Edwards v Legalese P/L T/A Peter Scragg & Associates

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

EDWARDS & ORS v LEGALESE P/L T/A PETER SCRAGG & ASSOCIATES

[2014] SASCFC 58

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Bampton and The Honourable Justice Parker)

6 June 2014

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DUTY OF CARE

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - DUTIES AND LIABILITIES - SOLICITOR AND CLIENT - NEGLIGENCE

Appeal from decision of Judge dismissing claim for damages for alleged breach of duty by solicitor – clients claimed that breach arose as a consequence of negligent advice given by solicitor – whether Judge erred in finding alleged advice not given and concluding that there was no breach of duty in tort – whether Judge erred in finding that had any such breach been proved clients failed to establish that such breach was causative of their losses – whether Judge erred in approach to determining question of damages.

Held: appeal dismissed – evidence supported conclusion that the advice allegedly given was not in fact given – evidence justified a conclusion that even had the alleged advice been given clients had failed to establish they could or would have done anything to save the company – Judge’s approach to determining question of damages not in error.

PROCEDURE - COSTS - APPEALS AS TO COSTS - DISCRETION

Respondent sought permission to cross-appeal against Judge’s refusal to certify costs fit for two counsel.

Held: permission to appeal granted – no basis to interfere with the exercise of the Judge’s discretion as to costs.

Austrust v Astley (2000) 197 CLR 1; Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (1996) All ER 698; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470, considered.

EDWARDS & ORS v LEGALESE P/L T/A PETER SCRAGG & ASSOCIATES
[2014] SASCFC 58

Full Court:  Vanstone, Bampton and Parker JJ

  1. VANSTONE J.     I have had the opportunity to read the reasons of Bampton J in draft.  I agree with the conclusions her Honour has reached.

  2. I would only add that in my view the judgment under appeal was extremely thorough and carefully reasoned.  The conclusions reached by the judge on each issue are amply justified.  Indeed, the closer the examination of the oral evidence, the contemporaneous documents and the chronology of events, the more compelling is the conclusion that the advice the plaintiff, Mr Edwards, claims Mr Scragg gave him in April 1999 was not in fact given.  The reasons which dictate that conclusion are clearly set out in the judgment under appeal.

  3. In relation to the issue of reliance, again the judge’s conclusions seem to me to be unassailable.  The company was insolvent.  Mr Edwards was alive to the insurmountable challenges it faced.  Even had the disputed advice been given, it was not demonstrated that the plaintiffs could or would have done anything to save the company.

