SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
EDWARDS & ORS v LEGALESE P/L T/A PETER SCRAGG & ASSOCIATES
[2014] SASCFC 58
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Bampton and The Honourable Justice Parker)
6 June 2014
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DUTY OF CARE
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - DUTIES AND LIABILITIES - SOLICITOR AND CLIENT - NEGLIGENCE
Appeal from decision of Judge dismissing claim for damages for alleged breach of duty by solicitor – clients claimed that breach arose as a consequence of negligent advice given by solicitor – whether Judge erred in finding alleged advice not given and concluding that there was no breach of duty in tort – whether Judge erred in finding that had any such breach been proved clients failed to establish that such breach was causative of their losses – whether Judge erred in approach to determining question of damages.
Held: appeal dismissed – evidence supported conclusion that the advice allegedly given was not in fact given – evidence justified a conclusion that even had the alleged advice been given clients had failed to establish they could or would have done anything to save the company – Judge’s approach to determining question of damages not in error.
PROCEDURE - COSTS - APPEALS AS TO COSTS - DISCRETION
Respondent sought permission to cross-appeal against Judge’s refusal to certify costs fit for two counsel.
Held: permission to appeal granted – no basis to interfere with the exercise of the Judge’s discretion as to costs.
Austrust v Astley (2000) 197 CLR 1; Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (1996) All ER 698; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; Stanley v Phillips (1966) 115 CLR 470, considered.
EDWARDS & ORS v LEGALESE P/L T/A PETER SCRAGG & ASSOCIATES
[2014] SASCFC 58Full Court: Vanstone, Bampton and Parker JJ
VANSTONE J. I have had the opportunity to read the reasons of Bampton J in draft. I agree with the conclusions her Honour has reached.
I would only add that in my view the judgment under appeal was extremely thorough and carefully reasoned. The conclusions reached by the judge on each issue are amply justified. Indeed, the closer the examination of the oral evidence, the contemporaneous documents and the chronology of events, the more compelling is the conclusion that the advice the plaintiff, Mr Edwards, claims Mr Scragg gave him in April 1999 was not in fact given. The reasons which dictate that conclusion are clearly set out in the judgment under appeal.
In relation to the issue of reliance, again the judge’s conclusions seem to me to be unassailable. The company was insolvent. Mr Edwards was alive to the insurmountable challenges it faced. Even had the disputed advice been given, it was not demonstrated that the plaintiffs could or would have done anything to save the company.
In my view it is to be regretted that the case has proceeded…
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- Case
- [2014] SASCFC 58
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the alleged negligent advice was not given, and consequently, that there was no breach of duty in tort. Further, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in finding that, even if a breach had been proven, the appellants had failed to establish that such a breach caused their losses. Finally, the court examined whether the primary judge's approach to determining the quantum of damages was flawed.
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the primary judge's conclusion that the alleged advice was not provided and therefore no breach of duty occurred. The evidence presented supported the finding that the advice in question was not given. Furthermore, the court found that even if the advice had been given, the appellants had not demonstrated that they would have acted differently to save their company. Consequently, the appellants failed to establish that any alleged breach of duty was causative of their losses. The court also found no error in the primary judge's assessment of damages.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
The appeal by the appellants, Mr and Mrs Edwards, against the decision of the trial Judge, was dismissed by the court. The central issues of the appeal were whether the trial Judge erred in finding that the alleged advice was not given and concluding there was no breach of duty by the respondent solicitor, and whether the trial Judge erred in his approach to determining the question of damages.
The court found that the evidence supported the trial Judge’s conclusion that the alleged advice given on 22 April 1999 was not in fact given. The court examined the evidence surrounding the meeting of 22 April 1999, including a brief file note by the respondent, Mr Scragg, and the testimony provided during the trial. The Judge had noted that Mr Scragg had already informed Mr Edwards in October 1998 that the construction proceedings would not prevent the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) from acting on its securities. The court found that Mr Edwards, an astute businessman, was already aware of the consequences of non-payment, as evidenced by his own correspondence to the CBA and his testimony during the trial.
The court held that the Judge’s finding that there was no breach of duty was justified. The court agreed with the Judge that the duty of care owed by the respondent was limited to providing advice in response to specific inquiries, rather than providing unsolicited advice on potential consequences of non-payment. Since Mr Edwards was already aware of the implications of not paying the monthly instalments, the alleged omission could not be found causative.
Further, the court found that even if the alleged advice had been given, the appellants failed to establish that such advice, if negligent, was causative of their losses. The court reasoned that Mr Edwards’ awareness of the consequences of non-payment, as evidenced by his actions and statements, undermined any claim that reliance on the alleged advice could have prevented the losses.
Regarding the determination of damages, the court found no error in the Judge’s approach. The Judge had concluded that the appellants had failed to establish that they could or would have done anything to save the company even if the alleged advice had been given. The court upheld the Judge’s conclusion that the appellants’ failure to take action despite knowing the consequences of non-payment meant they could not establish causation.
The court thus dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, affirming the trial Judge’s conclusions that there was no breach of duty by the respondent solicitor, and that the appellants failed to establish causation. The reasoning of the court was consistent with the evidence presented, and the binding legal principle established is that a duty of care owed by a solicitor is limited to providing advice in response to specific inquiries, and not to unsolicited advice on potential consequences of non-payment. The court’s decision aligns with prior authority that emphasizes the necessity for a causative link between the alleged breach and the losses claimed.