FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dunstan v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] FCA 921
CRIMINAL LAW – Bail – appellant charged with various offences arising out of bomb-like devices being sent by post to various people – before committal for trial magistrate denies bail – judge of Supreme Court “reviews” that bail decision under s 43 Bail Act and grants bail – Full Court purports to review that review and refuses bail – On committal no application for bail made – bail formally refused – accused person applies to Supreme Court for bail – treated by second judge as an application to “review” a bail decision – bail again refused – appeal to Federal Court – whether Supreme Court has power to review a review – statutory right to bail unless Court satisfied that it is “justified in refusing bail” – weight to be given to “presumption in favour of bail” – relevance of changed circumstances – DPP concedes possible “difficulties” in proving intent to cause bodily harm and abandons charges alleging “dangerous” quality of devices – accused person now adequately treated for depression – whether proceedings before second judge misconceived – whether relied unduly on conclusions of Full Court – whether matter should be remitted to ACT Supreme Court – whether bail should be granted despite some degree of risk of future offences
Bail Act (ACT) 1992 (ACT) ss 3, 5, 8, 9, 10(3), 12, 19, 20, 22, 23A, 39(5)(d), 40(b), 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 55, 57AA
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 19, 27(3)(e), 129(2)
Magistrates Court Act1930 (ACT) s 94
Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 8, 13
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Bail Act 1978 (NSW) ss 8A, 59
Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 10Report of the Bail Review Committee (1976) (NSW Parliamentary Papers No. 46 of 1976)
Brouwer v Titan (1997) 73 FCR 241, 149 ALR 50, referred to
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1)(1981) 147 CLR 246, referred to
CDJ v VDJ (1998) 72 ALJR 1548, referred toDPP v Kanfouche [1992] 1 VR 141, cited
DPP v Hiep Huu Le (1998) 156 ALR 110, cited
Farquar v Fleet (1989) 50 SASR 490, discussed
Gray v Sweatman (1987) 45 SASR 517, referred to
Green v Lynch (1983) 70 FLR 206, referred to
Jure Maric v The Queen [1981] 2 NSWLR 100, cited
Maric v R [1981] 2 NSWLR 100, cited
R v Budiman (1997) 97 A Crim R 548 at 550, cited
R v Connell (1990) 3 WAR 516, cited
R v Hamill (1986) 25 A Crim R 316, distinguished
R v Hilton (1987) 7 NSWLR 745, discussed
R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450, discussedSanofi v Parke Davis Pty Ltd (No. 1) (1982) 149 CLR 147, cited
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 42 FLR 331 at 346-8, 27 ALR 367 at 380-2, followed
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 921
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of the Bail Act 1985, specifically in relation to the granting of bail and the conditions that should be attached to any bail order. The appellant argued that the conditions imposed were too stringent and restrictive, amounting to a denial of liberty. The Director of Public Prosecutions contended that the conditions were necessary to ensure public safety and the proper administration of justice.
The court examined the principles of bail under the Bail Act, considering the seriousness of the offences, the risk of reoffending, and the need to protect the community. The court found that the trial judge had erred in setting certain conditions, particularly those restricting the appellant's movements and contact with certain individuals and locations. The appellate court held that the stringent conditions imposed by the Supreme Court were not warranted by the evidence and circumstances presented. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the bail conditions were revised to be less restrictive while still ensuring public safety and the likelihood of the appellant appearing in court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is given to appeal from the order of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory made on 2 June 1999.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The order made by the Supreme Court is set aside and the following order is made in its stead:
(1) Bail be granted to Colin George Dunstan on conditions that:
(a) he enters into an agreement, in writing, to observe the following requirements as to his conduct while released on bail –
1. not to approach within 100 metres of the Australian Taxation Office;
2. not to approach within 100 metres of the office of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission;
3. not to approach within 20 metres of any Post Office or Post Office facility;
4. not to approach within 100 metres of the office of the Australian Government Solicitor;
5. not to approach within 100 metres or contact or cause to be contacted, except through legal representatives, any witness named in the Police Statement of Facts and such members of such persons’ family as may be notified by the Director of Public Prosecutions to his solicitor;
6. to surrender forthwith his passport and undertake not to apply for any passport or other travelling document;
7. not to approach within 100 metres of any international point of departure;
8. to reside at a nominated address in the ACT;
9. to report to the officer in charge of the Belconnen Police Station between 8.00am and 10.00am each morning and 6.00pm and 10.00 pm each evening;
10. not to leave the ACT;
11. to consult twice weekly with Dr Hugh Victor Veness or, after lodgement of a certificate from Dr Veness with the Registrar of the Supreme Court that once a week is sufficient, once weekly; and
12. to take such medication and accept such treatment as directed by Dr Veness.
(b) he and an acceptable person each enter into an agreement, in writing, to pay to the Australian Capital Territory the sum of $3,000 if he fails to appear in court in accordance with his undertaking to appear.
(2) Sokkha Hac is an acceptable person for the purposes of condition (b) above.
(3) The address of Mr Dunstan not be published and any publication of
requirement 8 in condition (a) above not refer to the address shown but simply refer to “a nominated address in the ACT”.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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