  4. In my view it is to be regretted that the case has proceeded…

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Details
Case
[2014] SASCFC 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a claim by the appellants, Mr and Mrs Edwards, against their former solicitor, Peter Scragg & Associates, for alleged negligence. The clients contended that the solicitor's negligent advice led to their financial losses. The primary dispute revolved around whether specific advice was given by the solicitor and, if so, whether that advice was causative of the losses suffered by the appellants. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the alleged negligent advice was not given, and consequently, that there was no breach of duty in tort. Further, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in finding that, even if a breach had been proven, the appellants had failed to establish that such a breach caused their losses. Finally, the court examined whether the primary judge's approach to determining the quantum of damages was flawed.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the primary judge's conclusion that the alleged advice was not provided and therefore no breach of duty occurred. The evidence presented supported the finding that the advice in question was not given. Furthermore, the court found that even if the advice had been given, the appellants had not demonstrated that they would have acted differently to save their company. Consequently, the appellants failed to establish that any alleged breach of duty was causative of their losses. The court also found no error in the primary judge's assessment of damages.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my view the Judge’s conclusion that the alleged advice was not given and that there was no breach of the respondent’s duty of care to the appellants should be sustained. In these circumstances, it is necessary to deal only briefly with the appellant’s complaints with respect to the question of damages. Background Facts Falzon Brick operated the clay brick and paver business (the business) on land in St Agnes owned by Falzon Investments. Mr and Mrs Edwards borrowed heavily from the CBA and the Commonwealth Development Bank (CDB) to invest in Falzon Brick. The purchase of the business was also facilitated by vendor finance. The CBA held various securities, including a mortgage debenture dated 28 August 1989 in respect of Falzon Brick. There was also a charge over the land owned by Falzon Investments. It is apparent that Falzon Brick was in financial difficulty almost from the date of acquisition. During the ten years that followed the Edwards’ had repeated negotiations with their bankers arising out of their financial difficulties in meeting their commitments. On 17 August 1994, Falzon Brick and the CBA entered into an amended loan agreement secured by equitable mortgages over the assets of Falzon Brick and Falzon Investments (the 1994 loan agreement). Following negotiations in August 1995 the large debt owed to the CDB was written off. In February 1997 and again in November 1997 Falzon Brick fell into arrears with respect to its loan to the CBA. On 3 November 1997 the CBA served a Notice of Demand alleging arrears of $25,445. In February 1998 the CBA purported to increase the monthly repayments under the terms of the 1994 loan agreement. Falzon Brick challenged the right of the CBA to do so and in April 1998 with the respondent acting as its solicitor issued District Court proceedings (the construction proceedings).[2] The construction proceedings did not deny that Falzon Brick was indebted to the CBA or that Falzon Brick was obliged to make monthly repayments of $4,000. Rather, Falzon Brick asserted that all it had to pay was $4,000 per month for the term of the loan to meet its obligations and discharge the loan. [2] DCCIV-98-471. On 25 September 1998, shortly before the trial of the construction proceedings, Falzon Brick paid several months’ accumulated arrears, bringing the loan balance to $358,971.91.[3] In November 1998, the CBA indicated that it would accept $280,000 in full settlement of the loan (then standing at $364,830). The CBA agreed to the appellants having time to consider the offer on condition that monthly repayments of $4270 were made. The offer was not taken up. Mr Edwards made no attempt to pay or refinance, preferring to keep the benefit of the CBA loan.[4][3] The appellant made no further payments to the CBA until May 1999.[4] Edwards v Legalese Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 95, [92]-[94], [98]. In February 1999 the CBA advised Mr Edwards that it intended to enforce its securities in respect of the 1994 loan agreement. On 16 April 1999, the CBA issued the first of three notices of demand to the appellants and Falzon Investments indicating its intention to either appoint a receiver and manager or to enforce its securities. The notice of demand for 4 loan instalments plus interest totalled $18,480.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellants contend the Judge erred in:-failing to find the respondent had a duty to the appellants regarding the risk that the CBA would enforce its securities and the steps that should be taken to mitigate that risk. -failing to find that the alleged advice was given when the available contemporaneous evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the alleged advice was given and as a result, failing to find that the respondent breached its duty to the respondents.-finding that if the respondent was negligent in giving the advice, the appellants were negligent in relying on that advice.-failing to find the appellants suffered losses by reason of their reliance on the respondent’s inaccurate advice.Evidence surrounding the alleged advice of 22 April 1999 The 22 April 1999 meeting was the subject of a brief file note by Mr Scragg and was addressed in evidence at trial in some detail. The Judge considered these issues, particularly the meeting of 22 April 1999 together with the advice of Mr Caporaso.[5][5] Edwards v Legalese Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 95, [290]. I now turn to addressing the specific complaints made by the appellants regarding the Judge’s findings concerning the alleged advice.Negligence by omission – duty to advise The trial Judge found that had Mr Edwards sought advice from Mr Scragg on 22 April 1999 he was under a duty of care to provide adequate advice. The appellants argue that Mr Scragg was obliged to advise of the possible consequences of non-payment irrespective of any request from Mr Edwards. The Judge rejected the appellants’ claim on negligence by omission based on the finding that in October 1998, upon adjournment of the construction proceedings, Mr Scragg informed Mr Edwards that the construction proceedings would not prevent the CBA from proceeding on its securities.[6] The Judge encapsulated his reasons on this issue in the following passage:[7]Mr Scragg had made it clear to Mr Edwards in October 1998 that the construction proceedings would not prevent action by the CBA. He was not obliged to remind Mr Edwards of that advice. Mr Edwards is an astute businessman. In his evidence he said at all times that he was aware of the consequences of failing to pay the CBA. He also acknowledged the letter, from the CBA in July 1999 warning of the possible appointment of a Receiver. [6] Edwards v Legalese Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 95, [353].[7] Ibid, [357]. This finding by the trial Judge was unchallenged on appeal. Further, it is inconsistent with the alleged advice in April 1999. The Judge did not reject the case based on negligence by omission because he rejected that the duty owed by the respondent was broad enough to cover the effect of non-payment of admitted ongoing payments by Falzon Brick. The Judge found that in October 1998 upon adjournment of the construction proceedings Mr Scragg informed Mr Edwards that the construction proceedings would not prevent the CBA from acting on its securities. The evidence Mr Edwards gave at trial indicates that, in the period prior to 22 April 1999, he was aware that if he did not pay at least the $4,270 per month, as per the 1994 loan agreement, the CBA could act on its securities. This is supported by the fact that Mr Edwards, not Mr Scragg, wrote to the CBA on 2 March 1999 stating, “I am very conscious of my debt” and that he accepted that that was so in cross-examination. In cross-examination Mr Edwards also said, in relation to the notice of demand of 16 April 1999, that upon reading the demands he understood that it looked to him that he had to reach some agreement with the bank or it might move on its securities. It is clear that, having regard to Mr Edwards’ evidence, prior to 22 April 1999, he knew that he was not excused from paying $4,270 per month, the alleged negligent omission cannot be found to be causative, in the absence of any positive contrary advice being given.

