FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DZADS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1128
Citation: DZADS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1128 Appeal from: DZADS v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1082 Parties: DZADS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NTD 14 of 2014 Judge: MANSFIELD J Date of judgment: 24 October 2014 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VWBA [2005] FCAFC 175 cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2013) 308 ALR 18 citedDate of hearing: 19 September 2014 Date of last submissions: 19 September 2014 Place: Adelaide (via video link to Darwin) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 62 Counsel for the Appellant: JF Gormly with M Fozzard Counsel for the Respondents: T Anderson Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NTD 14 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: DZADS
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 OCTOBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO DARWIN)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay to the first respondent costs of and incidental to the appeal, fixed at $6639.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NTD 14 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: DZADS
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
24 OCTOBER 2014
PLACE:
ADELAIDE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO DARWIN)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a 29 year old Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity from the village of Udappu. He arrived in Australia at Christmas Island on 27 May 2012 as an irregular maritime arrival.
It appears the first respondent (the Minister) exercised his power under s 46(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to allow the appellant to apply for a protection visa. The Minister in submissions did not gainsay that assumption.
On 5 August 2012, the appellant applied for a protection visa under the Act. He had the assistance of migration advisors. On 18 September 2012, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellant a protection visa.
On 18 September 2013, the second respondent (the Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision.
On 23 October 2013, the appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court (the FCC) to set aside the Tribunal’s decision for jurisdictional error. On 27 May 2014, the FCC dismissed that application.
This is an appeal from that decision.
The outcome of the appeal turns…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1128
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims, particularly regarding the threats made by his creditors and Suranka. The appellant argued that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by assessing his claims based on what he should reasonably do to avoid persecution, rather than what he would do if he returned to Sri Lanka. The Minister conceded that if the Tribunal did not correctly assess the Suranka threat to report claim, the appeal should succeed.
The Federal Circuit Court (FCC) examined the Tribunal's reasons in detail, noting that the Tribunal was aware of the Suranka threat to report claim and had addressed it throughout its reasoning. The FCC concluded that the Tribunal had indeed rejected the Suranka threat to report claim in the first sentence of paragraph [52] of its reasons. The FCC found that the last two sentences of [52] concerned only a possible subjective fear and did not affect the overall decision. Therefore, the jurisdictional error alleged did not infect the Tribunal's decision, including its treatment of the Suranka threat to report claim.
In light of the above, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay to the first respondent costs of and incidental to the appeal, fixed at $6639.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated from a decision by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which was subsequently reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal found the appellant's claims to be not credible and rejected them. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia, which heard the case in the Full Court (FCC). The appeal focused on whether the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of the appellant's claims, particularly those related to threats from Suranka. The FCC examined the Tribunal's reasons and determined whether there was a misstatement of the law that impacted the decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Consequently, the FCC regarded the last two sentences of the Tribunal’s reasons at [52] as concerning only a remaining “possible subjective fear” such that the clear misstatement of the law in those sentences did not infect the decision, including, by implication, the Tribunal’s treatment of the Suranka threat to report claim.THE APPEAL: CONSIDERATION It is accepted by the Minister, for the purposes of the appeal, that if the last two sentences of [52] of the Tribunal’s reasons are the way in which the Tribunal dealt with the Suranka threat to report claim, then it fell into jurisdictional error, because it involved assessing that claim on the basis of what the appellant should reasonably do to avoid persecution if he were to return to Sri Lanka, rather than assessing that claim on the basis of what he would do if he returned to Sri Lanka: see Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473; Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VWBA [2005] FCAFC 175 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2013) 308 ALR 18 (noting that Special Leave to Appeal from the last mentioned decision was given by the High Court on 16 May 2014). It is therefore also common ground that, if the Tribunal did not address the Suranka threat to report claim other than in the last two sentences of [52] of its reasons, then the appeal should succeed and consequential orders made. The Minister’s position is that the last two sentences of [52] of the Tribunal’s reasons address the Suranka threat to kill claim, and then only as an aside and not in a material way, because the Tribunal elsewhere said it was not satisfied that the Suranka threat to report claim was made out. I have referred in some detail above to the Tribunal’s reasons because they must be read as a whole, and the Tribunal’s introductory reasons, and its recital and assessment of the evidence are part of the context in which the critical paragraphs of the reasons are to be read. It is clear that the Tribunal was aware of the Suranka threat to report claim. It is recorded in [3] where the Tribunal summarises the basis of the appellant’s claims. It is specifically referred to when the Tribunal assesses whether the appellant gave credible evidence about his business problems: see at [26], [27], [31] and [41], and the dealings with Suranka and their general consequences also are referred to expressly at [29], [32], [34] and [39]. It features more prominently in those parts of this section of the Tribunal’s reasons than the Suranka threat to kill claim. When the Tribunal turns to consider whether the applicant might be persecuted if he returns to Sri Lanka, its first subheading is the appellant’s “Business problems” in [51]-[54]. Paragraph [51] concerns threats from the appellant’s creditors. Then [52] concerns the reported history provided by the appellant: the first sentence refers to earlier findings, rejecting the appellant’s claims as a matter of fact, including that he had not been threatened with being reported as a LTTE supporter. It addresses in the second sentence whether the appellant’s creditors would actually harm or kill him. It addresses in the third sentence whether Suranka (his only identified debtor) would pay to have someone kill him. But for the final two sentences, in my view it is clear that the Tribunal in the first sentence of [52] has addressed and rejected the appellant’s claims, including relevantly the Suranka threat to report claim.