Dyne v Bravans Pty Ltd t/a Cavalier Homes Whitsundays

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CITATION: Dyne v Bravans Pty Ltd t/a Cavalier Homes Whitsundays [2016] QCATA 061
PARTIES:` Alan Harry Dyne
(Applicant/Appellant)
v

Bravans Pty Ltd T/A Cavalier Homes Whitsundays
(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER: APL517-15
MATTER TYPE: Applications and Appeals
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Justice Carmody
DELIVERED ON: 10 June 2016
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE:

THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

1.     Leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEALS – LEAVE TO APPEAL  – MINOR CIVIL DISPUTE – where the applicant was employed by the respondent as a salesman – where the applicant claims he was entitled to a commission for a sale – whether the Appeal Tribunal should overturn findings of fact – whether the applicant was afforded a fair hearing – where the applicant seeks to adduce new evidence

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ss 26, 32, 142(3)

Bolea v Savu’s Immigrations Solutions [2014] QCATA 83

Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232

Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1

Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435

Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388

Metcalfe v Hall & Anor [2015] QCATA 43

McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577

QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”).

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. This claim is for real estate sales commission of $19,800 (3 x $6,000 plus $1,800 GST) allegedly payable on housing contracts for three (3) lots – 2, 8 and 15 – of the Shelly Sands Subdivision in the Whitsundays.

  2. The respondent formerly conducted a project home design, planning and construction business trading as Cavalier Homes and built the homes on the three lots in issue.  The applicant worked for Cavalier as a salesman, providing marketing services from 16 May 2013 until 24 April 2015 under a Sales Contractor Agreement.

  3. The services the applicant was to provide as part of his contract are listed in Item 3 of Schedule 1 and include, inter alia:

    a.to sell and market homes and other products developed by the company;

    b.to prepare, complete and execute all relevant documentation as directed by the company pursuant to sales made by the contractor.

  4. Payment of a commission is provided for under Clause 11 of the agreement and specifically at Clause 11.3, which provides “the tax invoice is to contain details of all contracts entered into by the company with customers of the company that have become unconditional contracts during the preceding month, and that were introduced by the contractor”.

  5. Commission rates are paid in accordance with the Payment Schedule contained in Schedule 3, which states…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCATA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Dyne v Bravans Pty Ltd t/a Cavalier Homes Whitsundays, the applicant, a salesman, sought to appeal the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal's (QCAT) decision that he was not entitled to commission for sales made. The applicant contended that he had been denied a fair opportunity to present his case and that new evidence could change the outcome. The respondent opposed the appeal, arguing that the applicant had not provided a valid basis for overturning the findings of fact or for introducing new evidence. The appeal tribunal assessed whether the applicant's grounds for appeal met the criteria for leave, including whether there was a reasonably arguable case that the primary decision was erroneous and if there were good prospects of success or a substantial injustice.

The appeal tribunal examined whether the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and the introduction of new evidence could justify overturning the QCAT's findings. The tribunal noted that it would not usually disturb findings of fact if supported by the evidence. The tribunal also highlighted that new evidence could only be admitted if it could not have been reasonably obtained for the original hearing, was credible, and might have produced a different result. The tribunal found that the applicant's evidence, including the proposed new documents, did not meet these criteria and would likely not change the outcome.

The tribunal concluded that the applicant's grounds for appeal did not establish a reasonably arguable case of error or a substantial injustice. The tribunal found that the evidence supported the QCAT's conclusions, and the proposed new evidence was either irrelevant or inadmissible. Therefore, the tribunal refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal.

The tribunal's decision was that leave to appeal was refused, and no further orders were made. The tribunal emphasised that it would not alter the QCAT's findings unless there were compelling reasons to do so, which were not present in this case.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

1. Leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant claims he requires extra time in court to present his submissions and that he expected the parties would be recalled at a later date. The transcript, especially at 1-14: 27 or 1-22:35, does not bear out this complaint.Fresh evidence Contrary to Direction 4 of the QCAT Appeal Tribunal Directions dated 5 January 2015, the applicant seeks to support his application for leave with further evidence (namely, Attachments 3A and 10) that was not before the original decision maker. He has also sought to rely upon a Contract and Deed between Homecorp and the respondent to strengthen his contention that there was a scheme against him by the respondent to deny him commission payments for their own gain.[14][14]Applicant’s submissions dated 22 January 2015, attached contract Homecorp and Cavalier Homes Whitsundays Builder’s Introduction Fee Contract. The respondent opposes any application by the applicant for leave to adduce fresh evidence for the following reasons:a)Attachment 3A (submissions filed 14 December 2015) consists of email correspondence between Fritzsche and the applicant dated 11 February 2015 which would have been reasonably available to him for the original hearing. b)Attachment 10 is without prejudice correspondence dated 26 November 2015 sent to the applicant for the purpose of negotiating a settlement. Accordingly, aside from being irrelevant, it is protected from disclosure.c)The Contract and Deed between Homecorp and the respondent (attached to the applicant’s submissions dated 22 January 2016) has no logical bearing on any issue to be resolved on appeal. New evidence will only be allowed on appeal which could not, by reasonable diligence, have been obtained for the original hearing; is credible; and might have produced an opposite result.[15] There is no legal basis or justification for admitting this evidence on appeal. It is not an appealable error for the Tribunal not to consider evidence it was unaware of. In any event, no explanation for non-production of these documents is given. Even if this material was allowed on appeal, it would probably not produce an opposite result.[15]Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435.Factual issues The Appeal Tribunal will not usually disturb findings of fact if the evidence is capable of supporting the conclusions made by the judge at first instance.[16] In Chambers v Jobling,[17] Kirby P outlined the scope of an appeal judge’s examination of a finding of fact based on credit:“[S]uch review is always to be performed with proper regard to the advantages which the trial judge enjoyed. Especially is this necessary (as Brunskill lately reminds us) where issues of credibility are raised for decision, directly or indirectly. Particularly is it so where the credibility of a witness is determined by the trial judge, expressly or by inference, on the basis of his impressions of the witness whose credibility is under attack. In such cases, the appellate court is not released from its duty to review the trial judge's conclusions. But the circumstances in which it may reverse those conclusions are very narrowly defined indeed. They are confined to those few cases where the trial judge's decision is “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.”[16]Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549,561. [17](1986) 7 NSWLR 1, 10; citing Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53, 57.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Also, Brady disputes any collateral agreement with the applicant and asserts that “the reason Fritzsche contacted us was because we had done another lot of 10 homes with another third party sales ground and the solicitor that recommended us to Homecorp… The applicant has intercepted a phone call with Fritzsche, had given his generic sales advice… the sale is between the builder and the client … then the third party has made the sale which is Homecorp”.[3][3]T 1-16 20/11/2015.Original decision The applicant lost at first instance for want of proof. He did not establish to the Tribunal’s satisfaction that he had been the victim of a breach of an oral contract he had with the respondent via Brady’s agency to work together to sell the three lots in question. The Magistrate found that the applicant received an initial phone call from Fritzsche and provided him with general sales information about the respondent’s products, but was not entitled to the commission because he did not establish that he:· introduced the buyers of any of the three lots in question to the respondent;· had any further dealing with the buyer in relation to the sales; or· executed the contracts for which he claims the commission and had resigned before the contracts came into existence. The leave principles As this is an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in its minor civil jurisdiction, leave is necessary.[4] [4]QCAT Act, ss 26, 142(3). Leave to appeal will only be granted where there is some question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal is to the public advantage;[5] there is a reasonably arguable case that the primary decision made an error;[6] and, there are good prospects that the applicant would be granted orders in its favour,[7] or to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant caused by error.[8][5]Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388, 389; McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577, 578 and 580.[6]QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.[7]Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 [13].[8]QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41; Fox v Percy(2003) 214 CLR 118 [32] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ). That the Tribunal might have exercised the discretion differently is not a basis for changing the decision.[9] A finding of fact will generally not be disturbed on appeal, if the evidence before the Tribunal supports the inferences drawn and facts found.[9]Metcalfe v Hall & Anor [2015] QCATA 43 [31].The leave grounds The applicant’s stated grounds supporting his application for leave to appeal are:· the QCAT hearing before the Magistrate was ‘too short’, and he was no afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the respondent about false and misleading statements to the Tribunal he allegedly made;· the respondent adduced evidence to the Tribunal that the applicant was not aware of, viz. the 16 May 2013 Sales Contractor Agreement and Fritzsche’s statement;· he was uncertain as to which of Fritzsche’s statements was put before the Tribunal;· he was not afforded fair time before the hearing to analyse Fritzsche’s statements properly; and· he misunderstood that the hearing had been adjourned and he thought would be given further opportunity to present his case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established