Decision

Reasons for decision

VANSTONE J (dissent) BAMPTON J (dissent) PARKER J (dissent)
I would dismiss the cross-appeal. Conclusion I would dismiss the appellant’s appeal. I would grant the respondent permission on the cross-appeal, but dismiss the cross-appeal. I agree with the conclusions of Bampton J and the additional comments made by Vanstone J. I would dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The appeal by the appellants, Mr and Mrs Edwards, against the decision of the trial Judge, was dismissed by the court. The central issues of the appeal were whether the trial Judge erred in finding that the alleged advice was not given and concluding there was no breach of duty by the respondent solicitor, and whether the trial Judge erred in his approach to determining the question of damages.

The court found that the evidence supported the trial Judge’s conclusion that the alleged advice given on 22 April 1999 was not in fact given. The court examined the evidence surrounding the meeting of 22 April 1999, including a brief file note by the respondent, Mr Scragg, and the testimony provided during the trial. The Judge had noted that Mr Scragg had already informed Mr Edwards in October 1998 that the construction proceedings would not prevent the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) from acting on its securities. The court found that Mr Edwards, an astute businessman, was already aware of the consequences of non-payment, as evidenced by his own correspondence to the CBA and his testimony during the trial.

The court held that the Judge’s finding that there was no breach of duty was justified. The court agreed with the Judge that the duty of care owed by the respondent was limited to providing advice in response to specific inquiries, rather than providing unsolicited advice on potential consequences of non-payment. Since Mr Edwards was already aware of the implications of not paying the monthly instalments, the alleged omission could not be found causative.

Further, the court found that even if the alleged advice had been given, the appellants failed to establish that such advice, if negligent, was causative of their losses. The court reasoned that Mr Edwards’ awareness of the consequences of non-payment, as evidenced by his actions and statements, undermined any claim that reliance on the alleged advice could have prevented the losses.

Regarding the determination of damages, the court found no error in the Judge’s approach. The Judge had concluded that the appellants had failed to establish that they could or would have done anything to save the company even if the alleged advice had been given. The court upheld the Judge’s conclusion that the appellants’ failure to take action despite knowing the consequences of non-payment meant they could not establish causation.

The court thus dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, affirming the trial Judge’s conclusions that there was no breach of duty by the respondent solicitor, and that the appellants failed to establish causation. The reasoning of the court was consistent with the evidence presented, and the binding legal principle established is that a duty of care owed by a solicitor is limited to providing advice in response to specific inquiries, and not to unsolicited advice on potential consequences of non-payment. The court’s decision aligns with prior authority that emphasizes the necessity for a causative link between the alleged breach and the losses claimed.