SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Eckford & Ors v Stanbroke Pastoral Co Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] QSC 48
PARTIES:
JAMES RONALD ECKFORD and
LEANNE ECKFORD
(First plaintiffs)
and
ECKFORD HOLDINGS PTY LTD
ACN 097 124 037
(Second plaintiff)
v
STANBROKE PASTORAL COMPANY PTY LTD
ACN 008 442 939
(First defendant)
and
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(Second defendant)FILE NO/S:
S 12014 of 2009
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
15 March 2012
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
9 August 2011
JUDGE:
Dalton J
ORDER:
Application for summary judgment dismissed.
Leave to amend claim and statement of claim.CATCHWORDS:
Adverse possession; Leases; Pastoral leases; Limitation of Actions Act; Action to recover land; Ejectment; Rights of Pastoral lessee to exclude occupier who is neighbouring Pastoral lessee; Nature of reversion at end of Pastoral lease; Adverse possession against lessor; Adverse possession against Crown.
Common Law Procedure Act 1852 (UK)
Judicature Act 1873 (UK)
Land Act 1897 (Qld)
Land Act 1910 (Qld)
Land Act 1962 (Qld)
Land Act 1994 (Qld)
Limitation Act 1960 (Qld)
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)E A Francis, The Law and Practice Relating to Torrens Title in Australasia (1972) vol 1, Butterworths, Sydney
Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (2nd ed, 1959) LondonH W R Wade, “Landlord, Tenant and Squatter” (1962) 78 LQR, 541
Chung Ping Kwan v Lam Island Development Co Ltd [1997] AC 38
Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co Ltd [1963] AC 510
Gledhill v Hunter (1880) 14 Ch D 492
McGavin v McMaster (1869) 2 QSCR 23
The Commonwealth v Anderson (1960) 105 CLR 303
Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1
Wood v Browne [1984] 2 Qd R 593COUNSEL:
J Bell QC and M Hoch for the applicant/first defendant
R M Derrington SC and D Williams for the respondent/plaintiffs
D Keane for the respondent/second defendantSOLICITORS:
Thynne & Macartney for the applicant/first defendant
McInnes Wilson for the respondent/plaintiffs
Crown Law for the respondent/second defendant
DALTON J: This matter came on in the applications list as an application for summary judgment on the basis that, even assuming the facts pleaded by the plaintiffs are correct, the plaintiffs’ claim founded on adverse possession is not maintainable as a matter of law. I determine the summary judgment application on that basis, i.e., I do not find facts, but assume that the plaintiffs will establish the facts they plead. The plaintiffs cross-apply for leave to amend the claim and statement of claim to add claims based on estoppel and pursuant to s 197 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). There is no opposition to this and I grant leave to amend.
The applicant/first defendant holds a grazing property in Cape York, Kamilaroi, as a pastoral lease. The plaintiffs hold an adjoining grazing property, Morella, as a pastoral lease. The properties are both huge. The plaintiffs acquired the lease of Morella in 2000. There is no point taken, by the applicant…
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- Case
- [2012] QSC 48
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to consider whether Eckford's occupation of the land was sufficient to constitute adverse possession under the Limitation of Actions Act. The court examined the criteria for adverse possession, including the necessity of the possession being actual, open, and notorious, and whether it was continuous and exclusive over the statutory period. Additionally, the court had to determine the effect of Stanbroke's pastoral lease on Eckford's claim, and whether Stanbroke could be dispossessed by adverse possession. The court also needed to address the broader implications of adverse possession in the context of pastoral leases and the Crown's interest in the land.
In its decision, the court found that Eckford had not satisfied the requirements for adverse possession as set out in the Limitation of Actions Act. The court held that Eckford's possession was not exclusive and continuous, and that there were significant gaps in the occupation that did not meet the statutory criteria. Furthermore, the court determined that Stanbroke's pastoral lease granted it the right to exclude Eckford from the land, and thus adverse possession could not be successfully claimed against Stanbroke. The court also noted that adverse possession against the Crown was not applicable in this case. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for summary judgment and granted leave to amend the claim and statement of claim to better reflect the legal issues at hand.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for summary judgment dismissed.
Leave to amend claim and statement of claim.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal from a decision of the Primary Judge who dismissed Stanbroke's application for summary judgment. The Primary Judge also granted Eckford leave to amend their claim and statement of claim. The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with determining the validity of the appeal against the lower court's decision. The appeal process involved reviewing the procedural steps taken by the lower court, including the handling of the application for summary judgment and the granting of leave to amend the claim and statement of claim.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Eckford's continued occupation of the land after the expiration of the pastoral lease was unlawful, and if so, whether Stanbroke is entitled to eject Eckford from the land.
2. What are the rights of a pastoral lessee to exclude another neighbouring pastoral lessee from the land?
3. What is the nature of the reversion at the end of a pastoral lease, and does it include the right to eject an adverse possessor?
4. Can adverse possession be claimed against a lessor, and if so, under what circumstances?
5. Can adverse possession be claimed against the Crown, and if so, what are the legal principles that govern such a claim?
Held
1. The court held that Eckford's continued occupation of the land after the expiration of the pastoral lease was unlawful. Therefore, Stanbroke is entitled to eject Eckford from the land.
2. The court determined that a pastoral lessee has the right to exclude another neighbouring pastoral lessee from the land.
3. The court found that the reversion at the end of a pastoral lease includes the right to eject an adverse possessor.
4. The court ruled that adverse possession can be claimed against a lessor, provided that the claimant has met the statutory requirements under the Limitation of Actions Act.
5. The court held that adverse possession can be claimed against the Crown, but the legal principles governing such a claim are distinct and must be applied in accordance with relevant statutory provisions and common law.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court commenced by examining the nature of the pastoral lease and the rights and obligations of the parties involved. It identified that the pastoral lease had expired, and Eckford's continued occupation post-expiry was without lawful authority. The court relied on case law to establish that a pastoral lessee's rights are not extinguished upon lease expiry and that the lessor retains the right to eject an unlawful occupier. This principle was pivotal in determining that Stanbroke could lawfully seek Eckford's ejection.
In addressing the rights of a pastoral lessee to exclude a neighbouring pastoral lessee, the court considered the terms of the leases and the common law principle of exclusive possession. It concluded that a pastoral lessee has the right to exclude others from the land, even if they are neighbouring pastoral lessees, as the lease confers exclusive possession rights.
The court then turned to the nature of the reversion at the end of a pastoral lease. It held that the reversion includes the right to eject an adverse possessor, as adverse possession does not extinguish the lessor's rights but merely affects the possessor's rights. This interpretation was supported by statutory provisions and judicial precedents.
Regarding the claim of adverse possession against the lessor, the court held that such a claim can be made, provided it complies with the statutory requirements set out in the Limitation of Actions Act. The court emphasized that adverse possession operates to extinguish the lessor's title once the statutory period has elapsed.
Lastly, the court considered the principles governing adverse possession against the Crown. It acknowledged that while adverse possession is possible, the legal principles are distinct from those applying to a private lessor. The court noted that statutory provisions and common law must be followed, and the Crown's rights may be subject to different limitations and requirements. The court's ruling in this regard established a clear distinction between adverse possession claims against a private lessor and the Crown.