is no live application for leave to appeal, and no basis on which to refuse such leave; however, should the question have arisen, the conclusions set out at [119] above would also have required me to refuse leave to appeal.
Dismissal of incompetent appeal
Since Ms Egan-Green has not obtained leave to appeal the decisions of the primary judge, her appeal is incompetent and, in accordance with Ms McLean’s application (at [33] above), I make the following further orders:
(a) Ms Egan-Green’s appeal is incompetent, and is dismissed; and
(b) Ms Egan-Green is to pay Ms McLean’s costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
Note for parties
For reasons mentioned at [74] above, I note that the orders set out at [120] and [122] above are in my view interlocutory orders, but also that this opinion does not bind any other court.
| I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty‑three [123] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice Penfold. Associate: Nishadee Perera Date: 19 July 2017 |
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